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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANCE 
1.1.1 Insider trading and internationalization of securities markets 
Every day insider trading takes place legally when corporate insiders buy or sell stock 
in their own companies within the confines of company policy and the regulations 
governing this trading. The type of insider trading discussed here is the illegal kind. It 
is the trading that has been influenced by the privileged possession of corporate 
confidential information about important events. 
The concept of shareholder value emerged as people started to invest their capital in 
risky projects of great magnitude. The main challenge was to gain the confidence of 
investors in order to make their capital available. The central issue was to organize the 
control of potential managers of capital opportunism.  
Initially, the securities market was in essence unregulated. The first appearance of 
regulation for financial markets dates back to the thirteenth century and concerns the 
registration of securities in England. It is only in the Nineteenth Century that the first 
provisions governing the issuance of shares were established. However, modern 
securities regulation only dates back to early twentieth century.  
In North America, the first laws emerged assigning a power to governmental authority 
over the issuance of securities. The 1929 crisis led observers to question the approach 
used in state law to regulate the securities market; they felt it inadequately protected 
investors1. The U.S. Congress then adopted two federal laws: The Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were intended to ensure that 
investors had full and truthful information relevant to their decisions. The United 
States is the first country in the world to have enacted insider trading law. In Europe, 
laws prohibiting insider trading were created massively when the European Union 
required the Member States to implement the European Community Insider Trading 
Directive2. The insider trading prohibition appeared on average3 around 1990.  The 
recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to 
counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex 
operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading 
regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation 
battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities 
markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market 
stability.  
                                                           
1 Anderson, A., 1974. The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 
Hastings Law Journal 25, 311-354. 
2 Council Directive 89/592/EEC (OJ L334/30) of 13.11.1989 
3 Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 75-
108.p.80 : For instance, for the 25 European countries for which the data is available, the year of 
enactment of insider trading law was 1990 on average (Austria 1993, Belgium 1990, Cyprus 1999, 
Czech Republic 1992, Denmark 1991, Estonia 1996, Finland 1989, France 1967, Germany 1994, 
Greece 1988, Hungary 1994, Ireland 1990, Italy 1991, Lithuania 1996, Luxembourg 1991, Malta 1990, 
Netherlands 1989, Poland 1991, Portugal 1986, Romania 1995, Slovakia 1992, Slovenia 1994, Spain 
1994, Sweden 1990, United Kingdom 1981). 
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The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional 
notions of regulation and enforcement4. In order to ensure operational and 
informational efficiency of their market, domestic regulators have to deal with cross 
border cases. This means that they must be capable of assessing the nature of 
activities within markets and legal regimes that differ from their own environments. 
As a direct effect of globalization, financial and technological innovations, cross-
border activities, cross-asset effects and broader financial and economic policy issues 
are changing5. Regulators have to ensure they have sufficient capacity and a relevant 
structure to adapt their measures to a dynamic environment.  
1.1.2 Harmonization of the European Union insider trading regulations 
The harmonization of the European Union securities regulations began in the 1980s 
with a legislative framework for common market exchanges,6 introducing a model of 
mutual recognition and minimum harmonization aimed at consolidating internal 
markets and opening the European markets for investment. Amongst these measures, 
the 1989 Insider Dealing Directive7 was the first to prohibit insider trading at EU 
level. It arose out of the 1957 Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic 
Community, following the objective of creating a single internal European financial 
market. The economic importance of a healthy securities market is stressed in the 
preamble to the directive. It recognizes that, to a large extent, the smooth operation of 
the market depends on the confidence it inspires in investors. Such confidence highly 
depends on ensuring investors that they are placed on an equal footing and that they 
are protected against the improper use of inside information. Every measure should 
                                                           
4 The litterature raised some specific challenges potentially caused by the internationalization of 
securities legal standards. For instance, according to Zhao regulators can be captured or pressured by 
local interest groups in the securities industry. They can also be subject to opportunism whilst trying to 
maximize their personal prestige and act in favor of their carrier through complicated regulations. See 
Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the International Environment(University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow). Moreover, different levels of expertise amongst regulators and courts might be problematic 
regarding interpretation (See Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse 
Law: Revolution or Evolution, The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-
205.p4.). Noia perceives that uncertainty lead many Member States to renounce applying the current 
Market Abuse Directive (See Di Noia, C., 2012. Pending Issues in the Review of the European Market 
Abuse Rules, ECMI Policy Brief 19.p.1). Moreover Siems and Nelemands support that creative judicial 
interpretations can also leave space for errors of interpretation or deliberate evasion of EU norms (See 
Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or Evolution, 
The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-205.p.11. Geiger, U., 1998. 
Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market - A Proposal Fordham Law Review 
66, 1785-1836.) 
5 IOSCO, 1998. Report: Causes, Effects and Regulatory Implications of Financial and Economic 
Turbulence in Emerging Markets (Emerging Markets Committee of The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions). 
6 The Admission Directive, Council Directive 79/279/EEC (OJ 1979 L66/21) of 5.031979 ; the Listing 
Particular Directive, Council Directive 80/390/EEC (OJ 1980 L100/1) of 17.03.1980) ; the Interim 
Reports Directive, Council Directive 82/121/EEC (OJ 1982 L66/21) of 02.1982 ; the Major Share-
holdings Directive, Council Directive 88/627/EEC (OJ 1988 L348) of 12.12.1988 ; consolidated in 
2001 by the Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive, Council Directive 2011/34/EC (OJ 2001 
L184/1) of 28.05.2001 ; The 1985 White Paper, COM(85) 310 of 14.06.1985 ; the Single European Act 
(OJ 1987 L169) of 29.06.1987 ; the Single Market Programme ; the Undertaking for Collective 
Investments in Transferable Securities Directive, Council Directive 85/611/EEC (OJ 1985 L375/3) of 
12.1985 ; the Public Offers Directive, Council Directive 89/298/EEC (OJ 1989 L124) of 17.04.1989 ; 
Investment Service Directive, Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 1993 L141) of 10.04.1993. 
7 Council Directive 89/592/EEC (OJ 1989 L334/30) of 13.11.1989. 
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then be taken to ensure that the market operates smoothly to play its role effectively. 
Consequently, necessary measures should be taken to fight insider dealing because, 
by benefiting certain investors rather than others, it is likely to undermine this 
confidence and thereby prejudice the smooth operation of the market. 
The preamble also stressed that in some Member States there were no rules or 
regulations prohibiting insider dealing, and that the rules or regulations that did exist 
differed considerably from one Member State to another. For this reason, it was 
advisable to adopt coordinated rules at a Community level in this field. This directive 
required its members to adopt insider trading legislation.  
In 1999, the Commission adopted the Financial Action Service Plan (FASP),8 
containing 42 legislative measures, amongst which was the Market Abuse Directive.9 
Some years later, in the continuity of the FSAP, the Lamfalussy process10 gave place 
to the creation of a new general first level legislation framework for European 
financial markets,11 complemented by a series of more detailed second level 
legislative measures,12 providing technical details relative to the Market Abuse 
Directive.13 The European Securities Committee (ESC)14 and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR)15 were created. 
Adopted in early 2003, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC introduced a 
comprehensive framework to tackle insider dealing and market manipulation 
practices. In order to ensure the enforcement of Directive 2003/6/EC, Member States 
were required to implement appropriate administrative measures and sanctions. This 
requirement did not imply any consequences on the criminal dispositions of the 
Member States.  
Nevertheless, according to the Commission, the current system did not achieve the 
desired effective protection of financial markets16. In December 2010, the European 
                                                           
8 Financial services: Implementing the Framework For Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM(99) 232 
of 11.05.1999. 
9 The Market Abuse Directive, Council Directive 2003/6/EC OJ L/096/16 of 28.01.2003. 
10 The Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men On The Regulation of 
European Securities Markets (2001). 
11 First level legislation involve the EU Commission, Council and Parliament. 
12 Second level legislation involve the EU Commission, the European Securities Committee and the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators. 
13 Directive 2003/124/EC implementing The Market Abuser Directive, Council Directive 2003/6/EC 
OJ L/096/16 of 28.01.2003 as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the 
definition of market manipulation; Directive 2003/125/EC implementing The Market Abuser Directive, 
Council Directive 2003/6/EC OJ L/096/16 of 28.01.2003 as regards the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest; Directive 2004/72/EC implementing The 
Market Abuser Directive, Council Directive 2003/6/EC OJ L/096/16 of 28.01.2003 as regards accepted 
market practices; Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2273/2003 on Market Abuse. 
14 Commission Decision establishing the European Securities Committee, COM(2001) 1493 of 
06.06.2001. The ESC is constituted of officials of Member States government and Commission 
officials. 
15 Commission Decision establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, COM (2001) 
1501 of 06.06.2001. The CESR is constituted of representatives of Member States’ national regulators 
and Commission representatives. 
16 Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation 
COM(2011) 654 final. 
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Commission issued a communication on “Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the 
financial services sector”.17 
The European and Securities Market Authority (ESMA)18 replaced the Committee of 
European Securities Regulation on the 1st of January 2011. ESMA’s work on 
securities legislation aims at contributing to the development of a single rulebook for 
Europe by improving coordination and cooperation amongst securities regulators, as 
well as acting as an advisory group to assist the European Union Commission. ESMA 
is in charge of issuing guidance on the common operation of the Market Abuse 
Directive. 
On the 20th of October 2011, the Commission issued two proposals to review the EU 
regime dealing with market abuse. The first aspect of this reform proposition 
consisted of a proposal for a Regulation19. Secondly, on the basis of the article 83(2) 
TFEU, the European Commission’s proposition also entailed a Draft Directive on 
criminal sanctions, applicable to insider trading and market manipulation.20  This 
proposition was motivated by the fact that today the criminal measures used to 
enforce the prohibition of insider trading are very divergent across Member States. 
The Commission argues that this incentivizes persons to commit insider trading 
within Member States that provide weak measures for this offence. 
Indeed, current insider trading legislation and enforcement practices significantly 
diverge from one Member State to another. These different policies do not seem to 
particularly reply to any coherent and consistent logic. They are likely to result from 
cultural and historical differences and various judiciary traditions. To some extent, 
they may even appear to be the consequences of subsequent disconnected arbitrary 
political decisions. 
1.1.3 Financial criminal law 
It can be observed that criminal law falls within the area of public law, the specificity 
of which is to assure the safeguarding of the common interest. Criminal law in a 
business context is presented as a synthesis of laws, gathering together the criminal 
offenses of general application and the crimes specific to business, financial, tax and 
commercial law. It has expanded over time with the inclusion of criminal offenses 
under computer, securities or even labor and consumer law.  
This expansion can partially explain the sentiment, so often expressed in the business 
world, of excessive criminalization of economic activity, presented as limiting 
freedom of contract21. The de-criminalization of business law is a subject that has 
driven extensive debates. The economic analysis of law would thus enable a 
verification of the legal standards established by criminal law in a business context.  
                                                           
17 Communication of the Commission on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services 
sector, COM(2010) 716 final. 
18 http://www.esma.europa.eu/.  
19 Proposal for a Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (COM(2011) 651 final). 
20 COM(2011) 654 final. 
21 See Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière 
de l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris). 
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1.2 METHODOLOGY 
Insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe. The continuous changes of the 
securities market imply a constant evolution of financial instruments and require a 
flexibility of procedures. This dynamic character should encourage competent 
authorities to constantly assess the legal approach to the insider trading problem.  
The regulation of the business world is conducted through various mechanisms, with 
the law in a first rank position. The economic analysis of law has received a varying 
degree of acceptance depending on the legal traditions. In contrast to countries with 
an Anglo-American legal system, which have easily accepted this field, countries with 
systems based on a Romano-Germanic tradition have been reluctant. According to 
Richard Posner22, the difficulty of countries in the Romano-Germanic tradition to 
accept an economic analysis of law can be explained by the inefficiency of their 
systems compared to Common Law systems. This is why it is particularly appropriate 
to conduct a comparative analysis of European systems.  
Many lawyers are opposed to the introduction of economic cost-benefit analysis in the 
law. In fact, Bentham's philosophy of Utilitarianism23 may be perceived as contrasted 
with Kant's notion of Justice24. Numerous questions are thus raised: What is the goal 
of law? Are the effects of a legal rule desirable and beneficial for the society? Do the 
rules respond to the criteria of economic efficiency? 
The interconnection of legal and economic systems exists in criminal law as in any 
other branch of law. Resorting to the tools of economic analysis can enable an 
understanding of the developments in contemporary criminal law and can enrich the 
legal tradition through the provision of more recent and appropriate data in support or 
in opposition to its most ancient certainties. Economics and the law do not fall under 
the same borders nor even under the same time cycle. The economic analysis of 
criminal law therefore constitutes a relevant tool that allows the integration of 
economic and financial considerations in criminal policy. The areas of law that impact 
business life have indirectly erected economic notions into legal concepts. This is why 
economic analysis turns out to be a relevant tool for analyzing criminal law in a 
business context.  
It is particularly interesting as an economist to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
standards governing the business world. It is pertinent as a lawyer to verify the 
appropriateness of criminal sanctions in business law through the tools made available 
by economics. In the current context, it is more necessary than ever to ensure the 
proper foundations and effectiveness of the rules acting as a framework for economic 
and financial activities.  
Given these various elements, law and economics is capable of offering a fertile and 
innovative perspective in order to explain the practices, affirm them, or weigh against 
them when they have no rational basis. The analysis of all the questions relating to 
norms, to contraventions and their sanctions, and to institutions and procedures of 
                                                           
22 Posner, R. A., 1977. Economic Analysis of Law, 2d edition.(Little Brown, Boston). 
23 Bentham, J., 1789. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation(reproduction in "The 
Utilitarians", Rept. Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1973, Paris). 
24 Kant, I., 2010. The Philosophy of Law(The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.; Reprint edition). Originally 
published : Edinburgh : T.&T. Clark in 1797.  
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securities markets regulation, can be tackled in a single and simultaneous overall 
analysis. Insider trading is by essence difficult to identify, to quantify and to localize.  
Difficult choices have to be made in the formulation of the laws and their 
enforcement.  
1.3 GOAL OF THE STUDY  
Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study 
discusses how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, this study follows 
two goals: identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively 
induce insider trading deterrence and encouraging the construction of a consistent and 
responsive apparatus of public enforcement of insider trading laws, thanks to the 
theory and the comparison and analysis of various existing regimes in Europe. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION  
This study research questions are:  
First, is under all circumstances criminal law necessary to enforce insider trading 
laws? Second, even if criminal law is prescribed in certain circumstances, should it be 
introduced at EU level?  
 
The answer to these research questions implies addressing distinct sub-questions. 
First, what is the optimal type, nature and form of sanctions that create an efficient 
insider trading law enforcement policy according to the deterrence theory? 
Next, are the current European public law enforcement strategies regarding insider 
trading prohibition coherent with the theoretical law and economics 
recommendations?  
And finally, should insider trading criminalization be centralized at EU level 
according to the economics of federalism? 
 
The interest of this research consists in providing evidence of law and economics 
theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public 
enforcement of the insider trading prohibition. It also aims to reveal the economic 
rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of 
insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative 
analysis of the current legislations of a few selected countries and critically analyzing 
the European Union’s intervention.  
 
The general purpose is to analyze whether or not the actual European public 
enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical 
law and economics recommendations, and how the enforcement practices could be 
improved. 
1.5 SCOPE   
First of all, the scope of this research focuses on the issue of public enforcement 
process of insider trading laws, with a particular emphasis on sanctions. Public law 
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enforcement is considered to be either administrative or criminal and dealt with by 
governmental agents, agencies and criminal courts25.  
 
This research comprises two main parts.  
 
The first part of this research presents and comments different relevant legal and 
economic theoretical perspectives concerning the insider trading regulation (Chapter 
2), the basis of public and private enforcement literature applied to insider trading 
(Chapter 3) and questions the optimal form (monetary/non-monetary), nature 
(administrative/criminal) and type of sanctions (Chapter 4). The starting point of this 
first part is the deterrence theory26. The law and economics methodology is used to 
elaborate theoretical recommendations of public enforcement according to the 
criterion of efficiency. It is a normative approach. The most efficient choice is 
considered as being the one that lowers social losses at the lowest cost. 
 
The second part of this research investigates the practices of sanctions and public 
enforcement of insider trading laws in a selected number of Member States, in the 
light of the law and economics literature discussed in the previous chapters. The 
recent evolution of the European Union law in criminal insider trading matters is 
critically analyzed. This part has as objective to verify if the normative criteria are 
respected in the positive law and to determine which recommendations can be 
formulated in order to enforce insider trading law following the theoretical 
recommendations.  
 
The methodological approach of the first aspect of this second part is a comparative 
overview of the current approaches to administrative and criminal insider trading 
sanctioning and enforcement regimes in a restricted number of eight selected 
European Member States under the form of an index (Chapter 5). The main sources 
used to collect the data are the domestic codes, the enforcement reports and the 
statistics of the national and European authorities and jurisdictions.  
 
The second aspect of this part is a critical analysis of the recent European Union 
regulation evolution (Chapter 6). In that respect, the economic theory of federalism is 
used to analyze the division of labor between the Member States and EU level. This 
chapter also questions the consistency of the proposal for a Directive with the 
principles governing the introduction of substantive criminal rules at EU level. The 
underlying question is whether criminalization should be implemented at EU level. 
An alternative would obviously be to respect the subsidiarity principle and allow 
Member States to decide on the necessity of criminalization in certain given 
circumstances. 
1.6 STRUCTURE 
The outline of the thesis is as follows:  
 
                                                           
25 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2007. Handbook of Law and Economics, 1st edition.(Elsevier, 
Boston). Polinsly and Shavell define the public enforcement of law as the use of governmental agents 
to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. 
26 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. 
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Chapter 2 begins by briefly considering the underlying legal and economic theoretical 
debate and arguments surrounding insider trading regulation. The Justice theory, 
Equal access theory, the Equality theory, the Financial Public Order, the Agency 
Theory, the Market Theory and the Property Rights Theory all provide relevant 
arguments lending support to the insider trading regulatory intervention and offer 
multiple perspectives on how it may result in better outcomes for the market.   
 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine two aspects concerning the same question about how the 
insider trading prohibition should be enforced according to the deterrence theory 
approach. The main goal of these two chapters is to apply the insights from the Law 
and Economics literature on optimal public law enforcement to the area of insider 
trading regulation. These chapters are therefore grouped under the Title 1 “A 
theoretical approach to public enforcement of insider trading laws”. This title explores 
the deterrence-based enforcement approach, which seeks to ensure regulatory 
compliance and deterrence pursuing social objectives. The law and economics’ basic 
concept of rationality, deterrence theory, internalization of externalities regarding law 
enforcement and the main characteristics of the potential insider trading harm, gain as 
well as the probability of the sanction are developed to introduce Title 1. 
 
More precisely, Chapter 3 develops the rationale for public enforcement of insider 
trading law, that is, questions why society cannot rely exclusively on private 
enforcement of law to control undesirable insider behavior. It explores the economic 
criteria under which the use of public law enforcement should be preferred over 
private enforcement. 
 
In Chapter 4, the deterrence approach provides an economic analytical framework for 
the analysis of law enforcement: the goal of law and its enforcement is deterrence and 
should be achieved through the setting of optimal expected sanctions. Based on this 
theoretical framework, the regulator’s numerous options to elaborate optimal policies 
addressing insider trading are described. The central concern of this chapter is the 
sanction, and more precisely its type, nature and form. Therefore, the trade-offs 
between magnitude and probability of sanction, monetary and non-monetary 
sanctions, and criminal and administrative nature sanctions, are addressed and 
discussed according to law and economics theory objectives.  
 
Title 2 relates to EU legislation and domestic practices of insider trading sanctions 
and enforcement.  The goal of this title is to explore the practices of sanctions and 
public enforcement of insider trading laws in the light of the law and economics 
literature discussed in the previous chapters. After presenting the specificities attached 
to the practices of sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in eight 
selected Member States27 under the form of an index, the recent evolution of 
European Union law in criminal insider trading matters will be critically analyzed.  
 
Chapter 5 reviews the regimes of sanctioning and public insider trading law 
enforcement across eight Member States. In the first part of this chapter, an index will 
provide an overview of the current approaches to administrative and criminal 
sanctions and law enforcement concerning insider trading offences in eight selected 
European Member States. The objective is to carry out case studies in a finite number 
                                                           
27 Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (DE), Luxembourg (LU), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), and 
United Kingdom (UK). 
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of jurisdictions in order to accurately explore the following key characteristics of the 
different regimes of policy and practices under the Market Abuse Directive (MAD): 
Whether insider trading can give rise to criminal sanctions for natural and legal 
persons; the minimum and maximum amounts of a sanction for market abuse; the 
different categories of sanctions; the key factors that must be considered when 
determining sanctions according to law and whether sanction decisions must be 
published; whether the same set of facts can give rise both to administrative sanction 
proceedings and to a referral to the judicial authority within the framework of 
criminal proceeding; the purpose, type and formalization of the cooperation between 
competent authorities and judicial or other prosecuting authorities; the intensity of 
public enforcement of securities regulation (measured through the resources of staff 
and budget). Finally, the chapter describes the actual sanctions imposed during the 
period 2008, 2009 and 2010 in the selected countries.  
This examination aims to describe how the MAD is implemented and applied in 
practice by different Member States. This section will pinpoint the differences in 
interest and challenges faced by the selected countries but will not assess the 
regulatory regimes. The second part of this chapter identifies and formulates the 
implications for an effective enforcement policy. 
 
Chapter 6 is a critical analysis of the recent evolution of European Union law in 
criminal and insider trading matters, and more particularly of the proposal for a 
Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse. Economics of harmonization 
provide a relevant framework for analyzing whether harmonization is desirable, 
depending on the characteristics of a certain domain. This assessment is made on the 
basis of four criteria: inter-jurisdictional externalities, jurisdictional competition, 
transaction costs and preferences for differentiation. This chapter also questions the 
consistency of the proposal for a Directive with the principles governing the 
introduction of substantive criminal rules at EU level: the principle of a legitimate 
purpose, the ultima ratio principle, the principle of guilt, the principle of legality, the 
principle of subsidiarity, and the principle of coherence. The desirability of 
harmonization of enforcement methods (criminalization) at EU level is questioned.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the major findings, observations and conclusions of this study.  
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CHAPTER 2. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 
REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading is currently prohibited all over Europe. This chapter presents and 
clarifies the legal and economics theoretical foundations underlying the prohibition of 
insider trading. Clarifying this issue is directly enlightening the law and economics 
debate about the insider trading concept and indirectly providing elements that have 
an impact on the choice of optimal enforcement of insider trading laws strategies. 
Indeed, the different scholars’ positions reflect the lack of consensus concerning the 
appropriate remedy to insider trading.  
The prohibition of insider trading is considered here over two grounds: legal theory 
and economic efficiency. 
2.1 LEGAL THEORY: EQUAL TREATMENT OF INVESTORS AND PUBLIC 
ORDER 
This work starts with a legal analysis of insider trading regulation. Before addressing 
the efficiency objectives of insider trading regulation, it is necessary to clarify its non-
economic goals that are based on the justice theory and the financial public order. 
2.1.1 Justice, equity and insider trading 
2.1.1.1 About the distributional justice  
From a legal point of view, the very first goal of regulation may be defined as the 
“fair” or the “just” allocation of resources28. The concepts of justice and fairness 
cover many different notions rooted in the period of enlightenment in Europe and 
particularly in the approaches of Hobbes29, Hume30 or Kant31. The legal literature 
counts three major justice theories. The distributive justice theory aims at determining 
whether a specific action is proper. The retributive justice theory is concerned with 
determining whether penalties imposed on wrongdoers are actually fair. The 
compensatory theory is interested in assessing the relevance of the compensation of 
the victims. 
For the concern of this first chapter, the distributive justice model is the only one that 
is addressed as it is particularly relevant for questioning insider trading matters. 
 
The first question to address is whether, from a distributional justice point of view, 
insider trading can be considered as “wrong”. The distributive justice model contains 
a variety of schools of thought, including the egalitarianism, capitalism, socialism and 
libertarianism approaches. 
                                                           
28 Ogus, A., 1994. Regulation: Legal Forms and Economic Theory(Clarendon Press, Oxford).p.46 : 
“Regulation may be inspired by a desire, which is quite distinct from efficiency aims, to achieve ‘fair’ 
or ‘just’ distribution of resources”.  
29 Hobbes, T., 1998. Leviathan(Mayfield Publishing Co., US).pp.69-79 (originally published in 1651)  
30 Hume, D., 1777. Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge edition.(Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
31 Kant, I., 2010. The Philosophy of Law(The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.; Reprint edition). 
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From an egalitarianism perspective, what is equal is considered being just32 and what 
is unequal, wrong. Each person should receive equal benefits33 and systems of tax or 
welfare programs correct all kinds of unequal benefits. Economic equality may be 
perceived in many ways as an equality of opportunities, or resources, or income, or 
welfare34, etc. In this respect, from an egalitarian perspective insider trading is 
considered wrong because it results in the promotion of an unequal distribution of 
benefits. 
On the contrary, the distributive justice model of capitalism encourages the 
distribution of benefits according to an individual’s contribution to society.35It thus 
has greater concern for a merited outcome than for an egalitarian one. In insider 
trading matters, it could seem wrong to consider the individual possessing inside 
information as the one having contributed the most to society and therefore deserving 
greater benefits. Indeed inside information is often leaked and is likely to result from 
one’s position rather than from one’s performance36 (as it will be further discussed). 
In this respect, receiving benefits from insider trading is also wrong according to the 
capitalist approach.  
The distributive justice of socialism assumes that privileges should be abolished37 and 
society’s benefits should preferably be distributed according to the people’s needs. 
The regulator is in charge of redistributing the outcomes fairly. Considering that the 
benefits of an insider trading act are distributed to the individual who possessed the 
information, without any correlation with their particular needs, insider trading is 
certainly not consistent with the socialist idea of distributive justice. 
There is however one distributive model that could be consistent with considering the 
reception of benefits from insider trading as fair or just. Indeed, the distributive justice 
of libertarianism38 considers that all actions are permissible as long as none of the 
parties coerces the other39. Therefore, as long as a transfer of resource is based on 
agreed transaction and acquisition, it is right for an insider to enjoy benefits from 
insider trading.  
 
To conclude, all in all, our modern societies seem more likely to be influenced and 
driven by the capitalist, socialist and, marginally, by the egalitarian approaches of the 
distributional justice theory. A strict libertarian model may seem inconsistent with the 
                                                           
32 Aristotle, 1976. Ethics(Penguin Classics, London). “What is unjust is unequal, what is just is equal ; 
as is universally accepted even without the support of argument”. 
33 See Velasquez, M. G., 2002. Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases(Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey). 
34 Bojer, H., 2003. Distributional Justice: Theory and Measurement(Routledge, London).p.12. 
35 See Velasquez, M. G., 2002. Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases(Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey). 
36 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286. 
37 Ogus, A., 1994. Regulation: Legal Forms and Economic Theory(Clarendon Press, Oxford).p.47: 
“Pursuit of equality is a common theme, if by this is meant the abolition of advantages conferred by 
power, privilege, and wealth and the entitlement of individuals to resources such as will enable them to 
participate equally and fully in the community”. 
38 Hayek, F., 1976. The Mirage of Social Justice (Law, Legislation and Liberty)(Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London), Nozick, R., 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia(Basil Blackwell, Oxford). Libertarianism 
is a theory of procedural justice. The acquisition is just if it results from a just procedure. 
39 Kolb, R. W., 2010. Risk Management and Risk Transfer: Distributive Justice in Finance, The 
Journal of Alternative Investments 13, 90-98.p.90: Libertarianism deals with the “right to act in 
accordance with the right to accumulate wealth or garner other goods; whatever distribution of wealth 
results from those rightful actions is just”. 
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conception of civil societies, as we know them. From a legal theory perpective, 
insider trading should be regulated because it harms the value of distributional justice. 
 
After having apprehended the different schools of thought dealing with the 
distributional justice theory, the way this notion influences insider trading regulatory 
policies is suggested. The distributional theories consider that a policy should opt for 
measures that lead to a distribution of outcomes consistent with their precepts40. In 
that respect, one can observe that financial markets41 regulation in general and the 
insider trading law in particular are indirectly inspired by some distributional justice’s 
precepts. The coming section appreciates the influence of the distributional justice 
theory in the insider trading laws. Both the US and the EU approaches are analyzed. 
The US insider trading regulation is an example for the rest of the world, including 
Europe, and is characterized by a specific legal approach based on the equal access 
principle. There is not just one European legal approach to insider trading regulation 
but a multitude. Nevertheless, the equality theory is specific to the European 
approach. 
2.1.1.2 Equal treatment of investors, heritage of the distributional justice theory  
Most arguments in favor of prohibiting insider trading begin with a condemnation of 
the practice as immoral42 and unfair. The moral theory literature considers insider 
trading to be a “fraud-on-the-investor”, and defines it as a pendant of the respect for 
autonomy and fairness in securities regulation43. Hence, ethical moral theory 
considers that insider trading interferes with a person’s autonomous decision-making 
by violating a moral and legal duty to disclose material non-public information before 
trading on such information in securities markets. According to the equitable 
disclosure rationale, someone using material non-public information places other 
market players at a disadvantage in making a trade. Therefore the failure to disclose 
the information renders the trade fraudulent. The connection established between the 
investor’s confidence and the proper functioning of capital markets should not be 
underestimated. The informational advantage of insiders can alter investor confidence 
and have a negative impact on the market. If investors feel they are being treated 
unfairly they may lose confidence in the integrity of the securities market, withdraw 
from the market and invest in other opportunities44. Insider trading prohibition is 
                                                           
40 Stiglitz, J. E., 1989. The Economic Role of the State.p.28, Ogus, A., 1994. Regulation: Legal Forms 
and Economic Theory(Clarendon Press, Oxford).p.48. 
41 Kolb, R. W., 2010. Risk Management and Risk Transfer: Distributive Justice in Finance, The 
Journal of Alternative Investments 13, 90-98.p.90: According to Kolt, distributive justice is “the moral 
justification of how the goods and ills, or costs and benefits, of a society are distributed across its 
members”. 
42 Donagan, A., 1977. The Theory of Morality(University of Chicago Press, Chicago). Donagan holds 
that the theory of morality establishes that the morality of an act should be evaluated by considering 
whether it affects the autonomy, rights and dignity of someone else.   
43 Strudler, A., Orts, E., 1999. Moral Principles in the Law of Insider Trading, Texas Law Review 78, 
375-438.p.381: “We rely on the standard deontological view that what makes an act morally justifiable 
is the respect it expresses for the autonomy, rights, and dignity of those persons affected by it, and not 
merely the social welfare or the utility that act produces. We argue in particular that insider trading law 
protects the autonomy of public securities traders from unfair and wrongful deception. We maintain 
that deontological theory of insider trading specifies a relevant set of circumstances when such unfair 
and wrongful deception occurs”. 
44  Cox, C., Fogarty, K., 1988. Bases for Insider Trading Law, Ohio State Law Journal 49, 353-354. 
"Members of the financial community, regulators, lawyers, and judges seem to be based on the idea 
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based on the notion of equal treatment of investors with respect to information45. It 
aims at rectifying a breach in equal access to information between market 
participants, affecting the moral principles of fairness and equity46. Insider trading 
regulation would then maintain the confidence of investors.  
A clarification is however necessary: Informational disadvantages are not illegal per 
se. The problem with insider trading relates to the access to material non-public 
information. This inequality is considered unfair because an outside investor cannot 
acquire the same information than the insider can. Thus, insiders are considered to 
have an unfair advantage over outsiders in accessing non-public information47. These 
notions find an echo in the legal doctrine.  
 
Thus, the major legal principles on which insider trading regulation is based are the 
equal access theory in the US and the equality theory in Europe which both may be 
read as having an indirect influence emanating from the distributional justice theory’s 
precepts. 
 
The US equal access theory approach 
 
From a general point of view, the Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (and the Rule 10b-5 promulgated there under) established the equal access 
theory as a basis. The fiduciary duty theory, the misappropriation theory, and the 
fraud-on-the market theory48 are the major doctrines derived from the equal access 
principle according to which insider trading is illegal under USA federal laws. 
 
US statutory insider trading law is mainly based on common law prohibitions against 
fraud: Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the fraud in the sale of 
securities; section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the use of 
manipulative and deceptive devices, section 14(e) relates to proxies, section 16(b) 
prohibits short swing profits made by corporate directors, officers, and principal 
stockholders, section 20(a) relates to the liability of contemporaneous traders for 
insider trading, section 21(a) to civil penalties for insider trading, section 21(f) to 
securities whistleblower incentives and protection, and section 32 to penalties.  
 
To implement these sections, the SEC adopted different federal general rules and 
regulations (rule 10(b-5) on employment and deceptive devices, rule 10(b-5-1) on 
trading on the basis of material non-public information in insider trading cases, rule 
10(b-5-2) on duties of trust or confidence in misappropriation insider trading cases, 
rule 14(e-3) on transactions in securities on the basis of material non-public 
information in the context of tender offers, and regulation fair disclosure “FD”49 
(selective disclosure and insider trading): rule 100 on general rule regarding selective 
                                                                                                                                                                         
that such trading, by giving insiders an unfair advantage, will discourage ordinary investors", Manovre, 
M., 1989. The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
104, 823-845. 
45 Deffains, B., Stasiak, F., 2002. Les Préjudices Résultants des Infractions Boursières: Approche 
Juridique et Economique(Sorbonne, Paris). Pietrancosta, A., 1999. Le Droit des Sociétés Sous l'Effet 
des Impératifs Financiers et Boursiers(Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris). 
46 Brudney, V., 1979. Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities 
Law, Harvard Law Review 93, 355-356. 
47 Ibid. 
48  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
49 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm. 
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disclosure, rule 101 on definitions, rule 102 on no effect on antifraud liability, rule 
103 on no effect on exchange act reporting status, and rule 21(f-17) relating to 
whistle-blowing). 
From this broad corpus, the US courts have exercized their authority of interpretation 
leading to developments in insider trading law and to the consecration of the major 
theories on which it is based.  
 
The US equal access theory requires parity of access to information. According to the 
equal access theory, all traders owe a duty to the market either to disclose or to 
abstain from trading on material non-public information. This duty is imposed on the 
theory that it is unfair to exploit such information from which other market players 
are excluded. The American scholar Brudney directly refers to the notion of 
inequality between insiders and outsiders in accessing to material non-public 
information50 when justifying the insider trading ban.  
 
In 1961, in the case Cady, Roberts and Co.51 the court relied on two key elements: the 
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to serve corporate purpose rather than personal benefit, and the inherent 
unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information in the 
knowledge that is unavailable to those with whom that party is dealing. The ruling 
was read as promoting equal access theory of insider trading. 
 
In 1969, in the case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.52, the US Court of Appeals for the 
2nd Circuit stated that anyone in possession of inside information is required either to 
disclose the information publicly or refrain from trading because trading with the 
benefit of inside information operates as a fraud at the detriment of all other buyers 
and sellers in the market53. 
 
In 1980, the fiduciary theory raised with the emblematic case Chiarella v. United 
States54, a petitioner working for a financial printing company realized a trade based 
on information (regarding tender offers and a merger) he obtained from documents he 
was hired to print. He purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares 
immediately after the takeover attempts were announced to the public. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected the equal access theory and reversed the criminal 
conviction: the fraud on the shareholders can only be established where there is a duty 
to disclose or abstain arising from “a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence”. The intent was certainly to restrict the field of application of Rule 10b-5.  
On the following, in the 1982 case Dirks v. SEC55,the U.S. court of appeal ruled that a 
tippee is liable if he realizes a personal benefit from a confidential information 
received from an insider, while he knows the tipper breached his fiduciary duty by 
disclosing the information. This case also defines the concept of “constructive 
insiders” who receive inside information while providing services to the corporation 
and acquire the fiduciary duties of the true insider56.  
                                                           
50 See Brudney, V., 1979. Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal 
Securities Law, Harvard Law Review 93, 355-356. 
51 Cady, Roberts and Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
52 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
53 See http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm. 
54 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
55 Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
56 See http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm. 
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In 1986, in the case United States v. Carpenter57, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed 
the misappropriation theory. The U.S. Supreme Court reminded that a person who 
acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge or information for his 
own personal benefit but must account to his principal for any profits derived 
therefrom58. The Court wired fraud convictions for a defendant who had received his 
information from a journalist rather than from the company itself. The journalist was 
also convicted, on the grounds that he had misappropriated information belonging to 
his employer. The misappropriation theory seems to consecrate informational 
property rights59.  
 
In 1991, in the case United States v. Chestman60 the U.S. court of appeals for the 2nd 
circuit showed the complementarity of the misappropriation theory and the fiduciary 
duty. The misappropriation does not require the establishment of a fraud by the trader 
through the breach of a fiduciary duty to the company whose shares are being traded 
or to its stockholders61, but the establishment of a fraud by the trader on the source of 
the non-public information. Therefore, the misappropriation theory allows to extend 
liability under Rule 10b-5 in situations where the fiduciary duty does not apply. 
 
In 1988, in the case Basic Inc. v. Levinson62, the US Supreme Court adopted a 
presumption of reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market theory. According to the 
fraud-on-the-market theory, in open and developed securities markets the stock prices 
depend on all material information about the company available to investors. 
Consequently, investors rely on market prices that are supposed to reflect all material 
information into the share price. In turn, a causal link can be established between any 
misstatement and any stock purchaser. The underlying idea is that the misstatements 
defraud the entire market and thus affect the price of the stock. Therefore, a material 
misstatement's effect on an individual purchaser is no less significant than the effect 
on the entire market. In the case Basic Inc. v. Levinston, the question was whether this 
entitles an individual stock purchaser who did not directly rely on the misstatements 
to a presumption of reliance. 
 
The European equality theory approach 
 
The equality theory corresponds to an egalitarian ideal and is based on the fact that 
the law is capable of correcting wrongs resulting from insider trading by ensuring 
equal distribution of information and enforcing an opportunity to exploit information 
among investors63. Promoting equality of opportunity among investors is a 
                                                           
57 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
58 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E. 2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969). 
59 Kraakman, R., 1991. The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States.p.44-46. 
60 U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). 
61 U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991): “The predicated act of fraud is perpetrated on 
the source of the non-public information, even though the source may be unaffiliated with the buyer or 
seller of securities”. 
62 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
63 Umhoefer, C., Piétrancosta, A., 1992. Le Délit d'Initié: Insider Trading Law in France, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 30, 89-144.pp.135-139. 
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“normative approach to market regulation that ensures fair distribution of risk among 
market players”64 and therefore preserves confidence. 
The equality theory prohibits all insider transactions that infringe upon either market 
integrity or ideal equality of investors65. It seems to have a broader application than 
the equal access theory in the United States. This difference in fundaments seems to 
arise from historical, cultural and legal tradition specificities. However, it is clear that 
both the US and the EU approaches of insider trading regulations are influenced by 
the precepts of the distributional justice theory. 
2.1.2 The financial public order and the market interest   
Public order and public interests are very important notions in the context of the 
European insider trading laws’ analysis. They recently gave place to the new concepts 
of economic public order and market interest. These concepts play an influential role 
in the choice of rules and are the very foundations of the modern economic public 
enforcement of the prohibition of insider trading. 
 
The multi-faceted concepts “ordre public” or “public order” or “public policy” refers 
to normal and peaceful situations in the public sphere, but also covers in substance all 
mandatory rules created to protect the fundamental values of a society, of a 
community, or more generally, of an organized entity, which parties have no freedom 
to derogate from66. These mandatory rules can be created at a regional, national, or 
international level and can be unilateral or multilateral.  
 
Initially, the concept of “ordre public” comes from the French term for public policy. 
In France, the term would appear to refer to “the basic structure of a state governed by 
the rule of law, or in other words, a proper democratic republic”67. It is a small cluster 
of basic frameworks of rules of public policy and generally accepted moral standards 
on which the basis of society is built68 and from which private agreements may not 
derogate69. However, the notion has had a wide success and European legal scholars 
refer to “ordre public” as the notion of maintenance of the values and interests that are 
considered essential in a specific society or legal system70 or as the principles of a 
positive law system, which have to be considered of “special value”71 in the context 
of that system. However, the English term “public policy” is more amorphous and 
would not include the basic structure of the state, nor necessarily the fundamental 
rights of citizens. The European Court of Justice uses the term “public policy” to 
translate the concept of “ordre public”. In European law the concept of “ordre 
                                                           
64 Ibid.p.134. 
65 Ibid.pp.134-139. 
66 See Carbonnier, J., 2000. Droit Civil, les Obligations, 22 edition.(PUF, Paris), Kessedjian, C., 2007. 
Public Order in European Law, Erasmus law review 1, 25-37. Ghestin, J., 1993. Traité de Droit Civil, 
la Formation du Contrat, 3 edition.(LGDJ, Paris). Plagniol, M., 1956. Traité de Droit Civil, La 
Formation du Contrat, 2 edition.(LGDJ, Paris).  
67 Kessedjian, C., 2007. Public Order in European Law, Erasmus law review 1, 25-37.p.26. 
68 Malaurie, P., 1951. Les Contrats Contraires à l'Ordre Public(Université de Droit, Reims). 
69 Article 6 of the French Civil Code provides “ordre public” with its essence and its mandatory legal 
force. It states that “On ne peut déroger, par des conventions particulières, aux lois qui intéressent 
l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs”. 
70 De Jong, R., 2000. Orde in Beweging: Openbare-Ordehandhaving en de Persoonlijke 
Vrijheid(Tjeenk Willink, Deventer: W.E.J.). 
71 Schokkenbroek, J. G. C., 1986. Public Order as a Ground for Limiting the Freedom of Expression, 
NJCM - Bulletin 3. 
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public”, is sometimes used to denote the status of certain fundamental provisions in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This usage has to be 
distinguished from the concept of “public order” in the sense of public security, 
synonymous with the notion of a normal and undisturbed life in the public sphere72.  
 
The public order is a component of the public interest73. The legal scholarly literature 
states that a provision is of public order whenever it is inspired by considerations of 
general and public interest that would be compromised if individuals were free to 
prevent the application of the law74. The public interest can be defined as what tends 
to the satisfaction of the majority75. In 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau defined the 
public interest in Le Contract Social as the “cement” of the social order. He argues 
that humans are not naturally inclined to find an agreement and that the conditions of 
their union needs to be built in order to respect a new social order where justice 
supports utility. This social order produces legal standards that all together constitute 
public order. Finally, in the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 
1789, the French Conseil d’Etat held that the social order represents the will of the 
majority. In consequence, what is required by law and public action should always be 
in the general interest.  
 
Moreover, different institutions and organizations aiming at regulating finance pursue 
the public interest. Indeed, it is explicitly mentioned in the International Financial 
Reporting Standards76 foundation’s objectives that one of its major goal is to develop, 
in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, enforceable and 
globally accepted financial reporting standards based upon clearly articulated 
principles.77 For instance, the legal status of the recently created European Securities 
and Market Authority specifies: “The objective of the Authority shall be to protect the 
public interest by contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and 
effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and 
businesses”78. Hence, the last century gave place to the great emergence of capital 
markets and led to the creation of a related new body of laws, concepts, regulations, 
organizations and institutions. This is how the traditional concepts of public order and 
general interest evolved toward the notions of “economic public order” and “market 
interest”79 in the literature. Through the law, authorities aim to uphold the interest of 
the market, or in other words, make sure that it operates fairly. Hence, the market 
interest is defined as "a superior collective interest, a sort of general interest, which is 
intended to subordinate the individual interests of the stakeholders"80. Established 
legal scholars consider that a behavior contrary to the market interest is a behavior 
that "distorts the functioning of the market, provides an unfair advantage to some 
                                                           
72 See De Lange, R., 2007. The European Public Order, Constitutional Principles and Fundamental 
Rights, Erasmus law review 1, 3-25.p.8. 
73 Vincent-Legoux, M.-C., 2001. L' Ordre Public, Etude de Droit Comparé Interne(PUF, Paris). 
74 Plagniol, M., 1956. Traité de Droit Civil, La Formation du Contrat, 2 edition.(LGDJ, Paris). 
75 Malaurie, P., 1951. Les Contrats Contraires à l'Ordre Public(Université de Droit, Reims). 
76 IFRS Foundation is an independent, not-for-profit private sector organization. 
77 http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-the-IASB.aspx. 
78 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24.10.2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(ESMA), Article 1, paragraph 5. 
79 Fatih, A., 2010. Ekonomik Kamu Düzeni ve Ekonomik Kolluk Faaliyeti, Official Journal of the 
Ankara Bar Association 67, 75-84. 
80 Muller, A.-C., 2007. Droit des Marchés Financiers et Droit des Contrats(Economica, Paris). 
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people that (they) would not have obtained under normal market conditions, affects 
equality of information and treatment of investors"81.  
 
The economic public order refers to all of the requirements of the legal principles for 
financial markets pursuant to which the legislator, the market authorities and the 
courts justify the mandatory sanctions they decree in order to guarantee market 
interests82. The pursuit of market interest is therefore the purpose of the law of 
financial markets through regulation, through the organization of the competition in 
the financial market83 and through the supervision of the freedom of market 
participants in order to guarantee fair transactions84. Going further, the scholarly 
literature qualifies the market regulation, said of financial public order, as intending 
to ensure the proper functioning of markets and the protection of public saving by 
organizing market transparency and ensuring equality of investors85. 
 
Distributional justice, fairness, equity, and economic public order constitute the legal 
foundations for prohibiting insider trading in many legal systems. 
2.2 EFFICIENCY CRITERIA 
From an economic point of view, financial markets regulation is based on the notion 
that markets can be made more efficient86. Insider trading regulation finds 
foundations in different economic theoretical approaches. For instance, this second 
section mentions major economic arguments that make insider trading problematic for 
market efficiency from the Agency theory, the Market theory and the Property rights 
theory perspective. These three theories offer a comprehensive framework of how the 
financial market operates and what insider trading regulation may accomplish.  
2.2.1 Agency theory: The firm level effect of the insider trading 
Jensen and Meckling define agency costs as the sum of the shareholders’ monitoring 
costs, the managers’ bonding costs, if any, and the residual loss, which is the decrease 
in shareholders’ welfare caused by the divergence between the managers’ decisions 
and the decisions that would maximize the shareholders’ wealth87. Judge Easterbrook 
                                                           
81 Viandier, A., 1989. Sécurité et transparence du marché financier, JCP. 
82 Méadel, J., 2007. Les Marchés Financiers et l'Ordre Public(LGDJ, Bibliothèque de Droit Privé, 
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the community, the financial public order covers the financial market functioning and the interest of the 
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83 Malaurie, P., 1951. Les Contrats Contraires à l'Ordre Public(Université de Droit, Reims). 
84 Martres, J.-L., 1964. Les Caractères Généraux de la Police Economique(Bordeaux). Martres holds 
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85 Marini, P., 2000. Arbitrage, Médiation et Marchés Financiers, Revue Juridique de commerce 162, 
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anyone better off without making others worse off. However, the less restrictive Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency which only requires a net social benefit is often preferred by legal scholars because it leaves 
room for the notion of relative efficiency. 
87 Jensen, M. C., Mackling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
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was one of the first scholars to explore the agency dimensions of insider trading88. 
The issue covered in this section is the study of the existence of agency costs arising 
from insider trading. Insider trading is perceived as being an efficient compensation 
scheme by some scholars, whereas others, to the contrary, associate it with agency 
costs that must be controlled through regulation. 
2.2.1.1 Insider trading as an efficient compensation scheme 
Insider trading: incitation to entrepreneurial innovation 
 
Henry Manne claims that insider trading is a desirable function that motivates 
entrepreneurial innovation by giving a compensation related to the value of the 
entrepreneur’s contribution89. Entrepreneurial innovation creates valuable new 
information. The first person who knows about the valuable information created by 
the entrepreneurial innovation is the entrepreneur himself. According to Manne, 
allowing insiders to profit by buying the company’s shares before the public learns of 
the innovation and before their value rises to reflect the positive news is the best way 
to compensate their performances and to provide them with incentives to innovate90.  
 
A classic contracting process cannot ensure such encouragement: entrepreneurs 
cannot be identified in advance, nor can the value of their innovation 
 
Manne argues that salary and bonuses provide inadequate incentives for 
entrepreneurial inventiveness because they fail to accurately measure and take into 
consideration the value that innovations bring to the firm91. Thus, innovative 
entrepreneurs are difficult to identify in advance, because any employee may generate 
profitable innovations. Additionally, in any case, it is difficult to set entrepreneurs’ 
pay in advance because the value of entrepreneurial activity is complicated to 
measure in advance. Therefore insider trading might be an efficient mean to 
compensate entrepreneurs in direct proportion to and contemporaneously with their 
innovations. Even if the entrepreneur is wealth-constrained and hence cannot buy an 
unlimited quantity of shares, he can always “sell” the information to others. In this 
manner, insider trading “readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their 
innovations”92.  
 
Insider trading allows the agent to self-tailor his compensation to account for the 
information he produces without renegotiation ex-post of his contract 
 
Another argument in favor of insider trading as an efficient compensation is that ex-
ante compensation contracts require costly renegotiation and might be subject to 
strategic behavior 93. On the contrary, insider trading might allow an agent to revise 
                                                           
88 Easterbrook, F. H., 1985. Insider Trading as an Agency Problem(Harvard Business Press, Boston). 
89 See Dye, R. A., 1984. Insider Trading and Incentives, Journal of Business 57, 295-313. Manne, H. 
G., 1966. Insider Trading and the Stock Market(The Free Press, New York).  
90 Manne, H. G., 1966. Insider Trading and the Stock Market(The Free Press, New York). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Fama, E., 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88, 
288-307. Fama holds that contracts providing for periodic renegotiations ex-post based on imperfectly 
observed effort and output are alternatives  to  contracts that ex ante tie compensation to output. 
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its compensation package without renegotiating his contract. By trading on new 
information, the agent self-tailors his compensation to account for the information he 
produces.94  
 
Insider trading allows the revelation of the most innovative managers: improving the 
managerial firm aspect 
 
In addition, Professors Carlton and Fischel claim that a compensation scheme based 
on insider trading is a way to reveal the most innovative managers. Managers who 
prefer such compensation schemes may be those who are the least risk averse and the 
most capable. In that respect, it would also be a way of improving the managerial firm 
aspect: the most able managers might self-select into firms that allow insider trading. 
This phenomenon would imply a reduction of both screening and monitoring costs, 
implying lower agency costs95.  
 
Manne, Carlton and Fischel claim that by reducing the divergence between 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests, insider trading reduces agency costs and thus 
should not be prohibited from an agency theory point of view. 
2.2.1.2 Insider trading as an agency cost 
Contrary to that, authors considering insider trading to be an agency costs emphasize 
its rent-extraction potential, claiming that insider trading is an inefficient private 
benefit of control that benefits managers at the expense of shareholders96. Cox and 
Ang even empirically established the evidence of an agency cost borne by outsiders 
because of insider trading: “on average, insider purchases are generating significant 
abnormal profits at the expense of less informed traders”97. Shin supports that, by 
improving information disclosures, insider trading laws reduce agency costs and 
opportunistic managerial behavior98.  
 
Compensation scheme: wealth related 
 
Even assuming that the value of the innovation can be measured through the change 
in stock price, the insider’s compensation is limited by the number of shares he can 
purchase, in turn limited by his wealth. It means that the insider’s trading returns are 
more likely based on his wealth than on the value of his contribution as claimed by 
                                                                                                                                                                         
895.p.870: “Insider trading  may  present  a  solution  to  this cost-of-renegotiation  dilemma.  The  
unique  advantage  of  insider trading is that  it allows  a manager to  alter his compensation  package in 
light  of new knowledge, thereby avoiding  continual renegotiation”. 
94 Manne, H. G., 1966. Insider Trading and the Stock Market(The Free Press, New York). 
95 Carlton, D. W., Fischel, D. R., 1983. The Regulation of Insider Trading, Stanford Law Review 35, 
857-895.p.871: “A  related advantage  of  insider trading is that  it  provides firms with  valuable  
information concerning  prospective  managers (…) Because  insider trading  rewards  those  managers  
who  create  valuable  information and  are willing to  take  risks”. Seyhun, N., 1992. The Effectiveness 
of Insider-Trading Sanctions, Journal of Law and Economics 35, 149-182. 
96 Grossman, S. J., Hart, O., 1982. Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial 
Incentives(University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
97 Ang, J. S., Cox, D.R., 1997. Controlling the Agency Cost of Insider Trading, Journal of Financial 
And Strategic Decisions 10, 15-26.p.19. 
98 Shin, J., 1996. The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading, Journal of Financial Intermediation 5, 
49-73. 
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Manne. It would consequently not make insider trading more accurate than a salary or 
another performance related bonus.  
 
Non-excludability of innovation 
 
Another objection to the compensation argument is the difficulty of restricting trading 
to those who produce entrepreneurial innovations99. For instance, others managers can 
have access to this information and trade on it before its public disclosure. It creates 
two problems. First, due to this non-excludability, many firm agents may trade on the 
information without having contributed to its production. There is hence a free-rider 
problem. It could encourage the majority of the firm’s agents to be opportunistic and 
to wait for other agents to create valuable information rather than to innovate 
themselves. Indeed, Cox mentions that “most (U.S.) insider-trading cases have not 
involved those whose entrepreneurial or other managerial efforts have produced the 
value-increasing event that was traded upon. Instead, the defendants have been 
outside directors, professionals, or clerks whose assistance was used to complete the 
transaction, not to create it”100. In this case, insider trading would not be the fair 
efficient compensation scheme that would reward personal performances and 
innovations, as claimed by the compensation scheme advocates. Second, the real 
innovators would have an incentive to keep their innovation private so as to maintain 
a monopoly on insider trading profits. If they are not able to monopolize it, it can 
diminish the incentive to innovate and therefore negatively affect corporate 
performance. In addition, by obstructing the free flow of information within the firm, 
such information hoarding could reduce the firm’s overall organizational 
efficiency101. Therefore the non-excludability of innovation is a strong element in 
making the compensation scheme argument weaker.  
 
If insider trading was an efficient compensation scheme, it should replace other 
managerial remuneration mechanisms 
 
If allowing insider trading was an intentional form of remuneration of insiders in 
order to stimulate their competences and their trades, it would be perceived by 
managers like any other remuneration mechanism. However, Teeuwen empirically 
compares trading profits by chief executive officers and their cash compensation and 
concludes that cash compensation is not adjusted for trading profits. This conclusion 
implies that trading profits are not perceived by chief executive officers as part of the 
total compensation package102.  
 
A final objection to the compensation scheme thesis is that agent’s trading returns 
cannot be measured in advance, neither can the compensation itself. If an agent is risk 
averse, he might prefer a less uncertain mode of remuneration. The compensation 
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scheme would hence not constitute an efficient way of encouragement for such 
agents103.  
 
Insider trading harms the corporation 
 
Bainbridge explicitly describes significant potential harms done to the corporation 
connected to insider trading104. The first type of harm is related to the fact that insider 
trading creates incentives for managers to delay the transmission of information to 
superiors. This means that decisions may not be taken with accurate and timely 
information105. The second relates to the interference between managers and 
corporate plans. Indeed, if managers trade during the planning stage of an acquisition, 
insider trading may affect a corporate plan. The third concerns the incentive of the 
managers to manipulate stock prices. Managers have a strong interest in keeping the 
stock pricing stable, or in moving it towards a favorable direction while they are 
trading.  
 
Insider trading may spur managers’ indifference as to whether the firm is doing well 
or poorly 
 
Another criticism emanates from the difficulty of limiting trading based on positive 
and valuable information, beneficial for the firm. Indeed, allowing insider trading 
would mean accepting trading based on bad news as well. As a result, managers could 
profit whether a project succeeds or fails. If the project fails, the manager could sell 
his shares before that information becomes public and avoid a certain loss, or even 
worse, make a short sale of the firm’s shares and make a large profit. Thus, managers 
could profit from insider trading whether the firm is performing poorly or well106. 
Insider trading could also give managers incentives to choose to engage in risky 
investment behavior that creates private opportunities for profitable insider trading 
but reduces corporate value for the firm.  
2.2.2 The market theory and insider trading 
From the Market Theory point of view, the two issues that are most frequently 
addressed in the insider trading debate are the stock market price accuracy and the 
stock market liquidity. 
2.2.2.1 Insider trading, transparency and price accuracy 
Transparency  
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The principle of transparency is based upon the idea that transparent financial markets 
guarantee that the prices provide a good signal to economic agents and provides a 
satisfactory allocation of capital. A good flow of information ensures the proper 
functioning of the market by improving the informational efficiency of the market. 
The concept of informational efficiency refers to the speed at which information is 
incorporated into the price of securities107. Prices adjust rapidly to any new 
information and are unpredictable. When all individuals have the same information, 
the quoted price is equal to the fair price and all the agents can anticipate in the same 
way. The prices of securities instantly integrate the relevant information obtained by 
the agents. This is the best way to assess the prices correctly and to gain the 
confidence of both the investors and the issuers. For instance, investors rely on the 
market when they can rely on the prices of securities, i.e. when such prices represent 
the best estimation of net present value given the available information. Issuers rely 
on contracts when they believe their shares are properly valued. 
For all these reasons, a lack of transparency causes asymmetry of information and 
inadequacy of financial prices. 
 
Accurate prices and efficient capital allocation  
 
In economic theory, a market is efficient from an informational point of view if stock 
prices reflect the integration of all relevant information, i.e. both past events and 
anticipated events in capital asset pricing. Accurate stock prices correspond to stock 
prices that reflect as much firm-specific information as possible. As Professors Fox, 
Morck, Yeung, and Durnev point out, “share price is relatively “accurate” if it is 
likely to be relatively close, whether above or below, to the share’s actual value. 
When a price has a high expected accuracy, the deviation of the price from actual 
value is, on average, relatively small”108. 
Overall, market efficiency is seen as the ability of the financial market to provide 
capital to companies with the best investment projects on the most advantageous 
terms. The cost of access to information for investors has a direct impact on the extent 
of its distribution and therefore on the informational efficiency of the market. 
Accurate share prices are important to economic efficiency via their effect on capital 
allocation: more accurate prices can increase the amount of value added by firms as 
they use society’s scarce resources for the production of goods and services. In a 
competitive economy, the increase in value added will generally increase both the 
level of firm cash flow and the returns to other factors of production by improving the 
quality of capital allocation across investment projects in the economy and by 
improving the operation of existing real assets. Efficiency of the real economy is 
enhanced when share prices become more accurate109. 
 
                                                           
107 In a famous 1945 article, Friedrich Hayek claimed that economic agents do not need to have an 
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Therefore, the question arises whether insider trading affects transparency, price 
accuracy and capital allocation, and, if so, how?  
 
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model110, the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance 
Propositions111, and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis112 (ECMH) are the three 
most famous classical theories providing comprehensive approaches to capital market 
functioning regarding the specific aspect of capital asset pricing. All these three 
theories are built on perfect market conditions, i.e. rationality of agents, perfect 
information and no transaction costs. 
 
Amongst these theories the ECMH hold that the market is comprised of a large 
number of rational participants and that without transaction and information costs the 
market mechanism allocates capital to the most efficient use, tending towards 
equilibrium outcomes. The ECMH asserts that financial markets are informally 
efficient. This theoretical analysis, initially limited to ordinary goods markets, was 
extended in the 1970s to financial markets through the theory of financial efficiency. 
It was one of the foundations of the financial deregulation, in the name of the ability 
of financial markets to produce fair prices113. The efficient market hypothesis asserts 
that financial markets would be informally efficient. There are three basics versions of 
the hypothesis. The weak form of the efficient-market hypothesis claims that prices 
for traded assets already reflect all past publicly available information. The semi-
strong form of the efficient-market hypothesis claims on the one hand that prices 
reflect all publicly available information, and on the other hand that prices instantly 
change to reflect new public information. The strong form of the efficient-market 
efficiency additionally claims that prices instantly reflect even hidden or "insider" 
information. 
Many classic liberal economists, such as Hayek, have argued that market economies 
would create a spontaneous order: “a more efficient allocation of societal resources 
than any design could achieve”114. The underlying idea was that market mechanisms 
were sufficient to ensure spontaneous changing and securities market prosperity115. 
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From this perspective, any interference in spontaneous and instituted order could only 
result in catastrophic consequences116. An important tradition of scholars therefore 
characterized law as inappropriate, irrelevant, or even damaging for the spontaneous 
stability of financial markets117. As much as it would be capable of interfering with 
optimal functioning of existing market mechanisms118, law was therefore perceived as 
a potentially source of disturbances.  
The ECMH was largely accepted by the regulators as the theory providing a 
comprehensive explanation of the financial market functioning119. In the US, a series 
of legal decisions directly reflected the adherence of the SEC to this theory. In that 
respect, one of the most emblematic decisions was the Basic vs. Levington case120. 
According to the fraud-on-the-market theory, in open and developed securities 
markets the stock prices depend on all material information about the company 
available to investors. Consequently, investors rely on market prices that are supposed 
to reflect all material information into share price. In turn, a causal link can be 
established between any misstatement and any stock purchaser. The underlying idea 
is that the misstatements defraud the entire market and thus affect the price of the 
stock. Therefore, a material misstatement's effect on an individual purchaser is no less 
significant than the effect on the entire market.  
Insider trading incorporates information into stock prices and improves its accuracy
  
Going even further, some scholars argue the benefits of insider trading for the 
accuracy of market prices. Manne, Carlton and Fischel assert that insider trading is an 
efficient means to enable a firm to improve the accuracy of its stocks price relative to 
its true value, whilst avoiding the costs associated with the premature disclosure of 
firm specific information121. Moreover, insider trading would have the advantage of 
being a “soft” way to disclose the information and to incorporate it in the price 
directly through “price adjustment”122, without prematurely revealing the underlying 
information to the market123. This mechanism would be more efficient than 
prohibiting insiders from trading and therefore delaying the incorporation into stock 
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prices of information that the firm is unwilling or unable to disclose immediately124. 
A public announcement could destroy the value of the information125, could be too 
expensive, could be disbelieved, or even be costly for the reputation of the providers 
if incorrect126.   
 
The reality of the market: transaction and information costs 
In the 80s the literature was intrigued by the ECMH and deeply concerned by 
challenging it. The objective was to verify whether its predictions would still hold in 
the real world. The scholarly literature then started to emphasize the importance of 
transaction and information’s costs and nuanced the notion of spontaneous stability of 
the market, according a predominant role to institutions in the market mechanisms. 
 
In that respect, a certain number of scholars support that transparency and price 
accuracy should be supervised, requiring the intervention of regulations, and that the 
organization of society is more complex and less spontaneous overall. These scholars 
consider insider trading as undesirable from a Market theory approach. Their 
arguments can be summarized as follow. 
 
Insider trading introduces “noise” into stock prices 
 
In this context, the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency (MOME) of Gilson and 
Kraakman counts as one of the major contributions of the literature. The MOME 
principally established that because of information costs particular information might 
be reflected in real prices (opposed to ideal prices) with more or less relative 
efficiency. The MOME considered four mechanisms incorporating information in 
market prices with progressively decreasing relative efficiency: universally informed 
trading, professionally-informed trading, derivatively informed trading, and 
uninformed trading127. The operativeness of each efficiency mechanism depends on 
the initial distribution of fact, itself depending on the cost structure of the market for 
information128. The lower is the cost of information, the wider is the distribution of 
information, the most the market is likely to be efficient. In that process the active 
role of specific institutional arrangement and market mechanisms in enhancing the 
relative stability of finance by determining the transaction costs of acquiring and 
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verifying information in the first instance is recognized. Informational efficiency is a 
function of the institution’s performances129. 
 
From that point of view, the advocates of an insider trading prohibition consider that 
because insider trading does not allow to reveal information in a timely manner, it 
cannot be considered as a substitute for disclosure130. Some scholars support that 
insider trading might reduce stock price accuracy by increasing the insiders’ 
incentives to keep a monopoly on the information131, or eventually manipulate the 
timing and the accuracy of the disseminated information so as to maximize their 
profits132. It could therefore include hoarding information to the detriment of both 
price accuracy133 and the firm’s operational efficiency134. Additionally, it seems that 
the extent to which insider trading eventually makes stock prices more efficient 
depends on the extent to which uniformed investors are able to discern insider 
trading.135 However, access to information depends on the status of the insiders, and 
their ability to profit depends on their superior access to information136. For instance, 
empirical literature shows that some insider trading defendants use offshore accounts 
or trade in nominee accounts, or through proxies and intermediaries that are difficult 
to identify137. This would make the information costly to detect138. From that 
perspective, insider trading would increase asymmetrical information and thus 
transaction costs of trading139. On top of that, even if insiders do not hide their trades, 
they can be difficult to detect if they are not of a sufficient size. Therefore, such trades 
might fail to convey new information140. In addition, the more “noise” there is 
surrounding an inside trade, the lower is its informational value141. 
 
For instance, Fishman and Hagerty showed in an empirical paper that insider trading 
leads to less efficient stock markets. According to them, if it may be established that 
with insider trading the aggregate amount of information by traders in the market may 
be greater, the total number of informed traders in the market is nontheless lower (the 
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non informed traders are deterred from acquiring information by the presence of 
informed traders) and the information in the market is not evenly distributed across 
traders. These two effects lead to the undesirability of insider trading from an 
informational efficiency point of view142.  
 
Another central issue in determining whether insider trading is harmful from an 
information efficiency point of view is studying to which extent it affects stock prices. 
A number of empirical papers actually focused on establishing and measuring the 
price effect of insider trading. First of all it may be considered very complicated to 
isolate the trading based on inside information. The price movement could be asserted 
to legitimate origins such as media speculation or bidder’s purchase143. However, 
some scholars have established that most price movement before public 
announcement of inside information was actually occurring in response to informed 
trading144. An empirical study of illegal insider trading of Meulbroek confirmed that 
finding145. For instance, a study of Keown and Pinkerton measured that on average, 
40 to 50% of the price gain of a stock occurs before the sensitive information public 
announcement146. A study of Fishman and Hagerty reached the conclusion that insider 
trading leads to a stock price that is less efficient in providing information147. 
According to Fishman and Hagerty, market professionals are deterred to acquire 
information and trade because of the existence of informed trading. Consequently, the 
total amount of information reflected into the price is reduced. 
 
No advantage of insider trading over traditional disclosure 
 
The advocates of a ban of insider trading concede that it may be possible that, for a 
very rare type of information (the one that managers have little ability or incentive to 
disclose148), insider trading might tend to do more than a public announcement to 
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update prices, as Professors Manne, Carlton and Fischel argue. However, according to 
Manovre, even in that eventual case, traditional disclosure appears relatively cheaper 
and preferable in the very majority of scenarios and for the majority of information 
types149. Going further, Fox, Durnev, Morck and Yeung even sustain that rules 
mandating issuers to make public disclosure increase share price accuracy, 
establishing the superior role of disclosure over other routes by which information is 
gathered, including insider trading150. Consequently insider trading would, in any 
case, be advantageous compared to traditional disclosure. 
2.2.2.2 Insider trading and stock market liquidity 
The incursion of the notion of inherent instability of the financial system into 
economic theories is major. The scholarly literature revealed an endogenously driven 
process of economic instability. 
Frydman and Goldberg developped an Imperfect Knowledge Economic theory (IKE). 
This framework asserts that due to uncertainty, present investment strategies and 
decisions, even rational, will have to be adjusted to future events. Allocation of 
resources is suboptimal because of inconsistencies resulting from investors’ behaviors 
and financial market instability is therefore inherent151. Although IKE makes no 
explicit relationship between this process and the legal and institutional structure of 
finance, this framework however sustains that regulation should intervene to prevent 
extreme asset price swings that may cause financial crises152. 
Following on from the logic of this work, Minsky’s research includes the dynamic 
nature of the business cycle153 and mainly explains the inherently instability of the 
financial system by the liquidity constraint. The change of strategy due to imperfect 
knowledge may lead to a liquidity constraint reality. In particular, Minsky establishes 
that a context of economic stability is favorable to rising leverage (debt relative to 
assets or income) that may be confronted in the future with the risk that borrowers 
may not be able to repay: Liquidity is not always available on demand.  
Contrary to Frydman and Goldberg theory, Minsky’s inherent instability of finance’s 
conception emphasizes the role of social choice and institutional arrangement in 
maintaining the stability of financial systems154. This vision confers a primary 
importance to legal and institutional structures of finance. However institutions 
should intervene at a late stage to restructure the economy in case of established 
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market instability155 and correct the deviations. Minsky’s theory is visionary in that it 
prepares the ground for financial and economic crisis to come. 
Step by step, the scholarly literature establishes the building blocks of the legal 
construction of finance: Uncertainty combined with liquidity constraint causes 
inherent instability of the financial system. In that respect, law is relevant to finance. 
Scholars have succeeded in challenging the EMH and refined the theory to get closer 
to the reality.  
In the framework of this study, an important issue is therefore whether insider trading 
has a detrimental effect on stock market liquidity. 
 
The finance literature defines the stock market liquidity as translating the direct or 
indirect transaction costs of trading156. The liquidity of a stock market is a very 
important parameter that impacts the efficiency of capital allocation in the economy. 
In addition, the literature suggests that the more liquid the stock market is, the lower 
trading costs are, the lower cost of capital is, and the higher market valuation is. In the 
literature, the cost of trading is also referred to as the bid-ask spread157.  
 
Insiders benefit from the insider trading thanks to the asymmetry of information. 
Indeed, on average, insiders buy stocks at less than the true value and sell stocks for 
more than the true value. The premium the insider receives thanks to the asymmetry 
of information corresponds to the difference between the insider’s purchase or sale 
price and the “true” value158. It can be considered to be a trading cost for less 
informed outsiders159. Therefore, to be compensated for the risk of trading with a 
better informed counterparty, uninformed investors demand a higher expected return 
on investment, which implies an increase of the cost to the firm of raising capital160. 
This compensation corresponds to the average loss incurred. It depends on the 
market’s expectation of the probability of trading against a better-informed party and 
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is included in the bid-ask spread161. Thus, insider trading indirectly implies an 
increase of the transaction costs of trading162. 
 
To proxy for the harm caused by insider trading, Bhattacharya and Daouk explored 
changes in the country-level cost of capital. They used information regarding 103 
countries163 to test the effect of insider trading laws and its enforcement on the cost of 
capital164. They concluded that, if the mere existence of the law does not reduce the 
cost of capital, its enforcement has a negative effect on the cost of capital, ranging 
from 0.3% to 7%.  This result suggests that at least some of the cost of capital is due 
to illegal insider trading, which is reduced by the enforcement of insider trading laws. 
 
Furthermore the scholarly literature established that insider trading affects the market 
liquidity165. For instance, Beny constructed an insider trading law index using a cross 
section of 33 countries and checked the relationship between the severity of insider 
trading laws and the degree of ownership. She demonstrated that a concentration and 
market liquidity change in the IT index of 0.72 reduces concentration by 6.6% and 
increases liquidity by 16.5%. In other words, the more severe the insider trading law 
is, the more liquid the market is, and the less concentrated the shareholding is. If 
asymmetry of information is extreme, the confidence of the outsiders can be so 
affected that they refuse to trade altogether, making the stock market completely 
illiquid166. Here again, these results suggests that some illegal insider trading impacts 
the stock market liquidity, which is increased by the passing of tougher insider trading 
laws. 
Finally Glosten also argues that the reply of the marketmakers to the existence of 
informed traders is to reduce the liquidity of the market. According to him the level of 
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risk sharing that is less than optimal and insider trading creates inefficiencies from 
that perspective167.  
On the contrary, opponents to insider trading regulation dismiss the potential adverse 
effect of insider trading on liquidity. In particular, the fact that uninformed investors 
trade frequently implies that they are not hindered by the existence of more informed 
parties, whether or not the latter are insiders168. The fact that they trade in spite of 
asymmetric information may suggest that their trading decisions are independent of 
trading costs169. Indeed, uninformed investors may trade precisely because of 
informed insider trading, which is supposed to increase the accuracy of stock prices: 
“That trade occurs suggests that traders either do not believe they are uninformed or 
realize that enough informed trading occurs for the prevailing prices to reflect most 
material information.” In other words, the benefits of improved price accuracy might 
offset the potential costs of trading against better-informed counter-parties, according 
to the opponents of insider trading ban170, and could finally lead to a more 
informationally efficient stock market171. 
 
Another argument relates to the fact that prohibiting insider trading would not resolve 
the fact that some investors would always be better informed than others and therefore 
not completely eliminate the problem of informational asymmetry. Prohibiting insider 
trading would just exclude the insiders from the ranks of informed investors and 
simply redistribute (but not reduce) the profits from insiders to informed outsiders172. 
This mechanism should encourage informed outsiders to participate in the market; the 
informational market would in turn be more competitive. In consequence, forbidding 
insider trading would not reduce the cost of trading173. However, this last argument is 
not very powerful. The proponents to a ban on insider trading opposed that the 
exclusion of the insiders would reduce the total number of informed traders and 
increase the competition between them, which would imply lower total profits from 
informed trading and lower trading costs174. Consequently, forbidding insider trading 
would be a way to make the market more liquid. 
                                                           
167 Glosten, L. R., 1989. Insider Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist, The 
Journal of Business 62, 211-235. 
168 Carlton, D. W., Fischel, D. R., 1983. The Regulation of Insider Trading, Stanford Law Review 35, 
857-895. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid.  
171 Bernhardt, D., Hollifield, B., Hughson, E., 1995. The Review of Financial Studies, Investment and 
Insider Trading 8, 501-543. Leland, H. E., 1992. Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?, Journal of 
Political Economy 100, 859-887, Manne, H. G., 1966. Insider Trading and the Stock Market(The Free 
Press, New York).  
172 See Georgakopoulos, N. L., 1993. Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure 
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, Connecticut Law Review 26, 1-51. 
Informed traders are composed of insiders and informed outsiders. Informed outsiders are investment 
analysts, hedge funds, mutual managers. Insiders have a clear informational advantage over informed 
outsiders, because they have a monopoly of access to non-public corporate information, as well as to 
the associated profits. Haddock, D. D., Macey, J. R., 1986. Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and 
America: The Economics of the Politics(Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
173 Haddock, D. D., Macey, J. R., 1986. Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and America: The 
Economics of the Politics(Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
174 Frijns, B., Gilbert, A., Tourani Rad, A., 2013. Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Insider Trading?, The 
Financial Review 48, 205-232.p.212. 
44
 40 
2.2.3 Property rights theory and insider trading 
Insider trading legislation is fundamentally about the allocation of property rights in 
corporate information and hence about the distribution of rents derived from the use 
of such information175.  
 
The property rights theory 
  
The existence of property rights in a variety of intangibles, including information, is 
well established. Information is property, but owned by whom? Scholars have 
different conceptions of the way property rights in information should be attributed 
between a firm’s managers and a firms’ shareholders. Concerning insider trading, the 
question remains as to whether a corporate insider should be allowed to operate a 
personal benefit thanks to an information acquired in a professional context. The 
ambiguity relates to the kind of information that an insider acquires in the framework 
of his employment, thanks to his ability and ingenuity. Some scholars claim that 
property rights in information should be attributed fully either to the firm’s managers 
or to the firm’s shareholders, while others consider the Coasean contractual approach 
as the efficient solution. In turn, insider trading appears legitimate depending on 
whether scholars consider that property rights in information belong to a firm’s 
managers or not. 
 
The contractual approach: negotiation of the property rights in information 
 
Following the Coasean contractual approach, the rationale for allocating property 
rights in the field of copyrights and patents is to protect the economic incentive to 
produce socially valuable information. Applying this theory to insider trading, some 
scholars consider that the law should assign the property rights to the agent that 
produces information and therefore maximizes the social incentives for the production 
of valuable new information176. Based on the private contracting approach of 
Coase177, Carlton and Fischer advocate private negotiations between a firm’s 
investors and a firm’s managers for an optimal allocation of the property rights in 
information depending on who attributes it his highest value178.  
To make this explanation clearer, Bainbridge refers to the concrete example of the 
societal benefit of patents179. Accordingly, society provides incentives for inventive 
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(UCLA) - School of Law, Los Angeles). The question concerns whether a patent or the attribution of 
property rights to inventors are beneficial for society. When an inventor develops and commercializes a 
product, the invention (design, function, and composition) is revealed to potential competitors. If it is 
considered that all the competitors (including the inventor himself) face equivalent marginal costs to 
produce and commercialize the invention, the competitors will be able to set a market price at which 
the inventor will probably be unable to earn a return on his sunk costs. In fact, if there is no allocation 
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activity by using the patent system to give inventors a property right in new ideas. By 
preventing competitors from appropriating the idea, the patent allows the inventor to 
charge monopolistic prices for the improved product, thereby recouping his sunk 
costs. In principle copyright and trade secret law are justified on similar grounds.  
 
Similarly, according to the proponents of the application of the contractual approach 
to insider trading, a property right in information should be created when necessary to 
prevent a conduct by which someone other than the developer of socially valuable 
information could appropriate its value before the developer could recoup his sunk 
costs180. However, the parallel between patents and insider trading is unclear. Indeed, 
can the invention protected by the patent be assimilated to the inside trader’s 
innovation? If it is the case, the attribution of property rights in information would 
play the same role as in the case of patent protection.  
 
If the corporation is the party considered to produce information, as described before, 
a part of the literature considers that insider trading could affect the information’s 
value. In turn, insider trading could harm the corporation’s interests and thus affect its 
incentives to produce socially valuable information. Therefore, this argument may 
work in favor of the allocation of the property rights in information to the corporation 
and the shareholders rather than to the firm’s managers181.  
 
From this perspective prohibiting insider trading is an implicit way of granting 
property rights in information and associated rent to the shareholders and to the 
corporation182.  
2.3 SUMMING-UP  
This present chapter offers an introduction to the underlying legal and economics 
theoretical debate and arguments surrounding insider trading regulation.  
 
Whether insider trading is beneficial or detrimental can be assessed both from a legal 
theory point of view and from an economic theory point of view.  
 
First of all, the issue of insider trading can be assessed from a legal theory point of 
view. For the purpose of this chapter, the distributional justice theory has been 
particularly apprehended. According to this theory, the aim of regulation should be to 
achieve an optimal allocation of resources. This may have different meanings 
according to the main schools of thought that are egalitarianism, socialism, capitalism 
and libertarianism. However, it seems that insider trading is not desirable from the 
perspective of all these distributional justice model conceptions; except for the 
libertarianism one.  This first chapter further identifies the influence of legal theory on 
the actual regulation policies. In this context, it seems relevant to read the notion of 
equality of treatment of investors as being influenced by the distributional justice 
                                                                                                                                                                         
of property rights to the inventor, he might anticipate his inability to generate positive returns on his 
up-front costs and therefore be deterred from developing socially valuable information. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Beny, L., 2002. The Political Economy of Insider Trading Legislation and Enforcement: 
International Evidence, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series 348.p.4. 
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theory. This notion is referred to as the foundation of insider trading regulation, both 
in the US Equal access theory and in the European Equality theory. 
In this respect, it is fundamental to understand that the core theoretical foundation for 
regulating insider trading lies in the ethics and distributional justice considerations. 
Moral theory remains above all an autonomous deontological fundamental reason for 
regulating insider trading. Insider trading is undesirable per se because of its 
immorality.183  
 
Secondly, the controversy concerning insider trading can also be evaluated from an 
economic point of view. According to economic theory, regulation aims at economic 
efficiency and the maximization of welfare. However, economic theory strategies to 
reach maximization of welfare diverge depending on the school of thought. In this 
respect, the analysis of economic theory is complex to apprehend because economic 
scholars have different viewpoints regarding the effect of insider trading. In turn, 
deciding whether insider trading impairs or improves overall efficiency is difficult. 
However, if economic efficiency is considered as the result of several aggregate 
economic variables (such as informativeness of the prices, cost of capital and the 
stock market liquidity), measuring the impact of insider trading according to these 
variables may allow to reach a conclusion. First of all, most of the opponents of 
insider trading regulation, such as Manne, Carlton and Fischel, assert that insider 
trading fosters efficient capital markets by improving price market accuracy and 
constitutes an efficient compensation scheme. However, this vision is not shared by 
all economists and on the contrary, some scholars support that insider trading impairs 
the informativeness of stock prices. Furthermore, it has been seen that insider trading 
has been empirically analyzed as potentially increasing costs of trading, costs of 
capital, costs of information and affecting property rights in information. 
 
All together, some scholars comment that the discussion on whether insider trading 
should be regulated based on an economic analysis may be considered as 
inconclusive184. In this work, Manne, Carlton and Fischel’s approaches are not 
ignored, but the consideration is as follows: the perception of the insider trading effect 
on market efficiency is a matter of balance. The most convincing argument advanced 
by the proponents of insider trading legalization is that it may have beneficial effects 
on informational efficiency, as supported by Manne, Carlton and Fischel. According 
to them, this is the most important aspect of economic efficiency and the benefits of 
improved price accuracy offset all the detrimental effects. However, the proponents to 
insider trading regulation oppose valuable arguments to this point. On the contrary 
they argue that insider trading introduces noise in the prices. Furthermore there are 
major arguments advanced by the literature concerning the detrimental effects of 
insider trading on market liquidity, the cost of capital as well as its perverse 
managerial effects.  
 
                                                           
183 Schotland, R. A., 1967. Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Virginia Law Review 53, 1425-
1478. 
184 Wang, W., Steinberg, M., 2010. Insider Trading(Oxford University Press).p.39: “The supposed 
beneficial and harmful effects of insider trading on society are quite speculative”. Strudler, A., Orts, E., 
1999. Moral Principles in the Law of Insider Trading, Texas Law Review 78, 375-438.pp.382-383: 
“Distinguished scholars in law and economics disagree fervently about the economic costs and benefits 
of insider trading rules (…) This debate, however, is notoriously inconclusive”.  
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All in all the insider trading effects on economic efficiency is delicate to assess. 
However, our society is based on distributional justice, public order and general 
interest motivations. From this perspective, it must take steps in order to design 
optimal insider trading regulations and enforcement policies. The preliminary 
considerations contained in this chapter enable one to understand the objectives 
targeted by the theoretical corpus, and that should be addressed by insider trading 
laws and enforcement. This chapter's analysis of insider trading has broad 
implications for the debate over how to regulate securities markets best.  
 
By introducing the strong legal and economic theoretical arguments supporting the 
insider trading regulation, this chapter directly enlightens the foundation of the rules 
designed to regulate insider trading and enforce the insider trading laws that will be 
presented in the next chapters.  
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TITLE I. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO OPTIMAL PUBLIC 
ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
Many legal systems prohibit insider trading at the policy level. Hence the prohibition 
is taken as a given in the coming chapters and is not debated as such.  
Title 1 examines two aspects concerning the same question about how this prohibition 
should be enforced. The main goal of this title is to apply the insights from the Law 
and Economics scholarly literature on optimal public law enforcement to the area of 
insider trading regulation.  
Steven Shavell distinguishes three different dimensions according to which methods 
of law enforcement can differ: the “form of intervention: prevention or imposition of 
a sanction and its type”, the “privately versus publicly initiated intervention”, and the 
“timing of the enforcement measures”185. Another dimension was recently added 
related to “the division of competencies between central enforcement authorities and 
de-centralized enforcement agencies”186. With regard to Steven Shavell’s paper, 
Chapter 3 refers to the dimension of the role of private parties versus public agents in 
enforcement and Chapter 4 to the form and nature of the sanction.  
Insider trading problems lie on the boundary between private and public problems. 
Various branches of law can be used in terms of both substantive law and 
enforcement. Private, administrative and criminal law are the different options. 
Administrative and criminal law can be designated as a proper set through the 
denomination “public law”. Substantive and procedural insider trading laws are in the 
process of being increasingly harmonized within the European Union187. 
Nevertheless, strong differences remain in terms of enforcement strategy of insider 
trading laws within the Member States. The goal of the two next chapters is to clarify 
the optimal intervention of different enforcement mechanisms. 
The law and economics scholarly literature has, implicitly or explicitly, established a 
certain number of economic criteria under which the use of: 
1) Public or private nature of enforcement mechanism,  
2) The monetary or non-monetary form of sanctions,  
3) The administrative or criminal nature of sanctions would lead to a cost 
effective enforcement of law 
 
The goal of these chapters is to review and analyze these criteria and to apply them to 
insider trading matters. 
Chapter 3 concerns the nature of the insider trading law enforcement mechanism. The 
role of private parties versus public agents in the enforcement mechanism corresponds 
                                                           
185 Shavell, S., 1993. The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, Journal of Law and Economics 36, 
255-287, Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard 
Press University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
186 Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam). 
187 Cf. Chapter 6. 
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to the third of Shavell’s three criteria, according to which the method of enforcement 
can differ188.  
Chapter 4 deals with public enforcement power, regarding the form, nature and type 
of sanctions. It explores the theory of optimal law enforcement and the determination 
of the optimal sanction.  
                                                           
188 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
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INTRODUCTION TO TITLE 1 
Previous to Chapters 3 and 4, an introduction is dedicated to define notions that will 
be referred to all through them. This introduction firslty presents the major concepts 
relative to optimal enforcement that are rationality, deterrence theory and 
internalization of externalities. These considerations are then  complemented by the 
description of the main characteristics of potential harm, gain, probabilities of 
detection and conviction of the insider trading since it is central in determining how 
optimally enforce insider trading laws.  
(I) LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIC CONCEPTS 
Rationality 
In microeconomics, individuals are considered rational maximizers of their expected 
utility. Utility being considered to be the measure of the relative satisfaction the 
decision-maker will gain from a certain choice. If that level of utility is uncertain ex 
ante, the decision-maker can only base his choice on expected utility. The costs and 
the benefits of alternative choices are considered and the option that maximises the 
expected utility is chosen189. It implies that information is complete and that agents 
are able to analyze it.  
 
A formal definition of rationality would be the following: considering that consumers 
have the choice between different options designated A, B, C,…, they are always able 
to establish an order of preferences (completeness axiom) that are supposed to be 
transitive, meaning that if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, A is preferred to 
C (transitive axiom). Taking in consideration those preferences they seek to maximize 
their utility under constraints of time, income, knowledge, ... In the end, individuals 
will choose the most preferred option, thereby maximising their utility190.  
 
Rational choice theory is largely accepted for decisions concerning explicit market 
issues, because the decisions are considered to be explicitly quantifiable. Indeed, 
market decisions concern prices, that makes commensurability easy and allows 
comparison among different economic courses of actions and mostly concern 
repeated transactions that allow agents to be familiar with the choice191. On the 
contrary, rational choice theory has difficulties in acceptance as a model of non-
market choices, such as in legal matters. The argument presented by the literature is 
that non-market choice decisions precisely happen in conditions that do not 
correspond to market conditions and therefore differ from the conditions of 
frequency, commensurability and transparency that are particularly adapted to operate 
rational choice192. Therefore, some legal scholars reject the rational deliberation 
assumption to be applicable to legal matters193.  
                                                           
189 Friedman, M., 1953. Essays in Positive Economics(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago).p.15, 
28. 
190 See Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 2004. Law and Economics, 4th edition.(Pearson).pp.14,21-30. Posner, R. 
A., 2003. Economic Analysis of Law, 6th edition.(Aspan Publications, New York).p.361. 
191 Ulen, T., 2000. Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham).p.795. 
192 Ulen, T., 1998. The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law Review 51, 
1747-1763. 
193 Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 2004. Law and Economics, 4th edition.(Pearson).p.15. 
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Law and economics definitively affirms the relevance of the rational choice theory in 
non-market decisions and legal matters. Gary Becker’s crime deterrence model is the 
first to have formalized the rational choice theory applied to legal decision-making. 
“Optimal” decisions refer to decisions that minimize the social loss in utility or payoff 
from offenses. The loss is the sum of damages, costs of apprehension and conviction, 
and costs of carrying out the punishments imposed. Loss can be minimized thanks to 
a combination of the magnitude and the probability of the expected sanction, the 
form, the nature and the type of the sanction194. Becker’s theory is at the heart of the 
economic theory of crime and will be discussed in detail further.  
 
In the general scientific framework, scholars from all fields have been questioning the 
limits of the assumption of rationality195 and have raised the issue that one of the 
major premises of this assumption may not always be respected: people making 
decisions may not always maximize their utility196.  
Commentators have presented different justifications of bounded rationality. One of 
the major critics addressed to the neo-classical substantive rationality is that it is 
conceived as the perfect rationality, implying that individuals dispose of perfect 
information. In reality, it is likely that agents might not be informed about the 
alternatives, facing uncertainty and imperfections. Herbert Simon is one of the authors 
who focused on the issue of the limitation of rationality and offered a developed 
analysis of what could be a more realistic approach than the rationality assumption. 
He introduced the notion of “limited rationality”, according to which individuals try 
to maximize their utility according to their actual knowledge, leading to the concept 
of “procedural rationality”. The concept of procedural rationality is based on the best 
choice of decision-making method, as opposed to the concept of substantial 
rationality, based on the best result197.  
Critics formulated by the legal doctrine are somewhat akin to this reasoning. 
Criminals may not be rational and may not integrate the punishment to come as a cost 
when committing the crime. The particular cases of criminals who commit 
spontaneous crimes of passion or individuals under the influence of toxic substances 
that distort their perceptions are cited. Moreover individuals’ misinformation or 
inadequate measurement of sanctions is often referred to as interfering with the 
rationality assumption. A valid explanation asserts that, because of the ambiguity of 
information related to uncertain outcomes, individuals may fail to correctly assess and 
discount its importance and, therefore, to incorporate it in their decision198. 
Furthermore, individuals may focus on absolute outcomes rather than consider 
probable outcomes, neglecting the dimension of uncertainty. Another explanation 
could lie with the perceived outcome, which is partially based on a cognitive bias. The 
prediction of probability may depend on individuals’ perceptions. Their perception 
                                                           
194 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.p.199. 
195 For instance, the theories of biologic or social determinism deny rational behaviour and therefore 
mostly consecrate the moral dimension of the criminal discipline. 
196 Korobkin, R. B., Ulen, T., 2000. Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, California Law Review 88, 1051-1144. 
197 Simon, H. A., 1947. Administrative Behavior(S&S International, New York). 
198 Van Dijk, E., Zeelenberg, M., 2003. The Discounting of Ambiguous Information in Economic 
Decision Making, Journal of Behavioural Decision Making 16, 341-352. 
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can be influenced either by confidence (over- or under-confidence, optimism, 
pessimism) or by personal or related experiences (“available heuristic”)199. It may 
also happen very rarely that some individuals do not consider a penalty as a cost 
because they actually value the reputation effect, in other words to be known as a law-
breaker in a certain community 200. Indeed, for certain gangs, prison is a kind of 
initiation rite and reputation associated to prison constitutes an intangible but 
potentially valuable outcome. Commentators argue that many possible biases in 
decision-making can affect the prediction of rationality.  
As a response to these observations, it must be mentioned that the rational choice 
theory should not be misinterpreted. Indeed, law and economics scholars do not deny 
the possibility of an individual’s choice and behavior to diverge from rationality 
under specific circumstances201. However, this phenomenon should be negligible 
within aggregate behavior in markets; the standard predictions of rational theory 
would therefore still hold.  
Moreover, this study relating to insider trading matters directly deals with monetary 
valuable assets in a corporation environment where maximizing financial gain is 
explicitly targeted. This context is therefore consequently particularly favorable to 
rational decision-making, the potential wrongdoer belonging to a category of very 
specific corporate potential wrongdoers, who have been the object of several studies 
establishing them as “rational agents”, or even as “economic men”202. For instance, 
several studies describe white-collar and insider wrongdoers as informed, educated, 
and typically rational individuals who dispose of information to accurately evaluate 
and anticipate the sanctions, their enforcement and their costs203.  
For instance Hochstetler and Shover claim:  
                                                           
199 Faure, M., 2009. The Impact of Behavioral Law and Economics on Accident Law (Boom Juridische 
Uitgevers, The Hague). Jolls, C., 1998. Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 
Vanderbilt Law Review 51, 1653-1677. Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1974. Judgement Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases(Science, New York).  
200 Ulen, T., 2000. Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham). 
201 See Becker, G. S., 1962. Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, The Journal of Political 
Economy 70, 1-13. Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal 
of Political Economy 76, 169-217.p.192: “Sometimes it is possible to separate persons committing the 
same offense into groups that have different responses to punishments. For example, unpremeditated 
murderers or robbers are supposed to act impulsively and, therefore, to be relatively unresponsive to 
the size of punishments; likewise, the insane or the young are probably less affected than other 
offenders by future consequences and, therefore, probably less deterred (…)”. 
202 Oded, S., 2012. Inducing Corporate Proactive Compliance: Liability Controls and Corporate 
Monitors(Rotterdam Erasmus University, Rotterdam).p.51. Sutherland, E. H., 1983. White Collar 
Crime: The Uncut Version(Yale University Press, New Haven). 
203 White collar crime is a early nineteen twenties notion. See Calavita, K., Pontell, H.N., Tillman R. H. 
, 1997. Big Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Saving and Loan Crisis(University of California 
Press, Berkeley). Insiders’ profile differs from other white collar crime such as antitrust crimes or 
embezzlement because it neither advances the gain of the business entity, nor deprives the company of 
its use of the information, only its exclusive use. Moreover, while “thieves or embezzlers type” white 
collar criminals appear to predominantly belong to middle management or to the lower echelon of 
business, insiders defendants appears to be mostly composed of corporate officers and directors. See 
Geis, G., 1998. Antitrust and Organizational Deviance(JAI Press, Stamford, CT). Weisburd, D., 
Stanton W., Waring, E., Bode, N., 1991. Crimes of the Middle Classes: White Collar Offenders in the 
Federal Courts(Yale University Press, New Haven). Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: 
Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 273-286. 
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“There are good reasons to believe that white-collar criminals generally behave more 
rationally than street offenders; the latter routinely choose to offend in hedonistic 
contexts of street culture where drug consumption and the presence of other males 
clouds judgment and the ability to calculate beforehand. Many white-collar workers 
by contrast live and work in worlds that promote, monitor, and reward prudent 
decision-making. They are significantly older to boot and more capable, presumably, 
of exercising the greater care and caution of persons with some maturity”204.  
To conclude it seems that, if the rationality assumption constitutes a foundation for 
the microeconomics and law and economics disciplines, some law scholars remain 
skeptical about applying it to legal matters. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis 
relating to insider trading, and consequently to securities matter, it may be considered 
that this framework is likely to offer conditions that are comparable to those of the 
rational market decisions previously described. Consequently, according to the law 
and economics literature, individuals are assumed to behave rationally in this study. 
Starting from this premise, the next step consists in determining what means are 
available to public enforcement in order to obtain an individual’s commitment, given 
that agents seek to maximize their satisfaction. A homo economicus’ behavior is then 
considered to be the solution to the maximization of objectives under constraint so as 
to reach individual equilibrium. The purpose of this study is to offer a clear picture of 
the different enforcement tools available to create an adequate internalization that will 
deter the potential wrongdoer to commit the banned behavior of insider trading, 
relating to the choice of form, nature and type of the sanctions in order to maximize 
social welfare.  
Deterrence theory  
The deterrence power and goal of law is a concept that was first developed by authors 
such as Charles Montesquieu205, Cesare Beccaria206 and Jeremy Bentham207. For 
instance Bentham, strongly influenced by a utilitarian perspective, developed specific 
rules for the purpose of better proportioning punishment to offences208, claiming that 
the agent who is considering taking action behaves empirically as an economist, 
weighting advantages and disadvantages that may derive from the offense209. 
According to him, happiness is a composite of maximum pleasure and minimum pain 
and each individual seeks to maximize its own welfare according to the utilitarian 
principle. Legislation by the state provides four sanctions (political, moral, physical, 
and religious) that shape pleasures and pains. It is then possible to find a link between 
the search for the maximization of interest and the violation of law. These notions 
                                                           
204 Shover, N., Hochstetler, A., 2005. Choosing White-Collar Crime(Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge).p.3. 
205 Montesquieu, C., 1748. De l'Esprit des Loix(Chatelain, Genève). 
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edition.(Cambridge University Press). Pedrazzi, C., 1985. Le Rôle Sanctionnateur du Droit 
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were reintroduced almost two centuries later by authors such as Gary Becker210, 
Steven Shavell211 and Nuno Garoupa212.  
Wrongdoers’ incentives generally diverge from the socially optimal incentives; this 
refers to the economic concept of moral hazard. An enforcement system should aim 
at aligning the wrongdoer’s incentives with the social ones, at the lowest possible 
cost. In turn, the goal of an optimal enforcement system is to achieve a welfare 
objective by influencing people’s behavior, deterring them from committing unlawful 
acts and inducing compliance with the laws through the threat of sanctions213. More 
particularly, individual deterrence is aimed at preventing recidivism while general 
deterrence concerns people who have not yet been sanctioned214.  
Gary Becker’s crime deterrence model offers a comprehensive normative framework 
for optimal deterrence where individuals are rational and respond to incentives 
created by law and its enforcement215. In this model, a criminal is considered to 
decide rationally to commit an offense if the expected utility obtained from 
committing the crime exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and resources 
for other activities.216 Therefore rational agents decide to comply or not to comply 
with the law after having calculated the benefits versus the costs217. Values that are 
not direct market prices are integrated in the calculation218 through the assessment of 
both intangible and monetary valuable outcomes. 
The expected benefits of crime are obtained by the multiplication of the probability of 
success by the benefits (monetary and non-monetary) of the crime, which include the 
value of the material goods, the amount of money, or even the intangible valuable 
outcomes. 
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The expected sanction sets the level of deterrence and should be optimal in order to 
incentivize individuals to adopt a socially desirable behavior and lead to a 
maximization of social welfare. If the deterrence level is not optimal, it implies either 
under-deterrence (excessive social costs on society) or over-deterrence (excessive 
costs on individual taking excessive precautions)219, which are both inefficient220.  
The magnitude of a sanction sets the severity of a punishment in accordance with the 
proportionality principle and should be based on the gain or on the harm derived from 
the violation221 (this will be adressed in Chapter 3).  
The expected sanction is obtained by the multiplication of the probability of the 
detection and conviction of the perpetrator (probability of sanction) by the monetary 
value of the legal sanction and the value of any non-pecuniary losses he may suffer, 
such as reputation (magnitude of sanction)222.  
S = m . P 
P = Pd . Pc 
S = expected sanction, 
m = magnitude of the sanction, 
P = probability of sanction, 
Pd = probability of detection, 
Pc = probability of conviction 
Apart from deterrence, there is a wide variety of potential normative goals amongst 
which many involving non-economic considerations. The most common secondary 
objectives attributed to the law, by law and economics scholars, are distribution, 
compensation, punishment, rehabilitation and incapacitation223.  
Internalizing externalities 
According to Stigler, the very first goal of enforcement is to achieve a degree of 
compliance with the rule of prescribed behavior that society believes it can afford224. 
In order to reach a socially optimal level of violation of legal norms, enforcement 
agents dispose of different natures of enforcement powers and different forms, natures 
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and types of sanctions. The resources spent on enforcement efforts have to be 
balanced with the gains they procure. Optimal enforcement is achieved when the total 
costs for society of such harmful activities, including the costs of enforcement, are 
minimized225. The enforcement of a rule is never complete precisely because of its 
cost.  
In addition, the economics of enforcement regard the optimal control of negative 
externalities226. Harmful activities are considered as such when their social costs 
outweigh their social benefits227. Most harmful activities create negative externalities 
by having a negative impact on third parties.  
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen define externalities as the external costs of an 
exchange in a market. In the theory of welfare economics, externalities are considered 
as one type of market failure. The reasoning is that, if these external costs are not 
internalized, the wrongdoer will continue his activity, thereby creating a negative 
externality because of the difference between the “private marginal cost and social 
marginal cost”228. Market failures involving a negative-externality can be corrected by 
liability rules229, regulation230 or Market based instrument such as taxation231 inter 
alia. 
To conclude, building on the basic idea that law is a means that can create incentives 
affecting the wrongdoer’s utility and hence his decision, an optimal enforcement 
power should aim at internalizing externalities by inducing actors to incorporate all 
relevant costs and benefits of their activities into their decision-making. 
Consequently, the form, nature and type of the control devices should vary with the 
form, nature and type of the externalities caused232. The objective is to create optimal 
incentives through legal policies in order to achieve compliance or deterrence. 
Internalization is achieved when individuals do not perpetrate an illegal act because 
they want to avoid the sanction induced by it. Law and economics literature is very 
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concerned with the structures of the deterrence mechanisms and compliance 
incentives created by alternative instruments.  
(II) ABOUT THE INSIDER TRADING POTENTIAL HARM, GAIN AND 
PROBABILITIES OF DETECTION AND CONVICTION 
In discussing the appropriateness of different insider trading law enforcement 
regimes, the models for determining optimal enforcement require particular attention 
regarding the following variables: the level of potential social harm arising from 
insider trading, the level of gain associated to insider trading, the probability of 
detection and the probability of conviction of insider trading. Special attention should 
be given to this section as it introduces all of these dimensions. Further discussions 
will refer to this section in the following Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Insider trading potential harm 
 
In chapter 2, the controversy concerning insider trading was presented from both legal 
and economic perspectives. The legal theory argues in favor of the insider trading 
regulation because of its immorality233 and its undesirability from a distributional 
justice theory perspective234. 
To appreciate the controversy concerning insider trading based on economic 
arguments, it is necessary to balance the beneficial effects of insider trading against 
its detrimental effects.  
In the interests of clarity, the present paragraph condenses the strongest arguments 
presented by the economic literature claiming social harm due to insider trading. Most 
of these arguments are based on commensurable measures established through 
empirical methods, already presented in Chapter 2. To some extent this paragraph 
may seem to repeat what is already contained in Chapter 2 but it is necessary that 
these elements appear in a condensed paragraph in this section in order to define 
insider trading potential social harm. As previously mentioned, it is difficult to obtain 
a direct measure for the impact of insider trading. However, the consequences of 
insider trading are observable through the measure of its impact on aggregate 
variables of economic preformances such as the informativeness of the prices, the  
cost of capital, the concentration of shareholding or the stock liquidity. The main lines 
of the findings provided by the empirical literature are the following. First of all, 
insider trading has been presented as leading to stock prices that are less efficient in 
providing information235. The informativeness of a firm’s stock price is an important 
variable of economic performance because it provides information about the risk of 
investing in a firm and therefore participates in defining the demand for its 
stocks236.Another major detrimental effect created by insider trading denounced by 
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the scholarly literature is to raise the cost of capital237 (directly related to the cost of 
trading and the cost of information238). The cost of a firm’s capital provides relevant 
indications on its capacity to raise new capital and therefore indirectly informs 
investor about its potential future performance. Insider trading has been further 
described as impairing stock market liquidity239. Liquidity is a direct indicator of the 
attractiveness of a market because it provides information about the efficiency of 
capital allocation. 
 
In assessing potential insider trading harm, if the focus was only made on the 
detrimental effects of insider trading that should be internalized, the reasoning would 
be biased. The whole beneficial effects caused by insider trading supported by the 
opponents of insider trading regulation also have to be considered. From an economic 
perspective, potential insider trading harm measurement is therefore controversial. 
 
Insider trading gain 
 
Apart from the insider trading harm, the insider trading gain is a central element to 
consider in the framework of this study. For instance, several empirical studies 
established the average take resulting from an insider trading act. First, a study of 
Meulbroek regrouped data concerning 320 individuals charged with insider trading by 
the SEC during the period between 1980 and 1989. For this period the average gain or 
loss avoided was $24,124240. Insider trading’s gain has also been the object of a study 
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of Geis and Szockyi241 published in 2002. They regrouped data concerning 452 
individuals in the USA that were charged by the Federal Government for profiting or 
avoiding losses through insider trading. They established that, in the USA, the median 
gain or loss avoided was $25,800. Similarly, a paper of Frino et al. published in 2013 
regrouped a panel of 296 trades. They collected data from litigation reports available 
on the SEC website regarding the period between 1996 and 2004. They found that the 
median gain or loss avoided for this period was $26,860242. They further added that 
the mean gain or loss avoided was $215,696. This would suggest that a few insiders 
accomplish astronomical takes. The later are the cases that are released in the media. 
The average gain or loss appears to be stable through the decades and approximates a 
median of $25,594. How can one interpret if this amount has to be considered as 
large, medium or small? In the same time period, an average take for a street crime 
was definitely lower. For instance in 2002, the average loss in a bank robbery was 
$4,763, whereas a residential burglary averaged a loss of $1,549243 (while US income 
per capita was $30,906244). Therefore, the median gain or loss avoided thanks to an 
insider trading crime, whilst far from the astronomical numbers announced in the 
media, can still be considered as high if compared to an average take in a regular 
street crime, or to the US income per capita. However, an average board member, 
who could potentially be engaged in insider trading, does not necessarily resemble the 
average American; indeed, his average income can be presumed to be significantly 
higher. 
 
Insider traders earn considerably higher returns than do non-informed traders245. From 
this respect, it could be considered as a tempting lucrative act to perpetrate. However, 
looking at insider trading law enforcement statistics (see Chapter 5), it seems that it is 
not a rampant phenomenon. Empirical studies suggest otherwise. For instance, some 
authors do not hesitate to even qualify it as one of the “most common violations of the 
federal securities laws”246 or as a “widespread and, within certain circles, accepted”247 
practice. In a recent paper, Laura Beny demonstrated that illegal insider trading has 
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been intensified these past years248. The scholarly literature interprets the low 
enforcement level of insider trading as being the result of difficulties in both detecting 
and proving insider trading, rather than its actual rarity. 
 
Probability of detection of insider trading 
 
The empirical literature provides relevant elements that demonstrate the difficulty of 
detecting insider trading and suggests that a considerable part of insider trading 
remains undetected. The reasons seth forth are usually related to the immaterial and 
diffuse nature of insider trading, to the limited relevance of the methods used to detect 
insider trading and finally to the insufficience of enforcement efforts and expenses 
used by the public powers.  
 
(i) About the diffuse and immaterial nature of insider trading 
 
Considering the mere nature of insider trading, one could spontaneously conceive 
that it is a difficult act to detect. Two major characteristics of insider trading, both 
related to its precise nature, support this intuitive belief: its immateriality and its 
diffuseness.  
 
First of all, the immaterial nature of insider trading makes it difficult to detect. Unlike 
other white-collar crimes that require a positive act of theft, embezzlement, copy of 
documents, computer hacking, surveillance equipment manipulation, etc. insider 
trading involves the use of legitimately acquired confidential information, often 
within the context of a regular professional activity. The offense is based on the 
confidential nature of the information. Empirical literature seems to establish that 
insider trading is more the result of one’s personal or occupational position than of 
his specific skills, effort or technological knowledge249. A typical illustration is the 
case of the tippees who receive information. The tippees do not need to be particularly 
skilled or trained to trade on the basis of the information. Things may become more 
complicated when insiders use elaborate means to cover up their illegal trade by 
using off-shore accounts, nominee accounts, proxies and intermediaries that are 
difficult to identify250. Hence, insider trading occurs in an internationalized securities 
market framework in which a multitude of actors are involved. In conclusion, due to 
its immaterial nature, insider trading does not leave tracks, which partially explains 
the difficulty to detect it.  
 
In addition to being immaterial, insider trading is also characterized as being 
dispersed251, i.e. scattered over a large group. For instance, when an insider buys 
stocks or when informed insiders trade on inside information, any uninformed 
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investor trading against them will lose in the transaction252.  These people are not easy 
to identify because they could be any potential buyers who didn’t have the 
opportunity to buy. When an insider sells stock, the injured parties are the actual 
buyers of the stock, in which case they are easier to identify. Moreover, depending on 
whether the insider traded in order to avoid a loss or to make a gain, the potential 
victims could either be within the insider’s corporation (if he traded to avoid a loss 
that he saw coming, subsequently causing the other shareholders to suffer the loss) or 
outside of the corporation (potentially the whole group of third parties who could 
have been interested in purchasing the shares if they had had knowledge of the private 
information on which the insider traded to make his gain). In both cases, but 
especially in the case where the insider aims to make a profit, the potential number of 
victims affected by the insider trading can be quite large. The injured parties can 
include investors, shareholders and corporations.  
All in all, insider trading is “secretive” because of its very immaterial and diffuse 
nature. Hence, the probability of detecting insider trading may be considered 
correspondingly very low253. 
 
(ii) About the methods and the sources of detection of insider trading 
  
Considering the probability of detection of insider trading, special attention should be 
given to the empirical studies dedicated to the analysis of methods of detection and 
the sources of detection. They provide relevant information and suggest interesting 
conclusions. 
 
The literature describes that, in order to detect insider trading, “surveillance officers 
look for suspicious events - typically, large price changes on large volume”254. Most 
of the competent authorities in charge of detecting insider trading use techniques of 
detection that are based upon a restrictive number of criteria. Larry Harris, former 
Chief Economist at the SEC from July 2002 to June 2004, described these criteria as 
follow: A very first criterion of detection is trading with concurrent abnormal price 
movements255 (based on the measurement of the occurrence of abnormal returns 
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before sensitive markets announcements to determine suspect price movements256). A 
second criterion of detection is trading with concurrent abnormal volume movements. 
A third criterion of detection, though less important, is trading with apparent access to 
the sensitive information. 
 
Considering the methods of detection of insider trading, a part of the scholarly 
literature openly critiques the use of algorithms to examine abnormal trading activities 
and detect insider trading257. It argues that a significant volume of insider trading may 
not be detected through this technique. Meulbroek provides relevant data supporting 
this approach. Her study regroups data concerning 320 individuals charged with 
insider trading by the SEC during the period between 1980 and 1989. It provides the 
different sources of SEC case investigation by percentage of insider trading 
episodes258. The first source of cases appears to be the public complaint (41% of 
cases), followed by the security exchange referrals (31%) and only in third position 
only, the SEC investigations, source of 9% of detected cases.  
 
The fact that public complaint is actually the first source of detection may provide 
pertinent information. As already addressed, given the immaterial and diffuse nature 
of insider trading and in the context of a globalized market, the potential number of 
victims affected by insider trading can be quite large. One of the most sensitive 
aspects of private detection within insider trading prohibition hence reside in 
dispersed ownership. Therefore, the probability of someone knowing the existence of 
an insider trading seems quite limited. From that respect, it is most often relatives or 
close relations of the insider trader who are able to find out about the insider trading 
act, thanks to their shared intimate relationship. Given this relationship, it is likely for 
them to also benefit from the gain of the act. It is not surprising that Meulbroek 
explains that most public complaint cases arise from a person with whom the insider 
trader is having personal problems, such as ex-wives/husbands, former employee or 
fellow conspirators259. Therefore, in order to file a public complaint, the plaintiffs 
must know the insider trader well enough to find out about the act and also have a 
personal motivation to do so. One can imagine that this constitutes a particularly rare 
scenario. Nevertheless, it constitutes the first source of SEC case investigations.  
The second source of cases are the stock exchange referrals (cases referred by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, AMEX, New York Stock Exchange, 
Regional or the Chicago Board Of Trade). The cases that are initiated by an SEC 
investigation without an outside referral arrive in third position, with only 9% of the 
cases. The press stories (9%) constitute a source of cases equal to the SEC 
investigations. The remaining categories are the issuer referral (3%), that refer to the 
situation where the firm in which the inside trader makes the transaction contacts the 
SEC, the bidder referral (1%) occurs when the bidding firm in a takeover contacts the 
SEC, broker referral (2%) arises when a broker realizes that a client trades before a 
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public announcement. Another type of source is when the SEC investigates a 
company for another reason and randomly discovers insider trading violations (1%). 
 
In the study of Meulbroek, the SEC case investigations initiated by exchange 
referrals, by issuer or bidder referrals, by press stories, or by the SEC without an 
outside referral, are considered to be based on the detection methods described by 
Harris (involving abnormal volume or price movements of the security, or apparent 
access to sensitive information (direct insider)). On the contrary, the SEC case 
investigations that are initiated by public complaints, by broker referral or by the SEC 
in the framework of another investigation constitute the sources of cases that are 
detected with methods that do not involve abnormal price or volume movements. This 
later method represents the source of about 42% of the SEC  case investigations. This 
means that more than the half of the insider trading cases prosecuted by the SEC 
could not have been detected with the methods used by the SEC.  
  
A paper of Frino et al. published in 2013 confirms these numbers. They collected data 
concerning 296 trades from litigation reports available on the SEC website, in the 
time period between 1996 and 2004. They found that, out of the 296 illegal trades 
they studied, 185 (62,5%) were detected through one of the three main methods 
described in the above mentioned study of Harris260. They further emphasized that the 
111 remaining cases were detected by different methods (37,5%).  
 
Meulbroek’s analysis further argues that the sample of insider trading that is not 
discovered thanks to a method involving abnormal volume or price movements is 
likely to exhibit resemblance to the undetected sample of informed trades261. Indeed, 
according to her, the method used by the public agencies to detect insider trading 
allows to detect the illegal trades that respond to calibrated characteristics of volume 
or prices movement. On the contrary, the part of alternatively detected insider trading 
involves uncalibrated characteristics, and furthermore, she suggests that it is likely 
that the non-detected insider traders might exhibit even more furtive behaviors262.  
 
These studies suggest the existence of a considerable amount of undetected insider 
trading that corresponds to the illegal trades that escape the competent authority’s 
detection techniques. These are not denounced by a public complaint, nor randomly 
discovered. These authors does not intend to measure this part of undetected insider 
trading because the enterprise would be very speculative. Nevertheless, they however 
suggest that the part of alternatively detected trades provides relevant information 
about the randomness of detecting the less calibrated and the more furtive types of 
insider trading acts.  
 
In the perspective of this study, the major contribution of Harris, Meulbroek and 
Frino’s papers resides in two main aspects. First of all, they emphasize that the 
detection methods used by the authorities are based on specific criteria that may not 
be adapted to detect every kind of insider trading. Hence, these authors identify that a 
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significant volume of insider trading is detected through processes that do not involve 
abnormal price or volume movements as criteria of detection263. These studies suggest 
a weakness in the available methods of detection and used by the competent 
authorities. 
 
(iii) About the resources dedicated to public enforcement of insider trading laws 
 
An additional and very concrete aspect of the probability of detection of insider 
trading relates to the resources dedicated to public enforcement of insider trading 
laws.  
 
The prohibition of insider trading is understood to prohibit not only the trading on the 
basis of material, non-public information but also the disclosing or “tipping” of this 
information to others and finally assisting someone engaged in both of these 
activities. In turn, insider trading may potentially concern every information-specific 
trade. The question that arises is whether the enforcement efforts and expenses are 
adapted to enable a decent detection rate of insider trading, considering its nature and 
the multitude of information-specific trades that it potentially involves.  
 
The resources dedicated to public enforcement of insider trading laws may be 
assessed according to two main variables: the staff and the budget. They allow to 
indirectly measure the effort of insider trading law enforcement and therefore, to 
indirectly estimate the probability of detection of insider trading. 
 
Table 20 in Chapter 5 of this study reports the resource-based measures of public 
enforcement264. The first variable reported in this table is the size of the regulatory 
staff dedicated to the whole range of activities relative to market abuse sanctioning 
(full time equivalent) divided by the country’s population in millions for the year 
2005. It corresponds to the “staff per million population”.  Eight Member States are 
considered. For these countries, the staff per million population goes from 4,43 for 
Germany (followed by France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, United Kingdom) 
until 315,12 for Luxembourg. The average staff per million population is 48,56 while 
the median is only 11,13.  
Furthermore, the report “Actual use of sanctioning powers under MAD” issued by the 
European Securities and Market Authority provides relevant information about the 
number of staff of the administrative competent authorities dedicated to the market 
abuse sanctioning in most of the European Member States. The difference with the 
precited statistics is that it does not include the criminal enforcement data. According 
to this report, administrative enforcement of market abuse laws involves 10 staff 
members in sixteen Member States, between 10 and 30 staffs members in eight 
Member States, between 60 and 80 staff members in three Member States and more 
than 120 staff members in one Member State265. The activities related to market abuse 
sanctioning are defined as ranging from the detection of possible abnormal movement 
on the market to the imposition of sanctions. However, in most of the Member States, 
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competent authorities declared that between two-third and half of the staff were 
actually dedicated to the activities of market supervision. Note that these numbers 
should be minored because it does not only concern insider trading but market abuses.  
 
The second variable considered to appreciate the resources dedicated to insider 
trading enforcement is obviously the budget allocated to the enforcement of market 
abuse law. It is reported in table 20 of Chapter 5 as the “budget per billion US$ of 
GDP”. It provides information about the budget in $ divided by the country’s GDP in 
billions of US$ for the year 2005. The budget per billion US$ of GDP goes from 
12,90 for Germany, followed by Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, United 
Kingdom until 473,89 for Luxembourg. The average budget per billion US$ of GDP 
is 38,81 while the median is 91,11.  
 
The very first comment that can be made about these numbers is that the Member 
States do not dedicate the same enforcement efforts to the detection of market abuse. 
Amongst the eight considered countries, the rank per order of staff per million 
population is similar to the rank per order of budget per billion of GDP. The 
appreciation of this rough data is difficult as it really depends on the context of each 
country such as its financial activity and the other policy measures. However, 
absolute numbers of staff and budget allocated to market abuse enforcement appear to 
be quite low, especially considering the very nature of insider trading. This has led 
scholars such as Laura Beny to question the appropriateness of the level of resources 
dedicated to insider trading law enforcement266. 
 
To conclude, several studies suggest that insider trading remains rarely detected. 
According to the literature, this low probability of detection of insider trading seems 
to be mainly explained by its immaterial and diffuse nature, combined with a limited 
efficacy of the methods of detection used by the public authorities and the 
insufficiency of staff and budget resources dedicated to insider trading detection.  
 
Once detected, insider trading has to be prosecuted in order to obtain a conviction of 
the perpetrator.  
 
Probability of conviction of insider trading 
 
Insider trading involves the trading on the basis of material non-public information 
(as well as tipping and assisting). The prosecution and conviction of insider trading is 
therefore confronted to the establishment of major elements such as the material and 
the non-public qualities of the information on which the trade is based. Under certain 
circumstances, the intention of the insider also has to be proven. 
 
(i) About the material and non-public qualities of the information 
 
The definition of “material” and “non-public” are established in case law. 
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Information is considered to be material if there is a substantial probability that a 
reasonable investor relies on it in order to decide to realize an investment decision.267 
It seems to be very clear in the definitions given by law or cases, but the materiality of 
an information and the distinction between its legal and illegal use is subtle to 
apprehend in real life. Professor Orts mentions a relevant concrete example that 
allows to understand this subtlety: Imagine that a trader, in the framework of his 
function, is able to observe that a chief executive is meeting with a merger-and-
acquisition lawyer. If this trader decides to trade on the personal assumption that a 
merger is going to happen soon, he is realizing a legal trade. However, if this same 
trader had obtained information from an insider telling him about the merger, then the 
trade would have been illegal.268  
 
Any undisclosed material information acquired during the professional activity, or 
through a tip or a rumor, can not be used for realizing a trade without breaking the 
law. The limit between inside information and legitimate information is very thin. 
Furthermore, from a practical point of view, it should be mentionned that the 
materiality of an information is often determined after its public release and mainly 
considering its effect upon the market.269 The materiality of an information resides in 
its quality to be related to facts that may affect the company’s substantial 
development or financial results.270 For example they can include financial results, 
acquisitions or mergers offers, tender offers, joint ventures, investments, project or 
product developments, any changes in assets, dividends, debt, stocks, equity, 
litigation, changes in key personnel such as management or control, bankruptcies, etc. 
In turn, many types of information can actually be regarded as material. It is 
impossible to create an exhaustive list of types of information that can be considered 
as material. An information is not material per se271 but it depends on the very context 
of the company272 and therefore, the establishement of the materiality of an 
information requires specific appreciation of all of circumstances. 
 
The other fundamental aspect to establish in order to prosecute an insider trading case 
is the non-public quality of the information on which the trade is based. From a 
general point of view, information is considered to be non-public if it is not available 
                                                           
267 See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), for an information to be 
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33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, File No.S7-31-99, RIN 3235-AH82. 
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to investors generally273. If the information has been disclosed, or if the company has 
realized filings with the SEC and press releases, then the information is considered  
public.  
 
The successful prosecution of an individual for illegal insider trading implies the 
establishment of the realization of a trade on the basis of material non-public 
information. This process is difficult, and has even been qualified as “impossible” by 
Larry Harris, former Chief Economist at the SEC from July 2002 to June 2004.274 
 
(ii) About the establishement of a guilty mind for prosecuting 
 
Apart from the establishment of the aforementioned elements, the prosecution of an 
individual for illegal insider trading may require the establishment of mens rea.  
However, the level of culpability required to establish illegal insider trading differs 
depending on whether the conviction is made under tort, administrative or criminal 
law. Most of the time, the establishment of a certain level of culpability is only 
required under criminal law and differs from one country to another.  
In the US the essential differences between criminal and civil enforcement actions 
reside in the element of intent and in the burden of proof275. To impose a civil 
sanction, it must be proven that the defendant acted “recklessly”; while for criminal 
sanction276, it must be proven that the insider acted “wilfully”.  
Amongst the European Member States, the proof of intent is required to criminally 
sanction a market abuse in sixteen of the Member States277. The report “Actual Use of 
Sanctioning Powers under MAD” issued by the European Securities and Market 
Authority reports that the level of culpability required to impose a criminal sanction in 
a market abuse case differs from “negligence” to “intent”: in four Member States, 
guilt has to be proven beyond any reasonable doubt, in five Member States, the 
establishement of negligence is sufficient, in one Member State gross negligence may 
suffice, while in other three Member States, the “indirect intent”278 is enough. 
Moreover, in the absence of tangible proof of insider trading, it is possible to use a 
body of “serious, specific and convergent” evidence to help prove it, in 23 of the 
Member States. Concerning the administrative prosecution, the intent is not required 
to establish an insider trading in any of the Member States, except in Estonia279.  
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The establishment of any level of guilt proves to be extremely difficult in insider 
trading matters due to their very nature. The limited empirical evidence available 
seems to indicate that insider trading is poorly criminally prosecuted in Europe. One 
problem is that the evidentiary thresholds for proving insider trading in criminal law 
may be very high. For instance, the literature commented that a high burden of proof 
reduces the probability of successful prosecution280. Indeed, in order to avoid costly 
judicial error the most stringent sanctions are usually secured with high standards of 
proof requirements and are consequently less likely to result in a successful 
prosecution281. For instance, in the precise case of insider trading, condemnation 
relies on circumstantial evidence, which is often difficult to obtain, such as the 
content of phone calls or informal discussions282. Indeed, insider trading is largely 
inferential and the establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, common for 
criminal standard, tend to be difficult283. It leads to the conclusion that the poor 
enforceability due to the burden of proof might undermine the deterrent power of the 
criminal law. For instance, some empirical studies show the importance of the actual 
enforcement in making insider trading laws effective284. A study of Frijns, Gilbert and 
Tourani-Rad shows that the trade-off between severity and enforceability makes the 
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impact of criminal sanction ambiguous285. They examine the deterrence effect of 
criminal law by studying the impact of the introduction of criminal sanctions for 
insider trading in New Zealand in 2008 “without other change”. Their findings 
suggest that the weak enforceability of criminal law, mainly due to the high standard 
of proof, outweighs the associated increased magnitude of the sanctions. Going 
further they even show that the enactment of this poorly enforceable stringent 
criminal law led to a worsening of the financial measures for the cost of trading, 
degree of information asymmetry, and probability of informed trading. They conclude 
that the introduction of the most severe type of sanctions through criminal law is 
ineffective because of the lack of successful prosecutions mainly due to high standard 
of proof286. Hence, they argue that introducing stringent criminal law but not 
enforcing it because of procedural difficulties could even have a potentially perverse 
effect. However, some argue that one has to take into account that these studies relate 
to the situation in New Zealand, being one of the smaller developed markets in the 
world287. Therefore these conclusions might not necessarily apply to the same extent 
to larger markets.  
 
(iii) About the number of acquittals  
 
The information that may provide a good element in appreciating the difficulty to 
prosecute insider trading relates to the number of acquittals that take place under 
insider trading prosecutions.  
The report “Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD” issued by the European 
Securities and Market Authority provides information about the insider trading cases 
administratively prosecuted and the insider trading cases criminally prosecuted but 
originated by the administrative authority. In Europe, for the years 2008, 2009 and 
2010, a total of 47,7%288 of the administrative cases resulted in an acquittal. 
Regarding criminal prosecution, for the same period, a total of 62,7%289 of the 
criminal cases resulted in an acquittal. An acquittal means that the judgement found 
that the defendant was not found guilty of  breaking the law. The cases discharged 
therefore include the cases where the individuals were found innocent, but also the 
cases were the establishment of the elements of materiality and proof of intent could 
not be established. In the end, the percentage of acquittals is instructive for 
determining the probability of conviction of insider trading. It is of 52,3% for 
administrative insider trading and 37,3% for criminal insider trading. 
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Conclusion 
 
These aforementioned elements concerning the rationality, deterrence, internalization, 
potential harm and the gain associated with insider trading, as well as the probability 
of detection and conviction of insider trading, are central in this study. Indeed, as 
addressed in the previous section dedicated to the deterrence issue, the magnitude of a 
sanction should be based on the gain or on the harm derived from the violation.290 The 
combination of the probability of detection and the probability of conviction results in 
the probability of sanction. Finally, the expected sanction is obtained by the 
multiplication of the probability of sanction by the magnitude of the sanction291. 
Consequently, these elements are central in setting the level of deterrence and 
designing an optimal enforcement policy. 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, the choice between private and public enforcement, as well as the 
choice of form, nature and type of the control of devices will be considered.  
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CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING 
LAWS 
“Whatever the optimal degree of internalization of a negative externality, there is a 
debate about whether it is more efficiently achieved by private or public 
enforcement”292.  
This study mainly focuses on public enforcement of insider trading laws, therefore the 
private enforcement issue will not be extensively developed. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to begin by drawing the line between private and public enforcement of 
insider trading laws. This line may blur when it comes to discussing the design of 
optimal enforcement policies because the most efficient solution may well be a 
combination of private and public features293. Consequently, the aim here is to 
describe the circumstances under which one nature of enforcement may be more 
efficient and appropriate than another, and to apply it to the specific case of insider 
trading.  
Public law enforcement is the use of governmental agents to detect and sanction 
violators of legal rules294. It can take two forms: administrative and criminal law 
enforcement. On the contrary, private enforcement of law is operated by the civil 
court, which establishes a relationship between private parties that have initiated the 
enforcement. Both private and public enforcement of insider trading laws have 
strengths and weaknesses.  
Comparing the private and public enforcement of laws in terms of deterrence, the law 
and economics literature alternatively introduces notions of substitutability and 
complementarity of these modes of enforcement. In the 1970s, Gary Becker and 
George Stigler consecrated a substitute role of private and public enforcements295. 
Indeed, they argued that both of these methods of enforcement could exercise 
equivalent deterrent effects. Opposed to this, Landes and Posner claimed that the 
deterrent effect of private enforcement was limited, especially in cases where a high 
probability of detection was necessary296. This position tends to support the 
complementarity of private and public enforcements, which was then further 
developed.  
The debate over public enforcement versus private enforcement is associated with the 
question of state intervention and its role in determining and imposing sanctions297. 
The issue addressed in this section is the examination of the circumstances under 
which public enforcement of insider trading laws is preferable to private enforcement 
from an economic perspective. The literature is very prolific concerning this issue. 
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Authors such as Becker, Posner, Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, Shavell and Polinsky298 
have, implicitly or explicitly, established a certain number of economic criteria under 
which the use of public or private nature of enforcement mechanism is preferred. 
These criteria are applied to the specific case of insider trading. 
If the first criteria in arbitrating the desirable public or private nature of enforcement 
of law relates to the costs (3.1) there are strong arguments attached to the probability 
of violation detection, to the level of harm and gain (3.2) and to the incentives for law 
enforcement (3.3), for which the society can not exclusively rely on private 
enforcement. In the last section of this chapter these criteria are applied to the specific 
case of insider trading (3.4). 
3.1 COSTS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
There is one decisive reason why society must forego complete enforcement of the 
rule: enforcement is costly299. The extent of law enforcement depends on the amount 
of resources devoted to the task. Following the optimal enforcement theory, 
enforcement costs should be lower than or equal to the benefits in terms of 
deterrence300. This means that an optimal level of enforcement exists. Indeed, it is too 
expensive to deter all norm violation. If two enforcement instruments can procure the 
same deterrence effect, the cheapest one is socially desirable.  
One of the main differences raised by the literature between private and public 
enforcement resides in the costs of formulating safety rules, of investigative powers 
(monitoring and detecting) and enforcement costs of their sanctions301. It is important 
to briefly describe the costs associated to each different mode of enforcement to take 
this parameter into consideration. 
Private law is considered to be a relatively cheap instrument, composed of open 
norms that are easy to formulate and that only have to be specified after a violation 
has occurred, i.e. ex post302. Private enforcement costs include system costs and 
monitoring costs, both considered relatively low. Indeed, many cases are settled 
outside the court and thus the system costs are relatively low. Litigation costs include 
informational costs associated with the investigation of the law infringement, the 
procedural costs and the costs associated with the establishment of the damage and 
the causal link between the infringement and the harm. In cases that are trialed, the 
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costs of lawyers and courts have to be added to the system costs. To summarize, the 
costs of private enforcement include time, effort, private legal expenses, and public 
expenses of conducting trials303.  
Public enforcement can be administrative or criminal304. 
Administrative law is composed of norms formulated ex ante, implying costs of 
normative set-up, formulation and maintenance. Regulations can be issued by 
different authorities, which can lead to problems of inconsistency305 and competence 
competitions. Administrative enforcement of laws usually implies successive steps 
such as monitoring of regulatory requirement, inspection, warning, and investigation 
by the agency staff and possibly by specialists. These actions are expensive as they 
entail the verification of all behaviors (not only the deviant ones must be checked). 
Finally, administrative law does not provide for socially incapacitating sanctions, 
which are the most costly sanctions to enforce. 
Criminal law is associated with the highest enforcement costs306. The different stages 
of criminal prosecution include investigation, interrogation, collection of evidence, 
and possible detention. The litigation is usually longer than for an administrative 
enforcement307 because of the high procedural requirements308. There can usually be 
up to two appeals. The people involved in the criminal procedure include the 
Prosecutor, the investigator, the lawyers, the police, the judge and possibly the center 
of incarceration staff. Criminal sanctions may imply social incapacitation and 
therefore be associated with high enforcement costs. The cost of criminal law 
enforcement includes the maintenance of the entire public system (prison, courts,...).  
In conclusion, private enforcement appears to be less costly than public enforcement. 
Despite that, the use of public enforcement seems indicated under specific 
circumstances.  
3.2 LEVEL OF HARM OR GAIN AND PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 
Becker’s model of optimal enforcement establishes that a violation can be deterred if 
the expected costs of a violation are higher than its benefits309. Expected costs include 
the expected sanction, which results from a combination of the probability of 
detection and the severity of the sanction. Therefore, in order to attain optimal 
deterrence when the probability of detection is low or when the gain or the harm is 
high, more severe sanctions are needed in order to compensate310.  
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A problem with private law enforcement may occur when the probability of detection 
of a wrongdoing can be low or the level of harm or gain high.  
3.2.1 Relative sanction available to private and public laws 
One of the major weaknesses of the private law enforcement lies in the available 
sanctions. It is well known from the literature that if the probability of bringing a law 
suit is less than 100%, the sanction for deterring a potential insider should be 
correspondingly high. Similarly, the more harmful or profitable an activity is, the 
more it should be controlled311 and therefore potentially imply the use of a highly 
coercive enforcement mechanism312. This effect cannot be achieved through private 
enforcement in most European legal systems since tort law in principle only forces the 
injurer to compensate the victim in the amount of damage suffered. These 
compensations are exclusively monetary313. All in all, private law does not aim to 
punish314. Consequently, in cases where the probability of detection is less than 100% 
and the damage or the gain is high, private law remedies may not be considered 
appropriate315. Public enforcement is called for to outweigh the low detection rate and 
high gains.316 Hence, public sanctions have the potential to be set at the adequate 
levels and to be imposed on the offender in one proceeding rather than in numerous 
individual trials before court. Moreover, certain types of non-monetary sanctions, 
such as incarceration, are exclusively available to public enforcement through 
criminal enforcement of law317. Punishment may be necessary for deterrence and 
public enforcement enables to achieve this punishment318. This constitutes a strong 
argument in favor of public enforcement in case of a low probability of detection319, 
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large harm and high gain.  
 
Nevertheless, it could be possible to compensate for the low probability of detection 
through civil law by increasing the amount of compensation payable by the injurer 
under tort law. This is precisely the idea behind the concept of punitive damages that 
may be a way of reducing the necessity of public enforcement.320 The more the 
working of private enforcement can be improved, the less public enforcement is 
needed. However, many legal systems are reluctant to introduce it.  
3.2.2 Relative access to information  
Access to information has a direct impact on the probability of detection and the 
prosecution of a violation. It is an important determinant in designing an 
economically optimal system of enforcement. Hence, information is crucial to initiate 
and to win a lawsuit. In civil court, most of the evidence concerning the case and the 
wrongdoer is provided by the parties themselves321. If private parties have a relative 
informational advantage in discovering law infringement (it isn’t very difficult, 
neither very costly, to discover an infringement, the identity of the law infringer and 
the location of the infringement) then it may not be socially desirable to involve the 
state in enforcement activities. Hayek is famous for sustaining the advantage of the 
market system over a centrally planned economy from an informational efficiency 
point of view322. According to him, private individuals have a comparative advantage 
in getting knowledge about specific circumstances of time and place, which would be 
impossible to communicate to a central authority. This decentralized knowledge may 
be more important than any scientific centralized knowledge.  
On the contrary, an imperfect detection by private parties or an informational 
advantage of the public enforcer in detecting the harm makes public enforcement 
preferable323. Indeed the information related to the infringement itself may be too 
technical or difficult to be identified or understood by a private party324. It can be a 
problem if special expertise is needed for the evaluation of the infringement325. Not 
every victim is in position of or competent enough to identify an injury. In that 
respect, public agencies sometimes possess more extensive expertise, experience and 
resources than private parties326 in the case of specific matters. Public enforcement 
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offers specific tools to enhance revelation of information. It is very typical that public 
enforcers practice controls and inspections of market actors. For instance, monitoring 
disclosure requirements, periodic examination, inspections, and consistent accounting 
rules are publicly enforced measures327 that private parties would find difficult to 
devise on their own, to update, and to enforce even though they may play a key role in 
the private enforcement process328. Moreover, private parties may be given 
investigative powers to detect infringement. Finally, it is also important to mention 
that some aspects of private enforcement directly depend upon public enforcement. 
Indeed, very often the private enforcer can rely on the precited effort of the public 
enforcement and hence follow upon enforcement.  
As addressed in the introduction to Title I, insider trading has the characteristic to be 
immaterial and diffuse. It is most often close-relations to the insider that are able 
know about the illegal insider trading, thanks to their relationship329. From that 
respect private parties may have an advantage in accessing specific information about 
a specific trade. However, in general, the anonymity and the immaterial aspect of the 
securities markets make the identification of the injurer and of the insider trading 
particularly difficult and costly330. Therefore, the difficulties faced by private parties 
in accessing information relative to insider trading may thus hinder private 
litigation.331 
On the contrary, as mentionned in the introduction of Title 1, most of the competent 
authorities in charge of detecting insider trading use techniques of detection that are 
based on the examination of abnormal trading activities 332. A part of the scholarly 
literature openly critiques these methods333 as they argue that a significant volume of 
insider trading may not be detected through them334. 
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Looking at the empirical literature, the study of Meulbroek showed that the first 
source of detection of insider trading cases appears to be the public complaint (41%), 
followed by the security exchange referrals (31%), the SEC investigations (9%) and 
press stories (9%).335 These numbers show that the detection of insider trading cases 
emanate from both private and public sources. This would suggest that both public 
and private enforcer have advantages in accessing information regarding specific 
circumstances of trades. If information about specific circumstances of time and place 
of a trade and the identity of the wrongdoer may sometimes be easier to obtain for 
some private parties, a public enforcer may have an advantage over private parties in 
collecting and processing technical or difficult information related to abnormal prices 
and volume movements due to insider trading. This would therefore testify of a need 
to publicly enforce insider trading regulation. 
3.3 INCENTIVE TO SUE  
In the trade-off between private and public enforcement, one of the most important 
criteria is whether potential victims have sufficient incentives to file a lawsuit under 
private law.  
 
The possible misalignment of the private and social interests336 and motives tend to 
misalign when it comes to investing in law enforcement and filing a lawsuit. This 
explains why individual and social cost-benefit analyses can diverge. In some cases, a 
private party would engage in a case that would never be pursued by the competent 
public authority or even brought to its attention337. This is because, first of all, private 
enforcement accomplishes a direct compensation of the victims, which can 
complement the more indirect compensation of the victim realized by public 
enforcement.  Moreover, limited budgets do not allow the public enforcer to deal with 
all cases. Finally, the selection of cases may sometimes be biased, due to the self-
interest of the agencies.  
As opposed to this, the literature has presented imperfect enforcements of the law by 
private parties. A private victim may for example suffer substantial damage but never 
choose to bring a suit. This section examines the different situations where private 
parties may lack incentive to sue.   
3.3.1 Gains and expenses of private claim  
A plaintiff’s incitation to sue is driven by the gains and expenses of his claims. 
Therefore, private parties are supposed to initiate legal proceedings if the private 
benefits are higher than the private costs338. The private benefits are the monetary 
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transfer obtained from damages while the private costs are the litigation costs 
(informational costs associated to the investigation of the law infringement, the 
procedural costs, and the costs associated to the establishment of the damage and the 
causal link between the infringement and the harm).  
Regarding insider trading, Jackson and Roe report that private securities lawsuits 
usually provide quite small returns to the plaintiffs339. Moreover, a point is also made 
in the literature that private enforcement mechanism may be costly for the private 
party. Indeed, for instance, lawyers obtain large fees from both sides; this can derive 
to a rent seeking340 situation.  
Here again, one possible way to remedy the lack of incentive to sue in civil law due to 
lack of financial compensation, would be in fact to increase the amount of 
compensation payable by the injurer under tort through the use of punitive 
damages341.  
3.3.2 Dispersed ownership, rational apathy and private interests 
“The diffuseness of the losses weakens the effectiveness of private monitoring and 
enforcement and strengthens arguments in favor of public enforcement either through 
regulation or criminalization342”. 
Private parties initiate private enforcement. Therefore, one of the most sensitive 
aspects of private enforcement within insider trading prohibition may reside in 
dispersed ownership. As previously mentioned, the potential number of victims 
affected by insider trading can be quite large, and the harm, diffuse. However, since 
their personal loss can be relatively small, private parties may suffer from what is 
known in the literature as a rational apathy or a rational disinterest problem343, leading 
them to abandon the idea of bringing a lawsuit344. Therefore, dispersed ownership 
may affects shareholders’ capacity to litigate effectively, or to take remedial actions to 
control insider misbehavior345.  
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A solution to the rational apathy problem can be to allow group action.346 Group 
action can either be collective actions or representative actions, brought on by 
associations. However, the literature has pointed out limits to the benefits of 
collective action. Indeed, because of the involvement of private interests, a private 
enforcement may be misdirected347. For instance, class action attorneys may control 
the litigation in a way that does not truly benefit all the dispersed shareholders. Above 
all, in cases where collective action is possible, private enforcement may be subject to 
a free rider effect amongst dispersed investors, in which every victim leaves the 
enforcement efforts up to the other victims in order to benefit from the gains without 
spending their own resources348. 
 
Finally, private enforcement may face the problem of private interests involvement. 
Meulbroek mentioned that private parties who get to know about an insider trading 
act are most often relatives349. For this reason, it is first of all possible that they are in 
position to benefit from the act. In that context they have no motivation to file a 
complaint. Furthermore, the private enforcement of insider trading law may not be 
satisfactory when it concerns a certain kind of corporate wrongdoing. Victims may 
fear retaliation or feel sympathy for the wrongdoer350.  For instance, the literature 
demonstrates that director liability is rare within private shareholder lawsuits351. 
3.3.3 Public harm   
Legal rules are not only made to protect private interests but also more generally to 
protect the interests of society. Hence, in situations where private and social interests 
and incentives do not coincide, there is a risk of under (or over) enforcement of the 
law by private parties352. In this case, a public enforcement mechanism seems to be 
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indicated in order to reach an optimal level of enforcement353. For instance, as 
described in Chapter 2, insider trading matters typically concern public order and 
market interest. The words of US District Judge Richard J. Holwell, who pronounced 
the sentence of Raj Rajaratnam in 2011, illustrate this purpose. He termed insider 
trading as “an assault on the free markets that are fundamental elements of our 
democratic society. There may not be readily identifiable victims, but when the 
playing field is not level, the integrity of the marketplace is called into question and 
the public suffers”.354 
In that respect, it is likely that private parties do not feel personally involved in 
protecting the market interest355 and the financial public order356, nor in achieving 
general deterrence357. Moreover, in practice, the detection of insider trading may 
require the use of centralized oversight of trading markets. In that respect, private 
parties may have difficulties in efficiently maintaining these kinds of functions and 
may not be ideally situated to undertake public regulatory functions used for capital 
markets, mainly because of the transaction costs and the lack of personal interest. On 
the contrary, market and securities public agencies are usually experts and aware of 
the technical infringement, which can allow them to control compliance with 
technically complex rules and prove violations358.  
Consequently, laws relating to types of public harm may be better enforced by public 
mechanisms.359  
3.4 SUMMING-UP: PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT FOR INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
Considering the costs of enforcement, private enforcement should be preferred to 
public enforcement from an economic point of view whenever it can provide an 
equivalent deterrence effect. However, Becker’s model of optimal enforcement 
establishes that in order to attain optimal deterrence when the probability of detection 
is low or when the gain or the harm is high, more severe sanctions are needed in order 
to compensate360. From that perspective, public enforcement has an advantage 
because it provides for the most stringent sanctions. Private litigation of insider 
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trading may constitute a problem, mainly because of low probability of detection, 
potential high harm or gain derived from insider trading and low incentive to enforce 
the law (no sufficient financial gain, rational apathy, personal interest, dispersed 
ownership, public harm).  
In summary, there is a need for stringent sanctions through public enforcement of 
laws in case of: 
 
• Low probability of detection 
• High social harm  
• High gain  
• Low incentive to enforce the law by private parties (No sufficient financial 
gain, rational apathy, dispersed ownership, private interest, public harm) 
 
Considering the characteristics of insider trading potential harm, gain, probability of 
detection, and the low incentives to enforce the law of private parties, the first lesson 
to learn from an economic perspective is that the optimal enforcement of insider 
trading law appears to necessarily be a combination of private and public 
enforcement. The public enforcement is necessary in cases where private enforcement 
is likely to fail. In contemporary Europe, this may often happen for previously 
mentioned reasons. 
 
Furthermore, at a policy level, it may then be very interesting to look at alternatives to 
improve the functioning of private enforcement and address private enforcement’s 
weaknesses, thus reducing the need for public enforcement. As mentioned in this 
chapter, the lack of incentive to enforce the law due to insufficient financial gain or 
low available sanctions of private enforcement may be remedied by increasing 
expected sanction with punitive damages. Moreover, rational apathy could be solved 
by allowing collective actions. To the extent that rational apathy relates to the costs of 
the legal procedure, conditional fee arrangements could also provide an incentive to 
sue for potential victims, thereby shifting the risk of the legal procedure to the 
lawyer.361  
 
In this respect, US law evolved in the past decades towards a facilitation and 
improvement of these specific weaknesses of private enforcement362. Meanwhile, EU 
law reforms tend to develop public enforcement, as it will be discussed in chapter 5 
and 6. It is interesting to note that most European legal systems today largely prohibit 
contingency fees, collective action and punitive damages (although there are some 
nuances). There may be some steps towards considering to allow some of these 
devices363 and collective action as a mechanism, in order to improve private 
enforcement of competition law at EU level. Moreover, in legal doctrine, the 
introduction of punitive damages is actively discussed.364 However, most of these 
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initiatives have not yet been implemented.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE OPTIMAL SANCTIONS FOR INSIDER TRADING: 
EXPECTED SANCTION, FORM AND NATURE 
Once accepted that public enforcement is necessary to enforce insider trading laws, 
the next issue relates to the optimal sanctions for insider trading under a public 
enforcement regime. 
This section develops the theory of optimal enforcement of laws in the very specific 
perspective of optimal sanction matters, in addition to what has been briefly set out in 
the introduction to Title 1. 
The main idea brought to light by the literature is that the mandatory rule of law is not 
sufficient to ensure spontaneous compliance. Indeed, individuals may voluntarily not 
comply with the law365. Nevertheless, deterrence and compliance with the law can be 
strongly influenced by an efficient and coherent system of sanction determination.  
Sanctions may be of different magnitude and probability (4.1), form (monetary or 
non-monetary), type (4.2) and nature (criminal or administrative) (4.3). Their 
implementation does not generate the same costs, neither for the perpetrator nor for 
the enforcer. These parameters should be taken into consideration in order to 
accurately determine how to effectively deter wrongful behaviors and how to 
optimally enforce the law.  
4.1 THE EFFICIENT SANCTION SETTING  
According to the deterrence model mentioned in the introduction to Title 1, numerous 
legal and economics scholars assert that, under the sign of equivalence and 
proportionality, sanctions should be sufficient but not excessive in order to operate 
optimal deterrence366. Magnitude and probability have to be relevantly combined in 
devising an optimal proportional sanction in order to reach the objective of an optimal 
level of deterrence produced in society. Proportionality is supposed to ensure that 
sanctions are more predictable, less arbitrary and thus more appropriate for deterring 
the conduct at issue. This section shows a certain analogy and connection between 
notions contained in the legal, economic and law and economics literature. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the reasoning based on utility and 
proportionality of the sanction is not strictly limited to economics and to common law 
countries: it is also a component that often appears in civil law contexts367. 
                                                           
365  Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. 
366 Poncela, P., 2001. Droit de la Peine(PUF, Paris). 
367 It is relevant, in the framework of this analysis, to mention that these notions of equivalence and 
proportionality of the sanction also appear in “continental civil law” doctrine. As an illustration, the 
author Marc Domingo is particularly interested in the criminal sanction as an iconic representation of 
the sentence: “The function of the sanction is first and foremost to inflict suffering and to be endured 
by he who it strikes as a painful event, of which he fears the perspective and wishes the end. The 
sanction, and above all the imprisonment sanction, is a punishment which, through the mediation of the 
repressive apparatus, a state institution, expresses the resentment of the community when facing a 
major transgression of its rules of conduct. For centuries, criminal justice has thereby been a substitute 
mechanism to private vengeance, which is effectively its prime social utility, but also and foremost the 
instrument of a rational and controlled regulation of public condemnation. From the day in which this 
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4.1.1 Individual level: The sanction as a “price”   
When applying the rational choice theory to legal decision-making, the deterrence 
mechanism resides in the fact that the cost incurred by the penalty (its “price”) is 
greater than the benefit of the offense368.  
Therefore, following the utilitarian perspective, sanctions can be perceived as similar 
to market prices that must be paid in order to adopt a certain behavior, thereby 
translating the willingness of wrongdoers to face sanctions369.  
However, according to Shavell, the willingness to face sanctions for harmful acts does 
not imply that committing such acts is socially desirable. He insists on the 
differentiation of social value and private value of illegal gains370. He argues that 
optimal enforcement of law is precisely characterized by under-deterrence because of 
the costliness of enforcement efforts and limits on sanctions, which in turn may not 
discourage wrongdoers, as ideally expected.371. This position was recently reaffirmed 
in a work of Bowles, Garoupa and Faure372.  
4.1.2 Policy level: Optimal deterrence, expected sanction, probability and magnitude
  
An expected sanction is composed of a probability and a magnitude: the challenge for 
the policymaker is to elaborate an expected liability through an appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                         
function is altered, criminal law grows weak. From the day it fades away, it disappears. It isn’t that the 
deterrent role, or the role of intimidation, the curative, or the correcting functions, are without 
importance. But the ontological identity of criminal law fundamentally lies upon the integrity and the 
prevalence of this concept of punishment, from which derives the retributive function of the criminal 
sanction. As a result, on a strictly philosophical and legal level, the objective of efficiency is reached as 
soon as the inflicted sentence, whatever the virtue of its exemplary nature may be, and whatever the 
satisfaction granted to victim and prospects for the future given to the condemned, subjects the latter to 
a harm at least equivalent to the one he has caused.” See Domingo, M., 2003. Réflexions sur l'Efficacité 
de la Sanction Pénale(Economica). Professor Langlais wrote that the law and economics approach of 
criminal law offers a relevant alternative to simplistic social and biologic determinism to describe 
criminal rational behaviours. He comments that this vision implies consistent criminal regulations 
policies implications. See Langlais, E., 2011. Analyse Economique et Droit Pénal: Contributions, 
Débats, Limites, Economix Working Paper 2011-33.  
368 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.p.198: “One argument made against fines is that they are immoral because, in 
effect, they permit offenses to be bought for a price in the same way that bread or other goods are 
bought for a price. A fine can be considered the price of an offense, but so too can any other form of 
punishment; for example, the "price" of stealing a car might be six months in jail. The only difference 
is in the units of measurement: fines are prices measured in monetary units, imprisonments are prices 
measured in time units, etc. If anything, monetary units are to be preferred here as they are generally 
preferred in pricing and accounting”. 
369 Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 2011. Law and Economics, 6th edition.(Prentice Hall).p.3. See Becker, G. S., 
1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217. 
370 Shavell, S., 1985. Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non Monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 
Columbia Law Review 85, 1232-1262. Shavell, S., 1997. The Fundamental Divergence Between the 
Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, Journal of Legal Studies 26, 575-612. 
371 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
372 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2008. The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications, Journal of Law and Society 35, 389-416. 
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combination of these two components in order to reach the objective of an optimal 
level of deterrence produced in a society.  
 
Magnitude of the sanction   
 
The magnitude of a sanction sets the severity of a punishment in accordance with the 
proportionality principle.  
One concern in the theory of optimal deterrence is whether sanctions should be based 
on the gain or on the harm derived from the violation373. First, according to the gain-
based sanction method, the sanction should be set proportionally to the benefits 
achieved by the offender through the violation374. Second, according to the harm-
based sanction, the sanction should be set proportionally to the level of social harm 
created by the violation. 
The essential difference between the two methods is that gain-based sanctions deter 
all kinds of violations by clearing any benefit gained from violation, whereas harm-
based sanctions will only deter violations that cause inefficiency: efficient violations 
can still take place375. A violation is said to be efficient when the actor’s private gain 
is greater than the social cost of the violation. In that case, the violation leads to a 
positive social welfare. Therefore, the choice of method may here depend on what is 
believed to be the primary goal of securities law. Under this logic, the harm-based 
method should be preferred if the goal is to maximize total economic welfare. On the 
contrary, if the goal is to prevent wealth transfers from shareholders to insiders, then 
the gain-based method should be favored376. In that respect, some commentators 
argue that a harm-based sanction system may be preferable because it allows to 
achieve an internalization goal377. Indeed, it encourages potential wrongdoers to have 
socially correct incentives when engaging or not in a risky activity and to take the 
possible precautions to reduce social harm378 by adjusting their behavior directly to 
the proportional expected sanction. This last argument is related to the marginal 
deterrence argument379. Moreover, Shavell and Polinsky show that, with the gain-
based method, parties may be under-deterred to commit an act if they consider the 
possibility of judgment error, which could eventually result in an underestimation of 
their benefit. On the contrary, if the sanction is proportional to the harm the parties 
                                                           
373 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
374 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. Van den Bergh, R., 2007. Should Consumer Protection Law Be Publicly 
Enforced? An Economic Perspective on EC Regulation 2006/2004 and its Implementation in the 
Consumer Protection Laws of the Member States(Europa Law Publishing, Groningen).p.196. Poncela, 
P., 2001. Droit de la Peine(PUF, Paris). See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off 
Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891.p.888: “In 
some contexts the private gains might be identified at little cost. If this is the case, the fine (and 
possibly the probability) could depend on the private gain”. 
375 Oded, S., 2012. Inducing Corporate Proactive Compliance: Liability Controls and Corporate 
Monitors(Rotterdam Erasmus University, Rotterdam). 
376 OECD, 2008. OECD Policy Brief: Remedies and Sanctions for Abuse of Market Dominance. p.4 
377 Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2000. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, Journal of 
Economic Literature 38, 45-76. Stigler, G., 1970. The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, The Journal of 
Political Economy 78, 526-536.  
378 Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1998. Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis Harvard Law Review 
111, 869-962.pp.879-882. 
379 Stigler, G., 1970. The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, The Journal of Political Economy 78, 526-
536. 
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will be strongly discouraged from committing the act, even if the harm is 
underestimated380. 
However, in practice, insider trading potential harm is complicated to observe and 
quantify. As already described in Chapter 2 and the introduction to Title 1, insider 
trading is considerably harmful from a fairness point of view. It may be difficult and 
controversial to accurately assess insider trading potential harm. Comparatively, the 
gain yielded by insider trading is easier to assess. As previously mentionned in the 
introduction to Title 1 three different studies concerning different periods have 
established a median average gain obtained or loss avoided by insider trading of about 
$25,594381. For instance, looking at current regimes, most EU countries practice a 
gain-based sanction system. 
 
Finally, information about the magnitude of sanctions and its perception by 
individuals may also be imperfect. Indeed, the final decision regarding magnitude also 
belongs to the judge, who enjoys relative discretion over sanctions382. Consequently, 
the magnitude of sanctions may also be difficult to assess for individuals.  
 
Probability of the sanction  
 
The probability of sanction represents an enforcement effort level, which is a 
dependent variable that determines the possibility of resorting to sanctions. It results 
from several policy decisions concerning parameters of enforcement such as 
monitoring, detection, control and procedural rules on the burden of proof and the 
disclosure of the evidence (etc.)383. The extent of law enforcement depends on the 
amount of resources devoted to the task established, in turn depending on many 
factors including staff and budget384. Therefore, it appears that the probability of 
sanction is an ambiguous parameter to identify385.  
From an economic point of view, as mentionned in the introduction to Title 1, the 
probability of sanction results from the combination of the probability of detection 
and the probability of conviction.  
After having determined the probability of sanction, commentators recommend to 
multiply the basic amount by the inverse of the likelihood of sanctions. For example, 
for a 10% probability of sanction, the basic sanction amount should be multiplied by 
ten. If there is a 50% chance of being sanctioned, then the amount should be 
                                                           
380 Shavell, S., Polinsky, A. M., 1994. Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain 
to the Injurer?, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10, 427-437. 
381 Frino, A., Satchell, S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, 
International Review of Finance 13, 241-263. Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of 
Illegal Insider Trading, The journal of Finance 47, 1661-1699. Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider 
Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 273-286.  
382 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
383 Ibid. 
384 Stigler, G., 1970. The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, The Journal of Political Economy 78, 526-
536. 
385 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
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multiplied by two386. In any case, these theoretical methods of calculation of 
multipliers are based on the availability of relevant data, which in reality may be 
difficult to collect. However, the detection of an illegal behavior partially depends on 
the apparently unstable circumstances of the violation’s occurrence. Because of cost 
constraints, the probability of detection and conviction is always less than 100%. To 
take an example, a relatively easy violation to detect, such as a public abusive 
conduct, carried out in the open and therefore easy to detect, should be adjusted with a 
low multiplier. On the contrary, as developed in the introduction to Title 1, insider 
trading tends to be potentially difficult to detect and to prove. The main reason is the 
very secretive nature of insider trading and the difficulty in establishing material 
evidence and the eventual proof of intent necessary to its conviction. The multiplier 
should therefore be set correspondingly quite high.  
Optimal expected sanction: Combination of probability and magnitude  
 
The optimal design of enforcement thus requires to combine the magnitude and the 
probability of sanction in order to obtain the optimal expected sanction. To take a 
concrete example: in order to get an expected sanction of 500, several combinations 
can be considered. For instance, a first option could be a magnitude of 500 associated 
with a probability of 100 %, a second could combine a magnitude of 1,000 with a 
probability of 50% and last, a magnitude of 5,000 associated with a probability of 
10%. The subsequent question is whether there is any reason to prefer one 
combination to the other from an economic point of view.  
Part of the literature supports an economically advantageous policy combining a less 
certain probability of detection and a severe sanction387. The reason behind this 
stance is that a high magnitude of the sanction is considered less costly to implement 
than maintaining a high level of probability388.  
However, a series of arguments rises against the use of a high magnitude versus low 
probability combination in a systematic way.  
(i) Monetary sanction: Risk of insolvency 
 
                                                           
386 Bentham, J., 1789. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation(reproduction in "The 
Utilitarians", Rept. Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1973, Paris). OECD, 2008. OECD Policy Brief: 
Remedies and Sanctions for Abuse of Market Dominance.p.5. 
387 One of the two majors propositions that Gary Becker formulates in his seminal article of 1968 
directly relate to that issue. Indeed, his first proposition is based on the assumption that monetary fine 
are less costly to implement than an increased apprehension. Therefore Becker recommends to set the 
probability of apprehension as low as possible, with the corresponding fine as high as possible. It is 
designated as the “low probability - high magnitude” proposition. See Becker, G. S., 1993. Nobel 
Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, The Journal of Political Economy 101, 385-409. 
Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-
Off Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891. 
Polinsky and Shavell agrees on that proposition in the case where risk neutral individuals are targeted. 
388 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217, Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 2011. Law and Economics, 6th edition.(Prentice Hall). 
Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). Garoupa, N., 2001. Optimal Magnitude and Probability of 
Fines, European Economic Review 45, 1765-1771. 
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The first evident reason, regarding monetary sanctions, relates to the capacity of 
payment of the individuals. The wealth constraint should be taken into consideration 
and optimal fines should be relative to the wealth of the convicted389.  
(ii) Costs of implementation 
 
A second argument relates to the fact that the costs of implementation of a sanction390 
may increase with its magnitude391. Indeed, the more the sanction is severe, the more 
the wrongdoer may be encouraged to actually take steps in covering its activity and 
bear strategic costs in trying to escape the detection or to minimize the probability of 
conviction392. Furthermore, some authors even recommend to use policies that 
support and incentivize individuals to adopt legal conduct (for example grant 
protection and incentives to whistleblowers in the case of insider trading) in order to 
increase the cost of opportunity of an illegal conduct393.   
(iii) Marginal deterrence  
 
If severity is always at its maximum for every violation, the wrongdoer may not factor 
this into his behavior394. This argument is related to the necessity of proportionality. 
In that respect, Bentham emphasized that the goal of a sanction is  “to  induce  a  man  
to  choose  always  the  least  mischievous of  two  offenses;  therefore  where  two  
                                                           
389 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.pp.183-185, pp.191-193. Posner, R. A., 1977. Economic Analysis of Law, 2d 
edition.(Little Brown, Boston).pp.164-172. Landes, W. M., Posner, R. A., 1975. The Private 
Enforcement of Law, Journal of Legal Studies 4, 1-46.pp.10-11. See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 
1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic 
Review 69, 880-891.p.880: “It is frequently argued that the probability should be as low as possible. 
The only constraint on lowering the probability that is recognized is the inability of individuals to pay 
the fine; thus, the optimal fine implied by this argument equals an individual’s wealth”. Garoupa, N., 
2001. Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, European Economic Review 45, 1765-1771.p.2: 
“the government should set the fine equal to an offender’s entire wealth and complement it with the 
appropriate probability in order to achieve optimal deterrence”. 
390 It should be considered that the literature does perhaps sometimes wrongly consider that raising the 
magnitude is costless, for the society as well as for the wrongdoer. See the work of Becker and 
Garoupa assuming that imposition of monetary sanctions to be costless: Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217. Garoupa, N., 
2001. Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, European Economic Review 45, 1765-1771.p.1767: 
“A fine is a costless transfer from the convicted offender to the government”. Shavell includes 
expenses related to legal proceeding, locating assets of a person, and forcing him to disgorge assets in 
the calculation of the effective social harm. 
391 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
392 Malik, A., 1990. Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, RAND Journal of Economics 
21, 341-353. Nussim, J., Tabbach, A., 2008. Controlling Avoidance: Ex-ante Regulation Versus Ex-
post Punishment, Review of Law and Economics 4, 45-63.  
393 Friehe, T., 2008. Optimal Sanctions and Endogeneity of Differences in Detection Probabilities, 
International Review of Law and Economics 28, 150-155. Nussim, J., Tabbach, A., 2008. Controlling 
Avoidance: Ex-ante Regulation Versus Ex-post Punishment, Review of Law and Economics 4, 45-63.  
394 Stigler, G., 1970. The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, The Journal of Political Economy 78, 526-
536. Chu, C., Jiang, N., 1993. Are Fines More Efficient Than Imprisonment?, Journal of Public 
Economics 51, 391-413. 
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offenses  come  in  competition,  the  punishment for  the  greater  offense  must  be  
sufficient  to  induce  a  man  to  prefer  the  less”.395   
(iv) Enforceability of laws and clearance rate 
 
If some authors provide evidence supporting the undeniable effect of sanction 
magnitude on deterrence396, some empirical studies demonstrate the importance of the 
actual enforcement in maintaining the law’s effectiveness, associated with the 
probability of detection. For instance, the scholarly literature shows that in insider 
trading mattersno law at all may be better than a good law that is not enforced397. 
Using data on the criminal prosecution process in Germany, a study of Entorf 
establishes that the variation of crime rates appears to be related to the public 
prosecutor activity and, therefore, to the probability of conviction rather than to the 
severity of punishment (which appears to have a small and insignificant impact). 
These findings lead to the conclusion that a high clearance rate is essential in 
deterring crime398. Another study of Frijns et al. demonstrates that the introduction of 
extremely severe sanctions may be ineffective due to the lack of successful 
prosecutions399. High sentences being usually secured with high standards of proof 
required (under criminal prosecution for instance). A systematic low probability-high 
magnitude combination may therefore imply poor enforceability due to the difficulty 
of successful prosecution, thereby undermining deterrence.  
These studies underline the importance of the enforceability of laws and of the 
clearance rate, and emphasize the deterrence power of the probability of sanctions. If 
the severity of sanction is at its maximum but the probability of being convicted is 
very low, the deterrence objective may not be reached.  
(v) Attitude towards risk and complementarity of probability and magnitude rather 
than substituability 
 
                                                           
395 Bentham, J., 1789. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation(reproduction in "The 
Utilitarians", Rept. Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1973, Paris).p.171. 
396 Mendes, S. M., 2004. Certainty, Severity, and Their Relative Deterrent Effects: Questioning the 
Implications of the Role of Risk in Criminal Deterrence Policy", The Policy Studies Journal 32, 59-74. 
397 Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 75-
108.pp.2-3: “Theoretically and empirically (…) sometimes no corporate law may be better than a good 
corporate law that is not enforced. This is an important issue because a number of emerging markets 
have adopted corporate laws, but many of them have not enforced these laws.”, p.28: “if a law is 
enacted but not enforced, only some will follow the law; the ones who do not follow the law will 
deviate with greater intensity in equilibrium, thereby causing law abiders more harm than they were 
incurring when there was no law. We next ask whether insider trading laws satisfy the above 
conditions. Our answer is sometimes they do. This happens when corporate insiders have very 
imperfect information, if the cost of acquiring perfect information is not too high nor too low, and if 
there are many who will not follow the insider trading law if the insider trading law is not enforced.”, 
See Bris, A., 2005. Do Insider Trading Law Works?, European Financial Management 11, 267-
312.p.310: “It is worse to have a regulation that fails to prosecute those who violate it (Mexico, 
Norway, Russia), than no law at all. The legal reform in countries that have started it - especially in 
Eastern European countries - should definitely take into account that laws that are not accompanied by 
good enforcement are useless at best”. 
398 See Entorf, H., 2011. Crime, Prosecutors, and the Certainety of Conviction, IZA Discussion 
Paper.p.29. 
399 Frijns, B., Gilbert, A., Tourani Rad, A., 2013. Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Insider Trading?, The 
Financial Review 48, 205-232.p.230. 
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“Market participation depends, in some measure, on players’ abilities to ‘encapsulate’ 
or ‘frame’ their risks, i.e. to transform uncertainty into more manageable, acceptable, 
and profitable risks”400.  
A perfect substitutability of magnitude and probability of sanction would imply that 
any kind of less costly combination leading to the same expected sanction is equally 
desirable. However, probability and magnitude are not always substitutable, and 
therefore the proportion of these different components really matters.  
The literature identifies that the most probable reason why these variables may not be 
substitutable relates to a case where the social optimum involves under-deterrence401 
or where attitude towards risks influences the optimal combination of probability and 
magnitude of the expected sanction402.  
As often as decisions are made under uncertainty, attitude towards risks of individuals 
matters. Risk attitude has a serious effect on the appreciation of sanctions403. It does 
not affect the rational choice assumption in any manner, but in the framework of this 
study, it may be understood as distorting the relative appreciation of the magnitude 
and probability of the expected sanction404. It is important to mention this concept 
with respect to the consequences it may have on the optimal choice of magnitude and 
probability of sanctions405. An individual may anticipate the law differently 
depending on whether he is risk-neutral, risk-averse or a risk-seeker406. For that 
                                                           
400 Reichman, N., 1991. Regulating Risky Business: Dilemmas in Security Segulation, Law and Policy 
13, 263-295.p.264. 
401 Nuno Garoupa establishes that the variables of magnitude and probability of sanction are 
complementary in case of under-deterrence and that, therefore, the optimal probability of detection 
does not “monoticaly” decrease with the maximal fine. See Garoupa, N., 2001. Optimal Magnitude and 
Probability of Fines, European Economic Review 45, 1765-1771.p.1768: “(the substitutability between 
fine and probability) only holds if the social optimum involves nearly full deterrence. If there is 
substantial underdeterrence (the expected fine is significantly less than the social damage caused by the 
offense), then there is a complementary relationship between the two variables. When the fine goes up, 
so should the probability of detection.” The optimal probability of detection is not “monoticaly” 
decreasing in the maximal fine. 
402 Note that going further, one can ask wether the attitude towards risks may affect the optimal 
monetary or non-monetary form of the sanction, or the optimal administrative or criminal nature of the 
sanction. Shavell affirms that the attitude towards risk does not affect the recommendations concerning 
the form of the sanction: fines should always be used to their fullest extent before imprisonment 
Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). This point will be developed in the section dedicated to the 
form of the sanction. Concerning the nature of the sanction (administrative or criminal), there are not 
yet researches concerning the relation between risk aversion and the optimal nature of the sanction. 
403 Ibid. 
404 The perception and consequences of the probability of occurrence and magnitude of punishment are 
influenced by the individual’s attitude toward risk. See ibid.pp.413-417 . 
405 Polinsky and Shavell introduced attitude towards risks considerations in optimal enforcement 
reflexions. Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891. Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of 
Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts).  
406 See Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 2004. Law and Economics, 4th edition.(Pearson).p.50-52. A risk-neutral 
individual has a constant marginal utility of income and is indifferent to a certain prospect of income or 
an uncertain prospect of equal expected monetary value. A person is risk-averse if he considers the 
utility of a certain prospect of money income to be higher than the expected utility of an uncertain 
prospect of equal expected monetary value. Finally a risk-seeking individual has an increasing 
marginal utility of income and, therefore, prefers an uncertain prospect of income to a certain prospect 
of equal expected monetary value.  
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reason, an efficient deterrence strategy should take into account an individual’s risk 
bearing nature. 
One may ask what does the risk bearing nature imply regarding the optimal 
combination of magnitude and sanction. 
Risk neutral individuals are supposed to be indifferent to any kind of combination: for 
them, a high fine-low probability combination is optimal because it allows to achieve 
deterrence at the lowest possible cost. The reasoning also works with prison 
sanctions.407  
Things are different when individuals are not risk-neutral.  
To begin with, when individuals display a risk-averse attitude towards sanctions it 
means that their disutility of the expected sanction rises more than in proportion to the 
expected sanction408. Therefore, when risk aversion is introduced, compared to a 
situation of risk neutrality, the expected sanction can be lower and still operate a 
similar deterrence effect. This situation arises because the risk imposed on individuals 
subject to the sanction has to be taken into consideration in the calculation of welfare 
maximization. Moreover, risk-averse individuals prefer a certain low sanction over an 
uncertain high sanction409. Furthermore, the scholarly literature shows that risk 
aversion implies that optimal sanctions should not be maximal410. Finally, risk 
aversion is reputed to decrease with income411. 
                                                           
407 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2007. Handbook of Law and Economics, 1st edition.(Elsevier, 
Boston).pp.413-417. See Eide, E., Rubin, P. H., Shepherd, J.M., 2006. Economics of Crime(Now 
Publisher Inc).p.47. See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the 
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408 See Langlais, E., 2006. Criminals and Risk Attitude, Munich Personal Repec Archive Paper 1149. 
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Review of Law and Economics 12, 3-11. 
410 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2007. Handbook of Law and Economics, 1st edition.(Elsevier, 
Boston).pp.415-416: “risk-averse individuals are more easily deterred than risk neutral individuals, the 
fine does not need to be as high to achieve any desired degree of deterrence (…) due to risk aversion, 
the probability of detection that maintains deterrence falls more than proportionally, implying that the 
expected fine, and therefore fine revenue, falls. This reduction in fine revenue reflects the disutility 
caused by imposing greater risk on risk averse individuals. If individuals are sufficiently risk averse, 
the decline in fine revenue associated with greater risk bearing could more than offset the savings in 
enforcement expenditures from reducing the probability of detection, implying that social welfare 
would be lower”. See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891.p.884. See Polinsky, A. 
M., Shavell, S., 1991. A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among Individuals, American 
Economic Review 81, 618-621. 
411 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891. When difference in wealth is 
introduced, taking into consideration that risk aversion decreases with income, high wealth individuals 
are less risk-averse than low wealth people, meaning that the optimal magnitude of the sanctions 
imposed on high wealth individuals would be lower than the one imposed on low wealth people, and 
the probability higher. On top of that, optimal sanction imposed on the high wealth group would be 
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The opposite phenomenon should be observed when individuals display a risk-
seeking attitude towards sanctions. In this case, the disutility of the sanction raises 
less than in proportion to the sanction412 Thus,  the use  of a  low fine  with  a higher  
probability  of detection  will  deter more  effectively  risk-preferring individuals413. 
Insider trading and optimal combination of magnitude and probability   
Regarding the elements above-mentioned, it appears interesting to further examine 
whether insiders seem to display a risk-neutral, a risk-seeking or a risk-averse attitude 
towards sanctions. This would provide information on the amount of utility lost from 
a decrease in income for an insider414. This would determine the rate at which the 
insider discounts the expected value of the sanction in assessing the risks and benefits 
from insider trading415. Thanks to this analysis, recommendations could be formulated 
in terms of sanctions and enforcement policy orientation. This issue may require 
further development due to its complexity. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the 
main lines of the discussion in order to understand its relevance to the problem of 
optimal law enforcement.  
First of all, experimental literature demonstrates that the attitude towards risk is a 
challenging and complex issue, and that it may be difficult to categorically determine 
the “risk-type” of an individual. For instance, it has been shown that individuals might 
be prone to a risk-seeking attitude in a situation where there is either a small 
probability of losses or a large probability of gains. Individuals may actually display 
both risk aversion and risk seeking for a wide range of payoffs, depending on the 
probabilities associated to these payoffs and the prospects they are facing416. 
Furthermore, the attitude towards risk could potentially be determined exogenously, 
according to the choice of instruments in law enforcement policies, such as the 
probability of apprehension, the monetary fines and the non-monetary sanctions417.  
While risk aversion is a usual behavioral assumption in economics418, criminals 
belong to one of the rare categories of individuals who are presented as willing to 
undertake a risky and dangerous activity, both for others and for themselves, despite 
an evident risk of being caught and sanctioned419. This suggests that criminals are 
                                                                                                                                                                         
even larger in comparison to the one imposed on the low wealth individuals, if both high and low 
wealth group were risk neutral.  
412 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2007. Handbook of Law and Economics, 1st edition.(Elsevier, 
Boston).p.419. 
413 Elzinga, K. G., Breit, W., 1977. The Antitrust Penalties: A Study(Yale University Press). 
414 Ibid.p.120. Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891.p.881. 
415 O'Connor, M. A., 1989. Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of 
Section 16(b), Fordham Law Review 58, 310-380.p.361. 
416 Tversky, A., Wakker, P., 1995. Risk Attitudes and Decisions Weights, Econometrica 63, 1255-
1280. 
417 Langlais, E., 2006. Criminals and Risk Attitude, Munich Personal Repec Archive Paper 1149.p.8. 
418 See work of Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891. Neilson, W., 1998. Optimal Punishment 
Schemes With State-Dependant Preferences, Economic Inquiry 36, 266-271. Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 
2004. Law and Economics, 4th edition.(Pearson).p.51: “Economists presume that most people are 
averse towards risk, but somepeople are either neutral towards risk or, like gambler, rock climbers, and 
race car drivers, prefer risks”. 
419 Langlais, E., 2006. Criminals and Risk Attitude, Munich Personal Repec Archive Paper 1149. 
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likely to exhibit a risk-seeking behavior420. A certain number of studies formulates 
conclusions going in this direction421. Similarly, casual observations suggest that 
white-collar crimes require a positive act of theft, embezzlement, copying of 
documents, computer hacking, surveillance equipment to pass by, etc. indicating a 
certain expert-based and risk-seeking behavior422. For instance, a study of Dohmen 
established that white-collar workers are significantly more risk-seeking than blue-
collar workers.  
However, a certain number of studies tend to differentiate insider trading from the 
general forms of white-collar crime. 
First of all, the gender and socio economic profiles of white collar criminals and of 
insiders seem to differ significantly. A study made on white-collar crimes prosecuted 
in federal court, by Weisburd et al., as well as a study made by Hollinger et al., shows 
that most white-collar criminals are found to belong to middle management, the lower 
echelons of business, or to be employees in lower statuses, whilst only a few are 
owners or officers. Furthermore, 55 % of these criminals are male423. On the contrary, 
insider trading defendants appear to be more largely masculine (94%) and belong to 
the highest compensation package agents category. On average, they have an 
occupation hierarchically higher than regular white-collar criminals424. These 
elements do not provide direct indications on their attitudes towards risk but is 
interesting in showing that insiders actually differ from a regular white-collar 
criminals. This may be important to the extent that several plausible exogenous and 
                                                           
420 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.p.178. 
421 Coffee, J., 1981. No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment, Michigan Law Review 79, 386-459.p.395. Grogger, J., 1991. Certainety Vs. 
Severity of Punishment, Economic Inquiry 29, 297-309. Block, M., Gerety, V., 1995. Some 
Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties 
and Risk, Journal of Legal Studies 24, 123-138.p.138: “Students by and large evidenced an aversion 
(or at best, a mild indifference to risk), while prisoners showed a strong preference for risky 
situations”.   However a study of Neilson and Winter comes to complicate the picture and support that 
the expected utility model might not be relevant to make conclusions about attitude towards risks of 
criminals. This study shows that even though criminals tend to respond more to changes in certainty 
than in severity, it might be explained by the fact that their preferences are state-dependant and 
therefore it is possible for offenders to display risk aversion towards sentences while being more 
sensitive to changes in the certainty of punishment,  Neilson, W., Winter, H., 1997. On Criminal's Risk 
Attitude, Economics Letters 55, 97-102.p.102. 
422 Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde Jürgen Schupp, U., Wagner, G., 2005. Some Facts 
About Risk Attitudes: Evidence From a Large, Representative, Experimentally-Validated Survey (First 
Draft), Working Paper.p.17: “In terms of occupation, blue collar workers are significantly more risk 
averse than white collar worker”. 
423 Weisburd, D., Stanton W., Waring, E., Bode, N., 1991. Crimes of the Middle Classes: White Collar 
Offenders in the Federal Courts(Yale University Press, New Haven).p.55. 
424Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286.p.273: “Approximately 94 percent of the defendants were male”., p.276: “Approximately a 
third of all defendants came from the business sector (31.5 percent), whereas only 18.2 percent of the 
defendants were from the securities industry. Corporate officers and directors, because of their 
position, were more likely to have access to material nonpublic information and were far more likely to 
be charged for trading on such information than their employees (84.2 percent of the business 
defendants were business officers or directors and only 15.8 percent were lower status employees). 
Defendants in the securities industry, on the other hand, were unlikely to be executives: securities 
employees such as brokers, dealers, and analysts (77.5 percent) were more likely than securities 
executives such as CEOs, vice presidents, and heads of departments (22.5 percent) to be insider trading 
defendants”. 
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endogenous factors put forward by the literature are likely to be correlated with risk 
aversion. These factors relate to “gender”, “age”, “education”, “net income”, 
“occupation”, “education”, “marital status” or even “employment status” 425. 
Moreover, contrary to the positive act usually involved in a regular white-collar 
crime, a study of Szockyj and Geis shows that insider trading involves the use of 
legitimately acquired confidential information, often within the context of a regular 
professional activity. Insider trading would therefore appear as an opportunistic crime 
resulting of one’s personal position rather than one’s specific skills and technological 
knowledge426. 
Furthermore, a certain number of scholars have detected that insider traders can be 
risk minimizers427. This is probably the most significant element provided by the 
literature in establishing the risk attitude in the case of insider trading crimes. For 
instance, Reichman examines a certain specificity of stock market regulation, which 
he defines as a “complex and differentiated market”. While regular investors show 
limited capacity for managing risk on their own, market players demonstrate high 
skills for risk management. Insiders would therefore belong to the highly skilled 
category of individuals capable to minimize risks and to increase the certainty of 
profitable outcomes428. The sophisticated step up may be when insiders use elaborate 
means to cover up their illegal trade by using complex international network, nominee 
                                                           
425 See Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde Jürgen Schupp, U., Wagner, G., 2005. Some Facts 
About Risk Attitudes: Evidence From a Large, Representative, Experimentally-Validated Survey (First 
Draft), Working Paper.p.5: “After presenting the main results on risk attitudes, the paper reports 
correlations between risk attitudes and other important personal characteristics, such as net income, 
occupation, education, marital status, employment status, etc. These characteristics are likely to be at 
least partly endogenous to risk attitudes, so we refrain from making any type of causal inferences in 
this section”. For instance, this work is based on a survey working on sample of 22,000 individuals. 
Moreover, the paper contributes an additional, methodological innovation by conducting a 
complementary laboratory experiment, and testing the ability of their survey measures to predict real 
behavior under real incentives. This is a uniquely strong position to study the basic determinants of risk 
attitudes. The study aims at providing a representative picture of the determinants of risk attitudes and 
reveals a number of robust facts about risk taking attitude.  In this article it is shown that most of the 
variation in risk attitudes is explained by a single underlying factor. According to their study the gender 
matters and women appears to reveal more risk aversion than male (The first fact is a robust gender 
difference. Women are significantly more risk averse than men, as measured by self-reported 
willingness to take risks). Moreover, the probability of being risk averse apparently increases with age 
(Increasing age is associated with increasing risk aversion) and parental education (parents with higher 
levels of education tend to have children who are less risk averse, in most domains of life ). It is also 
explicitly mentioned that in terms of occupation, blue collar-workers are significantly more risk-averse 
than white-collar workers which themselves appears to be more risk averse than self-employed 
individuals. Nevertheless, it is very important to consider these results with the due care. In a survey, 
subject’s responses might reflect primarily influences of framing, information-processing strategies, 
and value functions, as opposed to an intrinsic risk attitude. See Schoemaker, P. J. H., 1993. 
Determinants of Risk-Taking: Behavioral and Economic Views, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 6, 49-
73.p.68. Consequently, considering the complex picture of the numerous determinants involved in 
influencing the risk attitude, the attempts to find generalized conclusion concerning the individual’s 
attitude towards risks might be taken carefully.  
426 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286.p.283: “(Insiders) belong to the highly skilled category of individuals”. 
427 Ibid.p.283. 
428 Reichman, N., 1991. Regulating Risky Business: Dilemmas in Security Segulation, Law and Policy 
13, 263-295.p.264. 
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accounts, proxies and intermediaries who are difficult to identify429. This would 
suggest that, rather than seeking action or risk, insiders appear to be taking illegal 
advantages of situations when they perceived minimal risk, and moreover taking steps 
to minimize risks430.  
Finally, a study of Elzinga and Breit formally establishes that insiders tend to be risk 
averse431.   
4.1.3 Summing-up: Optimal enforcement of insider trading laws  
The deterrence theory approach provides an economic analytical framework for the 
analysis of law enforcement: the goal of the law and its enforcement is to deter. It 
should be achieved through the setting of an optimal expected sanction.  
Considering the aforementioned arguments relative to the risks of insolvency, the 
costs of implementation of a large sanction, the marginal deterrence and the supposed 
risk aversion towards sanctions of the insider traders, the use of a high sanction with a 
lower probability of detection may not be optimal. Moreover, according to the 
scholarly literature, risk aversion implies that optimal sanctions should not be 
maximal432.  
As already mentioned, this issue would require further development. Nevertheless, 
this reflection may provide preliminary indications that could be used to adapt the 
enforcement of insider trading laws in respect to risk attitude, and should encourage 
future work in this direction.  
Finally it should be mentioned that most experiments do not take into consideration 
the existence of non-monetary sanctions. This may be problematic seeing as monetary 
                                                           
429 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286.p.283. Macey, J. R., 1991. Insider Trading: Economics, Politics and Policy(AEI Press, 
Washigton D.C.).p.5: “In addition, detecting insider trading is difficult. For one thing, insiders can 
disguise their identities and trade through proxies and foreign intermediaries. The difficulty of 
detection presents a problem for firms attempting to enforce any contracts that restrict the trading 
activities of insiders and others. While this difficulty should not prevent firms from deciding for 
themselves what sort of prohibitions to allow, public enforcement of intrafirm prohibitions might be 
desirable. Considerable economies of scales are likely to be associated with the monitoring of insider’s 
activities”. Cf. Chapter 2. 
430 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286. Grasmick, H. G., Tittle, C. R., Bursik, R. J. Jr, Arneklev, B. J., 1993. Testing the Core 
Empirical Implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi's General Theory of Crime, Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquancy 30, 5-29. 
431 Elzinga, K. G., Breit, W., 1977. The Antitrust Penalties: A Study(Yale University Press).pp.126-
129. 
432 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2007. Handbook of Law and Economics, 1st edition.(Elsevier, 
Boston).p.415-416: “risk-averse individuals are more easily deterred than risk neutral individuals, the 
fine does not need to be as high to achieve any desired degree of deterrence (…) due to risk aversion, 
the probability of detection that maintains deterrence falls more than proportionally, implying that the 
expected fine, and therefore fine revenue, falls. This reduction in fine revenue reflects the disutility 
caused by imposing greater risk on risk averse individuals. If individuals are sufficiently risk averse, 
the decline in fine revenue associated with greater risk bearing could more than offset the savings in 
enforcement expenditures from reducing the probability of detection, implying that social welfare 
would be lower”. See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891.p.884. See Polinsky, A. 
M., Shavell, S., 1991. A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among Individuals, American 
Economic Review 81, 618-621. 
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equivalents of non-monetary sanctions may not be perfect substitutes, given inter alia 
the monetary wealth of criminals433. Indeed, the relative sensitivity of offenders to the 
probability and magnitude of fines may depend on the presence of non-monetary 
sanctions, and the use of non-monetary sanctions may entail a larger marginal utility 
of wealth for criminals than in the state of freedom. Indeed, it is likely that marginal 
utility of wealth declines when combined to a state of imprisonment. This would 
imply a state dependent risk aversion.  
4.2 THE MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY FORMS OF SANCTIONS 
In 2009, Raj Rajaratnam was one of the richest men in the world, with a net value of 
approximately 1.3 billion. In 2011, he was sentenced to an eleven year prison term for 
insider trading, was ordered to forfeit 53.8 million of dollars in illegal profits and had 
to pay a fine of 10 million dollars. In this example, it can be noted that the proportion 
of the monetary sanction seems relatively small compared to the illegal profit and the 
personal wealth of the individual. Nevertheless, the monetary sanctions were 
complemented by a particularly heavy non-monetary sanction. This case illustrates 
how different available sanctions are combined to convict insiders.  
This section describes the different forms of sanctions available to public authorities 
and intends to establish the criteria for their optimal use in the enforcement of insider 
trading laws. 
If monetary and non-monetary sanctions are both considered as “prices” to pay434, it 
appears sensitive to establish their relationship. Some authors argue that they are 
neither alternatives435, nor substitutes436, but most likely complements437. What 
appears quite clear within the literature is that non-monetary and monetary sanctions 
are adapted to different contexts. As described, they do not operate a deterrence effect 
on the same grounds. Whilst monetary sanctions affect assets, non-monetary 
sanctions affect freedom and reputation.  
A superficial description of the main types of monetary and non-monetary sanctions 
is provided in the sections (4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Their definition and scope may vary from 
one country to the other. The law and economics scholarly literature has, implicitly 
and explicitly, established a certain number of economic criteria under which the use 
of the monetary would lead to a cost effective enforcement of law compared to the 
                                                           
433 Langlais, E., 2011. Analyse Economique et Droit Pénal: Contributions, Débats, Limites, Economix 
Working Paper 2011-33.p.8. 
434 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.p.195: “A fine can be considered the price of an offense, but so too can any other 
form of punishment; for example, the "price" of stealing a car might be six months in jail. The only 
difference is in the units of measurement: fines are prices measured in monetary units, imprisonments 
are prices measured in time units, etc. If anything, monetary units are to be preferred here as they are 
generally preferred in pricing and accounting”. 
435 Kahan, D., 1996. What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, University of Chicago Law Review 63, 
591-653. Langlais, E., 2011. Analyse Economique et Droit Pénal: Contributions, Débats, Limites, 
Economix Working Paper 2011-33.  
436 Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris). 
437 Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York). 
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non-monetary forms, and vice versa. The goal of this section is to review and analyze 
these criteria and to apply them to insider trading (4.2.3). 
4.2.1 Monetary sanctions    
“Fines have several advantages over other punishments: for example, they conserve 
resources, compensate society as well as punish offenders, and simplify the 
determination of optimal p’s and f’s. Not surprisingly, fines are the most common 
punishment and have grown in importance over time438.”  
Monetary sanctions play a very special role in sanctioning securities violations. A 
central argument is that securities delinquency usually deals with the typical homo 
œconomicus guided by animus cupidi439. In turn, monetary sanctions are very efficient 
from a deterrence point of view because they directly affect the private property and 
the patrimony, to which insiders are particularly sensitive440. This section offers a 
brief overview of the different types of available monetary sanctions.  
The fixed fine 
 
The usual way to set a monetary sanction is to associate fixed fines to an offence. It is 
a simple system because it avoids the study of each particular case. However, fixed 
fines may be considered as unfair because their appreciation is most likely to depend 
on personal wealth; in other words, they may affect the poor more than the rich. 
Consequently, commentators sometimes argue that fixed fines should be reserved for 
relatively small offences, or for offences in which all the potential convicted belong to 
a category of offenders who can potentially pay the fines441.  
The proportional fine 
 
The proportional fine consists in enacting a statutory maximum that is no longer 
fixed, but fluctuating and proportional. The sanction consists of a proportional basis 
and a multiplier.  
The multiplier enables the sanction to take into account economic reality442. The basis 
of this reflection is that the multiplier should be superior to one. Moreover, the 
                                                           
438 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. “p” is the probability, “f” is the size of the punishment. 
439 Mackaay, E., 2002. L'Analyse Economique du Droit dans les Systèmes Civilistes(Cujas, Paris). 
Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris).  
440 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. Posner, R. A., 1980. Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, American 
Criminal Law Review 17, 409-418. 
441 Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York). 
442 Bernardi, A., 1990. L'Amende dans une Perspective Européenne(Cujas, Paris). “Dans ce type de 
sanction, la première donnée numérique exprime l'importance de l'infraction, celle qui émerge de tous 
ses éléments objectifs et subjectifs, exception faite de l'élément constitué par la gravité du dommage 
causé ou du profit tiré au moyen du crime. Ce dernier élément, qui concerne la dimension économique 
concrète de chaque délit, devient la deuxième donnée numérique de l'amende proportionnelle”; "In this 
type of sanction, the first numerical data expresses the importance of the offense, which emerges from 
all objective and subjective elements, except for the element consisting of the gravity of the damage or 
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multiplier should be proportional to the difficulty of detecting the act443 in order to 
cover the enforcement costs. 
Concerning the insider trading case, the legislator often uses the gain-based 
proportional monetary penalty, which makes sense since wrongdoers make 
fluctuating profits. This choice of penalty creates a real deterrent effect under the 
condition that the maximum statutory fine allows to systematically absorb the realized 
profit. The proportional monetary sanction sets the fine according to the precepts of 
deterrence theory and is coherent with the precepts of equivalence and proportionality 
expressed in the previous section (4.1). A complementary issue would be to determine 
which would be the optimal multiplier. From a theoretical point of view, the literature 
does not provide a clear answer.  
The day-fine sanction 
 
A day-fine system relies on a discrimination based on an individual’s daily income. It 
is a sophisticated way of relating fines to the ability of offenders to pay them and it is 
consistent with Posner’s proportional penalty proposal444. The seriousness of the 
offence is accounted for in number of days or units, and the average daily income or 
the average daily surplus of the offender is then determined. The fine actually equals 
the number of days multiplied by the average daily income or surplus of the 
offender445.  
Scandinavian countries like Denmark, Sweden and Finland adopted this sanction 
system in the 1920’s, followed by many other European countries 50 years later. 
Under this scheme, the penalty is measured in terms of days, and a convicted offender 
is fined his daily income times the penalty days446. 
 
Disgorgement, confiscation or forfeiture 
 
From a general point of view, confiscation can be of two types. The first type is the 
general type and concerns any material or immaterial good, totally or partially 
belonging to the wrongdoer. The second type is the special type; it either concerns the 
removal of the mean or of the illegal gain of the infraction.  
In this study, disgorgement or confiscation designate the removal of the illegal 
gain447, the proceeds from insider trading. This type of sanction enjoys an increasing 
popularity due to its deterrence power448. Indeed, employing a mix of sanctions, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the benefit derived from crime. This last element, which constitutes the economic dimension of each 
specific offense, becomes the second numerical data of the proportional fine".  
443 Elzinga, K. G., Breit, W., 1977. The Antitrust Penalties: A Study(Yale University Press). 
444 Posner, R. A., 1985. An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, Columbia Law Review 85, 1193-
1231.p.1215. 
445 Friedman, G. M., 1983. The West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United States, 
University of Chicago Law Review 50, 281-304. Thornstedt, H., 1975. The Day-Fine System in 
Sweden Criminal Law Review 9, 307-312. 
446 Cooter, R., Ulen, T., 1988. Law and Economics(Scott, Forsman and Company, London).p.558. 
447 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2000. Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains, 
International Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-549.  
448  ibid.p.538: “As a result many modern statutes (…) provide for alternative types of sanctions which 
may be imposed at lower cost. Sometimes these measures take a direct, nonmonetary form such as the 
shut down of a company. Some legislatures also give the judge the possibility to order that the 
judgment should be published through mass media. But another direction taken by legislators searching 
for alternatives to conventional criminal sanctions has been the development of powers to confiscate or 
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including fines and confiscation of illegal gains, helps coming closer to efficient 
deterrence449. This type of monetary sanction appears to be particularly adapted to an 
insider-trading context. As previously mentioned, an example of confiscation of 
illegal gain can be found in the recent case of Raj Rajaratnam, who, in complement to 
a fine, was ordered to forfeit 53.8 million of dollars in illegal profits. 
4.2.2 Non-monetary sanctions 
Non-monetary sanctions are emblematically famous in their most severe form: 
imprisonment. In the financial sector, many modern statutes regulate market crimes 
by providing alternative non-monetary sanctions such as the shutdown of a company, 
the publication of the judgment through mass media, etc. These non-monetary 
sanctions involve different costs and utility losses. 
This section offers an overview of the various types of non-monetary sanctions in 
order to apprehend the different options that may be considered as sanctions for 
insider trading crimes. This study excludes every kind of sanction that may affect 
physical integrity such as death penalty or corporal punishments because of their 
incompatibility with human rights and human dignity. The non-monetary sanctions 
are divided into two groups: incapacitating types and other types.   
4.2.2.1 Non-monetary incapacitating sanctions  
The effect of non-monetary incapacitating sanctions is to remove wrongdoers either 
from the society (“social incapacitation”) or from the market (“economic 
incapacitation”). In the perspective of the legal concepts previously mentioned in 
chapter 2, both types of sanctions can correspond to the exclusion of agents that 
behave against the public interest (in the case of an exclusion from society) or against 
the market interest (in the case of an exclusion from the market).  
4.2.2.1.1 Social incapacitation 
“We believe that some nonviolent, first-time offenders (...) belong in prison. White-
collar criminals, those who commit fraud, those who extort or embezzle, and those 
who conspire or cover up can be just as deserving of punishment as any street 
predator. And we suspect that most Americans - most people who believe in equal 
justice under law - agree with us.”450 
                                                                                                                                                                         
seize assets or, more generally, the removal of illegal gain”, p.547: “There is a clear parallel between 
these criminal sanctions and the remedies available to injured parties in various areas of civil law. 
‘Disgorgement’ doctrines, which allow plaintiffs to recover the gains made by parties who have 
infringed private rights, are based on the same kind of idea as confiscation powers in criminal law (…)  
Another element which could help explain the increased popularity of confiscation is a change in the 
relative costs of imposing criminal penalties (especially fines) and of confiscating illegally-
accumulated assets”. 
449 Ibid.p.547: “By employing a mix of sanctions, with harm-based fines (or other punishment) plus 
confiscation of illegal gain, courts will be able to get closer to efficient deterrence than they can when 
constrained to use punishments in isolation”. 
450 Bennett, W., J., Dilulio, J. J., Walters, J. P., 1996. Body Count: Moral Poverty... And How to Win 
America's War Against Crime and Drugs(Simon & Schuster).p.101. 
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The very specific and exclusive function of incapacitation characterizes the severity 
of imprisonment451. Even though the use of imprisonment as a form of punishment is 
quite recent, prisons are everywhere and this sanction is quite common452. In 2005, 
there were more than nine million people imprisoned worldwide453.  
This section contains a short description of the major alternative types of social 
incapacitating non-monetary sanctions. 
Referral to an attendance centre / day reporting centre 
 
This type of sanction constraints the convicted to spend a portion of the day at a 
dedicated facility and therefore implies taking away the fundamental right of 
individual liberty. This formula is particularly adapted to provide specific 
infrastructures, and potentially to offer specific programs, adapted to certain 
convicted profiles, such as drug addicts.  
House arrest 
 
Here the house of the offender becomes his prison and therefore also implies taking 
away the fundamental right of individual liberty. The house arrest can also be partial, 
meaning that a convicted could carry on his professional activity for example. The 
convicted is responsible for meeting his basic needs on his own and administrative 
costs are thereby significantly reduced compared to the costs of imprisonment.  
Electronic monitoring 
 
Electronic monitoring is a technique used for ensuring compliance with a partially 
incapacitating sentence and implies that the convicted is monitored through means of 
electronic tagging devices. The convicted is usually subject to a detailed schedule and 
regular controls by the probation service. He is normally under house arrest except for 
specific activities such as employment, training, health care or participation in 
specific programs submitted to authorization from the probation service. Electronic 
monitoring yields substantial economic gains for all parties because the convicted can 
continue working normally. Nevertheless, technology may be expensive and 
restriction of privacy can heavily affect the convicted. 
In the 1990s, Sweden opted for commuting prison sentences to equivalent terms of 
electronic tagging. Currently, all offenders convicted up to six months can commute 
                                                           
451  Shavell, S., 1987a. A model of Optimal Incapacitation, American Economic Review 77, 107-110. 
Imprisonment is the simplest expression of incapacitation. Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2008. 
The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 
Journal of Law and Society 35, 389-416. Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and 
Promising Practices on Alternatives to Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York).p.27: 
“Imprisonment has an obvious punitive element: the loss of liberty”. 
452 Indeed, in the United States, 78,5% of sentences concerning financial, social and economic 
infringement were sanctioned by an incarceration term in 1999. Nevertheless, these sanctions are 
usually suspended sentences (69,1% of prison sentences in financial-related cases are in reality 
suspended sentences), even though a one-year suspended sentence is not comparable to one-year prison 
sentence in terms of deterrence. In the United States of America, 5% of the population will be 
incarcerated at some time during their lives Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of 
Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
453 Walmsley, R., 2005. World Prison Population List(King's College, London). 
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their incarceration sentence. All offenders serving a sentence of at least one year and a 
half may apply to serve the last four months under electronic monitoring454.  
Community or society service 
 
A community service order requires an offender to perform a specific task, or to work 
unpaid for the community for a specific number of hours. It requires close supervision 
and implies taking away the fundamental right of individual liberty. Some countries 
offer the possibility to commute short prison sentences to community service455. 
4.2.2.1.2 Economic incapacitation 
The second type of incapacitating sanction is the limitation or deprivation of the 
freedom to engage in a certain professional activity. This category of sanction is not 
exclusively criminal. Depending on the scope of the harm, the sanction aims at 
incapacitating the wrongdoers from some specific economic functions and at 
excluding him from professional circles.  
Status ban penalty and shutdown of a factory 
This category of sanction is called “status penalty” and denies the natural or legal 
person specific rights attached to their professional status in the society. This type of 
sanction establishes a direct link between an offense and a loss of status. It is 
therefore primordial that the offence relates to the professional status.  For instance, a 
natural or legal person convicted of fraud or of corruption may be forbidden to 
exercise a profession of trust ever again456.  
The most common status penalty mainly concerns revocation or suspension of 
licence, which can apply to a physical or a moral person. For the latter, it may even 
imply their disappearance. 
Different official organs, such as agencies, boards, commissions or political 
subdivisions of the State, issue licenses for the purpose of conducting a business457. 
                                                           
454 Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York).p.41. 
455 Countries like Thailand or Zimbabwe offer the possibility to commute short prison sentences to 
community service. For example in Thailand, drunk drivers are given suspended sentences and put on 
probation with the requirement that they perform 24 hours of community service generally related to 
the kind of injuries they might have cause with their offence (assisting car accident victims, 
volunteering for road accident emergency rescue units, etc.). In Zimbabwe, authorities allow to opt for 
community service as a sentencing alternative in order to reduce prison overcrowding and costs 
associated to incarceration . See “Hospital duty for drink drivers” in The Nation, March 11, 2005; 
“Tough campaign launched against drink driving” in the Bangkok Post, December 17, 2004. 
“Community Service in Practice”, Penal Reform International, 1997, On Governance and Social 
Development Resurce Center Website: http:www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ27.pdf. 
456 Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York). 
457 See Cussen, M. P., 06.07.2013. Breaking Down Financial Securities Licenses. Different financial 
securities licences exist depending on the types of investments to be sold, on the methods of 
compensation and on the provided scopes of services. Taking the concrete case of the United States, 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is a self-regulatory organization that oversees all securities 
licensing procedures and requirements. Amongst the many licenses corresponding to specific types of 
business or investment, registered representative or investment advisors mostly obtain three: the series 
6 license is known as the limited-investment securities license, it authorizes licenses to sell packages of 
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Some laws empower enforcers or competent organs to suspend or revoke the licenses 
of entities or individuals who engage in particular illegal activities. The license 
subject to suspension and revocation can be of any kind: a permit, a certificate, an 
approval, a registration, or an authorization required by the law and issued for the 
purpose of operating a business in the jurisdiction.  
For a corporation, the dissolution or the shutdown of a company corresponds to its 
closing or to the end of its business activity. It is a highly criticized sanction, qualified 
as extreme458 because of the high cost imposed on the employees, the shareholders 
and society459. Indeed, from a legal point of view, this type of sanction hurts a basic 
principle of personalized sanctions and may imply the imposition of a sanction on 
innocent third parties. Therefore, the shutting down of a company as a sanction is 
highly controlled and submitted to a series of restrictive conditions.  
Limitation of use of proper or external means of funding 
The limitation or ban of using certain means of payments (material or immaterial: 
cash, credit or debit cards, electronic payments…) or the limitation or ban of use of 
external investment can be imposed both on natural and legal persons, and have a 
certain effect on the economic activity460.  
4.2.2.2 Non-monetary non-incapacitating sanctions 
Suspended sanctions  
A suspended sanction is when an incarceration sanction is pronounced but its 
implementation depends on the convicted’s compliance with conditions set by the 
court judgment, under a certain period of time. The threat of the implementation 
deters the convicted. 
The costs associated to suspended sanction reside in the control of the respect of the 
conditions set by court. In the case of infringement of these conditions, the suspension 
of the sanction is revoked and the sanction is implemented. 
Naming and shaming sanctions 
                                                                                                                                                                         
investment products (mutual funds, variable annuities, unit investment trusts); series 7 license is known 
as the general securities representative license, it allows licenses to sell virtually any type of individual 
security (common and preferred stocks, call and put options, bonds and other individual fixed income 
investments, package products); series 3 license allow representatives to sell commodity future 
contracts. The North American Securities Administrators Association oversees the licensing 
requirement of three other licenses: the series 63 authorizes licenses to transact business within the 
state; series 65 is required for anyone intending to provide any kind of financial advice or service on a 
non-commission basis; series 66 is another one. These series correspond to exams; once obtained, 
licensees have two options. The first is to register their securities licenses with an approved broker-
dealer, who hold their licenses and oversee their business. The second is to register as a registered 
investment advisor, with the state or the SEC (if their assets under management exceed 25$ million). 
Legislators and agencies issue the circumstances under which a license can be suspended or revoked. 
Conditions differ from one state to another.  
458 Rouquet, F., 1975-1976. Sanctions Pénales et Personnes Morales, Revue de Droit Pénal et de 
Criminologie.p.698. 
459 Verny, E., 2002. Le Membre d'un Groupe en Droit Pénal(LGDJ, Paris). Levasseur, G., 1975-1976. 
Sanctions Pénales et Personnes Morales, Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 707-719. 
460 Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris).p.159. 
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The sanction of naming and shaming is used both as an autonomous or as a 
complementary sanction and involves the announcement or publication of the 
judgment. The names of the individuals will thereby be associated to the certain 
categories of crimes they have committed, with the aim of attracting attention, of 
expressing society’s moral condemnation and of provoking public disapproval461. 
They are especially designed to create stigma462.  Not only does this type of sanction 
convey information about the individual’s “bad character”, resulting in a feeling of 
shame, but it also expresses the inappropriateness of a conduct. Choosing this 
sanction is a way of refining the definition of reprehensible conducts by giving 
concrete examples. In a way, naming insures an educative function463.  
Dan Kahan offers an overview of the naming and shaming sanctions available in the 
U.S. and groups them into four categories464. The first category is the stigmatizing 
publicity. Aimed at magnifying the humiliation inherent to conviction, it is the 
communication of the offender’s status to a wider audience through the publication of 
his name in newspapers or in community-access television channels. The second 
category is literal stigmatization and corresponds to the stamping of an offender to 
signal his infringement in a public sphere, like for example wearing a t-shirt “I Am a 
Thief” or bracelet that read “I Write Bad Checks”. Another type of signal is a mark 
attached to property. For example, people convicted for drunk-driving have to display 
stickers on their cars, or convicted for sexual assaults have to post signs at their 
residences to warn their neighbors. The third category is the self-debasement penalty. 
It involves ceremonies or rituals that publicly disgrace the offender, usually in relation 
to the committed offense. For example, people guilty of urinating in public might be 
sentenced to cleaning the city’s streets. Self-debasement sanctions are as diverse as 
the crimes they punish. The fourth category is the contrition penalties, which require 
individuals to publicize their own convictions and apologize.  
Naming and shaming is evoked as an efficient alternative to incarceration465 because 
it implies a significant deterrent effect while keeping administrative costs relatively 
low. Indeed, some wrongdoers may be particularly sensitive to the negative reputation 
caused by the publication of a court decision, which nevertheless does not constitute a 
costly sanction. However, lots of limitations have also been raised, particularly 
concerning the error costs, the potential disproportion and the lack of deterrence466.  
                                                           
461 Escresa Guillermo, L., 2011. Reexamining the Role of Incarceration and Stigma in Criminal 
Law(Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Rotterdam). X, 2003. Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the 
Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions and Criminal Law, Harvard Law Review 116, 2186-2207. Bowles, R., 
Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2000. Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains, International 
Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-549. 
462 Adam, J., Engelen, P.J., Van Essen, M., 2011. Reputational Penalties on Financial Markets to 
Induce Corporate Responsibility(Springer, Heidelberg). 
463 Van Erp, J., 2008. Reputational Sanctions in Private and Public Regulation, Erasmus law review 1, 
145-162. Van Erp, J., 2011. Naming Without Shaming: The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch 
Financial Market, Regulation and Governance 5, 287-308.  
464 For more details and examples, see Kahan, D., 1996. What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 
University of Chicago Law Review 63, 591-653. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Van Erp, J., 2011. Naming Without Shaming: The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial 
Market, Regulation and Governance 5, 287-308. Van Erp holds that naming offenders functions as a 
general deterrent in the market for financial intermediaries, but considerably less so in the capital 
market.p.292: “An undesired, but perhaps more likely potential effect is that the publication of 
sanctions is experienced as stigmatizing. In that case, naming offenders results in defiance, 
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In the financial area, empirical economics studies suggest that the revelation of a 
firm’s misconducts will cause a depreciation of its quality by its trading partners 
(customers and investors), and consequently affect it in terms of trade. Armour, 
Mayer and Polo worked on the issue of reputational penalties and studied the impact 
of the announcement of financial and securities regulation enforcement by the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority and London Stock Exchange on the market price of 
sanctioned firms, and then on their corporate reputation467. They assimilated the 
firm’s reputational loss to a fall in equity market value, in excess of mandated 
payments. They calculated that the stock prices of the firms that received sanctions 
statistically experience significant abnormal losses (approximately nine times the 
fines and compensation paid). They associated this negative effect to situations where 
wrongdoings affect trading partners and not third parties. They concluded that 
reputational sanctions are very real and are a clear signal to the market of the 
reliability of a firm and provokes a significant reaction amongst trading partners.  
4.2.3 Economic criteria for monetary vs. non-monetary nature of sanctions 
Economic literature establishes a certain number of criteria under which the use of 
monetary sanctions would lead to a cost effective enforcement of law compared to the 
use of the non-monetary sanctions, or vice versa.  
If the administrative and social cost is the very first consideration in arbitrating the 
optimal monetary or non-monetary form of the sanction (4.2.3.1), criteria attached to 
the individual or to the illegal act may also have their importance (4.2.3.2). 
4.2.3.1 Costs of the monetary and non-monetary sanctions 
The cost of monetary sanctions 
The imposition of monetary sanctions is most of the time considered to be a transfer 
of "purchasing power"468, which does not imply any expenditure of enforcement 
resources and generates money for the public budget469. However, this reasoning 
neglects the circumstances under which the administrative costs of monetary 
sanctions may be substantial. For instance, in order to implement a monetary sanction, 
it may be necessary to localize the wrongdoer, to collect the money and sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                                         
disengagement, distrust, and, expectedly, more crime”. See note on X, 2003. Shame, Stigma, and 
Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions and Criminal Law, Harvard Law Review 116, 
2186-2207. There is hence a huge danger of overdeterrence and disproportional sanctions when 
stigmatisation is used as the goal of criminal law. As was convincingly shown by Klement, A., Harel, 
A., 2007. The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less 
Stigmatization, Journal of Legal Studies 36, 355-378. 
467 Armour, J., Mayer, C., Polo, A., 2012. Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial 
Markets, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 62/2010. 
468 Shavell, S., 2003. Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law, NBER Working Paper 
9699, 15.p.3. 
469 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. Garoupa, N., 2001. Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, European 
Economic Review 45, 1765-1771.p.1767: “A fine is a costless transfer from the convicted offender to 
the government”. 
469 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
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even to face potential resistance of certain individuals470. The wrongdoer himself may 
face costs in trying to escape or lower the monetary sanction471. Finally, the cost 
associated to the imposition of the sanction may even increase with its magnitude472.  
However, the monetary sanction is considered as the least costly type of sanction to 
impose and to enforce in society473. Therefore, the economic theory recommends its 
use in a very first position to its largest extent474. In order to take into consideration 
the differences in marginal utility of money, “the largest extent” should correspond to 
the calibration of the monetary sanction to the level of wealth of individuals475. 
Indeed, if the amount of the monetary sanction is too high in relation to the convicted 
individuals’ wealth, it may create a vicious incitation for them to commit another 
more severe crime 476. On the contrary, if the amount of the monetary sanction is too 
small compared to the individuals’ wealth, he may not be deterred through the 
prospect of the sanction. Therefore, monetary sanctions should be factored and 
calibrated to wealth in order to properly deter individuals. In that respect, the day-fine 
sanction system appears to be designated as the most adequate form of monetary 
sanction.  
The cost of non-monetary sanctions 
On the contrary, the administrative costs of incapacitating non-monetary sanctions are 
always considered sizeable. First of all, for any socially incapacitating sanctions 
                                                           
470 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts).p.474. Kaplow, L., 1990. A Note on the Optimal Use of Non 
Monetary Sanctions, Journal of Public Economics 42, 245-247.  
471 Langlais, E., 2011. Analyse Economique et Droit Pénal: Contributions, Débats, Limites, Economix 
Working Paper 2011-33. 
472 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). Langlais, E., 2011. Analyse Economique et Droit Pénal: 
Contributions, Débats, Limites, Economix Working Paper 2011-33. 
473 See Posner, R. A., 1980. Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, American Criminal Law 
Review 17, 409-418. 
474 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.p.213: “Fines have several advantages over other punishments: for example, 
they conserve resources, compensate society as well as punish offenders, and simplify the 
determination of optimal p's and f's. Not surprisingly, fines are the most common punishment and have 
grown in importance over time”.  
475 In the article “Optimal use of fines and imprisonment”, Shavell and Polinsky designate monetary 
sanctions as “fines” costless to impose. On the contrary, non-monetary sanctions are designated as 
“imprisonment” and are considered socially costly. See  Shavell, S., Polinsky, A. M., 1984. The 
Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, Journal of Public Economics 24, 89-99. The authors consider 
that in the situation where individuals differ by wealth, the high wealth individuals’ monetary sanction 
should be superior to the low wealth individuals’ one. They add that it is optimal to under-deter some 
poor individuals and argue this under-deterrence can be reduced at no social cost for individuals in the 
high wealth group by raising the fine for them. As Becker, they conclude that when fines and 
imprisonment are used together it is optimal to use the monetary sanction to its maximum and equal the 
wealth of the convicted party. Moreover, they add that difference in wealth also has an influence on 
optimal non-monetary sanctions and argue that when individuals differ by wealth, the optimal 
imprisonment term for the high wealth group may be longer or shorter than the term for the low wealth 
group. See also Bar Niv, M., Safra, Z., 2002. On the Social Desirability of Wealth-Dependant Fine 
Policy, International Review of Law and Economics 22, 53-59. Marginal utility of money depends on 
personal wealth, therefore monetary sanctions should be based on wealth. 
476 Standard marginal deterrence argument, cf. Posner, R. A., 1986. Economic Analysis of Law(Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston), Shavell, S., 1989. A note on optimal deterrence when individuals 
choose among harmful acts, Harvard Law School Discussion Paper. Chu, C., Jiang, N., 1993. Are 
Fines More Efficient Than Imprisonment?, Journal of Public Economics 51, 391-413. 
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(prison, attendance to a referral center, house arrest, community service,…), society 
bears the direct costs of maintenance of the infrastructure477 (depending on the degree 
and the nature of incapacitation).  
Moreover, both social and economic incapacitating sanctions imply direct costs of 
control. 
Furthermore, every incapacitating sanction implies indirect or consequential costs, 
associated with preventing a convicted offender from practicing his regular 
professional activity for instance. Society as a whole may suffer from the scarceness 
of an offender’s skills or from the disappearance of a company478. Some sanctions 
imply specific indirect costs, such as, for example, the recidivism subsequent to the 
imprisonment479, or the spread of diseases contracted in prison480.  
Finally, incapacitating sanctions are considered as an intrusive and costly form of 
sanction from a private point of view, as they imply taking away the fundamental 
right of individual liberty. Individual liberty is amongst the most fundamental of 
human rights and is protected by numerous international human rights instruments. 
Therefore, the very necessity of taking away this right should be established solely in 
the pursuit of a societal objective that cannot be achieved through a less restrictive 
mean.  
The economic incapacitating sanction is less costly than the socially incapacitating 
sanction, both from a social and from a private point of view; it should therefore 
always be preferred if it allows to reach the same level of deterrence.  
Finally, the non-incapacitating non-monetary sanctions are considered less costly than 
the incapacitating ones, and should from this point of view be used before the latter. 
However, naming and shaming sanctions should be imposed with due care. Indeed, 
stigma is unrecoverable. It exists as soon as the committed  wrongdoing is announced 
and the loss of reputation operates as soon as this announcement is pronounced. Some 
commentators mention that this sanction may imply a risk of recidivism. Indeed, a 
stigmatized convicted can never fully recover his loss and may therefore, in terms of 
opportunity cost, have more incentive than anyone to commit another offense481.  
From an economic perspective, the less costly monetary sanctions should always be 
used first to their largest extent. However, there are important reasons why society 
                                                           
477 Easterbrook, F. H., 1983. Criminal Procedure as a Market System, The Journal of Legal Studies 12, 
289-332.p.293. Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on 
Alternatives to Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York).p.4: “Direct costs include 
building and administering prisons as well as housing, feeding, and caring for prisoners”. 
478 Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York). 
479Nieuwbeerta, P., Nagin, D. S., Blokland, A. A. J., 2009. Assessing the Impact of First-Time 
Imprisonment on Offenders' Subsequent Criminal Career Development: A Matched Samples 
Comparison, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 25, 227-257.  
480  Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York).p.4: “Imprisonment may affect the wider 
community in various negative ways. For example, prisons are incubators of diseases such as 
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481 Funk, P., 2004. On the Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, European Economic Review 
48, 715-728. 
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cannot exclusively rely on monetary sanctions482.  
4.2.3.2 The need to use non-monetary sanctions for deterrence or incapacitation 
As presented in the previous section, non-monetary sanctions are assumed to be of 
three sorts: 
-    Social incapacitating non-monetary sanctions, 
-    Economic incapacitating non-monetary sanctions, 
-    Non-incapacitating non-monetary sanctions: naming and shaming, suspended 
sentences 
 
This sections aims at identifying economic criteria under which the use of these types 
of sanctions may be desirable.  
There are two classic justifications of the use of non-monetary sanctions: 
incapacitation and deterrence. Incapacitation and deterrence have distinct motives483. 
Hence, preventing an individual from engaging in an activity through incapacitation is 
different from dissuading him to engage in an activity through the prospect of a 
sanction. It is a matter of time perspective. In the first situation, the dissuasive effect 
can occur once (it works or doesn’t work on the individual)484, whereas incapacitation 
aims at neutralizing “undeterrable” individuals during a certain period of time485, 
particularly the ones who repeatedly commit crimes regardless of the sanctioning 
threat.  
The use of incapacitation through a non-monetary sanction is traditionally justified in 
cases when the main goal to achieve is not deterrence but rather incapacitation or 
rehabilitation486. However, under some circumstances, the prospect of incapacitation 
may operate deterrence better than any other sanction. Indeed, deterrence itself might 
be a consequence of incapacitation. In other words, the potential wrongdoer may be 
discouraged from acting due to the prospect of incapacitation487. In that respect, and 
contrary to Becker’s postulate, it may appear that under some circumstances fines are 
not necessarily more efficient than imprisonment even if deterrence is the concern 
(because fines and incarceration actually serve different deterrent functions to 
potential wrongdoers from different groups)488.  
The need to use non-monetary sanctions for deterrence 
 
(i) Limited wealth 
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The threat of non-monetary sanctions may deter an individual that would not be 
deterred by monetary sanctions alone. Due to the fact that a monetary sanction is a 
transfer of wealth, it has been raised by the literature that the appreciation of its 
deterrence effect is relative to and limited by personal level of assets or wealth489. 
Indeed, a monetary sanction is efficient from a deterrence point of view only up to the 
point where the actor can pay it490. Past this point, non-monetary sanctions should be 
used. The level of deterrence would be inadequate if the society only relied on 
monetary sanctions. Indeed, in case of high gain or harm, and low probability of 
conviction consequently high sanctions are needed to operate deterrence491. Limited 
wealth (or insolvency) is very useful in explaining the use of non-monetary sanctions, 
and especially their added value compared to monetary sanctions492.  
Going further, Polinsky and Shavell established that the low-wealth-type of 
individuals should face maximum monetary sanctions equivalent to their wealth, 
whilst high-wealth-type of individuals should not be imposed with maximal monetary 
sanctions since this may lead to over-deterrence493.  
(ii) Opportunity cost of time 
A sophisticated analysis sees in opportunity cost of time a parameter influencing the 
appreciation of socially incapacitating sanctions. Indeed, Chu and Jiang consider that 
the burden of imprisonment falls more heavily on individuals with higher opportunity 
cost of time494. Wage rate, rather than personal wealth, is considered as a factor 
influencing such opportunity cost of time. From this point of view, socially 
incapacitating sanctions should be lower for the high-income type of individuals to 
operate an equivalent deterrence effect. This argument also links in with the 
consideration of use of time. Baum and Kamas offered to measure the sanction in unit 
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“Offenders who cannot pay fines have to be punished in other ways”.  
491 See Chapter 3, Shavell, S., 1985. Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non Monetary Sanctions as 
a Deterrent, Columbia Law Review 85, 1232-1262.p.1237: “If the likelihood of failure to deter 
undesirable acts, together with the expected harm in which the acts would result, is sufficiently high, 
then resort to nonmonetary sanctions may be desirable despite the greater social costs attending their 
use”. 
492 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2008. The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications, Journal of Law and Society 35, 389-416. 
493 Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1991. A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among 
Individuals, American Economic Review 81, 618-621. 
494 Chu, C., Jiang, N., 1993. Are Fines More Efficient Than Imprisonment?, Journal of Public 
Economics 51, 391-413. 
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of time value instead of money value in order to address the issue of disparities in 
wealth495. However, this argument occupies little place in the literature. 
The need to incapacitate for preventing further harm 
(i) Incapacitation 
Incapacitation corresponds to the prevention of a class of undesirable acts by barring a 
party from engaging in an activity that would enable the party to commit the acts496. 
Indeed, incapacitated offenders are made incapable of offending for a substantial 
period of time497. It is an effective but costly way of preventing repeated crimes. 
Shavell’s seminal article about incapacitation offers a normative approach to 
incapacitation. He establishes that it would be optimal to maintain individuals in 
prison when their dangerousness, or the harm they would potentially inflict, is 
superior to the cost-per-period of keeping them in prison498. Consequently, 
broadening the conclusions, a person’s deprivation or limitation of freedom should 
provide a greater benefit to society than the cost imposed on him and on society. This 
implies that the act committed by a criminal provides information on his propensity to 
commit future damage. Consequently, from an incapacitation perspective, the term 
and conditions of deprivation of freedom should be set according to the 
dangerousness of an individual. 
(ii) Scope of the harm: danger for society (violence) or danger for the economy 
As described in the previous section, in the framework of this study, non-monetary 
sanctions designate a large corpus of sanctions associated with different degrees of 
incapacitation, which can have an administrative499 or a criminal nature. 
Total or partial incapacitating sanctions may be justified by the need to remove an 
individual from a circle because of their potential nuisance related to their 
dangerousness.  
Therefore, commentators argue that social incapacitation corresponds to the 
extraction of an individual from civil society and therefore should be used when there 
is a necessity to incapacitate individuals violent for society500. In a similar way, it is 
                                                           
495 Baum, S., Kamas, K., 1995. Time, Money, and Optimal Criminal Penalties, Contemporary 
Economic Policy 13, 72-79. 
496 Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard Press 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
497 Ashworth, A., 2010. Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Law in Context)(Cambridge University 
Press). 
498 See Shavell, S., 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law(The Belknap Press of Harvard 
Press University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). “If a person’s propensity to do harm each period exceeds 
the cost of incapacitation per period, he should be incapacitated each period, that is, forever, otherwise, 
he should not be incapacitated at all”. 
499  Ogus, A., Abbot, C., 2002. Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have the Right Regime?, Journal of 
Environmental Law 14, 283-298.pp.294-295. 
500 Posner, R. A., 1980. Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, American Criminal Law 
Review 17, 409-418. Shavell, S., 1985. Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non Monetary Sanctions 
as a Deterrent, Columbia Law Review 85, 1232-1262. Kahan, D., 1996. What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, University of Chicago Law Review 63, 591-653.  
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necessary to ban an individual (or an entity) from a specific professional status if they 
need to be distanced from a specific professional circle501.  
One aspect of the dangerousness of an individual could be related to the scope of the 
harm. Indeed, looking at the available incapacitating sanctions, it seems that two 
major kinds of incapacitating sanctions can apply depending on the scope of the harm. 
One category of sanctions should be applied to harm concerning public order matters 
(societal dangerousness), whilst the other category of sanctions should be applied to 
harm concerning economic order matters (market domain specific dangerousness).  
In reference to the foundations of the insider-trading ban, the parallelism of these 
sanctions could be founded upon the affectation of the concepts of public order and 
economic public order (cf. chapter 2)502. Indeed, both sanctions draw concentric 
circles representing functions of social networks involved in and harmed by the 
infraction503.  
4.2.4 Summing-up: Non-monetary sanctions for insider trading 
From an economic perspective, an optimal law enforcement policy should be 
achieved by first using monetary sanctions at the maximum, using proportional and 
wealth-related ones, and then second by completing with non-monetary sanctions504, 
starting with the less costly ones (considering control, infrastructure, maintenance, 
and indirect and consequential costs) and the less restrictive inducing a similar 
deterrent effect. From a theoretical point of view, at equal deterrence effect, non-
incapacitating non-monetary sanctions should be used first, followed by the 
economically incapacitating ones and, finally, the socially incapacitating ones. 
Incarceration should always be the last resort, meaning that it should be based on the 
experience that other sanctions are insufficient. All the other means have to be tried 
and explored before. 
The personal situation of wealth or occupation of an individual can have an impact on 
the necessity to use non-monetary sanctions for deterrence. The literature raises three 
specific aspects regarding this issue. First, the deterrence effect of a monetary 
sanction is limited by wealth and therefore non-monetary sanctions should be used in 
complement. Second, risk-seeking attitudes increase with wealth and therefore high 
wealth type individuals should not be imposed with maximum monetary sanctions. 
Third, individuals with high opportunity cost of time type should be imposed shorter 
prison terms.  
                                                           
501 Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to 
Imprisonment(United Nations Publication, New York). See section 4.2.2.1.1 : “First category of non-
monetary sanctions: incapacitation”. Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude 
du Droit Positif à la Lumière de l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris).p.143. 
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public order and economic public order developed in Chapter 2. 
503 Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris).p.143. 
504 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2000. Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains, 
International Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-549. Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217. Shavell, S., 1987b. The 
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Non-monetary sanctions should be used for incapacitation under restricted 
circumstances, calibrated to the social or economic dangerousness of the offender. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that most of this information is based on the 
assumption of a perfect information or at least, of a symmetric information; in reality, 
wealth and income may not be observable. In the case of asymmetric information, the 
lawmaker would choose a combination of uniform monetary and non-monetary 
sanctions that could lead to optimal level of deterrence. 
 
Summarizing, there may be different reasons for using non-monetary sanctions: 
 
Need for non-monetary sanctions to achieve deterrence in case of:  
• Limitation of wealth (insolvency) 
Need for non-monetary sanctions to achieve incapacitation in case of: 
• Undeterrable offenders (repeated offences) 
• Dangerousness for the economy: Need for economic incapacitation in 
particular 
• Dangerousness for society (violence): Need for social incapacitation in 
particular 
 
Application to insider trading 
 
The particularity of this study is to focus on insider trading. A certain number of 
studies already describe the characteristics of wealth and income of insiders and 
therefore facilitate the application of the economic criteria to insider trading. 
The question is whether there is a need to use non-monetary sanctions in the case of 
insider trading. Said differently, is there a particular risk of insider’s limitation of 
wealth? 
Coming back to the studies of Geis and Szockyj505, Meulbroek506 and Frino et al.507 if 
one were to take a gain of $25,594 dollars in a Becker-perspective as exposed in the 
introduction of this chapter, if the probability of detection were to be, for example, 
10% or 1%, an optimal fine (gain-based sanction) would either be of $255,940 or of 
$2,559,400. Depending on the particular situation of the insider, in the first situation 
the fine could probably be payable by the insider whereas in the second situation there 
may be a risk of insolvency, and hence a need for non-monetary sanctions in order to 
deter.  
In this respect, empirical papers also show that insider traders usually belong to high-
wealth category and occupy hierarchically high occupation (mostly composed of 
corporate officers and directors, and business executives such as presidents and vice-
                                                           
505 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286. 
506 Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, The journal of Finance 
47, 1661-1699. 
507 Frino, A., Satchell, S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, 
International Review of Finance 13, 241-263. 
114
 110 
presidents) with, on average, a high-compensation package508. These characteristics 
imply that insiders have a higher payment capacity than regular wrongdoers. 
Therefore, monetary sanctions for insider trading crimes should consequently be 
proportional to an insider’s high wealth and, only if necessary, completed with non-
monetary sanctions. This argument was advanced in recent proposals for reforming 
the business law sanctioning system509. Furthermore, according to Shavell and 
Polinsky, monetary sanctions should not be maximal because insiders belong to high 
wealth types of individuals. Finally, given the validation of the idea of calibrating 
sanctions to the opportunity cost of time of the wrongdoer, incapacitation terms 
should be lower for insiders, though this last argument is discussable.  
Finally, insider-trading is not a violent crime for which the use of non-monetary 
sanctions to operate incapacitation seems indicated. Indeed statistics indicate that 
67.5% of the defendants in insider trading cases were only charged on one occasion 
(meaning that they are not undeterrable repeat offenders that need to be 
incapacitated).510  
Consequently, a part of the literature raises the fact that social incapacitation may not 
be necessary in the context of financial infractions. Amongst them, Guillaume Royer 
states that even if the recourse to the sanction of incarceration for insider trading is 
not systematic, its omnipresent availability in the law makes it a powerful option. 
According to him, status sanctions are “sufficient” according to the law and 
economics precepts of deterrence511.  
 
To conclude, for insider trading, the need to use non-monetary sanctions in case of 
limited wealth seems less indicated than for the average wrongdoer, but however 
considerable; the need to use non-monetary sanctions in case of danger for the 
economy seems indicated because insider trading is characterized as potentially 
harming the economy512; the need to use non-monetary sanctions in case of 
undeterrability seems very limited; and in case of violence seems out of context. 
                                                           
508 See 4.1.2. Geis, G., 1998. Antitrust and Organizational Deviance(JAI Press, Stamford, CT). 
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512 Cf. Chapter 2. 
115
 111 
4.3 THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL NATURE OF SANCTIONS  
In this study, public law enforcement of regulations is considered to take place either 
through enforcement by agencies, associated here to administrative law, or by courts, 
associated here to criminal law.  
This section starts by describing the different goals served by administrative and 
criminal law (4.3.1). It then underlines the special function of criminal law in the legal 
doctrine (4.3.2) and emphasizes the ultima ratio conception of criminal sanctions 
(4.3.3). Finally, it clarifies the economic criteria for criminalization (4.3.4). 
4.3.1 Definitions and goals of administrative and criminal law enforcement 
The legal definition and the compliance goal of administrative law  
In the framework of this study, it is central to understand that the respective economic 
roles of administrative and criminal law lie in the different goals they serve: one 
mainly seeks compliance whilst the second mainly seeks deterrence. 
Administrative enforcement of laws fits into a complicance approach. Administrative 
enforcement designates an ex ante approach to guidelines and behavioral norms, 
prohibiting certain behaviors or making them unattractive by subjecting them to 
monetary or non-monetary administrative sanctions. An independent administrative 
authority imposes theses sanctions after a norm violation has been established513. First 
of all, administrative enforcement provides reparatory measure. One of the major 
advantages administrative enforcement offers compared to private enforcement is that 
the magnitude of the administrative sanction is not limited by the harm, contrary to 
damages and similarly to criminal sanctions. Consequently, administrative monetary 
sanctions have a more flexible character than tort damages514. Furthermore, from a 
procedural point of view, administrative sanctions are attached to norm breaking and 
are not conditional to whether losses have occurred515; intent is usually not even 
required. This makes the procedure easier from a judgment proof point of view.  
Even though administrative enforcement of laws operates prevention as well as 
deterrence516, the main goal attributed by the literature to administrative law is to 
operate compliance and restoration of harm using reparatory measures517.  
                                                           
513 Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.34. Seerden, R., Stroink, F.A.M., 
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516 Ashworth, A., 2000. Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, Law Quartely Review 116, 225-256. 
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Advocates of compliance and cooperative strategy argue that policies should take into 
consideration that individuals may have a law-abiding nature and may comply with 
the law without fearing a sanction, even in situations where utilitarian and behavioral 
theories may have predicted a will to infringe the rule518. From that perspective, 
policies should be shaped in order to encourage compliance whenever possible519 by 
providing repairs and information. The agency, better informed, could help the 
potential wrongdoers to comply with the regulation520. For instance, a compliance 
strategy is based upon a cooperative enforcement approach aimed at encouraging 
individual moral obligations to obey the law521.  
This implies that institutions seeking for compliance believe above all that individuals 
will comply. Indeed, the underlying mechanism does not rely on fear (like in the 
context of the deterrence strategy) but on trust. Trust is the basis of compliance and 
thereby influences the choice of individuals. Treating individuals with respect and 
trust, making them aware of their responsibilities and using less stringent regulatory 
system could potentially lead to better performances522. In this perspective, 
individuals’ perception of fairness and morality and of the legitimacy of rules, 
institutions and organizations influence their decision to obey523.  
Finally, a compliance strategy is based upon a continuing cooperation between the 
agency and the offender in order to induce compliance524. Compliance can be 
obtained through negotiation and bargain. This is possible to achieve because, in the 
regulatory framework, actors are often involved in repeated games and potentially 
deal with the same regulatory agency525.  
Regarding conciliation and compromising attitudes to law enforcement, cooperation 
may sometimes be more efficient than a deterrence strategy526. Hence, cooperative 
policies create a balance by allowing a smoother functioning of the society. Under 
certain circumstances and for certain types of offenses, this strategy is preferred. It 
may be the case for example for minor harms or mistakes due to insufficient 
knowledge or care on the part of the wrongdoer.  
However, some problems can arise in the compliance process. First of all, this 
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525 Fenn, P., Veljanovski, C., 1988. A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, The 
Economic Journal 98, 1055-1070. 
526 Hawkins, K., 1984. Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of 
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“interactive” type of strategy can diminish the credibility of the threat of legal 
sanction, which is crucial to attain voluntary compliance527. Indeed, compliance 
strategies may fail because they do not give potential offenders enough ex-ante 
incentives to comply with the law in the first place. Moreover, it may appear naïve to 
believe that individuals are willing to obey the law, and that guidance and advice may 
be sufficient to obtain compliance without having recourse to any coercive means. An 
alternative coercive measure should be operable if individuals do not comply 
voluntarily; if not, the policy may suffer discredit because it appears too weak and 
will likely not be respected528. Another type of problem is the risk of capture. Stigler 
argues that regulators may be captured by the industry to a much greater extent than 
judges possibly can, since judges do not have long-term relationships with firms529. 
The regulators’ behavior may end up considerably more biased against consumers 
than that of the judges. Interests groups may try to influence the position of the 
regulators within the decision making process. If it is the case, the regulation issued 
may be more likely to work in favor of the pressure group and fail at internalizing 
externalities to the detriment of social welfare530.  
The legal definition and the deterrence goal of criminal law 
 
Criminal law is also ex-ante531 defined in public legislation or in common law, 
governed by rules, and not standards, that can be primarily applied on the request of a 
public agent: a prosecutor or an agency. The introduction of substantive criminal rules 
should be consistent with the following principles: the principle of a legitimate 
purpose, the ultima ratio principle, the principle of guilt and the principle of legality.  
First of all, criminal law follows the principle of legality (nullum crimen nulla poena 
sin lege parlementaria) defined by Article 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: “No one should be held guilty of an offence on the account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed”. Therefore a criminal act is one defined as 
such in the penal code, or in other criminal statutes, by the legislature. This principle 
requires that criminal rules have to pass by Parliament to be legitimate532. The 
enactment of a criminal law should emanate from the people as directly as possible533. 
Some authors therefore underline the political opportunism and the contextual, 
historical and cultural biases534 in deciding to criminalize an act. Creating a new 
criminal act would in the end just correspond to the will of a legislature to signal a 
step towards a stricter enforcement. 
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Furthermore, the requirement of a legitimate purpose principle stands that a 
fundamental legal interest worthy of protection against socially harmful conduct of 
significant degree is a criteria to distinguish between criminal harms and 
administrative infractions535. The equivalent in common law tradition is the “harm 
principle”. In that respect, a criminal act should be the one that makes substantial 
public harm and contains a “third party interest” 536.  
 
Another important characteristic of the legal definition of a criminal act should refer 
to the individual state of mind. Indeed, it is the intention of the wrongdoer that makes 
avoiding the harm very costly for society. According to the principle of guilt, a 
criminal sanction should only be imposed when a criminal act has affirmatively been 
proven to be the product of a “guilty mind” resulting from “mens rea”. At a European 
level this principle result from article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU537. However, intent is not exclusive to criminal law, neither obligatory to 
constitute a criminal act. Hence, it can happen that pure negligence can be 
accompanied by the requirement of mens rea538, implying that a negligent act can also 
lead to criminal liability.  
 
Moreover, criminalization proposals should come with a requisite burden to ensure 
that it is used as a last resort to protect fundamental interests. Setting minimum 
standards in criminal matters should correspond to the last reply, accordingly to the 
ultima ratio principle emanating from the principle of proportionality539 (A special 
section will be dedicated to this principle in Chapter 6). 
 
Finally, criminal law has to apply to criminal acts through criminal sanctions, 
imposed by impartial judges540 aiming to deter and to punish. Criminal monetary 
sanctions offer the same flexibility as administrative fines, in the sense that their 
magnitude and timing are not restricted to the size and the occurrence of losses541. 
Most of non-monetary sanctions available to administrative law are available as well 
to criminal law. However, the specificities of criminal sanctions reside in two aspects: 
stigma and incarceration. Stigma is inherent to any criminal sanction, whilst a socially 
incapacitating sanction belongs to a category of criminal sanctions.  
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Now, regarding the goal attributed to criminal law, it is first to compensate542, or in 
other words, to bring justice to the victims. This does not appear to be the main goal 
of criminal law as it can also be achieved by administrative law or tort laws.  It 
consequently does not constitute an exclusive argument in favor of criminal law543.  
Criminal law is concerned with the prohibition of a designated act and also complies 
to the goal of punishment, considering that offenders need to be punished for their 
offences in order to obtain justice and operate deterrence544. This is not surprising 
insofar as criminal law is conceived as a device to punish deviations from the 
behavior considered as consistent to the smooth functioning of society. If an 
individual passes over a criminal prohibition, he is punished. Punishment makes 
individuals more responsive to legal standards545. With this concern, criminal law is 
intended to reflect social disapproval546. Nevertheless some scholars note the 
distinction between the function of criminal law and the function of sentencing547. 
They even sometimes consider that punishment is not an appropriate or natural 
response to offending548.  
Incapacitation549 and rehabilitation550 are considered by the literature as major goals 
of criminal law, which can be achieved respectively by incarceration and by various 
programs that have been already described (cf. 4.2.2). The aim of these measures is to 
prevent criminals from committing more harm in the future551. Nevertheless, it should 
be mentioned that, even if incarceration (social incapacitation) is exclusively available 
to criminal law, other administrative types of non-monetary sanctions enable to 
achieve potentially sufficient economic incapacitation. Indeed, incapacitation should 
sometimes occur prior to a deterrence effect, under certain circumstances. 
Finally, the deterrence goal seems to be the main goal invoked by criminal law552. A 
deterrence strategy is based on the assumption that an exemplary prosecution will 
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create a deterrent effect and hence lower the number of violations and harm553. 
Deterrence can occur at two different levels: individual and general. Individual 
deterrence seeks to deter an individual from re-offending, and his propensity to re-
offend is the main determinant of the sentence554. On the contrary, general deterrence 
aims at operating with a societal value and gives a counter-incentive to commit a 
criminal offence by inflicting a wrongdoer a severe exemplary sanction. Part of the 
literature also considers that the deterrence effect of criminal law is over-estimated 
and that it can also be achieved by administrative or tort laws. Consequently, the 
deterrence effect cannot constitute an argument exclusively in favor of criminal 
law555. Nevertheless, even if deterrence can be achieved by administrative or tort law, 
criminal law achieves his characteristic ultima ratio function. A deterrence strategy 
should always be used when the compliance strategies pursued by the administrative 
agencies are likely to fail556.  
4.3.2 The subsidiary legal role of criminal law 
This paragraph exposes the discussion of the legal doctrine about the role of criminal 
law in relation to those of other legal instruments. In the legal environment, different 
legal approaches support a subsidiary role of criminal law.  
The sanctioning conception of criminal law 
First of all, the “sanctioning” conception557 of criminal law denies it any autonomy in 
the creation of the legal values it protects. Following this vision, criminal law is 
limited to selecting legally enshrined values in other laws and lending its sanctioning 
instruments to the legal reality determined by contract, commercial or social laws 
when they fail to generate mechanisms capable of ensuring their own compliance and 
deterrence. It is a kind of “legal watchdog”, a “passive receptor of values determined 
by other branches of law”558 that acts as a strengthening “body belt”559. Law and 
economics theory holds that individuals are rational and do not spontaneously respect 
the obligations set forth by the law560. Criminal law is able to significantly influence 
the conduct of individuals when a strong and convincing argument is needed. It 
should be applied only in exceptional cases in order to rescue contract, commercial or 
social law when they fail to generate mechanisms capable of ensuring their own 
compliance and deterrence. This vision is sometimes criticized for its simplicity. 
However, many authors have supported the “sanctioning” conception of criminal law. 
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Numerous scholars from all over Europe traditionally share this vision and consider 
that “it is not the role of criminal law to regulate but to sanction”, or that criminal law 
is a “sanctioning law that the others rely on”561 . 
In 1762, Jean Jacques Rousseau operated a classification of the law into three groups: 
political law governing the State, civil law regulating relations between citizens and 
criminal law being a particular kind of law that is the punishment of all others562. 
Moreover, in the preliminary discourse of the draft civil code delivered the first 
Pluviôse IX, Portalis asserts that "criminal statutes are less of a particular kind of law 
than the penalty of all others"563. Furthermore, Jeremy Bentham supports that the role 
of criminal law is not to create an independent legal reality but to lend its sanctions to 
other laws to strengthen the deterrent mechanism. In this sense, criminal law does not 
create new social norms but has the function of ensuring compliance and enforcement 
of certain obligations issued by other laws, which are themselves “determining”.  
This conception has survived centuries and scholars such as Durkheim564, Roux565, 
Binding566, Natz567, Garraud568 or Jimenez de Asua569, always referred to as the 
sanctioning function of criminal law. The “Normentheorie” of Karl Binding 
developed in the book “Die Normen und irhe Ubertretung”570, in line with the old 
sanctioning conception, supports that the function of criminal law is to determine the 
legal consequences of the offense. This means that criminal law intervenes only after 
the offense and imposes to the judge the duty to punish the guilty. It also means that 
the offense is merely fulfilling the condition for the application of criminal law 
without constituting a violation of criminal law. It is in a separate standard of law that 
the transgression of the rule constitutes a criminal offense. 
However, the fundamental conception attributed to Portalis defining criminal law as a 
“sanctioning” subsidiary law has had its day571. This approach was recently criticized 
for granting too restrictive a role to criminal law572 and was qualified as 
“simplistic”573 and contrary to reality.  
The old “determining” 574 conception of criminal law is favored by recent doctrines 
favor that argues its normative and expressive575 dimensions.  Incrimination creates a 
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certain independent reality, and norms in other branches of law576. Criminal law is 
“sanctioning”, but not only. 
 
The subsidiary role of criminal law: ultima ratio 
 
The minimalist’s approach of law asserts that the law’s most coercive and 
condemnatory technique (criminal law) should be reserved for the most serious 
invasion of interest577. From this perspective, and on the following from the logic of 
the sanctioning conception of criminal law, the criminal sanction is conceived as the 
ultimate sanction that should act as a support to other branches of law. Therefore, the 
conditions required to make use of the criminal sanction can only be determined 
comparatively with the use of other sanctions; the scope of the criminal law should be 
limited to circumstances where other legal remedies are inadequate578. 
The ultimum remedium principle as a foundation of criminalization received support 
in the literature all over the world, even though it is a “continental” concept at its 
origin579. Jareborg developed the defensive model of criminalization580, arguing 
against what he calls an inflation of criminalization, or an over-criminalization. 
Summester and Sullivan581, Husak and Ashworth developed a restrictive theory of 
criminalization582, asserting the use of criminal law as a last resort. In the 
Netherlands, Hulsman also supported that any nature of enforcement should be 
resorted to before the criminal one. He even went further in the 1980s, developing an 
abolitionist approach of the criminal law583. De Roos is another scholar who support 
that the selection of conducts worthy of criminal punishment should be very diligent, 
arguing that criminal law could be only justified by the occurrence of a very large 
harm584.  
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4.3.3 Economic criteria for the use of criminal enforcement of  laws 
Chapter 3 presented the economic criteria under which the use of public enforcement 
would lead to a cost effective enforcement of laws compared to the use of private 
enforcement. This section examines the trade-off between administrative and criminal 
enforcement. The literature is prolific about this issue and provides criteria according 
to which it is more efficient to use either administrative or criminal law in order for 
society to come closer to a socially optimal level of harmful activity. 
Economics treats administrative and criminal laws as two mechanisms of public 
enforcement for controlling potentially harmful activities. They compete with 
alternatives such as civil law, private negotiation, or excise taxes, as means of 
preventing activities that impose social costs exceeding their social benefits585. One of 
the main criteria that determines whether to use a certain mechanism rather than 
another is that it should be the most efficient means of controlling a given activity586. 
If the administrative and social costs are the very first arguments in arbitrating the 
administrative or criminal nature of the sanction (4.3.3.1), the need to use criminal 
sanctions to operate deterrence or incapacitation (4.3.3.2) or to use criminal procedure 
to secure the imposition of criminal sanctions with high procedural requirements 
(4.3.3.3) are very important. Finally, some considerations are mentioned regarding the 
cumulation of sanctions and prosecutions (4.3.3.4). 
4.3.3.1 Administrative and social costs of the administrative and criminal sanctions 
The costs of apprehending and convicting associated with administrative and 
criminal enforcement of laws 
As already described in the section 3.1 dedicated to the costs of private and public 
enforcement of laws, criminal law is associated with higher enforcement costs than 
administrative law587.  
Social cost588 associated with administrative and criminal enforcement of laws 
Apart form the costs of apprehending and convicting, social costs associated with the 
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imposition of a sanction is an important dimension to consider. Indeed, at an 
individual level, the expected sanction is apprehended considering any non-pecuniary 
losses the convicted may suffer (such as bad reputation for example). For instance, a 
stigma effect and a reputational loss are associated with the punitive dimension of the 
criminal sanction. Stigma has been underestimated for a long time, or assimilated 
under the category of social norms; it is indeed a difficult component to assess. 
Nevertheless, social norms and law are indeed related and do influence each other589. 
Because of this punitive dimension, a wrongful criminal conviction can have serious 
consequences. Authorities require a great amount of information and a more complex 
procedure to secure a conviction. Economists generally agree that administrative law 
may not be able to inflict inherent stigma590. It is even argued that administrative 
authorities should not engage in “naming and shaming” of offenders because of its 
very high error costs. 591  
The eloquence of a criminal penalty marks the incriminated conduct of a blame that 
civil or administrative sanctions do not express592. Civil or administrative law covers 
domains such as accidents and negligent behavior, whilst criminal law usually covers 
intentional offenses that have to be established through a heavier procedural 
mechanism. From this standpoint, institutional properties of criminal law ensure that 
criminally convicted individuals are designated as bad types individuals593. Hence, 
criminalization clarifies the causality between an actor, an act and the extent of harm, 
thereby influencing social perception594. For instance, the criminal nature of the 
procedure confers a negative reputational effect to the sanction, so-called “stigma”595. 
According to a signaling and moral approach of criminal law, the higher standard of 
proof in criminal law implies that a criminal conviction conveys more reliable 
information about someone’s guilt596. 
Criminalization conveys information about an individual’s bad type as well as his bad 
behavior597. This information influences the norms by increasing the cost associated 
to the criminalized act598. A criminal conviction signals a different trait that may be 
considered important in an economic transaction: the convicted individual has 
                                                           
589 Escresa Guillermo, L., 2011. Reexamining the Role of Incarceration and Stigma in Criminal 
Law(Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Rotterdam). 
590 See inter alia Galbiati, R., Garoupa, N., 2007. Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: An 
Explanation of Consistent Beliefs, Supreme Court Economic Review 15, 273-283. 
591 See Faure, M., Ogus, A., Philipsen, N., 2009. Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics 
of Regulatory Enforcement, Law and Policy 31, 161-191.pp.173-176. 
592 Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., 2011. The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a 
European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, European Criminal 
Law Reveiw 1, 6-33.p.6: “The moral and social blame inherent in every criminal sanction remains 
firmly attached to the convicted criminal long after the sentence has been served”. 
593 Escresa Guillermo, L., 2011. Reexamining the Role of Incarceration and Stigma in Criminal 
Law(Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Rotterdam). 
594 Ibid. 
595 Ibid. 
596 Galbiati, R., Garoupa, N., 2007. Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of 
Consistent Beliefs, Supreme Court Economic Review 15, 273-283. 
597 Van Erp, J., 2011. Naming Without Shaming: The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial 
Market, Regulation and Governance 5, 287-308. About individual’s marginal productivity see 
Rasmusen, E., 1996. Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, Journal of Law and 
Economics 39, 519-543. 
598 Escresa Guillermo, L., 2011. Reexamining the Role of Incarceration and Stigma in Criminal 
Law(Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Rotterdam). 
125
 121 
deviated from the average behavior. People that do obey social norms are willing to 
signal their individual type599. On the contrary, people that are criminally convicted 
are described as non-performing their roles (doctors are supposed to protect health, 
lawyers to protect rights, financial advisors to take care of their clients’ assets, etc.). 
These elements also explain why the stigma effect arises out of individuals’ concern 
for their social status. Consequently, the stigma associated to a certain sanction may 
be perceived differently according to how sensitive the convicted person when it 
comes to their reputation.  
In the end, the negative association related to the criminal sanction complements the 
cost600 of the sanction and even emphasizes the deterrent effect of the criminal 
monetary sanctions, which would be experienced less seriously if they were 
administrative. These negative associations attributed to criminal law are important to 
consider criminal sanctions as an ultimum remedium: criminal sanctions should only 
be applied if alternative sanctions do not produce the desired effect601. 
To conclude, all things being equal, the administrative enforcement of laws appears to 
be less costly than the criminal enforcement of laws, both from an administrative602 
and social point of view. Therefore, from a cost-effective point of view it seems 
desirable to use the less costly administrative law first, instead of criminal law, in 
order to achieve optimal deterrence603. For this reason, many have argued that policies 
should be more based on administrative law to enforce violations of regulations604. 
However, there are two important reasons why the penalties that efficiently deter 
insider-trading crimes cannot all be imposed through administrative sanctions. Indeed, 
criminal law may sometimes be necessary: One reason is the sanctions available to 
criminal law (deterrence/socially incapacitation-based criteria) and the other is the 
error-costs minimization ensured by the criminal procedure (procedural-based 
criteria). 
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4.3.3.2 Relative sanctions available to administrative and criminal law 
The analysis so far has lead to the conclusion that, from an economic perspective, 
administrative sanctions may suffice in the case where the prospective gain or harm 
from insider trading and its probability of detection requires the use of public 
enforcement, but where deterrence can be achieved with a moderate administrative 
sanction. 
However, it may happen that the sanction needed to optimally deter the insider would 
have to be higher than the one available to administrative law. Criteria under which 
these sanctions are required constitute criteria in favor of using criminal law rather 
than administrative law. The scholarly literature has established that, when the gain or 
the harm out of the act is very high, for instance large, immaterial and diffuse605, and 
the probability of detection and conviction of the act is very low, the need to use the 
most stringent sanction is therefore necessary to operate optimal deterrence606. In this 
case, it may be necessary to use certain sanctions that are exclusively available to 
criminal law. 
Two dimensions make the sanctions available to criminal law unique: social 
incapacitation and inherent stigma. 
(i) Criminal law also exclusively provides for socially incapacitating sanctions. The 
criteria under which the use of social incapacitation is necessary were discussed in the 
previous section (the reader is invited to refer to section 4.2). They relate either to 
deterrence or to incapacitation objectives.  
(ii) The second specificity of criminal sanctions, which is particularly deterrent, 
resides in their inherent stigma607. Nevertheless, exactly as for naming and shaming 
sanctions, some economists have doubts on the possibilities to use stigma as an 
effective deterrent; one problem is that it may not be possible to inflict stigma in a 
way that is proportional to the crime.608 Another problem is that a growing amount of 
crime detection could result in less stigmatization.609 Based on this literature, using 
stigma as a motivation for criminal law is hence not unproblematic, to say the least.610 
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Because of these two specificities, criminal law provides for the most severe sanctions 
in terms of magnitude. Based on a perspective of deterrence, it may be necessary to 
use a very high sanction in the circumstances already exposed in chapter 3. In that 
respect, the intent of the offender can play an important role. The intent relates to the 
mental state of the offender and its intention to harm increases the probability of 
actually causing harm as well as the magnitude of the harm and lowers the 
probability of detection (the author of the crime can purposely hide it)611. In the 
context of intentional harm, arguments in favor of a criminal enforcement seem to be 
strong. Indeed, intentional insider trading usually constitutes a crime. 
4.3.3.3 High criminal procedural requirements 
From a procedural point of view, there is a clear economic reason why society does 
not want to impose very stringent sanctions through an administrative proceeding. 
The costs of the administrative proceedings may be lower than the costs of the 
criminal proceedings, but the accuracy of the latter may be a lot higher as well, thanks 
to an investigation often undertaken by professional lawyers.  
 
(i) Court errors and miscarriages of justice may have very costly impact for the 
convicted as well as for society.  
 
To administratively convict someone, it is likely that the prosecution must 
substantiate the allegation “on the balance of probabilities”. Moreover, depending on 
the regime, different elements of fault or knowledge on the part of the trader have to 
be established. They can relate to “due diligence”, “reasonable mistake”, or 
sometimes be part of a strict or absolute liability regime612. Most of the time, 
administrative agencies can negotiate with the convicted individual and try to find an 
agreement. Administrative law has a lower standard of proof, which may increase the 
risk of making a wrongful conviction. This also explains why administrative law 
cannot sanction with incarceration613.  
 
On the contrary, higher standards of proof are required to criminally convict 
someone614. Criminal proceedings are distinguishable because of their rules relating to 
investigation, arrest, filling of charges, trial, conviction and sentencing. Most of the 
time the procedure progresses with satisfaction from tests; the trial ends with a 
conviction when the prosecution manages to establish the suspect’s guilt “beyond 
reasonable doubt”. It is likely that, within a criminal proceeding, the intention, or at 
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least the knowledge of fault, on the part of the wrongdoer has to be demonstrated615. 
Therefore, the accuracy of the criminal prosecution is costly. Such procedures are 
made to legitimate criminal justice decisions and to ensure that no costly mistakes are 
made, such as convicting an innocent or acquitting a guilty616. Indeed, when 
incarceration may be involved, the cost of wrongful conviction is socially more 
significant. 
This aspect is important because the task of criminal law is not only to apply optimal 
sanctions to the guilty but also to avoid sanctioning the innocent. This is referred to as 
the goal of reduction of error costs.617 The error cost is obviously a lot higher when 
very serious sanctions, like social incapacitation, may be imposed. It is therefore 
understandable that less costly administrative proceedings are chosen in all cases 
where the consequences, and thus the error cost, will not be too high in the event of a 
wrongful conviction618. Arguably, another goal of the administrative procedure is also 
to avoid sanctioning the innocent and thus reducing error costs, although they operate 
at lower standards. This explains why administrative law and the corresponding 
administrative procedures are reserved for cases where relatively low penalties can 
suffice to induce deterrence.  
(ii) Courts and judges administer criminal prosecutions, whilst agencies and 
specialized bodies carry out administrative prosecutions. Therefore, it has been 
argued that administrative enforcement of regulations should be preferred in 
situations where the government possesses superior information compared to that 
possessed by the courts619. It should also be preferred when economies of scale will 
possibly be made thanks to the specificity of the agency structure in charge of the 
administrative law enforcement. After all, a more flexible law with a lower standard 
of proof, a specialized interpretation and a timely enforcement may be desirable to 
regulate certain economic and social activities620. 
4.3.3.4 Complement: Economic perspectives on cumulation of administrative and 
criminal prosecutions and sanctions 
The scope of optimal law enforcement is to achieve optimal deterrence at a minimal 
cost. From that perspective, the case of multiple prosecutions may be problematic.  
The issue of a prosecution is to impose a sanction when a violation of the law has 
been established. In cases where a first prosecution ends in an acquittal or in the 
                                                           
615 Faure, M., Ogus, A., Philipsen, N., 2009. Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of 
Regulatory Enforcement, Law and Policy 31, 161-191. 
616 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2008. The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications, Journal of Law and Society 35, 389-416. Garoupa, N., 
Rizzoli, M., 2007. Why Prodefendant Criminal Procedure Migth Hurt the Innocent?, University of 
Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper 137. Posner, R. A., 1985. An Economic Theory of the 
Criminal Law, Columbia Law Review 85, 1193-1231.  
617 See Miceli, T., 1990. Optimal Prosecution of Defendents Whose Guilt is Uncertain, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation 6, 189-201. 
618 Ogus, A., Abbot, C., 2002. Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have the Right Regime?, Journal of 
Environmental Law 14, 283-298. 
619 Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.36. 
620 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2008. The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications, Journal of Law and Society 35, 389-416. 
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imposition of an optimal sanction for a given violation of the law, any additional 
prosecutions may serve no useful purpose621. 
The first argument to this statement concerns the risk of over-punishment. Indeed, if 
further sanctions are added to the first optimal sanction, over-punishment may occur. 
The only case where a second prosecution may be desirable from an optimal sanction 
point of view is when the first prosecution has failed to secure an optimal sanction 
(sub-optimal sanction or an acquittal error). In that case, additional prosecutions are 
desirable up to the point where the optimal penalty is reached (implying that the first 
sanction has to be taken into consideration in the second prosecution).  
The second argument concerns the cost of prosecutions622. Social and individual costs 
have to be minimized in order to respect efficient law enforcement. From this 
perspective, multiple prosecutions also appear undesirable. The only case where a 
second prosecution is desirable is when the additional costs could be outweighed by 
the benefits of the additional prosecution. This also corresponds to the situation where 
the first prosecution failed in securing an optimal sanction. 
Therefore, the only reason justifying an additional prosecution from an economic 
point of view corresponds to the case where the first prosecution failed in securing an 
optimal sanction. This may occur from a lack of care in preparing and conducting the 
prosecution. In that respect, an appeal procedure is the solution to ensure the 
possibility of a “second chance”.  
Moreover, allowing cumulative prosecutions may have negative effects on the 
incentives of the prosecutor to take due care. Additional care in collecting evidences 
and prosecuting is not infinite and will consume scarce enforcement costs compared 
to those associated with an additional prosecution. The prospect of a one and only 
prosecution may encourage prosecutors to act with due care623. For instance, when 
different prosecutors can potentially prosecute the same violation of the law, the rule 
forbidding additional prosecutions increases the incentives for coordination between 
prosecutors. Depending on their resources, specialization, competences and power, 
one body can seem more adapted to prosecute a case than another. Forbidding 
multiple prosecutions is providing a stronger common interest in ensuring that the 
prosecutor who can achieve an optimal sanction at a minimal cost is the one who will 
prosecute the violation from the beginning624. Nevertheless, if an error occurs in the 
choice of prosecutor, the violation may not be relevantly punished.  
From an overall economics perspective, the rational forbidding of cumulative 
prosecution contributes to efficient law enforcement in various aspects: it supports the 
imposition of the optimal sanction at a minimal cost and provides incentives for 
efficient prosecution and efficient coordination between prosecutors625. 
                                                           
621 Wils, W., 2003. The Principle of "Ne Bis in Idem" in EC Antitrus Enforcement: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, World Competition 26, 131-148.pp.140-141: “From the perspective of minimizing 
cost, multiple prosecutions would thus always appear undesirable”. 
622 Coulon, J.-M., 2008. La Dépénalisation de la Vie des Affaires (Ministère de la Justice, France). 
623 Wils, W., 2003. The Principle of "Ne Bis in Idem" in EC Antitrus Enforcement: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, World Competition 26, 131-148.p.142. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid.p.143. 
130
 126 
4.4 SUMMING-UP: CRIMINALIZATION FOR INSIDER TRADING 
The starting point is, as already explained in the Chapter 3 dedicated to the division 
between private and public enforcement, that there are strong arguments in favor of 
the use of public enforcement of insider trading laws, most particularly because 
private enforcement may be too weak. However, this chapter stressed that public 
enforcement does not necessarily mean criminal enforcement. The possibility of 
improving the effectiveness of private enforcement, instead of resorting to 
criminalization, was previously mentioned in the study (See Chapter 3). Also, looking 
at the possibilities of administrative enforcement, the criteria we just mentioned do 
not systematically point to a need for criminalization.  
The last section of the chapter described that administrative law aims at obtaining 
compliance through the imposition of reparatory measures while criminal law aims at 
obtaining deterrence through the imposition of punishment. The employment of a 
deterrence strategy should be used only to the extent that compliance strategies are 
likely to fail626. From a legal theory point of view, the sanctioning conception of 
criminal law and the ultima ratio principle explains the subsidiary role of criminal 
law. From an economic point of view, the costs of administrative proceedings being 
lower than the costs of the criminal proceedings, administrative sanctions should be 
used at the largest extent before using criminal law. Administrative enforcement of 
law can suffice when the harm is relatively low, when the injurer may have enough 
assets and stake, when the individual does not need to be socially incapacitated but 
economic incapacitation may suffice and when inherent stigma is not necessary to get 
additional deterrence. 
However, there are clear economic reasons for which society cannot rely exclusively 
on administrative law. In the trade-off between administrative and criminal 
enforcement, the use of criminal law seems justified when there is a need for very 
stringent sanctions and accurate proceedings in order to secure the imposition of such 
stringent sanctions. More particularly, the use of the most severe sanctions through 
criminal law is desirable to operate deterrence when the gain or the harm is very high 
(for instance large, diffuse and immaterial) and when the probability of detection and 
apprehension is very low; or to operate incapacitation in case of limited wealth and 
violence627. The most severe sanctions are imposed through criminal proceeding 
because criminal procedure has the advantage of securing the imposition of such 
severe sanctions through high procedural requirements, which allow limited error 
costs. Moreover, inherent stigma associated to criminal law strengthens the deterrent 
effect of any criminal sanction.  
Nevertheless, it may not always appear optimal to systematically resort to criminal 
law when a high sanction is required to operate deterrence. It may be relevant to keep 
in mind that, even if criminal law seems to offer the most coercive sanctions (through 
social incapacitation and inherent stigma) some sanctions such as fines, economic 
incapacitating sanctions or naming and shaming sanctions, may be considered as 
serious alternatives. Moreover, as extensively described before, criminal law achieves 
a very specific goal and should be reserved for harms and wrongdoers fulfilling 
                                                           
626 Svatikova, K., 2012. Economic Criteria for Criminalization(RILE, Rotterdam). 
627 Becker 1968, 1974; Bowles, Faure, Garoupa 2008; Escresa Guillermo 2012; Shavell 1985, 1987, 
1989; Shavell, Polinsky 1984, 1991, 2004, 2007; Svatikova 2012. 
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specific criteria. Consequently, resorting to such enforcement should be thought out 
very cautiously and should be based on a necessity. 
Finally, regarding the articulation of administrative and criminal law enforcement, it 
seems desirable from an economic perspective to opt for a non-cumulative system of 
prosecutions. 
The division between administrative and criminal law can hence, from an economic 
perspective, be summarized as follows: 
There is a need for the most stringent sanctions through criminal law in case of:  
• Very low probability of detection and apprehension 
• Very high and substantial gain 
• Very high social harm: large, immaterial and diffuse 
 
The qualities of criminal law that make it a unique tool to achieve deterrence and 
incapacitation are: 
 
• Exclusive availability of social incapacitation, which is needed to achieve 
deterrence (limited wealth) or incapacitation (violent or undeterrable offenders) 
• Deterrent effect reinforced by inherent stigma 
• Reduced error costs thanks to high procedural requirements 
 
Application to insider trading 
One may ask how do the previously discussed economic criteria for criminalization 
apply to the case of insider trading. Given that the expensive and infringing criminal 
law system should be considered as ultimum remedium, the burden of proof should be 
on those who want to criminalize that the same results in terms of deterring insider 
trading cannot be achieved with either private or administrative enforcement.   
 
Firstly, insiders are not violent offenders and are mostly first time offenders. 
Consequently, a part of the literature raises the fact that the need to use criminal law 
for incapacitation may not be necessary in the context of financial infractions (See 
4.2.3.2.). In this respect, economic incapacitation seems more particularly adapted 
than social incapacitation.   
 
Secondly, the question of the need for criminal law really comes down to whether 
there is a need to use criminal law in a deterrence perspective. The issue to address is 
therefore to determine whether the potential harm caused by, or the gain obtained via 
insider trading, can be high enough and the probability of apprehension low enough 
for, the optimal administrative sanctions to fail in deterring potential insiders628. If it 
is the case, the system will require the use of the most severe sanctions through 
criminal enforcement.  
 
Regarding the harm associated with insider trading, insider trading should, in the very 
first place, be considered wrong for a matter of fairness and justice. As explained in 
                                                           
628 See section 3.2.3 for more detail about insider trading harm, gain and probability of detection. 
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the introduction to Title 1, potential insider trading harm measurment is controversial 
from an economic perspective.629  
 
Furthermore, several studies established that the average gain or loss appears to 
approximate a median of $25,594630. A study of Frino et al. established that the mean 
gain or loss avoided was $215,696. This means that in some cases, gains were 
substantially lower and in others, larger. This implies that, in many cases, 
administrative sanctions may suffice to deter but the use of criminal law is also 
justifed for the biggest takes.  
 
Regarding the probability of detection, several studies suggest that a large part of 
insider trading acts remains undetected. The literature explains this low probability of 
detection by the immaterial and diffuse nature of insider trading.631 In that respect, 
some scholars critique the detection methods used by the authorities632 and the 
insufficiency of staff and budget resources dedicated to insider trading detection633. 
All in all, the literature provide elements that support that insider trading is difficult to 
detect. 
Furthermore, in order to successfully prosecute an individual charged with illegal 
insider trading, the material and the non-public qualities of the information have to be 
established. The intention of the insider also has to be proven under some 
circumstances, especially under criminal prosecution. This process is difficult634. 
Consequently, the probability of conviction is relatively low.635 
                                                           
629 See introduction to Title 1: Economic efficiency is the result of several aggregate economic 
variables. Through the measure of the impact of insider trading on central aggregate economic 
variables such as informativeness of the prices, cost of capital and the stock market liquidity, a part of 
the scholarly literature provides arguments showing that insider trading can have potential serious 
consequences on economic efficiency. 
630 Frino, A., Satchell, S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, 
International Review of Finance 13, 241-263. Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of 
Illegal Insider Trading, The journal of Finance 47, 1661-1699. Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider 
Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 273-286.  
631 Easterbrook, F. H., 1985. Insider Trading as an Agency Problem(Harvard Business Press, Boston), 
Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286. Miceli, T., 2004. The Economic Approach to Law(Stanford University Press, Stanford). 
Kraakman, R., 1991. The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, Macey, J. 
R., 1991. Insider Trading: Economics, Politics and Policy(AEI Press, Washigton D.C.). Frino, A., 
Satchell, S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, International 
Review of Finance 13, 241-263. Harris, L., 2003. Trading and Exchanges(Oxford University Press, 
New York).  
632 Harris, L., 2003. Trading and Exchanges(Oxford University Press, New York). Frino, A., Satchell, 
S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, International Review of 
Finance 13, 241-263. Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, The 
journal of Finance 47, 1661-1699.  
633 Beny, L., 2012. Has Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United States? Evidences from 
Takeovers, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, University of Michigan Law School. 
634 Harris, L., 2003. Trading and Exchanges(Oxford University Press, New York).p.588: Insider 
trading prosecution has been qualified as  “impossible” by Larry Harris, former Chief Economist at the 
SEC from July 2002 to June 2004. 
635 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris). ESMA’s report has established that 
the probability of conviction of insider trading is 52,3% for administrative insider trading and 37,3% 
for criminal insider trading. 
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In conclusion, if the measure of the impact of insider trading on the economy is 
controversial, insider trading is harmful from a fairness and justice point of view. 
Moreover, insider trading associated gain of loss avoided can be substantial. 
Furthermore, the probability of sanction (resulting from the combination of the 
probability of detection and conviction) tend to be quite low. Under these 
circumstances, criminal law is needed for deterrence. 
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TITLE II. INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: EU 
LEGISLATION AND DOMESTIC PRACTICES (FOCUS ON CRIMINAL 
MATTERS) 
The second Title of this study explores the practices of sanctions and public 
enforcement of insider trading laws in a selected number of Member States and the 
recent proposals on market abuse matters of the Commission in the light of the law 
and economics literature discussed in the previous title. The objective is to verify if 
the normative criteria are respected in the positive law and to determine which 
recommendations can be formulated in order to enforce insider trading laws following 
the theoretical recommendations.  
 
The first chapter of this second Title is a comparative overview of the current 
approaches to administrative and criminal insider trading sanctioning and 
enforcement regimes in a restricted number of eight selected European Member States 
under the form of an index (Chapter 5). The methodological approach of the first 
aspect of this second part is a comparative overview of the current approaches to 
administrative and criminal insider trading sanctioning and enforcement regimes in a 
restricted number of eight selected European Member States. The main sources used 
to collect the data are the domestic codes, the enforcement reports and the statistics of 
the national and European authorities and jurisdictions.  
 
The second chapter of this part is a critical analysis of the recent European Union 
regulation evolution (Chapter 6). In that respect, the economic theory of federalism is 
used to analyze the division of labor between the Member States and EU level. This 
Chapter also questions the consistency of the proposal for a Directive with the 
principles governing the introduction of substantive criminal rules at EU level. The 
underlying question is, even if in particular circumstances the criminal law may be 
indicated for insider trading, whether criminalization should be implemented at EU 
level. An alternative would obviously be to respect the subsidiarity principle and 
allow Member States to decide on the necessity of criminalization in certain given 
circumstances.  
 
This second Title builds on the conclusions of the first title and complements it in 
addressing the research question. It describes how is insider trading enforced in the 
law and in practice, and shows what are the recent perspective in European law in this 
domain. Therefore it will have practical and policy implications as well since it could 
allow to shed a critical light, using economic analysis, on the current practices of 
selected Member States and on the proposals of the Commission. What was discussed 
in theory in Title 1 is discussed here in practice 
136
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CHAPTER 5. OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICES OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
UNDER THE 2003 MARKET ABUSE DIRECTIVE IN EIGHT MEMBER STATES 
Under the current legal framework, EU criminal law can require Member States to 
take effective, proportionate and dissuasive636 sanctions for a specific conduct. 
Member States are nevertheless autonomous concerning both the choice and the 
application of national sanctions. The European Commission recently pointed out that 
divergences in national sanctioning regimes in the European environment could be 
problematic.  
The design and enforcement of the national law provisions relative to sanctions for 
insider trading raises questions as to whether they are fully effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. In other words, are they capable of ensuring compliance with the law, 
of adequately reflecting the gravity of the violation and serious enough to deter 
potential authors of violations?  
Whether they actually meet these requirements depends on various aspects of the 
sanctioning regimes such as the nature and the level of the sanctions, their effective 
application and the efforts dedicated to the detection of violations637. 
 
In the first part of the section (5.1), an index will provide an overview of current 
approaches to administrative and criminal sanctions and law enforcement concerning 
insider trading offences in eight selected European Member States. The objective is to 
carry out case studies in a finite number of jurisdictions in order to accurately explore 
the key characteristics of the different regimes of policy and practices under the 
MAD: Whether insider trading can give rise to criminal sanctions for natural and legal 
persons; the minimum and maximum amounts of a sanction for market abuse; the 
different categories of sanctions; the key factors that must be considered when 
determining sanctions according to law; whether sanction decisions must be 
published; whether the same set of facts can give rise both to administrative sanction 
proceedings and to a referral to the judicial authority within the framework of 
criminal proceeding; the purpose, type and formalization of the cooperation between 
competent authorities and judicial or other prosecuting authorities; the intensity of 
public enforcement of securities regulation (measured through the resources of staff 
and budget). Finally, the chapter describes the actual sanctions imposed during the 
period 2008, 2009 and 2010 in the selected countries. The exercise aims to describe 
how the MAD is implemented and applied in practice by different Member States. 
This section will pinpoint the differences in interest and challenges faced by the 
selected countries but will not assess the regulatory regimes.  
 
The intention of the index is to provide an overall image of the practices and the 
context that motivated the European Commission to reform the Market Abuse 
Regulation and to issue two proposals in October 2011. It seems therefore insicated to 
                                                           
636 According to the Communication ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law’ COM(2011) 573 of 20.09.2011, p. 9: 
“effectiveness requires that the sanction is suitable to achieve the desired goal, i.e. observance of the 
rules; proportionality requires that the sanction must be commensurate with the gravity of the conduct 
and its effects and must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the aim ; and dissuasiveness requires 
that the sanctions constitute an adequate deterrent for potential future perpetrators”. 
637 COM(2010) 716 final of 8.12.2010, p.4. 
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study the practices that were taking place during this period in order to relevantly 
assess the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions in Chapter 6.  
When chosing the eight Member States to include in the study, the intention was to 
have a sample representing the diversity of the economic and financial activity in 
Europe. Following this logic, eight countries that occupy different positions in the 
world financial ranking638 (London is the first and Lisbon the 74th) were chosen. 
Another constraint was the language639. Indeed, the information on insider trading 
sanctions and enforcement laws and practices are obtained from the law, the doctrinal 
texts, the literature and from the competent judicial and administrative authority’s 
website and explicative documents as well as from documents issued by European 
Institutions (mainly the European Securities and Market Authority640 and the 
European Commission). The chosen countries were Belgium (BE), France (FR), 
Germany (DE), Luxembourg (LU), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), and United Kingdom 
(UK). For each of them, the year of the establishment of their main stock exchange 
and the year of enactment and enforcement of their insider trading laws are 
specified641.   
 
The data relative to the enforcement of administrative and criminal sanctions for the 
period 2008, 2009 and 2010 is mainly taken from the ESMA report. Firstly, this 
document provides data for the 27 European Union Member States and Iceland and 
Norway (European Economic Area Member Countries), making 29 countries in total 
that are designated as “Member States” in this study, just like in the ESMA’s report. 
Secondly, this report relies on the information provided by the national competent 
authorities and entails a weakness: regarding criminal enforcement of laws, it 
provides data for only 17 countries. BE, ES, IT are amongst the 12 countries for 
which the ESMA’s report does not provide data. It is interesting to observe that the 
European Authority in charge of the regulation of market abuse does not possess the 
information about the totality of the Member States. However, because the last part of  
this study is dedicated to the assessment of the proposal for a Directive on criminal 
sanctions for market abuse, this chapter makes the most of the report and summarize 
the major observations that can be made thanks to the data provided for the available 
17 Member States instead of only focusing on the eight chosen Member States.  
 
There were various methodological difficulties that appeared in drafting this 
particular index. Constructing a data set comparable across nations is not easy 
because, aside the fact that the law differs from one country to another, jurisdictions 
organize regulatory responsibilities and powers differently. Data is difficult to obtain 
and not always available for every country. Moreover, the selection and choice of 
variables to include in the index can be criticized. Another weakness is that this kind 
                                                           
638 The selection of the countries has been made lead by the exigency of providing a picture of the 
divergence in E.U. According to the Global financial centers index September 2012 ranking London is 
1st, Frankfurt is 13th, Luxembourg is 24th, Munich 25th, Paris 29th, Brussel 47th, Madrid 50th, Milan 
51st, Rome 62nd, Lisbon 74th Cf. http://www.longfinance.net/Publications/GFCI%2012.pdf. 
639 I could only read documents written in French, English, and latin languages in general (I chose to 
include Germany however). 
640 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris). ESMA/2012/270. 
641 Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 75-
108.p.80: In there study, Bhattacharya and Daouk established were insider trading was established and 
when was the first prosecution under this law (in 1999, for a very large number of countries including 
the countries studied in the chapter).  
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of methodology does not allow taking into consideration tangential factors, such as 
the influence of culture, history or the nature of the domestic regulatory system, 
which are crucial in assessing a regulatory regime. Furthermore the resource-based 
measures of public enforcement, including the number of staff dedicated to the whole 
range of activities relative to market abuse sanctioning (full time equivalent) divided 
by the population (“Staff per million population”), and the budget dedicated to the 
enforcement of market abuse law divided by the GDP in US$ (“Budget per billion 
US$ of GDP”), is only available for the year 2005 but allows to make an interesting 
comparison. Secondly, all the data about the substantial and the procedural aspects 
were collected in 2010, and the enforcement data concern the years 2008, 2009 and 
2010. Changes have occurred since then, regarding the law, the competent authorities, 
etc.  
 
The chapter is organized as follow: 
 
The index is divided in two major titles. The first title describes the major aspects of 
the substantive and procedural law relative to administrative and criminal sanctions 
and enforcement (5.1.1). The second title relates to the actual resources and 
enforcement data (5.1.2). 
 
The first title (5.1.1) is divided in two subtitles: 
The first subtitle focuses on issues regarding sanctions (5.1.1.1): whether insider 
trading can give rise to criminal sanctions for natural and legal persons; the minimum 
and maximum sanctions for market abuse; the different categories of sanctions; the 
key factors that must be taken into account when determining sanctions according to 
the law; whether sanction decisions have to be published. The second subtitle focuses 
on issues relative to the interaction and cooperation between the sanction and 
enforcement powers of administrative and criminal bodies (5.1.1.2): whether the same 
set of fact can give rise to both administrative sanction proceedings and to a referral to 
the judicial authority within the framework of criminal proceedings; the purpose, type 
and formalization of the cooperation between competent authorities and judicial or 
other prosecuting authorities. 
 
The second title (5.1.2) is also divided into two subtitles: 
The first subtitle focuses on the intensity of public enforcement of securities 
regulation (5.1.2.1), measured here through the resources dedicated to this issue, 
consisting of the number of staff dedicated to the whole range of activities relative to 
market abuse sanctioning (full-time equivalent) divided by the population, and the 
budget dedicated to enforcing market abuse law divided by the population.  The 
second subtitle (5.1.2.2) focuses on the actual administrative and criminal monetary 
and non-monetary sanctions imposed between 2008 and 2010.  
 
On the basis of this information, certain observations about the sanctioning regimes of 
the selected countries are summarized in order to reflect key issues of policy 
challenges. The objective is to identify and formulate implications for an effective 
enforcement policy in the second part of this chapter (5.2).  
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5.1 ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 
PRACTICES OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS IN EIGHT MEMBER STATES 
To introduce the index, the major characteristics of the law and the administrative and 
criminal procedures in relation to insider trading sanctioning under the Market Abuse 
Directive are shortly described for each of the eight chosen countries. 
5.1.1 Overview of the national laws concerning administrative and criminal 
procedures 
In Belgium (BE), the year of the main exchange was 1801 whilst insider trading law 
was enacted in 1990 and the first enforcement was made in 1994. The Law of 2 
August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services 
(amended by the Law of 2 July 2010) provides for both an administrative and a 
criminal sanctioning regime for insider trading. Regarding administrative 
enforcement, the Financial Services and Market Authority (FSMA) can impose 
administrative sanctions based on the article 25§1642. The administrative enforcement 
of laws follows this path: a supervisory and inquiry phase; an assessment of the case 
by the Management Committee regarding the seriousness of the offense (the 
committee could also potentially decide to forward the case to the judicial authority); 
a referral to the FSMA’s Investigation Officer and the appointed “Rapporteur” who 
investigates the charges and defense of the case, examines the allegations and submits 
his findings to the perpetrator of the insider trading and to the Sanctions Committee of 
the FSMA, that then decides to impose an administrative sanction or not. An appeal is 
possible. The sanction decision is published on the website of the FSMA. Criminal 
sanctions for insider trading can be imposed on the basis of article 40 of the Law of 2 
August 2002.  
 
In Germany (DE) the year of the main exchange was 1585 whilst insider trading law 
was enacted in 1994 and the first enforcement was made in 1995. The “Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht” (BaFin) is the competent authority for prosecuting 
administrative offences based on the “Wertpapierhandelsgesetz” (Securities Trading 
Act) (Section 3)643. Firstly the BaFin is in charge of monitoring compliance with 
insider trading regulation. Therefore, all securities transactions data which credit and 
financial services institutions have to report are analyzed. If certain elements show a 
potential case of insider trading, the BaFin launches a formal investigation. If 
relevant, the offence can be reported to the Public Prosecutor office.  
 
In France (FR) the year of the main exchange was 1826 whilst insider trading law was 
enacted in 1967 and the first enforcement was made in 1975. The administrative 
measures are provided by the articles L621-13, L621-14 and L621-15 of the “Code 
Monétaire et Financier”644. The “Autorité des Marchés Financiers” (AMF) is the 
competent authority to impose administrative measures and sanctions. Its role is to 
supervise financial instrument transactions in order to detect abnormal situations. An 
investigation can start based on the decision of the Secretary General, on the request 
of another authority or on the basis of a complaint. The AMF Board then decides to 
                                                           
642 http://www.fsma.be/~/media/Files/fsmafiles/wetgeving/wet_loi/en/law_02-08-2002.ashx#art25. 
643 http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html. 
644 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072026. 
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open an administrative sanction proceeding (or to forward the case to the public 
prosecutor). The case is then transmitted to the Enforcement Committee (separated 
and independant from the Board) that will take the decision to sanction on the basis of 
the report made by the “Rapporteur” and the hearing of the respondent. This decision 
can be reviewed by an administrative or criminal court on the demand of the 
defendant. The AMF Chairman is also entitled to review it based on the “Loi de 
régulation bancaire et financière” adopted in October 2010. The “appeals” are heard 
by the Paris Court of Appeal, and eventually by the Cour de Cassation (only on a 
point of law), and exceptionally by the Conseil d’État (for a category of professionals 
mentioned in the Code Monétaire et Financier). An insider can be criminally 
sanctioned on the basis of the article L465-1 of the Code Monétaire et Financier. A 
criminal proceeding can start and run simultaneously to an administrative proceeding. 
The Public Prosecutor decides (on its own motion or referred by the AMF) to conduct 
a preliminary inquiry or a judicial investigation. A public hearing is then held to the 
Paris “Tribunal Correctionnel” that decides which sanction to impose. An appeal may 
be logged in front of the “Cour de Cassation”. 
 
In Italy (IT) the year of the main exchange was 1806 whilst insider trading law was 
enacted in 1991 and the first enforcement was made in 1996. The “Comissione 
Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa” (CNSB or Consob) is the authority in charge of 
the supervision of the financial markets, based on Art. 184 and 187-bis of the 
Financial Law (58/1998). After a preliminary inquiry, the Consob starts a formal 
investigation in order to collect evidence, establish insider trading and finally sends a 
formal notification letter to the defendant. After reception, the defendant has 30 days 
to present his defense. The Market Abuse Investigation Unit has to wait 210 days 
(390 if the offender resides abroad) to move the proceeding forward before the 
Administrative Sanction Unit, addressing a report containing relevant elements 
regarding the investigation and the defense. If relevant, a report can also be sent to the 
Judicial Authority. The Administrative Sanction Unit has 150 days to notify the 
offender, eventually receive additional defensive elements, and finally make a 
proposal of sanction to the Commission Board that will take the final decision, 
published in the Consob’s Bulletin. A criminal proceeding can run in parallel to an 
administrative proceeding. Furthermore, Consob may join the procedure as a civil 
claimant and therefore ask for damages for breaches of market integrity. 
 
In Luxembourg (LU) the year of the main exchange was 1929 whilst insider trading 
law was enacted in 1991. The Law of 9 May 2006, amended by the Law of 26 July 
2010 provides for both an administrative and a criminal sanctioning regime for insider 
trading, exclusively applicable according to certain criteria provided in the law. The 
“Commission de Surveillance des Marchés Financiers” (CSSF) is the authority in 
charge of the supervision of securities markets and can initiate a prosecution of 
administrative offences, either for self-initiated inquiries or on the demand of a 
foreign administrative authority. Firstly, preliminary inquiries based on internal and 
publicly available information are optional. Secondly, investigations are conducted by 
a specialized division of the CSSF that collects information from market professionals 
and issuers. According to its supervisory and investigative powers, the division 
decides to open a procedure and collect and examine the relevant facts and evidence. 
The suspected person is heard during a contradictory debate, sometimes assisted by a 
lawyer or an advisor. The final decision of the CSSF is then subject to a judicial 
review by the “Tribunal Administratif” and the “Cour Administrative”. The whole 
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administrative proceeding is subject to review. If at the opening of the prosecution or 
even during the proceeding, the intent to obtain illicit profit or benefit is detected, the 
CSSF informs the State Officer. The State Prosecutor has three days to decide 
whether prosecution will be initiated. If it is the case, any administrative proceedings 
stop. If further conditions for a criminal prosecution are not fulfilled, the Prosecutor 
transfers the file to the CSSF.   
 
In Portugal (PT), the year of the main exchange was 1825 whilst insider trading law 
was enacted in 1986. The “Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios” (CMVM) 
is the authority in charge of the supervision of securities markets and can initiate 
prosecution of administrative offences. If the analysis of a suspicious transaction 
establishes facts that may be qualified as insider trading, the Executive Board 
formally orders the opening of preliminary investigation proceedings, followed by the 
issuing of the conclusion of the Trading Analysis and Enforcement Department. The 
conclusion results in the writing of either an administrative or a criminal report. In the 
case of an administrative report, the Executive Board refers the process to the Legal 
Affairs Department. After an investigation, the CMVM informs the defendant through 
a formal act of accusation specifying the facts, the potential sanction and the time they 
have to present their defense. After studying the arguments and evidence, the CMVM 
formally issues a decision. There are two possibilities of appeal to the judicial courts 
and to the second level court of appeal. In the case of a crime report, the Executive 
Board refers to the Public Prosecutor, in charge of criminal proceedings based on the 
“Codigo dos Valores Mobiliarios” (Titulo VIII, Crimes e Ilicitos de Mera Ordenaçao 
Social, Art. 404). The Executive Board should be notified of every decision taken. 
After a preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor either closes the case or 
accuses. The accusation can be appealed. In this case, an inquiry will be conducted 
through and through in order to confirm the trial or not. An appeal is possible both for 
the defendant (in case of a conviction) and the Public Prosecutor (in case of an 
acquittal). 
 
In Spain (ES) the year of the main exchange was 1831 whilst insider trading law was 
enacted in 1994 and the first enforcement was made in 1998. The “Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores” (CNMV) is the authority in charge of 
administrative proceedings under the “SMA Ley 24/1998, de 28 de Julio, del 
Mercado de Valores” (Securities Market Act)645. An investigation can be opened on 
the CNMV’s own decision, on the demand of a foreign competent authority or on a 
complaint. The CNMV’s inspector therefore prepares a “technical report”, transmitted 
to the CNMV’s Executive Committee (EC), that can possibly ask for a “legal report”, 
and finally decide to institute an administrative proceeding. The instructor informs the 
parties involved, whom have 15 days to constitute their defense. Afterwards, they 
receive the charge sheet including the facts and their consequences. The parties have 
20 more days to complete their defense. Once the period of additional actions is over, 
the instructor issues the resolution proposal. The parties have 20 business days to 
allege. The CNMV EC finally issues a resolution. A criminal proceeding can only be 
carried out by the Judge, based on the Article 285 of the Criminal Code.  
 
In the United Kingdom (UK) the year of the main exchange was 1773 whilst insider 
trading law was enacted in 1980 and the first enforcement was made in 1981. The 
                                                           
645 http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Fiscal/l24-1988.html. 
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authority in charge of enforcing insider trading law is the Financial Service Authority 
(FSA)646. Firstly, when an insider trading case is found or signaled, the Market 
Division and the Enforcement and Financial Crime Division (EFCD) jointly decides 
to open an administrative or a criminal investigation, based on certain criteria. If an 
administrative procedure is opened, the “target” of the investigation is designated and 
a preliminary investigative report on the case made by the FSA is issued and sent to 
the FSA’s independent Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC). This committee is 
composed of practitioners and non-practitioners appointed to represent the public 
interest. The RDC then issues a notice. The target can appeal the decision to the 
Upper Tribunal. The final decision is published. Settlement is possible at any stage of 
the administrative procedure. If the FSA suggest a criminal proceeding, it has to be 
agreed by the RDC. The criminal prosecution is then instigated by the FSA through a 
request that a court summons the target to attend the court, or by asking the police to 
charge the target and require him to attend the court. A lower court decides whether 
the matter is sufficiently serious to be tried in front of a jury (most often) or if a lower 
court Magistrate may suffice.  
 
The index is organized as follows: 
 
Variable/ Component Description Source 
 
Laws / Competent authorities: 
 
- BE: Financial Services and Market Authority (FSMA)’s Website647, Law 
of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial 
services648 (Art.25§1) 
 
- DE: “Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht” (BaFin)’s 
Website649, “Wertpapierhandelsgesetz” (Securities Trading Act) (Section 
3)650 
 
- ES: “Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores”(CNMV)’s Website651, 
SMA Ley 24/1998, de 28 de Julio, del Mercado de Valores (Securities 
Market Act)652, Crim. Code (Art.285) 
 
- FR: “Autorité des Marchés Financiers” (AMF)’s Website653, Act of 1st 
August 2003 (“loi n°2003-706”), amended by an Act of 4 August 2008 and 
by an Act of 22 October 2010, “Code Monétaire et Financier” (Art. L.621-
13,-14,-15, Art. L.465-1, Art. L.466-1)654 
 
- IT: “Comissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa”(CNSB)’s 
Website655, Art. 184 and 187-bis of the Financial Law (58/1998)656 
                                                           
646 Since then, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was created with the Financial Services Act 
2012 and replaced the FSA. 
647 www.fsma.be. 
648 http://www.fsma.be/~/media/Files/fsmafiles/wetgeving/wet_loi/en/law_02-08-2002.ashx#art25. 
649 http://www.bafin.de/DE/Startseite/startseite_node.html. 
650 http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html. 
651 http://www.cnmv.es/portal/home.aspx. 
652 http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Fiscal/l24-1988.html. 
653 http://www.amf-france.org/. 
654http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=012DB0E1862383D4DFBF874B07627052.
tpdjo12v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006170504&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072026&dateText
e=20131112. 
655 http://www.consob.it/. 
656http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/fr_decree58_1998.htm#sdfootnote1sym. 
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- LU: “Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier” (CSSF)’s 
Website657, Law of 9 May 2006, amended by the Law of 26 July 2010658  
 
- PT: “Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios”, 
 (CMVM)’s Website659, “Código dos Valores Mobiliários”, Securities 
Code, Art. 378/1; Crim. Code, Titulo VIII, Art. 47/1, Crimes e Ilícitos de 
Mera Ordenação Social, Art. 404660  
 
- UK: the Financial Service Authority (FSA)661 became the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA)662 with the Financial Services Act 2012: Website 
5.1.1 Categories of administrative and 
criminal sanctions and procedures for 
insider trading: content of the law 
  
5.1.1.1 Categories of administrative 
and criminal sanctions   
5.1.1.1.1 Administrative sanctions   
Table 1. Administrative sanctions for 
natural / legal persons 
Can administrative sanctions apply 
to natural and/or legal persons? 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / “Report: Actual Use of 
Sanctioning Powers under MAD”, 
(April 2012), ESMA’s report) (p.38) 
Table 2. Availability of administrative 
monetary sanctions 
Minimum and maximum 
administrative monetary sanctions 
provided by legislative or 
constitutional provisions and 
principles 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.44-5) 
Table 3. Key factors for administrative 
sanctions 
Factors that have to be taken into 
account in determining 
administrative monetary sanctions 
according to the law 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities/ ESMA’s report (p.55) 
Table 4. Availability of administrative 
non-monetary measures and sanctions 
Categories of measures and 
sanctions 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.63) / 
“Report on Administrative Measures 
and Sanctions as well as the 
Criminal Sanctions available in the 
Member States under MAD” 
(November 2007, CESR/07-693) 
Table 5. Publication of administrative 
sanction decisions 
- Does the law require that 
administrative sanction decisions 
be made public in principle? 
- Is there a possibility to make the 
decisions anonymous? 
Law / Website Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.134) 
5.1.1.1.2 Criminal sanctions   
Table 6. 1 Criminal sanctions for 
natural / legal persons 
Can criminal sanctions apply to 
natural and/or legal persons? 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.73) 
Table 7. Availability of criminal 
monetary sanctions 
Minimum and maximum criminal 
monetary sanctions provided by 
legislative or constitutional 
provisions and principles 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.87) 
Table 8. Key factors for criminal 
sanctions 
Factors that have to be taken into 
account when determining criminal 
monetary sanctions according to 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.97, 
103) 
                                                                                                                                                                         
657 http://www.cssf.lu/. 
658 http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2006/0083/a083.pdf. 
659 http://www.cmvm.pt/cmvm/Pages/default.aspx. 
660http://www.cmvm.pt/EN/Legislacao_Regulamentos/Codigo%20Dos%20Valores%20Mobiliarios/Pa
ges/Title%20VIII%20-%20Crimes%20and%20administrative%20offences.aspx?nrmode=unpublished. 
661 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/. 
662 http://www.fca.org.uk/. 
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the law 
Table 9. Availability of incarceration 
Minimum and maximum length of 
imprisonment terms provided by 
the law 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.106-
107) 
Table 10. Availability of other 
criminal non-monetary sanctions 
Different categories of other non-
monetary sanctions? 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.111) 
/ “Report on Administrative 
Measures and Sanctions as well as 
the Criminal Sanctions available in 
the Member States under MAD” 
(November 2007, CESR/07-693) 
Table 11. Publication of criminal 
sanction decisions 
- Does the law require that criminal 
sanction decisions be made public 
in principle? 
- Is there a possibility to make the 
decisions anonymous? 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.138) 
5.1.1.1.3 Interaction between 
administrative and criminal 
enforcement 
  
Table 12. Articulation of 
administrative and criminal 
proceedings 
- Exclusive or cumulative use of 
enforcement and sanctions? 
- Whether the same set of facts can 
give rise to both administrative 
sanction proceedings and to a 
referral to the judicial authority 
within the framework of criminal 
proceedings 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities’ website / ESMA’s 
report (p.27, 28) 
Table 13. Cooperation between 
competent administrative and judicial 
authorities 
Purpose, type and formalization of 
the cooperation between competent 
authorities and judicial or other 
prosecuting authorities 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.29, 
31) 
5.1.1.2  Procedure for administrative 
and criminal sanctions   
5.1.1.2.1 Administrative procedures 
for measures and / or sanctions   
Table 14. Availability of settlement 
within administrative proceeding  
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.29, 
36) 
Table 15. Authority, body entrusted to 
take decisions and inflict 
administrative measures and / or 
sanctions 
- Authority responsible for 
inflicting the administrative 
measures and / or sanctions 
- Bodies or persons entrusted to 
take sanctioning decisions in 
relation to insider trading 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.23) / 
“Report on Administrative Measures 
and Sanctions as well as the 
Criminal Sanctions available in the 
Member States under MAD” 
(November 2007, CESR/07-693) 
Table 16. Administrative procedural 
conditions to sanctions 
Required evidence / Standard of 
proof 
Law / Website of Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.67) 
Table 17. Ability of the administrative 
authority to criminally prosecute 
market abuse in front of judicial courts 
within the framework of criminal 
proceedings 
 Law / Website of Competent Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.79) 
5.1.1.2.2 Criminal procedures for 
measures and / or sanctions   
Table 18. Authority or body entrusted 
to take decisions and inflict criminal 
sanctions 
  
Table 19. Criminal procedural 
conditions to sanction 
Required evidence / Standard of 
proof 
Law / Website Competent 
Authorities / ESMA’s report (p.112, 
146
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5.1.2 Administrative and criminal 
sanctions: Resources and 
enforcement data 
  
Variable / Component Description Source 
5.1.2.1 Public enforcement effort: 
Resources in 2005   
Table 20. Staff per million 
population  
Number of staff dedicated to the 
whole range of activities relative to 
market abuse sanctioning (full-time 
equivalent) divided by the 
population 
- “How countries Supervise Their 
Banks, Insurers and Securities 
Markets”, Central Banking 
Publications of London663; 
- Population Data from World Bank 
Data and Statistics Web site664 
Table 20. Budget per million GDP 
(in $) 
Budget dedicated to the enforcement 
of market abuse law divided by the 
GDP 
- “How countries Supervise Their 
Banks, Insurers and Securities 
Markets”, Central Banking 
Publications of London; 
- Population Data from World Bank 
Data and Statistics Web site 
5.1.2.2 Administrative and criminal 
sanction decisions in 2008, 2009 and 
2010 
Review period: 2008/2009/2010 ESMA’s report 
5.1.2.2.1 Administrative sanction 
decisions   
Table 21. Administrative monetary 
sanction decisions  (p.41, 48, 54) 
Table 22. Administrative non-
monetary sanction decisions  (p.64) 
5.1.2.2.2 Criminal sanction decisions   
Table 23. Criminal monetary 
sanctions  (p.90-93) 
Table 24. Cases originated by CA 
and transmitted to criminal court  (p.81) 
Table 25. Incarceration sanction 
decisions  (p.109-110) 
Table 26. Criminal non-monetary 
sanctions alternative to incarceration 
decisions 
 (p.111) 
                                                           
663 Central Bank, 2007. How Countries Supervize their Banks, Insurers and Securities Markets, Robert 
Pringle edition.(Central Banking Publications). 
664 http://data.worldbank.org/. 
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5.1.2 Categories of administrative and criminal sanctions and procedure for insider 
trading: Content of the law  
5.1.2.1 Categories of administrative and criminal sanctions for insider trading 
5.1.2.1.1 Administrative sanctions  
Table 1. Administrative sanctions for natural / legal persons 
Administrative 
sanctions for natural 
/ legal persons 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Natural (27MS) X X X X X X X X 
Legal (27MS) X X X X X X X X 
 
Table 2. Availability of administrative monetary sanctions 
Availabili
ty of 
administra
tive 
monetary 
sanctions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU 
PT 
(CMVM) 
 
UK 
Minimum 
administra
tive 
monetary 
sanctions 
!2,500 for 
the same 
offence or 
the same 
totality of 
offences 
!5 
!30,000 
for very 
serious 
infringem
ents; 
!12,000 
for serious 
infringem
ents 
O !100,000 !125 !25.000 O 
Maximum 
administra
tive 
monetary 
sanction 
!2,500,00
0 
Where the 
infringem
ent has 
resulted in 
the 
offender 
obtaining 
a capital 
gain, that 
maximum 
shall be 
raised to 
twice the 
capital 
gain and, 
in the 
event of a 
repeat 
offence, 
to 3 times 
!200,000* 
Up to the 
highest of 
the 
following 
amounts: - 
five time 
the gross 
profit 
obtained 
as a result 
of the acts 
or 
omissions 
comprisin
g the 
infringem
ent; 5 per 
cent of the 
infringing 
firm’s 
own 
funds; 
Up to 
!10,000,0
00 or ten 
times the 
profit 
realized 
(for 
supervise
d entities 
and 
natural 
persons 
placed 
under its 
authority 
of, or 
acting on 
its behalf, 
or, any 
other 
person)* 
 
!15,000,0
00 
!1,500,00
0 
!5,000,00
0 O 
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the capital 
gain. 
five per 
cent of the 
total 
funds, 
owned by 
the firm 
or third 
parties, 
that were 
used in 
the 
infringem
ent; 
!600,000 
(and up to 
!100,000,
000 for 
insider 
trading 
committe
d from 
October 
24, 2010 
onwards*
*) 
*amount of profit obtained or value of transaction may increase the maximum. 
** with an exception for insider trading committed by individuals acting under the authority of, or 
acting on behalf of, financial markets professionals mentioned in the relevant legal provisions of the 
French Monetary and Financial Code for whom the maximum cannot exceed !1,5 million or ten times 
the amount of any profit realized.  
 
Table 3. Key factors for administrative sanctions 
Key factors that are taken into account when determining administrative monetary 
sanctions to impose according to law. 
 
Key factors for administrative 
sanctions BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Seriousness of the violation (23CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Amount of Financial benefit derived 
from the violation (22CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Cooperative behavior of the author of 
the violation with the competent 
authority (19CAs) 
X X X O X X X X 
Financial strength and/ or size 
(18CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Duration of the violation (18CAs) X X X O X X X X 
Impact on market and consumers 
(22CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Loss incurred by clients or those 
impacted (18CAS) X X X X X X X X 
Extent to which the author of the 
violation may have taken steps to 
compensate those impacted by the 
violation (17CAS) 
X X X X X X X X 
Degree of culpability on the part of 
the author of the violation (19CAs) X X X X O X X X 
Repetitive nature of the violation 
(19CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Compliance history of the author of 
the violation if it is a regulated entity 
(19CAs) 
X X X X X X X X 
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Level of responsibility / seniority of 
an individual (19CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Other factors (8CAs) X O X X X O     X X 
 
Table 4. Availability of administrative non-monetary measures and sanctions  
 
Availability of administrative non-
monetary measures and sanctions BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Injunction to cease practice    X  X X X 
Emergency suspension    X   X X 
Disciplinary sanctions against 
professional entities (supervision 
warning, reprimand, or temporary 
/ permanent prohibition from 
providing some or all of the 
services offered) 
 X X X X X X X 
Notification to Public X  X X X  X X 
Sequestration of assets    X   X X 
Temporary suspension from 
professional activities X X X X  X X X 
Seeking an emergency court order 
to comply or end irregularity    X   X  
Withdrawal of licenses  X  X  X X  
 
Table 5. Publication of administrative sanction decisions 
Publication of 
administrative sanction BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
The law requires that 
administrative sanction 
decisions must be made 
public in principle 
(16MS) 
X O X** X* X O X** X* 
Possibility of 
anonymity of the 
administrative decisions 
(only the content is 
made public) (18MS) 
X(1,2) X(1,2) O X(2) X(1,2) X(1,2) X(2) X*** 
* Exceptions to publication when disproportionate damage might be caused to the financial market or 
to the parties involved  
** Minor sanctions (low seriousness of the infraction and culpability of the defendant) may not be 
published 
*** In practice there is no anonymity 
 
Main criteria in deciding anonymity relates to: 
(1) Risk of causing serious damages to the integrity of the market 
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(2) Avoid disproportionate damage to the parties  
5.1.2.1.2 Criminal sanctions  
Table 6. Criminal sanctions fo natural / legal persons 
Criminal sanctions 
for natural / legal 
persons 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Natural X X X X X X X X 
Legal X O X X X O O X 
 
Table 7. Availability of criminal monetary sanctions  
Availability of 
criminal 
monetary 
sanctions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Minimum 
criminal 
monetary 
sanctions 
!275 !5 
O but the 
benefit 
obtained 
from the 
infringem
ent puts a 
minimum 
limit 
O but the 
benefit 
obtained 
from the 
infringem
ent puts a 
minimum 
limit 
!40,000 
!125 
(minimu
m the 
profit 
realized) 
!50 O 
Maximum 
criminal 
monetary 
sanctions 
!55,000 
!10,800,0
00 
 
O 
or Up to 
the triple 
of the 
obtained 
or 
favoured 
benefit  
!1,500,00
0 or ten 
times the 
profit 
realized 
(for 
natural 
person) 
and five 
times the 
amount 
imposed 
on natural 
person 
(legal 
person) 
!6,000,00
0 
!1,500,00
0 or ten 
times the 
profit 
realized 
!180,000 O 
 
Table 8. Key factors  for criminal sanctions 
Key factors for criminal 
sanctions BE* DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Seriousness of the 
violation (21CAs) X X X X X X X X 
Amount of Financial 
benefit derived from the 
violation (18CAs) 
X X X O X X X X 
Cooperative behavior of 
the author of the 
violation with the 
competent authority 
(16CAs) 
O X X O X X X X 
151
 147 
Financial strength and/ 
or size of the author of 
the violation (17CAs) 
O X X X X X X X 
Duration of the 
violation (17CAs) O X X O X X X X 
Impact on the market in 
general and on 
consumers (18CAs) 
O X X O X X X X 
Loss incurred by clients 
or those impacted 
(17CAs) 
O X X O X X X X 
Extent to which the 
author of the violation 
may have taken steps to 
compensate those 
impacted by the 
violation (15CAs) 
O X X O X X X X 
Degree of culpability on 
the part of the author of 
the violation (18CAs) 
X X X O X X X X 
Repetitive nature of the 
violation (16CAs) O X X O X X X X 
Compliance history of 
the author of the 
violation if it is a 
regulated entity 
(13CAs) 
O X X O X X X X 
Level of responsibility / 
seniority of an 
individual (14CAs) 
O X X O X X X X  
Amount of planning that 
went into committing 
the offence (2CAs) 
O X O O O O X X 
Criminal records of the 
defendant (2CAs) O X O O O O O  
Personality of the 
offender (3CAs) O O O O X O O X 
Protection of the public 
order (1CA) O O O O X O O O 
Consideration of 
general prevention 
(2CAs) 
O O O O X O O O 
Existence of family 
responsibilities (1CA) O O O O O O O X 
Effect of conviction on 
the offender (1CA) O O O O O O O X 
Preservation of trust to 
the market (1CA) O O O O O O O O 
Low risk of detection 
(1CA) O O O O O O O O 
Professionalism (1CA) O O O O O O O O 
Any other 
circumstances of the 
case (1CA) 
O O O O O O O X 
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* BE clarified that the main two factors taken into account in it jurisdiction are the seriousness of the 
violation and the degree of culpability of the offender and that the other factors listed are sub-elements 
of those two main factors. 
 
Table 9. Availability of incarceration 
Availability of 
incarceration BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Minimum length Up to six month 
Up to six 
month 1 year O 2 years 
Up to six 
month O O 
Maximum length 1years 5years 6years 2years 12years 2years 3years 7years 
 
Table 10. Availability of other criminal non-monetary sanctions 
Availability of other criminal non-
monetary sanctions BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
No other type of sanctions in 
addition to fines and prison (8CAs) O X O O O X O O 
Disqualification from the practice as 
agent of the profession or activity 
associated with the crime, including 
prohibition of the practice of 
management, administration, control 
or supervision and, in general, 
representation of any financial 
intermediary 
      X  
Publication of the conviction at the 
expense of the defendant in 
newspaper 
      X  
 
Table 11. Publication of criminal sanction decisions  
Publication of criminal 
sanction decisions BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
 The law requires that 
criminal sanction 
decisions must be made 
public in principle 
(19MS) 
X O X X X O X X* 
Possibility of anonymity 
of the criminal decisions 
(only the content is made 
public) (11MS) 
X X O O O X O X 
* The decision will not be published if there are particular issues of concern, for example where the 
offender is known to have a specific vulnerability and publication might risk unwarranted adverse 
consequences or where wider disclosure might undermine a police investigation. 
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5.1.2.1.3 Interaction between administrative and criminal enforcement 
Table 12. Articulation of administrative and criminal proceedings 
Articulation of 
administrative and 
criminal proceedings 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
National legislation 
provides for both 
administrative and 
criminal sanctions but 
in practice, regarding  
insider dealing, the 
same set of facts can 
be subject either to 
one or to the other 
kind of proceeding 
(15MS) 
O X* X* O O X* O O 
Regarding  insider 
dealing the same set 
of facts can be subject 
to both kinds of 
sanctions 
cumulatively (10MS) 
X O O X X** O X X**+*** 
Criminal sanction 
proceedings may halt 
the administrative 
proceedings (14MS) 
O X X O O X O O 
When administrative 
and criminal 
monetary sanctions 
can be imposed for 
the same facts, there 
is a limit to the total 
amount of the 
sanctions that can be 
imposed in total 
(4MS) 
X**** O O X**** O O X O 
When administrative 
and criminal 
monetary sanctions 
can be imposed for 
the same facts, admin. 
and judi. authority 
take into account 
what has been 
imposed by the other 
authority in order to 
avoid / limit the 
situation of 
cumulative sanctions 
X O O X X O O X 
* Reasons on which the decision is taken whether to pursue administrative or criminal sanctioning 
proceedings are based on legal descriptions of the respective administrative and criminal offences. This 
approach might involve differentiation between groups of offenders (DE), depend on the amount of 
benefit obtained or loss avoided by the wrongdoer (ES), be according to the wrongdoer’s conduct (for 
example dealing with intent) (LU).  
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** Competent authority and judicial authority will take into account what has been imposed by the 
other authority but 5 MS including IT and UK have, in principle, no specific figure limiting the total 
cumulative administrative and criminal monetary sanctions which can be imposed.  
*** Also this is legally permissible, the FSA’s published policy is not to pursue both criminal and 
administrative market abuse cases in practice 
****Principle of proportionality (The French Conseil constitutionnel stated that the proportionality 
principle requires that the combined amount of sanctions which might be imposed cannot exceed the 
highest penalty provided for in the law) 
 
Table 13. Cooperation between competent administrative and judicial authorities  
Purpose and type of 
the cooperation 
between competent 
authorities and 
judicial or other 
prosecuting 
authorities 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Cooperation at the 
beginning of the 
proceeding (28MS) 
X X X X X X X X 
Provide 
information, 
including opinions 
on the case or on 
point of law (29MS) 
X X X X X O X X 
Provide other kind 
of assistance (7MS) O O X O O O O X 
Cooperation at later 
stage (13MS) X X X X O O X X 
Influence on the 
outcome of the 
proceedings (6 MS) 
O O O O X O O X 
 
Are cooperation 
between 
administrative 
authorities and 
judicial authorities 
formalized? 
BE DE ES FR IT PT LU UK 
Yes (13MS) O X O O X X O X 
Formalized by legal 
provisions (6MS) O X O O X O O O 
Formalized by 
cooperation 
agreements (7MS) 
O O O O O X O X 
Formalized 
cooperation regulates 
the exchange of 
information (13MS) 
O X O O X X O X 
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5.1.2.2 Procedure for administrative and criminal sanctions 
5.1.2.2.1 Procedure for administrative measures and sanctions 
Table 14. Availability of settlement within administrative proceeding 
Availability of 
settlement within 
administrative 
proceeding 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Yes X X* O O O O O X* 
* In DE and UK the outcome of the settlement is considered to constitute a sanctioning decision665 
 
Table 15. Authority and body entrusted to take decisions and to inflict administrative 
measures and/or sanctions 
Authority 
and body 
entrusted 
to take 
decisions  
and to 
inflict 
administra
tive 
measures 
and / or 
sanctions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Authority 
responsibl
e for 
inflicting 
the 
administra
tive 
measures 
and / or 
sanctions 
 
Commissi
on 
bancaire 
et 
financière 
et des 
assurance
s 
(CBFA) 
Bundesan
stalt für 
Finanzdie
ntleistung
saufsicht 
(BaFin) 
Minor and 
serious 
infringem
ents: 
Comision 
nacional 
del 
Mercado 
de valores 
(CNMV)’
s Board; 
Very 
serious 
infringem
ents: 
Ministry 
of Finance 
at the 
proposal 
of the 
CNMV’s 
Board 
Autorité 
des 
marchés 
financiers 
(AMF); 
Indirectly 
AMF 
through 
"Tribunal 
de Grande 
Instance 
de Paris” 
for 
measures 
such as 
request of 
sequestrat
ion of 
assets; 
Request 
temporary 
suspensio
n from 
profession
Commissi
one 
nazionale 
per le 
societa e 
la borsa 
(CONSO
B) 
Commissi
on de 
surveillan
ce du 
secteur 
financier 
(CSSF) 
Comissao 
do 
Mercado 
de 
Valores 
Mobiliari
os 
(CMVM) 
Measures: 
Financial 
Services 
Authority 
(FSA) 
Sanctions 
numbered 
1) and 2) 
are 
imposed 
by the 
civil 
courts of 
England 
& Wales 
on 
applicatio
n by the 
FSA. 
Sanction 
numbered 
3) is 
imposed 
by the 
                                                           
665 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).p.36. 
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al 
activities; 
Seeking 
an 
emergenc
y court 
order to 
comply or 
end 
irregularit
y 
 
FSA. Any 
person 
subject to 
a such a 
decision 
of the 
FSA may 
refer that 
decision 
to the 
FSMT, 
which is 
entirely 
independe
nt of the 
FSA, 
where the 
matter 
will be 
heard de 
novo666 
Body or 
persons 
responsibl
e for 
taking 
sanctionin
g 
decisions 
A 
Dedicated 
Sanctioni
ng 
Committe
e 
The 
Enforcem
ent 
Departme
nt 
The Board 
/ 
Governin
g Body of 
the CA 
(or 
Minister 
of 
Finance) 
A 
Dedicated 
Sanctioni
ng 
Committe
e 
The Board 
/ 
Governin
g Body of 
the CA 
The Board 
/ 
Governin
g Body of 
the CA 
The Board 
/ 
Governin
g Body of 
the CA 
Settled 
case: the 
decision is 
taken by 2 
Directors 
of the CA 
who have 
not been 
involved 
in the case 
/ 
Contested 
cases: the 
decision is 
taken by a 
Regulator
y 
Decisions 
Committe
e made up 
of 
practition
ers and 
non-
practition
ers 
appointed 
by the 
Board and 
representi
ng the 
public 
interest 
 
Table 16. Administrative procedural conditions to sanctions  
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
157
 153 
Administrative procedural 
conditions to sanction BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
In the absence of tangible 
proof of insider trading, 
CAs are able to use 
“serious, specific and 
convergent evidence” to 
prove the case (24MS) 
X X X X X X X X 
Intent is not a requirement 
to prove a wrongdoing 
within administrative 
proceeding (25MS) 
X X X X X X X X 
 
Table 17. Ability of the administrative authority to criminally prosecute market abuse 
in front of judicial courts within the framework of criminal proceedings 
Ability of the administrative 
authority to criminally 
prosecute market abuse in 
front of judicial courts 
within the framework of 
criminal proceedings 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Yes (4MS) O O O O O O O X 
5.1.2.2.2  Procedure for criminal sanctions 
Table 18. Authority and body entrusted to take decision and to inflict criminal 
sanctions 
Availabili
ty of 
criminal 
monetary 
sanctions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
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Authority 
responsibl
e for 
inflicting 
the 
criminal 
monetary 
sanction 
Judicial 
Authority 
Criminal 
Court 
 
Criminal 
court 
“Tribunal 
Correctio
nnel” 
(Chambre 
du 
Tribunal 
de Grande 
Instance 
de Paris), 
Criminal 
Court 
  
 
 
Judicial 
Authority 
"Tribunal 
d'Arrondis
sement 
siègeant 
en matière 
pénale" 
 
Criminal 
Court 
Criminal 
Court 
 
 
 
The FSA 
has power 
to 
prosecute 
those 
committti
ng the 
offence of 
insider 
dealing as  
defined in 
the CJA s. 
52  
and the 
offence of  
misleadin
g 
statements 
and 
practices 
as defined  
in FSMA 
s. 397. 
Other 
governme
nt 
prosecutor 
may also 
prosecute 
insider 
dealing 
under the 
CJA.) 
Prosecutio
ns are 
brought in 
the 
criminal 
courts so 
responsibi
lity for 
imposing 
the 
sanction  
lies with 
the court. 
 
Table 19. Criminal procedural conditions to sanctions 
Criminal 
procedural 
conditions to 
sanctions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
In the absence 
of tangible 
proof of market 
abuse it is 
possible to use 
a body of 
“serious, 
X X 
X 
(“beyond 
reasonabl
e doubt”) 
X (this 
method 
has been 
used in a 
very few 
cases: the 
person 
O O 
X 
(possibili
ty to 
indirectly 
prove and 
judge 
according 
X 
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specific and 
convergent” 
evidence to 
help proving it 
(23MS) 
accused 
did not 
acknowle
dge the 
facts and 
wrongdoi
ngs) 
to the 
rules of 
experienc
e, on the 
basis of a 
“pattern 
of 
insider” 
evidence 
Proof of intent* 
is required in 
order to have a 
guilty verdict in 
a insider trading 
case (16MS) 
X O O X X X X O 
- Level of 
culpability 
required in 
order to have a 
guilty verdict in 
a market abuse 
case (notion of 
“guilty mind” 
differs across 
MS) 
Intent 
Gross 
negligenc
e or 
indirect 
intent is 
sufficient 
Negligen
ce is 
sufficient
: In 
insider 
trading 
cases 
there is a 
presumpt
ion that 
those 
who trade 
when in 
possessio
n of 
inside 
informati
on are 
using this 
informati
on and 
intend to 
use it 
Intent 
(Precisio
n: there is 
no notion 
of “level 
of 
culpabilit
y”) 
Intent  
(It is 
necessary 
to prove 
that the 
offender 
acted 
knowingl
y and 
willingly; 
indirect 
intent is 
not 
sufficient
) 
Intent  
(Guilt has 
to be 
proven 
beyond 
any 
reasonabl
e doubt) 
Intent 
Proof of 
intent is 
not 
required 
but it is 
necessary 
to prove 
that the 
person 
knew 
both that 
he/she 
had 
inside 
informati
on and 
that it 
was from 
an inside 
source 
5.1.3 Administrative and criminal sanctions: Resources and enforcement data  
A measure of the intensity of public enforcement of securities regulation is based on 
regulators’ budgetary resources and staffing level of the year 2005 and is completed 
by the data relative to the actual sanctions imposed during the years 2008, 2009 and 
2010.  
5.1.3.1 Public enforcement effort: Resources in 2005 
Table 20 presents the resource-based measures of public enforcement including the 
number of staff dedicated to the whole range of activities to market abuse sanctioning 
(full time equivalent) divided by the population for the year 2005 (“Staff per million 
population”) and the budget dedicated to enforcement of market abuse law divided by 
the GDP in dollars for the year 2005 (“Budget per billion US $ of GDP”). 
Table 20. Public enforcement effort: Resources in 2005 
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Public 
enforceme
nt effort: 
Resources 
in 2005 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Staff per 
million 
populatio
n  
13,76 4,43 8,5 5,91 7,25 315,12 14,5 19,04 
Budget 
per billion 
US$ of 
GDP  
27,276 12,903 29,873 28,851 61,239 473,894 75,562 80,902 
5.1.3.2 Administrative and criminal sanction decisions in 2008, 2009 and 2010 
5.1.3.2.1 Administrative sanction decisions 
Table 21. Administrative monetary sanction decisions 
Administr
ative 
monetary 
sanction 
decisions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
- Natural 
person          
2008  
(12MS) 
X: 
1 sanction 
3 
discharges 
O: 
0 sanction 
2 
discharges 
X: 
2 
sanctions 
3 
discharges 
X (highest 
number of 
sanctions 
by a CA: 
29): 
29 
sanctions 
38 
discharges 
 
X: 
5 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
O: 
0 sanction 
2 
discharges 
O 
 
X: 
6 
sanctions 
0 
discharges 
2009  
(12MS) 
O: 
0 sanction 
5 
discharges 
O 
 
X: 
1 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
X: 
5 
sanctions 
39 
discharges 
X (highest 
number of 
sanctions 
by a CA: 
14): 
14 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
O: 
0 sanction 
3 
discharges 
X: 
3 
sanctions 
0 
discharges 
X: 
5 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
2010  
(9MS) 
X: 
1 sanction 
7 
discharges 
O 
 
X: 
15 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
X (highest 
number of 
sanctions 
by a CA: 
14): 
14 
sanctions 
16 
discharges 
X: 
12 
sanctions 
3 
discharges 
O 
 
O 
 
X: 
10 
sanctions 
1 
discharge 
- Total 
amount of 
issued 
        
161
 157 
monetary 
sanctions  
2008 !5,000 to 9,999 O 
!1m to 
4,999,999 !5m+ 
!1m to 
4,999,999 O O 
!100,000 
to 
999,999 
2009 O O !20,000 to 49,999 
!1m to 
4,999,999 !5m+ O 
!20,000 
to 49,999 
!100,000 
to 
999,999 
2010 !20,000 to 49,999 O 
!100,000 
to 
999,999 
!1m to 
4,999,999 
!1m to 
4,999,999 O O !5m+ 
         
- Legal 
person         
2008 
(3MS) 
O: 
0 sanction 
1 
discharge 
O O 
X: 
1 sanction 
3 
discharges 
X: 
1 sanction 
0 
discharge 
O O O 
2009 
(5MS) 
O: 
0 sanction 
4 
discharges 
O 
X: 
1 sanction 
0 
discharge 
X (highest 
number of 
sanctions 
by a CA: 
2): 
2 
sanctions 
8 
discharge 
X (highest 
number of 
sanctions 
by a CA: 
2): 
2 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
O 
X: 
1 sanction 
0 
discharge 
O 
2010 
(4MS) O O 
X: 
4 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
O: 
0 sanction 
3 
discharges 
X: 
1 sanction 
0 
discharge 
O O O 
Total 
amount of 
administra
tive 
monetary 
sanctions 
        
2008 O O O !20,000 to 49,999 
!100,000 
to 
999,999 
O O O 
2009 O O !20,000 to 49,999 
!1m to 
4,999,999 
!1m to 
4,999,999 O 
!20,000 
to 49,999 O 
2010 O O 
!100,000 
to 
999,999 
O 
!100,000 
to 
999,999 
O O O 
 
Table 22. Administrative non-monetary sanction decisions 
Administrative non-
monetary sanction 
decisions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
2008 (4MS)         
162
 158 
Reprimand 
addressed to a 
regulated entity 
(2MS) 
      (1)  
Other (3MS)     (10)    
2009 (7MS)         
Reprimand 
addressed to a 
regulated entity 
(2MS) 
      (2)  
Withdrawal of 
licenses (2MS)         
Other (4MS)     (24)  (12) (4) 
2010 (6MS)         
Reprimand 
addressed to a 
regulated entity 
(2MS) 
      (1)  
Temporary 
prohibition to 
provide financial 
services (1MS) 
       (1) 
Permanent 
prohibition to 
provide financial 
services (1MS) 
       (1) 
Withdrawal of 
licenses (3MS)         
Other (4MS)    (3) (25)    
 
Table 23. Cases originated by the competent authorities and transmitted to criminal 
courts  
Cases originated by 
the administrative 
competent authorities 
and transmitted to 
criminal courts  
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
2008  X: 1 case 
X: 
59 cases 
X: 
1 case 
X: 
20 cases 
X: 
6 cases O 
X:  
4 cases O 
2009 X: 6 cases 
X: 
88 cases 
O 
 
X: 
16 cases 
X: 
7 cases O 
X:  
3 cases O 
2010 X: 2 cases 
X:  
72 cases 
X:  
10 cases 
X:  
16 cases 
X:  
8 cases 
X:  
3 cases 
X:  
4 cases O 
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5.1.3.2.2 Criminal sanction decisions 
The data relative to criminal sanctions taken by criminal courts are based on the 
report of ESMA relying on the information provided by the administrative authorities. 
I chose the 8 countries in considering their relative place in the world financial place. 
UK is the first one and Portugal is the 74th. They are representative of all the layer of 
the economies. The report of the ESMA comport a weakness: it does provide data for 
only 17 countries regarding criminal enforcement of laws. BE, ES, IT are amongst 
these 17 countries.  
 
Table 24. Criminal monetary sanction decisions 
Criminal 
monetary 
sanction 
decisions  
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
- Natural 
person         
2008  
(8MS) NA 
X: 
5 
sanctions 
NA 
 
X: 
2 
sanctions 
 
NA 
 
O 
 
X:  
2 
sanctions 
O 
2009  
(2MS) 
NA 
 
 
X: 
23 
sanctions 
 
NA O NA 
 
O 
 
O O 
2010  
(8MS) NA 
 
X: 
37 
sanctions 
 
NA X: 1 sanction NA 
O 
 
X:  
3 
sanctions 
X: 
1 sanction 
Total 
amount of 
criminal 
monetary 
sanctions 
         
2008 NA !10,000 to !99,999 NA 
!10,000 to 
!99,999 NA O 
!10,000 to 
!99,999 O 
2009 NA 
!100,000 
to 
!999,999 
NA O NA O O O 
2010 NA 
!100,000 
to 
!999,999 
NA 
!100,000 
to 
!999,999 
NA O 
!100,000 
to 
!999,999 
!10,000 
to 
!99,999 
- Legal 
persons         
2008 / 
2009 
(2MS) / 
2010 
(1MS) 
NA O NA O NA O O O 
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Table 25. Cases criminally prosecuted by administrative authorities in front of 
criminal courts 
Cases 
criminally 
prosecute
d by 
administra
tive 
authorities 
in front of 
criminal 
court 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
Natural 
and legal 
persons 
        
2008 
(1MS) O O O O O O O O 
2009 
(1MS) O O O O O O O 
X: 
4 
sanctions 
0 
discharge 
2010 
(3MS) O O O O O O O 
X: 
2 
sanctions 
3 
discharges 
 
Table 26. Incarceration sanction decisions 
Incarcerati
on 
sanction 
decisions 
BE DE ES FR IT LU PT UK 
2008 
(4MS) NA O NA 
X: 
2 
sanctions 
(6 
months; 1 
year) 
NA O O O 
2009 
(4MS) NA 
X: 
2 
sanctions 
(1yr and 
3months; 
3 years) 
NA O NA O O 
X: 4 
sanctions 
(>1yr and 
3months; 
<3years) 
2010 
(3MS) NA O NA 
X: 
1 sanction 
(1year) 
NA O O 
X: 
2 
sanctions 
(1 year 
and 9 
months; 2 
years) 
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A table 27 should list the number of criminal non-monetary sanctions alternative to 
incarceration decisions. However, no one of the five chosen MS for which the 
information is available imposed non-monetary sanctions different from fines and 
incarceration. 
5.2 OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE SANCTIONING ENFORCEMENT 
PRACTICES OF THE EIGHT SELECTED MEMBER STATES: CHALLENGES 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT POLICY  
First of all, it is important to mention that the development and practices of insider 
trading laws are quite recent, as shown by the dates at which the countries passed and 
enforced their insider trading laws667 reported in the introduction of this chapter. For 
indication, the years in which the countries’ main exchange stock exchange was 
established was also reported668. The review of current practices allows to identify 
general divergences and convergences in the sanctioning and enforcement regimes of 
the selected countries. Some specific observations must be made.  
5.2.1 Observations about substantive law: Categories of administrative and criminal 
sanctions and their interaction 
5.2.1.1 Divergences in levels of sanctions: The magnitude of sanctions varies widely 
across Member States  
(i) Divergences in minimum and maximum amount of monetary administrative 
sanctions / criminal sanctions; Divergences in minimum and maximum length of 
criminal incarceration 
 
Most of the time legislative and constitutional provisions limit the minimum and the 
maximum sanctions available to the Member States; this results in significant 
differences. Firstly, the administrative minimum amounts available in 2010 ranged 
from !5 in Germany to !100,000 in Italy following this ranking: [DE] < [LU] < [BE] 
< [PT < ES] < [IT]669, with an average administrative minimum monetary sanction of 
!26,271 and median of !13,750 (see table 2). Secondly, the administrative maximum 
amounts available ranged from !200,000 in Germany to !100,000,000 in France 
following this ranking [DE < ES] < [LU < BE < PT] < [IT] < [FR]. The average 
administrative maximum monetary sanction was !17,828,571 and the median 
!2,500,000. In a European comparison, the case of Estonia is famous for having the 
lowest maximum administrative monetary sanction for insider trading of only !1,200. 
 
As for criminal sanctions, the minimum amounts available ranged from !5 in 
Germany to !40,000 in Italy following this ranking: [DE] < [PT] < [LU < BE] < [IT]. 
The average criminal minimum monetary sanction was !8,091 and the median !275. 
IT displayed a particularly high criminal minimum monetary sanction, actually 
comparable to BE’s criminal maximum monetary sanction. Secondly, the maximum 
                                                           
667 Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 75-
108. 
668 Ibid. 
669 (each [ ] regrouping the countries belonging to the same order of 10 or so). 
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amounts available ranged from !55,000 in Belgium to !10,800,000 in Germany 
following this ranking: [BE] < [PT] < [LU = FR < IT] < [DE]. The average criminal 
maximum monetary sanction was !3,339,166 and the median 1,500,000! (See table 
7). In a European comparison, the cases of Netherlands and Estonia were famous for 
respectively providing a maximum criminal monetary sanction of !18,500 and 
!16,000,000 (which contrasts Estonian’s maximum administrative monetary sanctions 
mentioned in the previous paragraph).  
 
The range of the minimum length of incarceration applicable for insider trading 
violation varies from “up to six month” in BE, DE and LU to 2 years in IT following 
this ranking: BE = DE = LU < ES < IT. The average minimum length of incarceration 
is 0,9 year; the median is 0,5 year (See table 9). The range of the maximum length 
varies from one year in BE to 12 years in IT following this ranking: BE < LU = FR < 
PT  < DE < ES < UK < IT. The average maximum length of incarceration is five 
years; the median is four years. In a European comparison, the minimum term ranged 
from 15 days in Slovenia to three years in Slovakia, while the maximum term ranged 
from 30 days in Estonia to 12 years in Italy and Slovakia. 
 
From a general point of view, there are wide differences in the administrative and 
criminal minimum and maximum monetary and non-monetary sanctions for insider 
trading in the eight selected Member States, and in Europe in general670. There is 
apparently no specific coherence in the setting of minimum or maximum quanta or 
magnitude of a sanction for insider trading. The literature comments that sanctions 
tend to be the arbitrary result of different successive criminalization policies671. For 
instance, regarding the minimum administrative monetary sanctions, the order varies 
from 1 to 10,000 times. 
Some specific observations can be formulated. The average and the median criminal 
minimum and maximum monetary sanctions are respectively lower than the average 
and the median administrative minimum and maximum monetary sanctions. 
Moreover, BE, FR, IT and PT all provide for maximum administrative monetary 
sanctions that are higher than their maximum criminal monetary sanctions. These 
observations can appear surprising because the theory usually considers that criminal 
law provides for more stringent sanctions than administrative law, as it is the case in 
DE or ES for instance.  
Regarding notable tendencies, it can be observed that DE simultaneously displays the 
lowest minimum administrative and criminal monetary sanctions and the maximum 
administrative monetary sanctions; and the highest maximum criminal monetary 
sanctions. IT displays the highest minimum administrative and criminal monetary 
sanctions, the second highest maximum administrative and criminal monetary 
sanctions and the highest maximum prison term. 
In a European comparison, the case of Estonia emblematically illustrates the extreme 
cases and policy choices in setting the sanctions for insider trading. Indeed, this 
country both provides for the lowest maximum administrative monetary sanction 
(!1,200) and the highest criminal monetary sanction (!16,000,000). 
 
                                                           
670 See ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris). 
671 Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris). 
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From an economic point of view, as presented in section 4.2.4, an optimal 
enforcement of law policy should be achieved by using monetary sanctions at the 
maximum and to complement them with non-monetary sanctions672. Therefore, 
Member States should preferably provide efficient, proportional and dissuasive 
maximum monetary sanctions. It may be questionable whether an administrative 
maximum monetary of !1,200 fulfills such conditions. 
 
(ii) The sanctions are not set according to the same factors 
 
Firstly, the key factors used to determine the imposable administrative monetary 
sanctions appear to be very similar in the eight examined countries (See table 3). 
Secondly, for the criminal monetary sanctions, whilst DE, ES, IT, LU, PT and UK 
determine the imposable monetary sanctions based on a similar set of key factors than 
for determining administrative sanctions, BE and FR seem to focus on a more 
restricted number of key factors, starting with the “seriousness of the violation” (See 
table 8). 
 
According to theory, from an economic perspective, an optimal law enforcement 
policy should be achieved by using proportional and wealth-related monetary 
sanctions at the maximum. However, the competent authorities do not exactly take 
into account the same factors when determining sanctions according to the law. The 
level of harm is taken into consideration under the factor entitled “seriousness of the 
violation” and the level of gain under “amount of financial benefit derived from the 
violation”. Some member states such as BE, DE, ES, FR and LU factor the maximum 
monetary sanctions to the realized profit. In FR, the financial strength and/or size of 
the author of the violation is explicitly taken into account; in DE the criminal fine is 
imposed in so-called daily units calculated on the basis of the offender’s economic 
situation673. Hence, only two countries (DE and FR) take into account factors relating 
to the wealth of the individual even though wealth-related proportional monetary 
sanctions constitute one of the key recommendations of the law and economics 
literature for obtaining optimal enforcement of insider trading laws.   
 
From an economic point of view, it would also be preferable for Member States to 
take into consideration factors relating to the wealth of the individuals when 
determining the applicable sanctions in order to reach an optimal enforcement of 
insider trading laws. 
                                                           
672 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2000. Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains, 
International Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-549. Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.p.208: “Fines have several 
advantages over other punishments: for example, they conserve resources, compensate society as well 
as punish offenders, and simplify the determination of optimal p's and f's. Not surprisingly, fines are 
the most common punishment and have grown in importance over time. Offenders who cannot pay 
fines have to be punished in other ways, but the optimality analysis implies that the monetary value to 
them of these punishments should generally be less than the fines”. Shavell, S., 1985. Criminal Law 
and the Optimal Use of Non Monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, Columbia Law Review 85, 1232-
1262.pp.1236-1237: “non-monetary sanctions should be employed only when monetary sanctions 
cannot adequately deterundesirable act(…)”. Shavell, S., Polinsky, A. M., 1984. The Optimal Use of 
Fines and Imprisonment, Journal of Public Economics 24, 89-99. Shavell, S., 1987b. The Optimal Use 
of Non Monetary Sanction as a Deterrent, American Economic Review 77, 584-592. 
673 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).pp.103-104. 
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5.2.2.2 Divergences in types of sanction 
Divergences exist in the nature, categories and forms of sanctions at the disposal of 
competent administrative and judicial authorities. The most important element of this 
issue concerns the alternatives to fines and prison. 
 
(i) Under an administrative proceeding, BE, DE and UK provide the possibility of 
making a settlement for insider trading. The outcome of a settlement is conceived as a 
sanctioning decision in DE and UK (See table 14). 
 
(ii) Some competent authorities only provide for monetary sanctions and 
incarceration, and thus cannot address alternative non-monetary sanctions. 
 
Under administrative law, the eight countries considered all provide for diverse 
alternative non-monetary sanctions such as disciplinary sanctions, prohibition of 
activity or temporary suspensions (See table 4).  
 
Under criminal law only six MS’ judicial authorities declared to be able to impose 
other types of sanctions in addition to fine and imprisonment. Germany and 
Luxembourg reported to not provide for alternative sanctions to fines and prison (See 
table 10). In a European comparison, it is also the case for Estonia, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Malta. Moreover, only a few countries provide for economically 
incapacitating sanctions. Amongst the eight countries considered in the index, only 
PT provides for disqualification of the practice. In a European comparison, Finland 
provides for business prohibition orders, Poland provides for license suspensions674. 
Only one country (Denmark) declared providing for socially incapacitating sanctions 
as an alternative to prison through the form of community service. 
 
From a general point of view, there are more types of alternative non-monetary 
sanctions available under administrative law than under criminal law. From a 
theoretical point of view, as mentioned in Chapter 4, society cannot rely exclusively 
on monetary sanctions; indeed, non-monetary sanctions are needed under particular 
circumstances previously specified. An optimal law enforcement policy should be 
achieved by using monetary sanctions at the maximum, and then completing with 
non-monetary sanctions675, starting with the less costly (in terms of control, 
infrastructure, maintenance, indirect and consequential costs) and the less restrictive, 
for a similar deterrent effect. At equal deterrence effect, non-incapacitating non-
monetary sanctions should be used first, followed by the economic incapacitating 
ones and finally, the socially incapacitating sanctions. Incarceration should always be 
a last resort. The theory highly recommends providing alternatives to socially 
incapacitating sanctions, starting with settlement676, then turning to economically 
                                                           
674 Ibid. p.111. 
675 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2000. Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains, 
International Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-549, Shavell, S., 1987b. The Optimal Use of Non 
Monetary Sanction as a Deterrent, American Economic Review 77, 584-592. Shavell, S., Polinsky, A. 
M., 1984. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, Journal of Public Economics 24, 89-99. 
Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217.  
676 Considered as a sanction in some MS, while not in others. See ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual 
Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, 
Paris).p.34. 
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incapacitating sanctions and ultimately using socially incapacitating sanctions 
different than prison677.  
 
From an economic point of view, Member States should preferably use alternative 
sanctions to fines and prison such as referral to an attendance center or day reporting 
center, house arrest, community or society service, or electronic monitoring, in order 
to reach an optimal enforcement of insider trading laws. Incarceration should be used 
as an ultimum remedium. 
 
(iii) Some competent authorities cannot address criminal sanctions to legal persons 
 
In Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal, insider trading can give rise to criminal 
sanctions only for natural persons. In a European comparison, a total of eight 
countries cannot impose criminal sanctions on legal entities for insider trading (on top 
of the three former: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Sweden) (See table 6). 
 
(iv) Some competent authorities cannot publish sanction decisions 
 
For administrative and criminal sanctions in DE and LU, convictions are not to be 
made public in principle. On the contrary, BE, ES, FR, IT, PT and UK administrative 
and criminal authorities have an obligation to publish the decisions in principle. 
Publications can even be made preserving anonymity of the sanctioned person under 
specific conditions, though less easily under criminal law (not possible in ES, FR, IT, 
PT) than under administrative law (not possible in ES). In a European comparison, 
publicity of sanction decisions is a principle in 19 MS for criminal sanctions and in 16 
MS for administrative sanctions, and anonymity is an option in 18 MS for criminal 
sanctions and 11 MS for administrative sanctions (See table 5 and 11). 
 
The publication of sanctions belongs to the category of non-monetary non-
incapacitating sanctions, and more precisely to naming and shaming sanctions. As 
presented in Section 4.2.2.2, the publication of sanctions is an efficient sanction 
because it has a highly deterrent power and is considered as being non-costly. 
However, the scholarly literature shares doubt about its deterrent power and the 
difficulty to proportion it and recommends using this sanction in the context of a 
criminal procedure in order to avoid error costs, which can be high and furthermore 
unrecoverable. Therefore, publication of sanctions should be preferably made under a 
criminal procedure or maybe a reinforced administrative procedure.  
5.2.2.3 Procedural differences concerning cooperation and cumulation of sanctions 
(i) In some countries, the cumulation of administrative and criminal prosecutions and 
sanctions is possible and organized, whilst in others prosecutions are separated and 
exclusive 
 
In BE, FR, IT, PT and UK, insider trading can be subject to administrative and 
criminal sanctions proceedings cumulatively. It is not the case in DE, ES and LU 
where the prosecution is exclusive (See table 12). The cooperation between 
                                                           
677 Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris). 
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administrative and judicial authorities is formalized in DE, IT, PT and UK, as in nine 
other MS in total (See table 13). Cooperation can occur at different stages (in the 
beginning of the proceeding in 29 MS; at a later stage in 13 MS) and can be of 
different nature (from the assistance in seven MS, to the exchange of information in 
most of the MS (See table 13)).  
 
In organizing the articulation between the two kinds of procedures, the criminal one 
halts the administrative one in DE, ES, LU and in 11 other MS. Moreover, in BE, FR, 
IT and UK (which are the countries where administrative and criminal sanctions can 
be cumulated), the competent administrative and judicial authorities take into account 
what has been previously imposed by the other authority (See table 12). PT is the only 
country where there is a limit to the total amount of sanctions that can be imposed but 
where the competent authorities do not take into consideration what has been imposed 
by the other authority. On the contrary, in IT and UK, insider trading can be subject to 
both administrative and criminal sanctions cumulatively but there is no limit to the 
total cumulative administrative and criminal monetary sanctions. Considering that in 
IT the maximum administrative monetary sanction is !15,000,000 and the maximum 
criminal monetary sanction is !6,000,000, and that there is no statutory maximum in 
UK at all, the monetary sanction resulting from the cumulation of administrative and 
criminal sanctions can indeed be very high. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, as mentioned in the section 4.3.3.4, two major 
problems may occur from multiple prosecutions. The first problem is over-deterrence 
and the second problem is the multiplication of procedural costs.  
 
Some countries provide relevant solutions to overcome the problem of over-
deterrence by limiting the total amount of sanctions imposed or by asking authorities 
to take into consideration what the previous prosecuting authority has imposed. It is 
consistent with the principle of proportionality and with the will to limit over-
deterrence. These solutions do not however prevent from the multiplication of costs 
induced by the double administrative and criminal prosecutions. Therefore, according 
to the literature, countries should favor cooperation and non-cumulation of 
prosecutions in order to obtain an optimal enforcement of insider trading law and 
thereby to rule out the possibility of having two cumulative, parallel and independent 
prosecutions. Cooperation at an early stage allows to choose the relevant competent 
authority to prosecute the case from the beginning. For instance in DE, ES and LU, 
criminal prosecutions may halt administrative proceedings; or in UK, the competent 
administrative authorities are allowed to prosecute criminal insider trading in front of 
the competent criminal court. 
 
(ii) Some competent authorities can criminally sanction insiders without establishing 
their intent  
 
Proof of intent is not required for administrative sanctions in any of the eight 
countries considered, as it is the case for most European countries, except Estonia. It 
should be observed that, as previously mentioned, Estonia provides for a maximum 
administrative monetary sanction of only !1,200. This combination may appear 
surprising since the literature recommends securing the sanction imposition with a 
highly rigorous procedure (in order to avoid error costs) only when sanctions are very 
stringent. Moreover, most of the time, in the absence of tangible proof of insider 
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trading, competent authorities use serious, specific and convergent evidence. It is the 
case for all the eight MS considered (See table 16). 
 
To impose criminal sanctions, a particular state of mind of the accused is required: 
guilt. The level of culpability required to prove a guilty criminal insider varies across 
the different MS, from “negligence” to “intent”. For instance, intent has to be 
established in five of the MS considered, but not in DE, ES and UK, where the 
establishment of negligence may suffice. In Europe, proof of intent is required only in 
16 MS. Moreover, in the absence of tangible proof of insider trading, it is possible to 
use a body of “serious, specific and convergent” evidence to help prove it, in six of 
the selected MS (but not in IT and LU) as well as in 23 MS (See table 19).  
 
Taking the cases of the three selected MS where the intent does not have to be 
established to criminally convict someone, it should be observed that DE provides for 
the highest maximum criminal monetary sanctions (amongst the eight chosen 
countries) while ES and UK are the only 2 countries that do not set a maximum for 
criminal monetary sanctions. Moreover, DE is also the only country amongst the eight 
chosen to provide for a maximum criminal monetary sanction higher than its 
administrative maximum monetary sanctions (See table 2 and 7). On the contrary, BE, 
FR, IT and PT all provide for maximum administrative monetary sanctions higher 
than maximum criminal monetary sanctions and require the establishment of intent to 
criminally convict someone.  
Moreover, DE also provides for a maximum of five years of imprisonment term, six 
years in Spain and seven years in the UK, which are the longest terms amongst the 
eight chosen MS (See table 9). 
 
The fact that such potentially high stringent sanctions may be imposed without the 
need to establish the intent of the offender may be criticized from a theoretical point 
of view (See section 4.3.2, 4.3.3). Indeed, according to the literature, criminal 
conviction should require higher standards of proof678.  Criminal proceedings should 
be distinguishable because of their investigation, arrest, filing of charges, trial, 
conviction, sentencing, etc. Most of the time this procedure progresses with the 
satisfaction of each step and the trial only ends with a conviction when the 
prosecution manages to establish an accused individual’s guilt “beyond reasonable 
doubt”. It is therefore likely that the intent, or knowledge of fault of the trader, would 
have to be demonstrated679. The accuracy of criminal prosecution should be 
thoroughly maintained in order to legitimate criminal justice decisions and ensure that 
no costly mistakes are made (such as convicting an innocent or acquitting a guilty)680. 
Indeed, when criminal sanction is involved, the cost of wrongful conviction is socially 
more significant due to its inherent stigma and the possible incarceration. This is 
                                                           
678 Garoupa, N., 2001. Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 
German Working Papers in Law and Economics 6, 410-433. 
679 Faure, M., Ogus, A., Philipsen, N., 2009. Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of 
Regulatory Enforcement, Law and Policy 31, 161-191. 
680 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2008. The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications, Journal of Law and Society 35, 389-416. Garoupa, N., 
Rizzoli, M., 2007. Why Prodefendant Criminal Procedure Migth Hurt the Innocent?, University of 
Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper 137. Posner, R. A., 1985. An Economic Theory of the 
Criminal Law, Columbia Law Review 85, 1193-1231.  
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referred to as the goal of reduction of error costs.681 The error cost is obviously a lot 
higher when very serious sanctions, like social incapacitation, are at stake. It is 
therefore understandable that less costly administrative proceedings are chosen in 
cases where the consequences, and thus the error cost, will not be too high in the 
event of a wrongful conviction682. Arguably, it is also a goal of administrative 
procedure to avoid punishing the innocent and reducing error costs, even though they 
operate at a lower standard. This explains why the literature considers administrative 
law, and the corresponding administrative procedure, to be reserved for cases where 
relatively low penalties can suffice to deter (said differently when no socially 
incapacitating sanctions are involved).  
 
To conclude, from a theoretical point of view, Member States should preferably 
require a proof of intent when establishing the guilt of criminal insider trading in 
order to reach an optimal enforcement of insider trading laws.  
5.2.3 Administrative and criminal sanctions: Resources and enforcement data 
description 
5.2.3.1 The staff and budget effort allocated to public enforcement of insider trading 
laws vary widely across Member States 
Resources dedicated to public enforcement of insider trading laws are assessed 
according to two main measures. The first is the size of the regulatory staff dedicated 
to the whole range of activities relative to market abuse sanctioning (full time 
equivalent) divided by the country’s population in millions for the year 2005. It 
corresponds to the “staff per million population”683. The second one is the budget 
allocated to the enforcement of market abuse law in $ divided by the country’s GDP 
in billions of US$ for the year 2005. It is designated as the “budget per billion US$ of 
GDP”.  
 
In the eight MS considered, the staff per million population goes from 4,43 for DE to 
315,12 for LU, following this order: DE < FR < IT < ES < BE < PT < UK < LU. The 
average staff per million population is 48,56 while the median is only 11,13. 
The budget per billion US$ of GDP goes from 12,903 for DE to 473,894 for LU, 
following this order: DE < BE < FR < ES < IT < PT < UK < LU. The average budget 
per billion US$ of GDP is 38,81 while the median is 91,11 (See table 20).  
Amongst the eight considered countries, the rank per order of staff per million 
population is similar to the rank per order of budget per billion of GDP. Luxembourg 
allocates the highest number of staff to the capital market’s oversight compared to its 
population and the highest budget compared to its GDP while Germany allocates the 
lowest number of staff compared to its population (about 70 times lower than LU) and 
the lowest budget compared to its GDP (about 36 times lower than LU).  
 
The staff per million population and the budget per million GDP are two variables 
that allow to indirectly measure the effort of insider trading law enforcement and 
                                                           
681 See Miceli, T., 1990. Optimal Prosecution of Defendents Whose Guilt is Uncertain, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation 6, 189-201. 
682 Ogus, A., Abbot, C., 2002. Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have the Right Regime?, Journal of 
Environmental Law 14, 283-298..  
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therefore, of the probability to sanction insider trading. The probability of sanctions 
should be assessed in combination with the magnitude of the sanction. Looking at the 
maximum administrative and criminal monetary sanctions, Germany provides for the 
lowest maximum administrative monetary sanction (!200,000) and the highest 
criminal one (!10,800,000) and a maximum 5 years prison term. Luxembourg 
provides for both a !1,500,000 maximum administrative and criminal monetary 
sanction and a maximum of 2 years. Looking at the cases of the other considered 
Member States, the variable of magnitude and the variable of probability of sanctions 
does not seem to coordinate. There is no evident interrelation in the setting of these 
two variables contrary to the literature recommendations, as presented in section 4.1.  
 
From an economic point of view, Member States should preferably make the setting 
of the probability and the magnitude of the sanctions taking into consideration the 
other variable in order to reach an optimal expected sanction, and therefore an optimal 
enforcement of insider trading laws.  
5.2.3.2 Enforcement of insider trading laws varies widely across Member States 
The last part of the index is dedicated to the actual application of sanctions across 
Member States for the period 2008, 2009 and 2010. The ESMA’s report provides data 
regarding the enforcement of market abuse laws for the 27 European Union Member 
States, Iceland and Norway (European Economic Area Member’s Countries). The 
data provided are complete regarding administrative enforcement. However, the 
report contains a weakness regarding information about criminal law enforcement 
because data is only available for 17 countries, excluding BE, ES and IT.  
In this part, information about all of the 29 countries for administrative enforcement is 
included and about the 17 countries with available data for criminal enforcement. It is 
valuable information to share in the framework of this study and this section will 
paint a more exhaustive picture of the practices in the whole of Europe.  
 
(i) Administrative enforcement of laws 
 
-          Regarding administrative sanctions the report shows that in Europe, 14 
competent authorities out of 29 imposed 78684 administrative sanctions on natural and 
legal persons in 2008685, 15 for 40686 sanctions in 2009, and 14 for 70 sanctions687 in 
2010 (without distinction between monetary and non-monetary sanctions).  
 
The highest number of administrative sanctions imposed in the review period was 30 
on natural and legal persons in 2008 in FR (while it was only 16 in Italy in 2009 and 
19 in Spain 2010) 688.  
 
-          As for the eight chosen Member States, in BE the administrative competent 
authority imposed on average 0,6 sanction per year against natural and legal persons; 
                                                           
684 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).pp.41-71: on natural person, p.7: on 
legal persons. 
685 Ibid.p.41, 48 and 63: monetary and non monetary. 
686 Ibid. p.41, 33: on natural persons and 7 on legal persons. 
687 Ibid. 57: on natural persons and 13 on legal persons. 
688 Ibid. p.41. 
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in ES eight sanctions; in FR seventeen sanctions; in IT five sanctions; in PT one 
sanction and in UK seven sanctions.  
Moreover, the following observations can be made: no administrative sanctions were 
imposed in DE and LU, whilst sanctions were imposed exclusively on natural persons 
in BE, ES and UK. In total only 4 sanctions were imposed in PT in 2009.  IT is the 
only Member State where sanctions were imposed on both legal and natural persons 
each year. Over the three years, the highest number of sanctions (53) and the highest 
number of discharges (107) were imposed in FR, not only considering the eight but 
for the whole 29 MS. Finally, comparing the total amount of issued monetary 
sanctions with the number of sanction decisions, one can observe that the average 
amount of sanctions appears to be much lower than the maximum administrative 
monetary sanction stipulated by law. Sanctions provided for in legislation often just 
stipulate the maximum penalties, but are not revealing as to what is effectively 
imposed by the competent authority (For example in BE the average administrative 
monetary sanction imposed was !21,250 while the maximum administrative sanction 
provided by law was !2,500,000) (See tables 2 and 21). 
 
-          In total, other types of administrative sanctions were imposed in 11 MS in the 
three years covered. Amongst the eight selected MS, PT’s competent authority (CA) 
addressed a reprimand to a regulated entity and a temporary disqualification of natural 
persons, FR’s CA addressed a reprimand on a natural person, and IT’s CA, and UK’s 
CA imposed temporary prohibition to provide financial services (See table 22).  
 
-          With regards to administrative sanctions imposed on legal persons on Europe, 
seven administrative sanctions were imposed on legal persons in 2008, seven in 2009 
and thirteen in 2010689. The highest number of sanctions imposed in the review period 
was seven for legal persons in Greece in 2010 (while it was only five by Greece’s CA 
in 2009 and two by Italy’s CA and France’s CA in 2009).  
 
(ii) Criminal enforcement of laws 
 
In the report, a distinction is made between the sanctions pronounced in cases 
originated by the administrative competent authority and transmitted to the judicial 
authority, and the monetary sanctions, the incarceration sanctions and the alternative 
types of sanctions pronounced in cases originated by and dealt by the judicial 
authority. 
 
-          First of all, the report shows that, in the 17 countries for which data is 
available, ten competent jurisdictions (CJ) criminally prosecuted 139 natural persons 
in cases originated and transmitted by the administrative competent authority (22 
were sanctioned and 117 were discharged) in 2008; eight jurisdictions prosecuted 88 
natural persons (45 were sanctioned and 43 were discharged) in 2009; ten 
jurisdictions prosecuted 116 natural persons (55 were sanctioned and 61 were 
discharged) in 2010690.  
Finland, Norway and The Netherlands are the three Members States where five legal 
persons were imposed by judicial criminal courts to pay fines in cases originated and 
                                                           
689 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).p.41. 
690 Ibid.p.83. 
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transmitted by the administrative competent authority691. Only two legal persons were 
discharged in 2009 in Finland.  
 
In the eight considered MS, the report shows that UK’s administrative authority did 
not transmit any cases to the judicial authority, whilst the highest number of sanctions 
pronounced in cases transmitted by the CA was 219 in Germany over the entire 
considered period. The rank per number of sanctions pronounced in cases originated 
by the administrative authority and transmitted to the judicial authority is the 
following: UK < BE < ES = PT < IT < FR < DE (See table 23). 
 
-          From an overall point of view, in the 15 countries for which the data is 
available, judicial authorities imposed less monetary sanctions than administrative 
authorities (in number). 
In 2008, 18 pecuniary sanctions were imposed in a total of eight countries, in 2009, 
36 pecuniary sanctions were imposed in three countries, and in 2010, 56 pecuniary 
sanctions were imposed in eight countries692. The highest number of monetary 
sanctions imposed by judicial authorities in the review period was 37 for natural 
persons in 2010 in Germany (while it was only five in 2008 and 23 in 2009 always in 
Germany) and two for legal persons in Finland in 2009 (one in Finland in 2010, no 
sanction in 2008)693.  
 
Regarding the specific case of the five selected Member States for which data is 
available, criminal sanctions were imposed by the judicial authority on natural 
persons in DE, FR and PT for the years 2008 and 2010, and in DE only for the year 
2009. None of the Member States imposed criminal sanctions on legal persons for this 
period (See table 24). Finally, the UK is the only MS where six cases were prosecuted 
by administrative authorities in front of judicial criminal court in 2009 and 2010 (See 
table 25). Comparing the total amount of issued monetary sanctions with the number 
of sanction decisions, one can observe that the average amount of sanctions appears to 
be much lower than the criminal maximum monetary sanction stipulated by law. Here 
again sanctions provided for in legislation often just state the maximum penalties, but 
are not revealing of what is effectively imposed by judges (For example in FR the 
average criminal monetary sanction imposed was !605,000 while the maximum 
criminal sanction provided by law was !1,500,000) (See table 7 and 24). 
 
-          Incarceration sanctions are rare and their terms are relatively short. In a 
European comparison, data is available for 17 countries. In 2008, eight imprisonment 
sanctions were imposed in four countries (longest term: one year). In 2009, ten 
imprisonment sanctions were imposed in four countries (longest term: three years) 
and in 2010, six imprisonment sanctions were imposed in three countries (longest 
term: three years)694. 
Amongst the chosen MS, the DE’s judicial competent authority imposed two 
incarceration sanctions, the FR’s three sanctions and the UK’s six sanctions (See table 
26). Here again, the incarceration terms imposed were lower than the maximum 
incarceration terms provided by law (See table 9). 
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-          The data shows that the imposition of criminal sanctions alternative to fines 
and incarceration remains rare. On Europe, eight MS including Germany, Estonia, 
Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia and Malta reported that no other type of 
sanctions were used in addition to pecuniary sanctions or imprisonment in cases of 
market abuse violation695. Only five MS have indicated that judicial authorities 
imposed other types of sanctions in addition to fines and imprisonment, including 
community service in Denmark, business prohibition order in Finland, money 
donation to foundation and license suspension in Poland, and conditional sentence 
combined with fines in Sweden. 
 
Regarding the specific case of the five selected Member States for which data is 
available, LU’s judicial authority did not impose any criminal sanction for the 
reviewed period, in DE the judicial authority imposed on average 22,3 sanctions 
(fines and incarceration) per year against natural and legal persons; in FR two 
sanctions; in PT 1,6 and in UK 4,3 sanctions (See table 24 and 26). When comparing 
the data regarding the imposition of administrative and criminal sanctions for the five 
MS for which we have both information, DE’s judicial authority imposed the highest 
amount in total of criminal sanctions but did not impose any administrative sanctions 
at all.  
5.3 SUMMING-UP 
From an overall point of view, the substantive and procedural content of insider 
trading administrative and criminal law consistently diverges in Europe. Chapter 6 
will question whether this is necessarily a problem. This conclusive part confronts 
actual law and practices and the theoretical recommendations formulated in Chapters 
3 and 4. Indeed, concerning the elaboration of optimal enforcement of insider trading 
laws, the literature produced relevant observations that should preferably inspire the 
Member States.  
First of all, theory recommends that insider trading regulation should preferably 
provide for proportional and dissuasive maximum monetary sanctions in order to 
satisfy the deterrence objective. In that respect, Member States should preferably take 
into consideration factors relating to the wealth of the individuals when determining 
sanctions to inflict in order to optimally induce deterrence.  
In practice, the use of alternative administrative sanctions is low and the use of 
alternative criminal sanctions is almost inexistent. Incarceration is used. Member 
States should then develop administrative and criminal non-monetary sanctions 
alternative to prison, such as those designated as economically incapacitating 
sanctions (e.g. referral to an attendance center or day reporting center, house arrest, 
community or society service, electronic monitoring) in order to reach an optimal 
enforcement of insider trading laws. It should be reminded that incarceration should 
always be used as an ultimum remedium.  
Moreover, the scholarly literature recommends the publication of the sanction 
preferably under a criminal procedure in order to avoid error costs, which may be 
high and furthermore unrecoverable. Therefore, the publication of sanctions should 
                                                           
695 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).p.111. 
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preferably be made under a criminal procedure or eventually a reinforced 
administrative procedure.  
The literature also offers a viewpoint on the question of articulation and cumulation of 
proceedings. To obtain an optimal enforcement of insider trading law, it recommends 
to favor cooperation and non-cumulation of prosecutions, instead of enabling the 
possibility of having two cumulative, parallel and independent prosecutions. 
Cooperation at an early stage allows the choice of a relevant competent authority who 
will prosecute the case from the beginning. Finally, from a theoretical point of view, 
Member States should preferably require a proof of intent to establish guilt of 
criminal insider trading in order to avoid high error costs. 
 
Secondly, resources and enforcement of insider trading laws also significantly diverge 
in Europe. For the 15 countries for which the data is complete in the report, one can 
observe that they display a total of 101 administrative sanctions and a total number of 
155 criminal sanctions696. Incarceration sanctions occupy a relative importance 
because they represent  39 of the sanctions for these Member States over the studied 
period. Their terms are relatively short compared to the legal provisions limiting the 
maximum. MS allocate different amounts of staff and budget resources to public 
enforcement of insider trading laws. However there is no correlation established 
between these resources and the level of law enforcement.  
For instance, out of the 8 MS considered, LU allocated the highest budget per billion 
US$ GDP and the highest number of staff per million population to public 
enforcement of insider trading law and did not pronounce any sanction for insider 
trading during the reviewed period. Germany allocated the lowest number of staff 
compared to its population (about 70 times lower than LU) and the lowest budget 
compared to its GDP (about 36 times lower than LU) and at the same time the highest 
number of monetary sanctions imposed by judicial authorities in the review period 
was 65 for natural persons in Germany over the entire period. Finally, legal persons 
are rarely administratively prosecuted and sanctioned and even less so criminally 
prosecuted and sanctioned. 
 
There are considerable differences between both the fines and the prison sanctions 
provided by law and sanction decisions. The question arises whether that is 
necessarily a problem. Fines and prison sanctions do not only differ between Member 
States as far as insider trading is concerned, but for many other violations as well. 
This often has to do with the legislative tradition (particularly concerning criminal 
law) in the various Member States. However, these differences do not indicate that the 
system of enforcement in one Member State is necessarily more effective than in 
another. In this respect, it should be stressed that the sanctions provided for in 
legislation often just stipulate the maximum penalties, but are not revealing of what is 
actually imposed by regulators or judges, as observed in the index and mentioned in 
the observations. From an economic perspective, this would only be a problem if the 
sanctions provided by the legislation were of such nature that they would make it 
impossible in practice to impose effective sanctions for insider trading when taking 
into account the economic criteria. 
                                                           
696 Ibid.pp.41, 91, 111: Number of monetary and non-monetary sanctions imposed on natural and legal 
persons. 
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CHAPTER 6. HARMONIZATION OF CRIMINAL INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
AT EU LEVEL 
For a long time, it was generally held that the EU had no competence in the area of 
criminal law. The EU made directives, but the essence of a directive was that Member 
States decided on the method of implementation. Only the result was binding, not the 
instrument chosen. 
 
However, starting with the domain of environmental law, the European Commission 
wished to force Member States to sanction violations of national legislation 
implementing EU law with criminal sanctions. In a landmark decision of 13 
September 2005, the European Court of Justice decided that when the application of 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national 
authorities is an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, 
criminal law may be prescribed on the condition that it is necessary in order to ensure 
that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully effective. 
 
Meanwhile, the European Commission has used these powers in the environmental 
area with the so-called Environmental Crimes Directive of 19 November 2008697 and 
through Directive 2009/123 on Ship Source Pollution of 21 October 2009.698 These 
powers of the EU to force Member States to use criminal law have now also been laid 
down in the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Although initially limited to the domain of environmental criminal law, the 
Commission apparently intends to broaden EU criminal law also to the area of 
economic law and more particularly insider trading. On 20 October 2011 the 
European Commission launched a proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for 
insider dealing and market manipulation.699 The idea is to introduce minimum rules 
on criminal offences which will have to be transposed into national criminal law and 
applied by the criminal justice systems of the Member States. The reason is that today 
Member States’ enforcement practices significantly diverge. The Commission argues 
that this may provide incentives for persons to carry out market abuse in Member 
States which do not provide for criminal sanctions for these offences or provide weak 
enforcement. 
 
This proposal is in line with the policy of the Commission to increasingly introduce 
common EU minimum criminal law standards, arguing that only the criminal law can 
demonstrate social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to 
administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under civil law.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to critically analyze this proposal concerning 
criminalization of insider trading at EU level from an economic perspective. In that 
respect, the following approach is used: even if in particular circumstances the 
criminal law may be indicated, the question also arises whether it should be 
introduced at EU level. The economic theory of federalism, which analyzes the 
                                                           
697 OJ L328/28 of 6.12.2008. It had to be implemented by 26 December 2010 by the Member States.  
698 OJ L280/52 of 27.10. 2008. It had to be transposed by 16 November 2010. 
699 Proposal for Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation 
COM(2011) 654 of 20.10.2011 
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division of labour between the Member States and the EU level, is used to analyze 
whether criminalization should be implemented at EU level. An alternative would 
obviously be to respect the subsidiarity principle and to allow Member States to 
decide on the necessity of criminalization in particular circumstances. 
This last chapter will hence contribute to the economic theory of federalism by 
indicating whether such a criminalization should be imposed on EU or rather on 
Member State level and therefore will have practical and policy implications as well 
since it could allow to shed a critical light, using economic analysis, on the proposals 
of the Commission. 
The remainder this chapter will be structured as follows: after this introduction, the 
legal background for harmonization of criminal law in the EU as well as the contents 
of the proposal for a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation as well as the reactions in the literature on this proposal are sketched 
(6.1); next the question whether such a criminalization should be realized at EU or 
rather at member state level is adressed (6.2). A few concluding observations finish 
the chapter (6.3). 
6.1 LEGAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND: CONTEXT OF THE ISSUING OF 
THE DIRECTIVE ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR MARKET ABUSE 
6.1.1 Harmonization of criminal law in the EU 
Criminal law, a traditional state sovereignty matter 
 
Criminal law is one of the fundamental expressions of State sovereignty: the right to 
punish. It intrinsically expresses fundamental values of the society by determining the 
censurable behaviors. The criminal procedure is the process through which criminally 
sanctionable conduct can be made an offence. 
 
Beyond that, the holding of a criminal trial and the realization of criminal sentences 
might require and imply that certain fundamental freedoms be infringed.   
 
Therefore, criminal law results in the confrontation of the State’s right to punish and 
the guarantee of citizens’ civil liberties. For these reasons, the rules relating to 
criminal law fall within the competence of the legislature. Parliamentary democratic 
oversight is strongly involved in its elaboration. 
 
Because of all these characteristics, it is difficult to achieve progress at an 
international level in the sensitive field of criminal law.  
 
Indeed, criminal law actually embodies fundamental values of the society such as 
culture, religion, history, etc. Within the EU, it differs from one country to another. 
Consequently, as presented in the index in Chapter 5 the same behaviors might not be 
equally punished in different Member States, procedures might not correspond to the 
same demands, and the nature of sanctions might diverge significantly. 
 
 
 
EU criminal law  
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For a long time, it was generally held that the EU had no competence in the area of 
criminal law. Indeed, EU criminal law is a contested field of EU action because it 
presents a challenge to State sovereignty in the potentially tougher domain of law. 
Consequently, the power of the EU in this field is limited because it can only address 
criminal sanctions through the issuing of Directives. 
 
Behind the use of criminal law, there is the will of the Commission to “demonstrate 
social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative 
sanctions or compensation mechanisms under civil law (…) to improve deterrence 
(…) to take serious enforcement action.”700 
 
Before the Lisbon Treaty 
 
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the three pillars of the EU legal structure. 
The third pillar was dedicated to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
(PJCC)701 and the powers of the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice were limited with respect to the Council. The Maastricht 
Treaty was the beginning of the creation of a European criminal law-enforcement 
area702. 
 
Nevertheless, before the Lisbon Treaty, because of the lack of an explicit legal basis, 
only very few measures have been taken for the purpose of strengthening the 
enforcement of EU policies703. 
 
This changed with the decision of the Court of Justice of 13 September 2005 in case 
C-176/03 where the Court had argued that although ‘as a general rule, neither 
criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the community 
competence’, ‘the last-mentioned finding does not prevent the community legislature, 
when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by 
the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious 
environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the 
Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it 
                                                           
700 This statement comes from the recital in the Environemental Crime Directive 2008/99/EC and it is 
repeated in the Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation COM(2011) 654 final p.3. 
701 Called “Justice and Home Affairs” (“JHA”) from 1993 until the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1999. 
702 Before Maastricht, measures were not really aimed at creating a European criminal justice area. The 
Council of Europe attempted to create interoperable mechanisms for the judicial systems of its 
members by addressing the issue of “mutual assistance in criminal matters” through two conventions 
respectively on extradition (1957; CETS No.:02) and mutual assistance (1959; CETS No.:03) in 
criminal matters. Moreover, TREVI should be mentioned as well. TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, 
Extremism, Violence International) was the forum of the operational cooperation between ministries of 
justice and internal affairs of the Member States from 1975 until 1993. One of the first step towards 
operational cooperation in criminal matters in EU was the Schengen Treaty of 14 June 1985, executed 
through Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990.  
703 Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L 328/28 of 
6.12.2008; Directive 2009/123/EC amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the 
introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ L 280/52 of 27.10.2009; and Directive 2009/52 
providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals, OJ L 168/24 of 30.6.2009; Council Framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection 
with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 140/1 of 14.6.2000.; See COM(2011) 573 final of 20.9.2011. 
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lays down on environmental protection are fully effective’.704 In a second decision of 
the Court of Justice of 23 October 2007 in case 176/03 the Court, however, specified: 
‘By contrast, and contrary to the submission of the Commission, the determination of 
the type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied does not fall within the 
community’s sphere of competence’.705 With that decision, it was made clear that 
within the conditions set by the decision of 13 September 2005 the Commission may 
prescribe the use of criminal penalties (if the necessity conditions are fulfilled and the 
topic falls within its sphere of competence). However, the EU level is clearly not 
competent, so it was held by the Court, to ‘determine the type and level of the 
criminal penalties to be applied’.706 
 
As it was meanwhile equally already made clear in the introduction to this chapter, 
the European Commission has used the new powers that were allocated to her with 
the promulgation of the Environmental Crime Directive of 19 November 2008 and the 
directive on Ship-Source Pollution of 21 October 2009. Both directives had already to 
be implemented by the end of 2010. Since then, the landscape has changed 
considerably as a result of the extension of the powers in the domain of criminal law 
under the Lisbon treaty. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty  
 
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty707 introduced three specific competences to the European 
Union for criminal law708, providing for a new legal framework for criminal 
legislation and giving a strong role to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the European Court of Justice. The new legal framework under the Lisbon Treaty 
aims at providing means to develop consistent and coherent EU criminal law 
legislation. It allows the Member States to work together with the Institutions709 by 
providing national parliaments a stronger role in the field of criminal law than in the 
context of other EU policies710. They can give their views on proposals, and monitor 
the respect of the principle of subsidiarity711.  
 
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty made the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally 
binding, protecting citizens712. 
                                                           
704 Par. 48 of the decision of 13 September 2005. 
705 Par. 70 of the decision of 23 October 2007. 
706 For further details see Faure, M., 2008. The Continuing Story of Environmental Criminal Law in 
Europe after 23 October 2007, European Energy and Environmental Law 17, 68-75.  
707 The Lisbon Treaty amends the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) and the Treaty of 
Rome (Treaty establishing the European Community) which form the constitutional basis of the 
European Union. The Treaty of Rome was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). 
708 OJ C 326/47 of 26.10.2012 . 
709 COM(2011) 573 final of 20.09.2011, p.4. 
710 See Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union C83/203 of 30 of March 
2010. 
711 OJ C 326/47 of 26.10.2012 art. 5 and Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality OJ C83/206 of 30 of March 2010, article 7(2): “Where reasoned opinions on a draft 
legislative act's non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the 
votes allocated to the national Parliaments in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, 
the draft must be reviewed”. 
712 Communication from the Commission “Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights by the  European Union”, COM(2010) 573 final of 19.10.2010. 
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Finally when a Member State considers that a proposal dealing with criminal or 
criminal procedure touches upon fundamental aspects of their national criminal 
justice system they have the option to refer it to the European Council713.   
 
Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines 
the substantive competences of the European Union in criminal matters by providing 
two specific legal basis for substantive criminal law714.  
 
Article 83(1)715 
 
First of all, according to Article 83(1) of the TFEU, the EU can adopt directives 
providing for minimum rules regarding the definition of criminal offences for the so-
called listed “Euro crimes”: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, 
money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime 
and organized crime. The Euro crimes are crimes that are considered as meriting an 
EU approach because of their serious nature and cross-border dimension. 
 
On 5 February 2013, on the basis of this article, the Commission proposed a new 
Directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting 
through criminal law (COM (2013/42) replacing Council Framework Decision 
2000/383/JHA). 
 
Article 83(2) TFEU716 allows the European Parliament and the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, to establish ‘minimum rules with regard to the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations 
of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a 
Union policy in an area which has been subject to a harmonization measure’.  
 
In addition, article 325 (4) of the Treaty provides for the specific possibility to take 
measures to fight against misuse of EU public money and to prevent fraud affecting 
                                                           
713 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards an EU Criminal Policy: 
Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law” COM(2011) 573 final of 
20.09.2011, p.4. 
714 Miettinen, S., Criminal Law and Policy in the European Union(Routledge), 2012, p.42. 
715 OJ C 326/47 of 26.10.2012 art. 83(1): “The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of 
directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime 
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special 
need to combat them on a common basis. These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking 
in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms 
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and 
organised crime. On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying 
other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act unanimously after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament”. 
716 OJ C 326/47 of 26.10.2012 art. 83(2): “If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the 
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area 
which has been subject to harmonization measures, directives may establish minimum rules with 
regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives shall 
be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of 
the harmonization measures in question, without prejudice to Article 76”. 
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the financial interests of the Union.  
 
The proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation of 20 October 2011, that constitutes the starting point for this last 
chapter, is based on this new article 83(2) TFEU. It should be added that on 20 
September 2011, the Commission issued the Communication ‘Towards an EU 
Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through 
criminal law’, intending to provide, amongst other things, some specific guidance 
regarding the article 83 (2) of the TFEU717. It is mentioned that this article provides 
the possibility for EU institutions to determine which EU policies require the use of 
criminal law as an additional enforcement tool.  
 
The Treaty explicitly requires a test of whether criminal law measures are ‘essential’ 
to achieve the goal of an effective policy implementation. According to the 
Communication, in order to establish that the effective implementation of a specific 
EU policy requires the use of criminal law, the Commission has to carry out an 
assessment of the national enforcement regimes in place, based on clear factual 
evidence,718 and of the added value of common EU minimum criminal law standards, 
taking in account the principles of necessity, proportionality719 and subsidiarity. In 
this Communication, market abuse is the first policy area cited amongst the ones for 
which EU criminal law is desirable. Once the need for criminal law established, the 
next step concerns the concrete criminal measure to adopt at EU level.  
 
Under article 83 of the Treaty, EU legislation is limited to ‘minimum’ rules on 
criminal law. Consequently, full harmonization is impossible. Moreover, article 83(2) 
TFEU mentions that the objective to reach is an ‘approximation of criminal laws and 
regulations of the Member States’, meaning a reduction of the variation degree 
between the national systems.720 Nevertheless, according to the principle of legal 
certainty and proportionality, it is important to clearly define what conduct may be 
considered criminal, as well as the result to be achieved through the implementation 
of EU legislation. 
 
The concept of ‘minimum’ rules would gain to be clarified721 to avoid any ambiguity. 
Regarding sanctions, EU criminal law can require Member States to take effective, 
                                                           
717 COM(2011) 573 of 20.09.2011, p.6.  
718 The clear factual evidence should treat about the nature or effects of the crime and about a diverging 
legal situation in all Member States, which could be problematic for the effective enforcement of an 
EU Policy subject to enforcement. These proofs should preferably be statistical data allowing to assess 
the factual situation. 
719 The Institutions have to establish a test of whether criminal law measures are “essential” to achieve 
the goal of an effective policy implementation. It implies that the legislators need to analyse whether 
measures other than criminal law measures could not sufficiently ensure the Policy implementation and 
whether criminal law could address the problem more effectively; COM(2011) 573 of 20.09.2011, p.7. 
Moreover, the condition of necessity applies on the level of deciding which criminal law; measures to 
include in a particular legislative instrument. The Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights “the 
severity of the penalty must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense” applies here; COM(2011) 
573 of 20.09.2011, p.8. See further Groenhuijsen, M., Ouwerkerk, J., 2013. Ultima ration en criteria 
voor strafbaarstelling in Europees perspectief(Kluwer, Deventer).p.258. 
720 COM(2011) 573 of  20.09.2011, p.9. 
721 See Miettinen, S., 2012. Criminal Law and Policy in the European Union(Routledge).p.44: “The 
choice of instruments and their inherent limits will also remain a point of contention. Express 
provisions on approximation refer to directives as the legal instrument by which the Union may create 
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proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions for a specific conduct. The 
Commission’s interpretation of ‘minimum rules’ is clear: several documents specify 
that ‘EU law sometimes specifically determines which types and/or levels of criminal 
sanctions are to be made applicable’.722 In each case, the EU instrument may only set 
out which sanctions have to be made ‘at least’ available to the judges in each Member 
State723.  
6.1.2 Harmonization of EU insider trading law  
The European Community was created after the Second World War to ensure 
integration and co-operation with the scope of establishing peace and stability724. 
 
The EU aims at creating a single common market725, through harmonization, towards 
an ideal of federation. Nevertheless, political and cultural differences persist. 
Moreover, member states are usually skeptical about giving total control to a central 
body. Consequently, the EU usually uses flexible legal instruments only binding in 
relation to the “result that is to be achieved”726: directives727. National regulators can 
thereby keep the control over implementation. The existing EU legislation is 
restricted to administrative sanctions and measures. Member States enjoy 
considerable autonomy in terms of choice and application of national sanctions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
minimum rules. Given substantial limitations to the directive as an instrument, and to the potential lack 
of direct effect to instruments containing minimum rules, the question arises whether any provisions on 
the new Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) may allow directly applicable rules on criminal 
law to be created in the form of Regulation, or whether either these or other competences ostensibly 
outside the AFSJ can be exercised to circumvent AFSJ references to directives. If the narrative on the 
development of EU criminal competences can be seen as a contest between the centralizing effects of 
EU law and the desire of the Member States to retain criminal law as a relatively decentralized policy 
area, then Lisbon has changed the rules but has not ended the game. What, for example, are ‘minimum 
rules’?”. 
722 The possibility to make a proposal in the field of criminal law including type and level of criminal 
sanctions included in EU directive appears in the COM(2011) 573 of 20.09.2011, p.8: “Regarding 
sanctions, "minimum rules" can be requirements of certain sanction types (e.g. fines, imprisonment, 
disqualification), levels or the EU-wide definition of what are to be considered aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances”; It also appears in the Communication of the Commission on reinforcing 
sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector, COM(2010) 716 final of 8.12.2010, p.14: “Any 
proposals in the field of criminal law should aim at ensuring appropriate coherence and consistency 
across different sectors, in particular when considering the type and level of criminal sanctions 
included in EU directives”; The European Commission page dedicated to the criminal law policy is 
also specifying that “The EU can adopt directives providing for minimum rules regarding the definition 
of criminal offences, i.e. rules setting out which behavior is considered to constitute a criminal act and 
which type and level of sanctions are applicable for such acts” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/, accessed on 08.05.2013. 
723 COM(2011) 573 of 20.09.2011, p.8-9. 
724 Craig, P., de Burca, G., 2008. EU Law, Text and Materials(Oxford University Press, Oxford).p7. 
725 OJ C 340 of 10.11.1997 (Art. 2, Treaty of Amsterdam). 
726 OJ C 326/47 of 26.10.2012 (Art. 249). 
727 Currently the European directives and regulations in place in the area of financial law deal with four 
principal issues: (1) coordination of the power to impose sanctions between several Member States; (2) 
obligation for Member States to provide for the application of appropriate administrative sanctions and 
measures and ensure that they are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive; (3) sanctions for specific 
infringements; (4) provision for the authorities to publish the measures and sanctions under certain 
circumstances; See COM(2010) 716 final of 8.12.2010. 
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The harmonization of the European Union securities regulation started in the 80’s 
with a legislative framework for common market exchanges,728 introducing a model 
of mutual recognition and minimum harmonization aimed at consolidating the 
internal market and opening the European market for investments. Amongst these 
measures, the 1989 Insider Dealing Directive729 was the first to prohibit insider 
trading at EU level. 
In 1999, the Commission adopted the Financial Action Service Plan (FASP),730 
containing 42 legislative measures, amongst which was the Market Abuse 
Directive.731 Some years later, in the continuity of the FSAP, the Lamfalussy 
process732 gave place to the creation of a new first level general legislative framework 
for European financial markets,733 complemented by a series of more detailed second 
level legislative measures,734 providing technical details relative to the Market Abuse 
Directive.735 The European Securities Committee (ESC)736 and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR)737 were created. 
Adopted in early 2003, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC introduced a 
comprehensive framework to tackle insider dealing and market manipulation 
practices. In order to ensure the enforcement of Directive 2003/6/EC, Member States 
were required to implement appropriate administrative measures and sanctions. This 
requirement did not imply any consequences on Member States’ criminal 
dispositions.  
 
                                                           
728 The Admission Directive, Council Directive 79/279/EEC (OJ 1979 L66/21) of 05.03.1979 ; the 
Listing Particular Directive, Council Directive 80/390/EEC (OJ 1980 L100/1) of 17.03.1980); the 
Interim Reports Directive, Council Directive 82/121/EEC (OJ 1982 L66/21) of 02.1982 ; the Major 
Share-holdings Directive, Council Directive 88/627/EEC (OJ 1988 L348) of 12.12.1988 ; consolidated 
in 2001 by the Consolidated Admission and Reporting Directive, Council Directive 2011/34/EC (OJ 
2001 L184/1) of 28.05.2001; The 1985 White Paper, COM(85) 310 of 14.06.1985 ; the Single 
European Act (OJ 1987 L 169) of 29.06.1987 ; the Single Market Programme ; the Undertaking for 
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities Directive, Council Directive 85/611/EEC (OJ 1985 
L375/3) of 12.1985 ; the Public Offers Directive, Council Directive 89/298/EEC (OJ 1989 L124) of 
17.04.1989 ; Investment Service Directive, Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 1993 L141) of 
10.05.1993. 
729 Council Directive 89/592/EEC (OJ 1989 L334) of 13.11.1989. 
730 Financial services : Implementing the Framework For Financial Markets : Action Plan, COM(99) 
232 of 11.05.1999. 
731 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation of the 28.01.2003. 
732 The Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men On The Regulation of 
European Securities Markets (2001). 
733 First level legislation involve the EU Commission, Council and Parliament. 
734 Second level legislation involve the EU Commission, the European Securities Committee and the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators. 
735 Directive 2003/124/EC implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of 
market manipulation ; Directive 2003/125/EC implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the 
disclosure of conflicts of interest ; Directive 2004/72/EC implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices; Regulation (EC) No. 
2273/2003 on Market Abuse. 
736 Commission Decision establishing the European Securities Committee, COM(2001) 1493 of 
06.06.2001. The ESC is constituted of officials of Member States government and Commission 
officials. 
737 Commission Decision establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, COM 
(2001)1501 of 06.06.2001. The CESR is constituted of representatives of Member States’ national 
regulators and Commission representatives. 
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Nevertheless, according to the Commission, the current system did not achieve the 
effective protection of the financial markets738 as desired. In December 2010, the 
European Commission issued a communication on “Reinforcing sanctioning regimes 
in the financial services sector”.739 
 
The European and Securities Market Authority (ESMA)740 replaced the Committee of 
European Securities Regulation on the 1st of January 2011. ESMA’s work on 
securities legislation aims at contributing to the development of a single rulebook in 
Europe by improving co-ordination and co-operation amongst securities regulators, 
as well as acting as an advisory group to assist the European Union Commission. 
ESMA is in charge of issuing guidance on the common operation of the Market 
Abuse Directive. 
6.1.3 Proposal for a directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 
The proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions is the first legislative proposal 
based on the new Article 83(2) of the TFEU, which as already mentioned provides for 
the adoption of common ‘minimum rules with regards to the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the 
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union 
policy in an area which has been subject to a harmonization measure’. 
On the 20th of October 2011, the Commission issued two proposals to review the EU 
regime dealing with market abuse. The first aspect of this reform proposition consists 
of a proposal for a Regulation,741 which basically replaces the MAD and incorporates 
major elements of the Directives implementing it, cited here above. This proposal for 
a Regulation suggests modifications to the prohibition, to the  supervisory742 and 
enforcement powers743 as well as to the administrative measures and sanctions744, 
                                                           
738 Proposal for Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation 
COM(2011) 654 of 20.10.2011, p.3. 
739 Communication of the Commission on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services 
sector, COM(2010) 716. 
740 http://www.esma.europa.eu/. 
741 Proposal for a Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation of 20.10.2011 (COM(2011)  
651, final). 
742 Two important modifications relate to the expansion of the scope of the prohibition on insider 
trading (and the definition of attempted market manipulation), See COM(2011) 651, Article 6 “Inside 
information”, p.29: “(e) information not falling within paragraphs (a), (b), (c), or (d) relating to one or 
more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments, which is not generally 
made available to the public, but which, if it were available to a reasonable investor, who regularly 
deals on the market and the financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract concerned, 
would be regarded by that person as relevant when deciding the terms  on which transactions in the 
financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract should be effected”. The notions of “precise 
nature” and “significant effect on prices” relative to insider information in all the other paragraphs (a), 
(b), (c) and (d) are missing in this one. It consequently considerably extends the definition of inside 
information. cf. Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: 
Revolution or Evolution, The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-205.       
p.10. 
743See COM(2011) 651, Article 17 “Powers of competent authorities”, p.39: “Regarding regulators 
power, the regulation introduces reporting of suspicious orders and OTC transactions; ensure access to 
data and telephone records of telecommunications operators to investigate  and sanction market abuse, 
subject to a judicial warrant; ensure access to private premises to seize documents to investigate and 
sanction market abuse, subject to a judicial warrant; grant protection and incentives to whistleblowers. 
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directly applicable by the Member States. The Commission justified this choice with 
the fact that a Regulation would be the most appropriate legal instrument to define the 
market abuse framework within the Union because it actually reduces the regulatory 
complexity related to the diversity of legislation across the Union. Indeed, it would 
offer greater legal certainty for those subject to the legislation across the Union, 
introducing a harmonized set of core rules, thereby contributing to the functioning of 
the Single Market.745  
 
Secondly, on the basis of the article 83(2) TFEU, the European Commission’s 
proposition entails a Draft Directive on criminal sanctions, applicable to insider 
trading and market manipulation.746 The motivation is that today Member States use 
divergent criminal measures to enforce the prohibition of insider trading. The 
Commission argues that this may provide incentives for persons to carry out insider 
trading in Member States which provide weak measures for this offence. 
 
This proposal is in line with the policy of the Commission to increasingly introduce 
common EU minimum criminal law standards, arguing that only the criminal law can 
demonstrate social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to 
administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under civil law. 
 
Because the Commission can only address criminal matters by the way of directives, 
it produced a proposal for a Directive which only addresses approximation in insider 
trading criminal matters and general minimum rules. 
 
The proposal requires Member States: 
 
- to take the necessary measures to ensure that insider dealing (as well as 
inciting, aiding, abetting and attempting) constitutes a criminal offence (not 
the case in one country: Bulgaria)… 
- …when committed intentionally  (Art.3) (not the case in 10 Member States 
Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, 
Sweden, United Kingdom747) 
- to take the necessary measures to ensure that the criminal offences are subject 
to ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ criminal sanctions (Art. 5) 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Article 19 “Obligation to cooperate”, Article 20 “Cooperation with third country”: Cross-border 
cooperation will be reinforced. 
744 See COM(2011) 651, Chapter 5 “Administrative measures and sanctions”, pp.47-48: One of the 
most revolutionary aspects of the proposal for a Regulation is that administrative measures and 
sanctions will be harmonized: “administrative pecuniary sanctions of  up to twice the amount of the 
profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined (…) in respect of 
a natural person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to !5,000,000 (…) in respect of a legal 
person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to 10 % of its total annual turnover in the preceding 
business year (…) Every administrative measure and sanction imposed for breach of this Regulation 
shall be published without undue delay, including at least information on the type and nature of the 
breach and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise 
the stability of financial markets”. 
745COM(2011) 651, p.5. 
746 COM(2011) 654. 
747 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).p.112: “Is proof of intent required 
in order to have a guilty verdict in a market abuse case? No: Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom”. 
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- to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for criminal insider trading (Art. 
6) (not the case in 8 Member States: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Sweden748). 
 
Moreover, article 9 of the proposed directive holds that four years after the entry-into-
force of the Directive the Commission should provide a report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of the Directive and, if necessary, on 
the need to review it, in particular with regard to the appropriateness of introducing 
common minimum rules on types and levels of criminal sanctions. The Commission 
hence explicitly wishes to reserve the right to introduce common minimum rules on 
the types and level of criminal sanctions based on Article 83(2) TFEU.749  
6.1.4 Comments in the literature  
The proposal for a Directive has already been critically received by some legal 
doctrine.  
First of all, it should be mentioned that authors do not seem to contest per se the 
criminalization of insider trading at EU level and express more preoccupation about 
the content of the Regulation because of its direct applicability. Nevertheless, it 
appears that commentators seem concerned about the enlargement of the scope of 
insider trading prohibition contained within the Regulation, which may have a 
repercussion on the scope of the criminal law750. Indeed, the major changes provided 
by the proposals for Regulation and for a Directive regarding insider trading relate, on 
the one hand, to the expansion of the scope of the prohibition on insider trading, and 
on the other hand, to the requirement of the Member States to consider intentional 
insider dealing as criminal offences. According to the literature, both changes may not 
be compatible. Indeed, according to the principle of legal certainty criminally 
enforceable norms should take on specific qualities and need to live up to high quality 
requirements. Consequently, some commentators harshly criticize the enlarged scope 
of the prohibition on insider trading. 
According to the MAD, the prohibition on insider trading currently contains three key 
elements: the information should be “precise”, should have a “significant” effect on 
the price, if it was made public, and the individual should “use” the information.751 
The proposal for Regulation on Market Abuse introduces two definitions of inside 
information. A differentiation is made between the inside information that cannot be 
abused, related to the insider trading prohibition, and the inside information that listed 
companies have to disclose, because of the obligation to disclose.  
While the disclosure of information relies on the same definition of inside information 
given under the current MAD, the notion of inside information that should not be 
                                                           
748 Ibid.p.73: “Market Abuse can not give rise to criminal sanctions: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Sweden”. 
749 See COM(2011) 573final, p.8: Minimum rules with regards to the definition of sanctions, according 
to the Communication of the European Commission, “rule out the possibility of full harmonization” 
(p.7) but at the same time “Regarding sanctions, "minimum rules" can be requirements of certain 
sanction types (e.g. fines, imprisonment, disqualification), levels or the EU-wide definition of what are 
to be considered aggravating or mitigating circumstances”. 
750 COM2011(654) final, Art.2 : “"Inside information" means information within the meaning of 
Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No…of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and 
market manipulation”.  
751 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation of the 28.01.2003, article 1(1). 
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abused is enlarged through article 6.1 (e) of the proposal for Regulation. Indeed, the 
proposal for Regulation prohibits trade if a person has non-public information that a 
reasonable investor would consider “relevant when deciding the terms on which 
transactions (...) should be effected”.752 This definition considerably broadens the 
notion of inside information. This modification also implies an impact on the scope of 
the prohibition on tipping.753  
The proposal for the Directive requires the national legislator to treat intentional 
insider trading as a criminal offense. While they seem to implicitly express their 
approval in requiring Member States to provide criminal sanctions for insider trading, 
commentators specify that the violation should be carefully described. Due to the 
requirement of making the criminal enforcement of these norms available, the 
prohibition needs to meet high quality requirements.754 
Commentators doubt that the modified definitions and consequently the prohibition 
on insider trading set by the proposals respond to these qualities. Indeed, they 
consider that the definitions provided by proposals are loose and that the key notions 
related to insider dealing are not precise enough.755 All in all, they feel that the 
prohibition on insider trading is a poorly defined norm, which may not satisfy the 
quality of criminally enforceable norms.  
A first argument in favor of providing precisions would be to avoid uncertainty and 
allow citizens to easily and clearly understand what constitutes an abuse.756 A second 
argument is that precise norms avoid discretion for interpretation at a national level. 
Indeed, as experienced with the MAD, the different stages of development of capital 
markets across Europe and the different level of expertise amongst regulators and 
courts might be problematic regarding interpretation.757 It seems that uncertainty is 
one of the reasons why many Member States today do not apply the MAD.758 
Moreover, it can also leave space for interpretation errors or deliberate evasion of EU 
norms through creative judicial interpretations.759 
Finally, criminalizing uncertainly defined violations as well as extending the scope of 
violation might be problematic by having a negative impact on markets. For example, 
financial intermediaries will be incentivized to limit their trades because of the 
unclear potential risk they imply. The consequences of this limitation could be a 
reduction of liquidity on European stocks.760 
                                                           
752 Proposal for a Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation of 20.10.2011 (COM(2011) 
651 final), Article 6.1 (e). 
753 Article 7(3) and (4) proposal for a Regulation on Market Abuse 
754 See Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or 
Evolution, The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-205.p.205. 
755 It appears for example that notions such as “price-sensitivity”, “misleading”, “artificial”, 
“abnormal” remains non explicitly defined. 
756 See Di Noia, C., 2012. Pending Issues in the Review of the European Market Abuse Rules, ECMI 
Policy Brief 19.p.2. 
757 See Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or 
Evolution, The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-205.p.201. 
758 See Di Noia, C., 2012. Pending Issues in the Review of the European Market Abuse Rules, ECMI 
Policy Brief 19.p.1. 
759 See Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or 
Evolution, The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-205.p.206. 
760 According to Noia, there is also a risk to see the corporate governance dialogue between companies 
and shareholder reducing if the later feel restricted in their ability to trade. It may also reduce the 
corporate governance dialogue, often encouraged by European institutions, between companies and 
shareholders, if the latter feel restricted in their ability to trade. It may also severely limit the possibility 
for companies to act in general and operate on their shares (despite the provision of Art. 3) and to use 
variable compensation schemes for managers instead of granting only fixed compensation, irrespective 
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In sum, legal doctrine has formulated substantial criticisms both on the proposal of a 
Regulation and on the proposal for a Directive. Some of those relate to a too broad 
definition of insider trading and hence more on the contents of the rules; another 
criticism relates precisely to the fact that this broadened notion of insider trading is 
combined with a criminalization. Applying criminal law to vague norms would 
violate the lex certa principle which is fundamental to criminal law.    
 
The fundamental question relates to whether, from an economic perspective, a need to 
criminalization of insider trading should be imposed at EU level.  
6.2 CRIMINALIZATION OF INSIDER TRADING AT EU LEVEL? 
6.2.1 Criminalization and harmonization 
Starting point for the analysis was the proposal of the European Commission to come 
to a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation. The 
difficulty is hence that in fact two issues are occurring at the same time. On the one 
hand, the question arises whether insider trading should be criminalized; that is the 
question focused on in section 4.3 of Chapter 4. The other question is when one has 
decided that there should be a role for criminal law, whether this criminal law should 
be mandated at EU level. They seem like separate questions, but in the proposal for a 
Directive they come together. Yet an additional analytical complication is that the 
question whether criminalization should be promulgated at EU level cannot be seen 
separately from the question whether rules regarding insider trading and market 
manipulation themselves should be harmonized at EU level.761 The latter question is 
no longer an issue which will be addressed for the simple reason that insider trading 
has been regulated at EU level. However, the mere fact that the norm (in this case 
prohibition of insider trading) has been promulgated at EU level does not necessarily 
imply that the enforcement measure (criminal law) should be prescribed at EU level 
as well. Recently, van Zeben has rightly indicated that as far as the allocation of 
competences within a federal system like the EU is concerned, one should distinguish 
between competences for standard setting (making the norm) implementation and 
enforcement, whereby in both cases a choice between allocation to the Member State 
or the Member State level based on economic criteria would be possible.762  The 
question therefore can be asked whether the mere fact that the norm itself (prohibition 
of insider trading) has been promulgated at EU level should necessarily imply that the 
method of enforcement (i.e. use of the criminal law) should be harmonized as well.763  
 
These questions are addressed by first looking at the economic criteria for 
centralization (6.2.2) and then looking at the issue from an European legal perspective 
                                                                                                                                                                         
of the results of the companies. Di Noia, C., 2012. Pending Issues in the Review of the European 
Market Abuse Rules, ECMI Policy Brief 19.). 
761 A similar problem arises when discussing the desirability of harmonization of procedural law. This 
issue is also strongly related to the harmonization of the substantive private rules as well. See on that 
issue Visscher, L., 2012. A Law and Economics View on Harmonization of Procedural 
Law(Springer).p.65-91. 
762 See  Van Zeben, J., 2014. Competence Allocation and Regulatory Functioning. A Study of the 
European Emission Trading  Scheme(Cambridge University Press). 
763 Recently, Klip rightly held that at a European level the subsidiarity principle should therefore also 
be considered as a criterion for criminalization See Klip, A., 2012. European Criminal Policy, 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 20, 6-7. 
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(6.2.3). However, from the outset it should be stated that it may be difficult to apply 
the economic criteria for the simple reason that those have been developed mainly to 
examine whether there would be arguments in favor of centralization of normative 
legal standards (prohibition of insider trading), not so much for the question whether 
enforcement measures would have to be harmonized as well. In that respect, only the 
general need for harmonization of the method of enforcement (criminalization) is 
questioned. The theoretical framework does not allow to provide an answer to 
whether a specific modality of this criminalization such as the procedural requirement 
of intent or the criminal liability of legal person is desirable. 
6.2.2 Economics of federalization criteria for centralization of norms settings 
6.2.2.1 Transboundary externalities 
The economic criteria in favor of centralization of powers, as mentioned, usually 
relate to the normative legal rules and less to the enforcement issues. Arguments that 
play a role in that respect are the fear of transboundary externalities, the race-for-the-
bottom risk and the diminution of transaction costs.764 Interestingly, those arguments 
are to some extent also advanced as criteria by criminal lawyers for harmonization of 
the criminal law.765 The danger of cross-border crimes is also advanced by the 
European Commission in favor of the use of EU common criminal law to prevent 
unpunished offences against EU law, in certain policy areas (such as the protection of 
the environment and finance).766 This is the traditional transboundary or inter-
jurisdictional externalities argument which would justify harmonization.  
 
Of course, it is not difficult to make the argument that securities markets have become 
increasingly transboundary and even global. 
 
The 80s and the 90s have led to the advent of the current global marketplace. During 
the 80s, restrictions on cross-border capital flows were gradually relaxed within the 
major industrial countries.767 Internationalization of the securities markets can be 
illustrated by the significant increase in securities transactions that occur across the 
borders of several countries. Investors have access to foreign securities and issuers 
can tap the major stock markets in the United States or Europe to raise equity 
capital.768 Indicators showing the reality of the internationalization of the securities 
market include cross listing of securities,769 cross-country hedging and portfolio 
                                                           
764 See Faure, M., 2001. Regulatory Competition vs. Harmonization in EU Environmental Law(Oxford 
University Press, Oxford).pp.283-286. 
765 See Klip, A., 2002. Conditions for a Corpus Iuris Criminalis(Intersentia, Antwerp).pp.110-115. 
766 COM(2010) 716 final of 8.12.2010. 
767 See Steinberg, M. I., Michaels, E., 1999. Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of 
Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, Michigan Journal of International Law 20, 
207-266. 
768 Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the International Environment(University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow).p.100. 
769 See Scarlata, J.G., ‘Institutional Developments in the Globalization of Securities and Futures 
Markets’p.18, available at: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/01/Developments_Jan_Feb1992.pdf., Cross-listing 
means that a company incorporated in one country lists its securities on an exchange in another 
country. See Coffee, J., 2002. Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependant Perspective, 
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 192.p.17: “the number of foreign companies listed on 
193
 189 
diversification,770 open national stock market771 and ‘passing the book’.772 All of these 
practices have significantly increased in the past decades.773 
 
Internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions 
of regulation and enforcement.774 In order to ensure operational and informational 
efficiency of their market, domestic regulators have to deal with cross border cases. 
This means that they have to be in a position to assess the nature of activities within 
foreign markets. As a direct effect of the globalization, financial and technological 
innovations, cross-border activities, cross-asset effects and broader financial and 
economic policy issues are changing.775 Most modern securities markets are regulated 
on a national basis, the current territorial approach to regulation suffers from 
numerous weaknesses. Regulators can be captured or pressured by local interest 
groups in the securities industry. They can also be subject to opportunism whilst 
trying to maximize their personal prestige and act in favor of their carrier through 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the two principal U.S. stock markets (the NYSE and Nasdaq) grew from 170 in 1990 to over 750 in 
2000 (or roughly a 450% increase)”, Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Klingebiel, D., 2000. Stock Markets in 
Transition Economies, World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper 5. 
770 Cross-national portfolio investment is the degree to which investors of a country buy securities 
listed in another country. See Scarlata, J.G., ‘Institutional Developments in the Globalization of 
Securities and Futures Markets’ p.18 available at: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/01/Developments_Jan_Feb1992.pdf, p.18: “A 
U.S. trader, for example, can diversify a portfolio composed of U.S. stocks by buying stocks of a U.K. 
firm in London through a London broker.”, See Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the 
International Environment(University of Glasgow, Glasgow).p.72: “In the 1950’s, foreign investors 
held a little more than 2 percent of U.S. securities; by mid-1988 it was nearly 12 percent”. 
771 See ibid.p. 72: “Many countries opened their exchanges for membership by foreign firms in 1980s. 
Holding membership in another country’s exchanges is another form of internationalization. Before 
December 1997, only 45 nations offered serious market-opening measures in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) context. In December 1997 WTO issued an accord to liberalize worldwide 
financial markets. The current agreement commits over 102 WTO members to liberalize their domestic 
markets and provide access to foreign financial services providers”. 
772 See Scarlata, J.G., ‘Institutional Developments in the Globalization of Securities and Futures 
Markets’ p.18 available at: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/01/Developments_Jan_Feb1992.pdf. “Passing the 
book” is the expression describing that the “control of trading is passed between traders at exchanges 
around the globe. This enables 24 hour trading of a financial instrument.” It consists in transferring the 
handling instructions between trades and mostly concern foreign exchange and bullion, not equities.  
773 See Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the International Environment(University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow).p.70-73. 
774 See Geiger, U., 1998. Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market - A 
Proposal Fordham Law Review 66, 1785-1836.p.1786-1787. Choi, S. J., 2001. Assessing Regulatory 
Responses to Securities Market Globalization, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2, 613-647. See IOSCO, 
1998. Report: Causes, Effects and Regulatory Implications of Financial and Economic Turbulence in 
Emerging Markets (Emerging Markets Committee of The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions).p.63: “What these developments suggest is that the environment of securities regulation 
no longer appears to be limited in scope (…) A major implication for regulators in these jurisdictions 
therefore, is that they will have to consider whether the regulatory framework within which they 
operate has sufficient capacity and appropriate structure to accommodate a wider and more complex set 
of objectives”. 
775 See IOSCO, 1998. Report: Causes, Effects and Regulatory Implications of Financial and Economic 
Turbulence in Emerging Markets (Emerging Markets Committee of The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions).p.63: “This has certain implications for securities regulators— and 
particularly for emerging market regulators. It is likely that they would be increasingly expected to deal 
with issues outside of their traditional scope of responsibilities, in particular, those involving cross-
border activity, cross-asset effects and broader financial and economic policy issues”.  Available at: 
http://www.sc.com.my/clients/sccommy/Links/ioscosept98.pdf. 
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complicated regulations.776 Moreover, different levels of expertise amongst regulators 
and courts might be problematic regarding interpretation.777  
 
These arguments clearly show that the securities market is transboundary, but that 
does not necessarily show that Member States would be able to externalize harm to 
other Member States if e.g. one Member State would decide to criminalize insider 
trading and another would not. The powerful argument in favor of centralized rule 
making based on the risk of externalities between jurisdiction relates to the question 
whether preferences for divergent national rules in criminal insider trading matters 
within the European Union eventually risk to imply the report of negative 
externalities from one Member State to another Member State778. The underlying 
reasoning being that in a situation where a harm caused by an insider trading may 
occur in more than one country the domestic criminal laws may not guarantee a full 
internalization of the negative externalities occurring outside the insider’s home state. 
If the costs of a legal rule can not remain in the Member State that enacted it, 
centralization should be favored. 
6.2.2.2 Race-to-the-bottom 
The second type of argument that is related to the former would be that there may be a 
race-to-the-bottom in enforcement of insider trading laws. That scenario would imply 
that some Member States would not be interested in seriously enforcing insider 
trading laws e.g. by enforcing it through very weak enforcement mechanisms779. 
There is, however, no evidence that such a race-for-the-bottom in this area would take 
place. One problem is that all Member States (with one exception, Bulgaria) have, as 
showed in Chapter 5, de facto criminalized insider trading, although the level of 
penalties differs. It is, however, doubtful, whether those differences in levels of 
penalties can be qualified as an attempt of states to engage in a race-for-the-bottom 
which would lead to a destructive competition in order to attract insider traders. There 
is no evidence whatsoever that such a scenario is likely to occur between European 
Member States.  
 
Some, more particularly Roberta Romano, have even advocated the likelihood of a 
race-to-the-top. The race-to-the-top refers to the fact that investors would not be 
willing to pay as much for securities of firms incorporated in states that have a legal 
regime which is detrimental to shareholders’ interest and benefits management too 
much. The reasoning is that lenders will not make loans to these firms without 
compensation on the risk associated with managers’ lack of accountability. The result 
would consequently be a rise of these firms’ cost of capital, and a decline of their 
earnings. For these reasons, corporate managers have strong incentives to implant 
                                                           
776 See Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the International Environment(University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow).p.100. 
777 See Siems, M., Nelemans, M., 2012. The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or 
Evolution, The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19, 195-205.p.199. 
778 Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.51: “Consequently, the need to 
cope with externalities between legal orders is a major argument in favour of centralized decision-
making”. 
779 Cox, J. D., 1999. Regulatory Duopole in US Securities Markets, Columbia Law Review 99. Fox, M. 
B., 1999. Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor Empowerment, Virginia 
Law Review 85, 1335-1419. 
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their companies in countries offering rules preferred by investors.780 
6.2.2.3 Transaction costs 
Thirdly, centralization may allow transaction costs saving781. This argument is often 
advanced by European legal scholars pleading for harmonization of private law in 
Europe, and is based on the argument that differences in legal systems are very 
complex782. Concerning insider trading, issuers and investors may face transaction 
costs associated with the international aspect of a trade. Divergences in sanctions and 
enforcement of insider trading laws from one country to another may create 
transaction costs for issuers and financial institutions in obtaining the information as 
well as in undertaking actions to comply with host countries regulation, in addition to 
complying with home country regulations. If a company seeks to export and expand 
its operations into a foreign country, it faces transactions costs783. These transaction 
costs vary depending on the area of laws. For example, a commissioner for Internal 
Market and Services identified that amongst the 250 E.U. issuers listed in the United 
States, the largest companies spend between $1 million and $10 million per year to 
reconcile International Accounting Standards (IAS) to the United States Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP)784. 
The costs associated to the divergence of regimes may reduce the advantages of 
investing internationally and might prevent investors and companies from 
participating in the international securities market. From this point of view, 
harmonization could be beneficial. Full harmonization would completely eliminate 
the problem, as companies would only need to comply with a unique set of regulatory 
requirements785. However, so far, there is no empirical evidence supporting that 
substantial transaction costs saving in the particular fields of criminal insider trading 
matter could constitute a strong argument in favor of harmonization of method of 
enforcement. 
6.2.2.4 Internal market? 
Economic arguments in favor of a harmonization of the enforcement mechanism do 
hence not seem to be very convincing. There is little evidence of particular risk of 
externalization, transactions costs nor of a race-to-the-bottom. It is also not clear that 
                                                           
780 See Romano, R., 1985. Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 1, 225-283. (The Delaware case). Romano, R., 1998. Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, Yale Law Journal 107, 2359-2430. R. Romano 
holds that a competitive legal market supplants a monopolist federal agency in the fashioning of 
regulation as it will produce rules more aligned with the preferences of investors, whose decisions 
drive the capital market. 
781Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam). 
782 This is one of the arguments made by the Danish scholar Lando in favour of harmonised private 
law. Lando, O., 1993. Die Regeln des Europäischen Vertragsrecht(Nomos, Baden Baden).pp.473-474. 
783 Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the International Environment(University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow).p.100. 
784 McCreevy, C., 2005. E.C.Strategy on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and 
Consistency(European Commission. European Federation of Accountants' (FEE) Seminar on 
International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS, Bruxelles). 
785 Zhao, L., 2008. Securities Regulation in the International Environment(University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow).p.101. 
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the internal market would be endangered without a harmonization of criminal 
sanctions with respect to insider trading. Differences between legal rules, as has often 
been stated, only endanger the internal market when those differences would 
endanger the free movement of services, capital goods or persons.786 Currently, 
insider trading law seems not to be a big issue in any of the Member States, i.e. there 
are not many cases of enforcement of insider trading through criminal law. Hence, the 
Commission were to have a point if e.g. one Member State would fanatically enforce 
insider trading and throw insiders systematically in jail whereas others would not and 
would in that way try to attract insiders. There is no evidence of such a behaviour 
whatsoever and hence no evidence that the current situation would cause any social 
harm. Moreover, it should also not be forgotten that investors are informed of the 
applicable insider trading laws in the countries where they buy shares and of the way 
in which they are enforced. Hence, in an application of the Coase Theorem787 if one 
Member State were e.g. not to enforce insider trading laws effectively, investors 
would presumably react to this by offering lower prices for the concerned shares (if 
that were the case at all). 
6.2.2.5 Benefits of differentiation 
Finally, economic analysis of harmonization and the law and economics of federalism 
have often pointed at the substantial benefits of differentiated legal rules. First of all 
differentiated legal rules allow the satisfaction of heterogeneous preferences. This 
corresponds with the Tiebout framework of competition between legal orders where 
citizens are free to choose the insider trading legal rule quality that corresponds 
optimally with and vary according to their preference788. In that respect, one 
advantage of decentralization is to enable Member States to provide for rules which 
best serve the goals preferred by the local population789. As presented, criminal law is 
a traditional State sovereignty matter. Consequently, States are very attached to their 
competences in this particular domain of law. Criminal law embodies States’ cultural, 
historical, political specificities and is particularly representative of local individual 
preferences. Therefore, the substantial benefit from differentiation of criminal insider 
trading legislation should not be neglected. 
Another benefits of the differentiated legal rules is that through the application of 
different legal rules substantial learning effects can be obtained.790 A disadvantage of 
                                                           
786 See Ogus, A., 1999. Competition between National Legal Systems: a Contribution of Economic 
Analysis to Comparative Law, International Comparative Law Quarterly 42, 405-418. See Faure, M., 
2000. Product Liability and Product Safety in  Europe: Harmonization or Differentiation?, Kyklos 53, 
467-508. 
787 Coase, R., 1960. The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics 15, 1-44. 
788 Developed by Ogus, A., 1994. Standard Setting for an Environmental Protection(Maklu).pp.25-30 
and more generally in Ogus, A., l.c., 413. Tiebout, C. M., 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 
Journal of Political Economy 64, 416-424. 
789 Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.50.  Romano, R., 1985. Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, 
225-283.p.281: “a centralized system could impose a welfare loss on firms, to the extent that it would 
be difficult to duplicate the important transaction-specific assets that serve to safeguard the interests of 
the parties”. 
790 See inter alia Van den Bergh, R., 2000. Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory 
Competition in Europe, Kyklos 53, 435-466. 
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a harmonization at the European level is that those learning effects would be gone.791 
Especially in this new domain of the enforcement of insider trading, where learning 
about the most effective methods of enforcing insider trading law may be quite 
important, learning from the experiences in different Member States could provide 
valuable insights on the most effective tools to remedy insider trading792. Those 
benefits of mutual learning would be gone in a model of harmonization of criminal 
law as the Commission is currently proposing in its directive.  
6.2.3 Commission legal perspective: Member States’ enforcement deficit 
Of course, the perspective from the European Commission may be a totally different 
one than the economics of federalism. Starting point for the European Commission is 
not the economic theory that would address e.g. whether there are interjurisdictional 
externalities or a race-to-the-bottom, but whether criminal law is needed to encourage 
the compliance with EU directives, in this case concerning insider trading. This idea 
to criminalize insider trading should hence be seen within the context of the general 
worry at EU level that there is a considerable implementation deficit with respect to 
EU law, although this is stronger in some areas than in others. Therefore, a major 
focus of European law during the past thirty years has been on the issue how 
implementation of European law can be improved by requiring a correct 
implementation from Member States. In this respect, we can e.g. point at evolutions in 
case law: 
 
- Although Member States remain free in the choice of instruments for the 
implementation of a directive, case law holds that these sanctions in case of a 
violation of implementing legislation should at least be effective, proportional and 
dissuasive.793 Hence, one can now find in many directives the obligation for Member 
States to provide sanctions which are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.794 
 
- Case law also held that the lack of effective prosecution against violators of 
implementing legislation can be considered as a violation of European law.795 Hence, 
Europe has increasingly received effective remedies to cope with the implementation 
deficit. However, most recently, starting with the environmental crimes directives we 
mentioned in the introduction, the EU now also wishes to cure the implementation 
deficit by forcing Member States to choose a particular type of sanction, in this 
particular case the criminal law.796 The question can, however, be asked whether a 
                                                           
791 See Visscher, L., 2012. A Law and Economics View on Harmonization of Procedural 
Law(Springer).pp.84-85. 
792 Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.50: “Differences in rules allow for 
different experiences and may improve an understanding of the effects of alternative legal solutions to 
similar problems. This advantage relates both to the formulation of the substantive rules and their 
enforcement”. 
793 See ECJ 21 September 1989, case C-68/88 (Greek Corn). 
794 This is also the formula used in article 6 of the proposal for a directive COM (2011) 654 final. 
795 ECJ 9 December 1997, case C-265/95 (Spanish Strawberries). 
796 A few years ago, Corstens and Pradel, two leading legal scholars in criminal law in Europe, still 
wrote: “Such a method requiring Member States to use criminal penalties is compatible with neither 
the character of a directive, nor the opinion that the communities do not have authority to require 
Member States to impose criminal penalties” This  statement was obviously written in a time before the 
Lisbon Treaty. See Corstens, G., Pradel, J., 2002. European Criminal Law(Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague). 
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harmonization of the criminal law, as currently proposed, is indeed necessary to 
guarantee a correct implementation of European law and in this particular case the 
Market Abuse Directive. 
 
Chapter 5 presents enforcement of insider trading laws data about 15 Member States 
for wich the information was available for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010. As far as 
insider dealing is concerned, all the Member States provide criminal sanctions except 
for Bulgaria.797 Moreover, one can observe that they display a total number of 155 
criminal sanctions798 imposed over the entire period; higher than the total of 101 
administrative sanctions. This information does not seem to support a Member State’s 
enforcement of criminal insider trading law deficiency. 
6.2.3.1 Effectiveness doubtful 
The overview offered in Chapter 5 shows that all Member States, with the exception 
of Bulgaria, do have criminal sanctions, but that there may be considerable 
differences in modalities of sanctions. It should be stressed that the current directive 
will, at least in the first phase imply little change. First, the directive will merely force 
Member States towards criminalization which, with the exception of Bulgaria, all 
Member States already do.  
Regarding the modalities of this criminalization, for all other Member States, as far as 
the sanctions are concerned, two things may change. First the Directive requires to 
provide for criminal liability of legal persons (which is not the case in 8 Member 
States currently in Europe)799. Second, the Directive requires the establishment of  
“intent” to prove a guilty criminal insider trading (which is not the case in 10 Member 
States) 800.  
The remaining differences will hence remain into existence and would only change if 
the European Commission would use its powers according to article 9, introducing 
common minimum rules on the types and levels of criminal sanctions. However, even 
if that were the case, one always has to take into account that it still will be impossible 
to constrain the prosecution policy of public prosecutors nor the discretionary powers 
of the judiciary as far as the application of penalties is concerned. Even if one were 
hence, according to article 9, to harmonize the rules on types and levels of criminal 
                                                           
797 Bulgaria does not provide criminal sanctions for market manipulation either. Hungaria only does not 
provide it for market manipulation (but does for insider dealing). See Document of the Council of 
Europe, ‘Bulgaria Progress report and written analysis by the Secretariat of Core Recommendations’, 
p.6: “According to the Bulgarian authorities, at present, a new Concept for Criminal Policy of the 
Republic of Bulgaria was adopted in July 2010. The above mentioned Concept envisages the 
elaboration and adoption of a new Penal Code. One of the main purposes of the new Penal Code is to 
address the necessity to criminalize modern types of criminal activity, including those provided for 
under the international agreements undertaken by the Republic of Bulgaria. The timescale for the 
drafting and adoption of the new Penal Code is estimated to be 2014.”, It is understood that market 
manipulation and insider trading are taken into consideration in the concept of the new Penal Code; 
available a at  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/Progress%20reports%202y/MONEYVAL
(2011)5_ProgRep2_BLG.pdf.  
798 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).pp.41, 91, 111: Number of 
monetary and non-monetary sanctions imposed on natural and legal persons. 
799 Ibid.p.73: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Sweden 
800 Ibid.p.112: “Is proof of intent required in order to have a guilty verdict in a market abuse case? No: 
Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom”. 
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sanctions, this may to a large extent remain a symbolic window dressing operation 
that should not necessarily change anything in the practice of the Member States, 
except perhaps facilitating mutual recognition and cooperation. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that this attempt to harmonize the method of 
enforcement of insider trading laws through criminalization at a EU level will be  
symbolic with limited effects as far as the sanctions that will be implied in practice 
are concerned.  
6.2.3.2 Arguments of the Commission not convincing 
In this respect, the motivation provided by the European Commission can also be 
criticized. A first argument in favor of criminal sanctions at EU level is that ‘the 
sanctions currently in place to fight market abuse offences are lacking impact and are 
insufficiently dissuasive which results in ineffective enforcement of the Directive’801. 
First, the Commission does not provide any empirical basis for this strong statement. 
Second, since we mentioned that the Directive merely forces criminalization in one 
Member State, the introduction of criminal liability in 8 Member States and introduce 
a tougher procedural condition to criminal sanction for 10 Member States, it remains 
a puzzle how the Commission thinks that merely providing theses changes will 
change the ‘ineffective enforcement of the Directive’. Third, the Commission argues 
that the current ‘divergence undermines the internal market’ and even argues that 
perpetrators would be able ‘to carry such abuse in jurisdictions which do not provide 
for criminal sanctions for a particular offence’. Basically, the Commission here relies 
on a race-to-the-bottom argument. As we mentioned, the only Member State for 
which this holds true is Bulgaria. In the hypothesis of the Commission, Bulgaria 
should then become a ‘insider traders haven’ for which there is no empirical proof 
whatsoever. Fourth, the Commission stresses the importance of criminal law ‘to 
ensuring the effectiveness of this union policy by demonstrating social disapproval of 
a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative sanctions or compensation 
mechanisms under civil law’. This shows that the Commission believes strongly in 
the ‘stigma’ effect of the criminal law on which economic literature, as we showed, 
had serious doubts. Moreover, since 26 out of 27 Member States802 already have 
criminal law in place, questions can be asked on the added value of European action 
in this respect. Finally, the importance of criminal law is also stressed to ‘improve 
deterrence as they demonstrate to potential offenders that the authorities take serious 
enforcement action’. Again, this strongly stresses the symbolic value, not only of 
criminalization, but also of criminalization at EU level. Questions can, however, be 
asked on the real effectiveness of this entire enterprise. 
6.2.3.3 Inconsistency with European policy  
Finally, it should also be mentioned that it is remarkable that the European 
Commission is in this area (of insider dealing and market manipulation) stressing the 
need to introduce criminal sanctions, whereas in another domain, more particularly 
competition policy, apparently another strategy is followed. Competition policy in 
Europe has for years been based on an administrative sanctioning by the European 
                                                           
801 COM(2011) 654, p.2. 
802 Croatia was not yet part of the E.U. when Chapter 5 was written. 
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Commission without criminal penalties. Many have stressed the importance to 
introduce criminal penalties to be applied to severe violations of competition law, like 
hard core cartels,803 but these voices have not been heard.804  
 
Moreover, in the area of competition policy increasing attention is now given to 
possibilities of private enforcement and methods to provide incentives to potential 
plaintiffs to bring suits in the area of competition law (like introducing treble 
damages, class actions etc.) are now also discussed in the area of competition policy. 
 
It is striking that in this related domain of insider dealing the European discussion on 
enforcement mechanisms seems to focus on criminalization and not e.g. on ways of 
improving private enforcement in order to increase deterrence. This not only shows 
that there is apparently little consistency in the general enforcement strategy at EU 
level, but also that the Commission should probably learn from the experience with 
competition policy to look at ways, other than criminalization, to improve 
enforcement. In that way, criminal law could truly remain an ultimum remedium. 
6.2.4 Fundamental principles of European criminal law: Qualitative problems 
It may be difficult to identify when the EU shall be justified in employing criminal 
law under article 83(2). This section questions the consistency of the proposal for a 
Directive with the principles governing the introduction of substantive criminal rules 
at a EU level. For instance, the Manifesto on European Criminal Policy805 published 
in 2009 by the European Criminal Policy Initiative aimed at clarifying the major 
principles of criminal law rooted in European law: the principle of a legitimate 
purpose, the ultima ratio principle, the principle of guilt, the principle of legality, the 
principle of subsidiarity, and the principle of coherence.  
6.2.4.1 The principle of proportionality 
From an overall point of view, the principles of legitimate purpose, the ultima ratio 
principle and the principle of guilt may be perceived as directly emanating from the 
principle of proportionality.  
 
First, of all the principle of proportionality is a fundamental principle of European law 
stated in the third paragraph of Article 5 TFEU ‘Any action by the Community shall 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’ 
From this principle directly results the requirement of a legitimate purpose principle: 
The resort to criminalization at EU level could be regarded as proportionate and 
legitimate only if a fundamental legal interest worthy of protection against socially 
harmful conduct of significant degree806 can be justified. In that respect the need to 
                                                           
803 Wils, W., 2005. Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answear?, World Competition 28, 
117-159.  
804 For an overview of the enforcement of EU competition policy, see Van den Bergh, R., Faure, M., 
2011. Critical Issues in the Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: a Law and Economics 
Perspective(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham).pp.54-75. 
805 Available at http://www.zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2009_12_383.pdf, accessed the 18.12.13. 
806 Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., 2011. The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a 
European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, European Criminal 
Law Reveiw 1, 6-33.p.15: “The requirement of a fundamental interest that is harmed in a socially 
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reach the objectives of the EU cannot constitute a good motivation for harmonization. 
Of course, it should be observed that fundamental legal interests may eventually differ 
and diverge at national and European levels.  
  
Second, the ultima ratio principle is absolutely major in this context. The EU is now 
competent to bind its Member States as to the minimum standards of criminal law to 
larger extent than ever thanks to the new article 83(2). These new competences should 
call for great caution. With respect to the application of the ultima ratio principle any 
criminal law proposal at EU level should come with a requisite burden to ensure that 
it is used as a last resort to protect fundamental interests807. Setting minimum 
standards in criminal matters should correspond to the last reply, meaning that the EU 
tried every other solution before. The question should then be whether administrative 
sanctions could not be at least equally effective to ensure the effective implementation 
of the Union’s policy in the insider trading field. Wouldn’t administrative law be 
sufficient to ensure an equivalent protection? Previous legislative initiatives should be 
carefully assessed. The adoption of criminal dispositions at EU level should be based 
on the experience that other sanctions are insufficient808. Criminal law should be used 
as an additional means. Finally, some commentators argue that harmonization may be 
perceived like encouraging a movement towards an increased repression809, making 
criminal law a principle.  
In that respect, it should be noted that the fact that the proposal for Regulation 
provides for administrative sanctions for noncriminal actions is consistent with the 
idea that there is a softer alternative to criminal law at EU level. However, the 
Commission issued at the same time both the Proposal for a Regulation and the 
Proposal for a Directive. This may not demonstrate that all the means were explored 
and tried before resorting to criminal law. Improvement of the 2003 MAD does not 
automatically imply the resort to criminal law.  
 
Third, according to the principle of guilt (nulla poena sine culpa), a criminal sanction 
can only be imposed when a criminal act has affirmatively been proven to be the 
product of a “guilty mind” resulting from “mens rea”. At a European level this 
principle results from article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU810. 
Therefore, the principle of guilt seems to be the one that guided the Commission to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
significant way would be of particular usefulness in determining when the EU shall be justified in 
employing criminal law means to effectively implement its policies under article 83(2) TFEU”. 
Elholm, T., 2011. The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011, European Criminal Law 
Review 1, 86-103.p.87: “The legislative powers of the EU in relation to criminal law issues should only 
be exercised in order to protect fundamental interests if: (1)These interests can be derived from the 
primary legislation of the EU; (2)The Constitutions of the Member States and the fundamental 
principles of the EU Charter of Fundamentals Rights are not violated, and (3)The activities in question 
could cause significant damage to society or individuals”. 
807 Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., 2011. The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a 
European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, European Criminal 
Law Reveiw 1, 6-33.p.18. 
808 Böse, M., 2011. The Principle of Proportionality and the Protection of Legal Interests, European 
Criminal Law Review 1, 35-43.p.34. 
809 Asp, P.Ibid. The Importance of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Coherence in the Development of 
EU Criminal Law, 44-55.p.44: “criminal law is a legal area which, by its very nature, is repressive, 
which (in turn) means that harmonization in this area will – at least in practice – focus on increased 
repression”. 
810 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp.391-407. Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: 
“Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”. 
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require Member States to establish “intent” to criminally sanction an insider trading 
and to provide for criminal liability of legal persons. As already mentioned in Chapter 
5 the level of culpability required to prove a guilty criminal insider trading varies 
across the different Member States from “negligence” to “intent”. Moreover, some 
Member States reject the criminal responsibility of legal persons partially because of 
its incompatibility to their conception of the principle of guilt811. Finally, a part of the 
literature supports that the proof of intent regime and the criminal liability of legal 
persons should be decided at a national level812. Therefore, the dispositions contained 
in the proposal for Directive relative to criminal liability of legal entities and the 
degree of culpability (intent) to be held liable may face resistance at Member States’ 
level. Furthermore, the EU already made exceptions in the past regarding this aspect 
and accepted that “the intentional nature of an act or omission (…) may be inferred 
from objective, factual circumstances”813 and that “each Member States shall take the 
necessary measures to allow (these persons) to be declared criminally liable in 
accordance with the principles defined by its national law”814 in the Convention on 
the Protection of the European Union’s financial interests. 
6.2.4.2 The principle of legality 
The principle of legality815 regroups different sub-principles: the lex certa, the nullum 
crimen nulla poena sin lege parlementaria816, the requirements of non-retroactivity 
and the principle of lex mitior. 
The lex certa principle is the most relevant in this context. This principle holds that an 
individual shall be able to predict actions that will make him criminally liable. We 
                                                           
811 Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., 2011. The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a 
European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, European Criminal 
Law Reveiw 1, 6-33.p.31. See “Manifesto on European Criminal Policy” ZIS 2009, p.697 et seq.  
available at http://www.zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2009_12_383.pdf, accessed the 18-12-13, p.711: 
“There are framework decisions that obligate the Member States to impose sanctions on legal person. 
However, it should be positively noted that as yet it is up to the Member States whether they fulfil this 
obligation by means of criminal law”. 
812Elholm, T., 2011. The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011, European Criminal Law 
Review 1, 86-103.p.88: “This does not predetermine the answer to the question of whether legal entities 
can be held criminally liable. There is a decisive difference between guilt of an individual and that of a 
legal entity. Rules concerning criminal liability of legal entities must thus be elaborated on the basis of 
criminal law provisions at the national level”, p.96: “In some Member States rules on criminal liability 
for legal persons would not be compatible with their concept of the principle of guilt, forming the basis 
of their national criminal law system. There are framework decisions that obligate the Member States 
to impose sanctions on legal person. However, it should be positively noted that as yet it is up to the 
Member States whether they fulfil this obligation by means of criminal law”. 
813 OJ 1995 C 316, Art.1(4). 
814 OJ 1995 C 316, Art.3 “Criminal liability of heads of businesses”. 
815 Article 7(1) European Convention on Human Rights: “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed”, article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, article 6(3) TFEU. 
816 Firstly, the nullum crimen nulla poena sin lege parlementaria requirement requires that criminal 
rules have to pass by Parliament to be legitimate. The enactment of a criminal law should emanate 
from the people as directly as possible. The objective is to respect the constitutional traditions that 
particularly matter concerning legality. Even though the Lisbon Treaty improved this aspect as 
underlined in the introduction of this chapter, this dimension remains particularly problematic at a 
European Union level in criminal matters. However, it is a general remark valid for all legislative 
proposal at EU level, and not especially relevant for the proposal assessed here. 
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should repeat what has been stated above, when summarizing the critical literature 
with respect to this directive, being that in some cases the formulation of the standard 
for insider trading is formulated even more broadly than before as a result of which 
individuals will be exposed to the danger of criminal sanctions on the basis of a vague 
norm. The legality principle in criminal law prescribes that criminal provisions should 
be formulated as precisely as possible and that vague notions should to the extent 
possible be avoided. This was also stressed in an important case Procura della 
Repubblica Italiana v. X817 which concerned criminal proceedings in Italy against 
persons unknown for presumed breaches of a legislative decree concerning the use of 
display screen equipment. The ECJ held in this respect: 
 
‘It is clear from the wording of that provision that the question whether the time 
habitually spent by a worker at a display screen amounts to a significant part of his 
work is to be assessed in relation to that person’s normal work. The phrase cannot be 
defined in the abstract, and it is for the Member States to specify its import when 
adopting national measures implementing the directive.’ 
 
In view of the vagueness of the phrase in issue, the Member States must be accorded a 
broad discretion when adopting such implementing measures, which in any event, by 
virtue of the principle of legality, in relation to crime and punishment called at 
paragraph (25) above precludes any reference by the competent national authorities to 
the relevant provisions of the directive when contemplating the institution of criminal 
prosecutions in the field covered by the directive.’ 
 
This important decision of the ECJ shows that also the ECJ attaches great importance 
to the lex certa principle and refers explicitly to the case law of the European Court 
on Human Rights with respect to article 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in which the lex certa principle has also been incorporated. The ECJ therefore 
holds that a criminal provision cannot be based on the ‘habitual use of display screen 
equipment’, since that would violate the lex certa principle. We showed above that 
the current Directive in its proposal contains a lot more vague notions that are hence 
problematic from a lex certa principle. Vague notions should be avoided in any 
criminal provision818 and also for that reason forcing criminalization of insider trading 
via EU law should be avoided since it reduces the quality of criminal provisions. 
6.2.4.3 Principles of subsidiarity and coherence 
According to the article 5(3) TFEU “the Union shall, in areas that do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.”  
Said differently, as far as the national legislator is capable of dealing effectively with 
a given issue the European legislator should not intervene in criminal matters. This 
principle insures the protection of the differentiated legal rules and the satisfaction of 
heterogeneous preferences. As already mentioned these dimensions are of particular 
importance in criminal matters since they reflect national identities. It is a way to 
restrict the EU competence and is related to the principle of coherence that states that 
                                                           
817 C74/95 (1996) ECR I-6609. 
818 See further Faure, M., 2010. Vague Notions in Environmental Criminal Law (Part.1), 
Environmental Liability 4, 119-133. Faure, M., 2010. Vague Notions in Environmental Criminal Law 
(Part.2), Environmental Liability 5, 163-170. 
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one shall not, without good reasons, disturb or interfere with the coherence of the 
national criminal law systems819. In the case where instruments dealing with criminal 
matters are enacted, article 4(2) TFEU calls for paying a special attention to the 
coherence of the national criminal law systems, part of the national identities of the 
Member States. The coherence of the criminal law system lies upon the idea that the 
entire regime is rooted in historical and cultural national values particularly sensitive 
to external influence820. This principle is closely related to the notions of democracy, 
self-governance and State sovereignty. In that respect, it seems that no sufficiently 
convincing element was advanced so far to support the failure of national 
enforcement of criminal insider trading laws, as mentioned in Chapter 5. 
 
The above analysis allows to deduce the following conclusions: Criminal law being 
the most stringent mechanism of control that deeply affects fundamental civil 
liberties, any initiative in that field of the Commission should therefore be consistent 
with the principles governing the introduction of substantive criminal rules at EU 
level. 
In that respect the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanction may be criticized in 
various aspects. The most problematic may be the vagueness of some notions relative 
to the definition according to the lex certa principle. The fact that the proposal for 
Directive was issued at the same time as the proposal for Regulation may also be 
problematic regarding the principle of proportionality and the principle of ultima 
ratio. The principles of subsidiarity and coherence can be raised as principles 
supporting legal rules diffentiations. 
To conclude, the point is not to contest the legitimacy of the EU in criminal matters 
but to enlighten the importance to restrain the content of the Directive to the strict 
minimum in order to facilitate its implementation in a manner that respects civil 
liberties and citizens preferences. The Treaty of Lisbon mentions the guarantee of the 
fundamental rights of the citizen as a goal. The proposal for a Directive should 
therefore reflect this will and should be consistent with such guarantee in practice.   
Finally, it should be mentioned that Member States would be able to oppose the 
proposal for a Directive by invoking the emergency clause of article 83(3) TFEU. 
Indeed, when legislating on substantive criminal law or criminal procedure, Member 
States can express their opposition and refer to the European Council821 if they 
consider that proposed Directive touches upon fundamental aspects of their national 
criminal justice system822, or breach of one of the fundamental principles of criminal 
law outlined above. 
                                                           
819 Asp, P., 2011. The Importance of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Coherence in the Development 
of EU Criminal Law, European Criminal Law Review 1, 44-55.p.46: “The principle of subsidiarity is 
founded on the idea that society is built from the bottom to the top and not the other way around. This 
means that the central – or in the case of the EU: the supranational – authorities should fulfil only those 
tasks that cannot be fulfilled effectively by actions on a decentralized, local or regional, level. In this 
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the demands of society”. 
820 Ibid.p.44, Elholm, T., 2011. The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011, European 
Criminal Law Review 1, 86-103.p.91: “criminal law is also a value system, and as such it is a 
component part of the ‘national identities’ of the Member states”. 
821 COM(2011) 573 final. 
822 Denmark is not participating in newly adopted measures on substantive criminal law, while the 
United Kingdom and Ireland only participate in the adoption and application of specific instrument 
after a decision to “opt” in. 
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6.3 SUMMING-UP 
The proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation has been critically analyzed in this last chapter. The core of the proposal 
is that insider dealing and market manipulation as defined in the Directive and 
accompanying Regulation will have to be criminalized when committed as an 
intentional offence and criminal liability of legal person will have to be provided. 
Using an economic perspective, the question whether there is a need to impose 
criminalization of insider trading at a European level was addressed.   
In the light of the economic theory of harmonization there is a doubt whether at this 
stage there is a large practical need of imposing criminal sanctions at the EU level. 
Even when (in some limited cases) criminal enforcement may have a role to play in 
insider trading cases (more particularly there where private enforcement and 
administrative law may fail) it is yet unclear that there would today be a serious 
enforcement problem in the law of the Member States. Today, 26 out of the 27 EU 
Member States have criminal law to back-up insider trading legislation. Hence, the 
added value of European legislation in this respect is limited. Moreover, the mere 
imposition of criminal sanctions at EU level will of course not guarantee that 
problems with the effective enforcement of insider trading law, that would currently 
exist in the Member States, would be solved. Moreover, the Commission refers to a 
current ‘ineffective enforcement’ of insider trading law, but there is not much 
empirical proof that is provided to back this up. If the Commission would refer to the 
fact that there are few cases, then the problem of course is that merely forcing 
criminalization via the EU level will as such not solve that problem. 
 
Moreover, looking at the specific provisions proposed at EU level, the literature has 
been quite critical of the proposal, more particularly since the proposal amounts to a 
criminalization of vague notions which is at odds with the fundamental principles of 
european criminal law, more particularly the lex certa principle which is derived from 
the legality principle, but also the ultima ratio principle and the principle of guilt.  
 
It is therefore hold that, even though there is a specific role to play for criminal law in 
enforcing insider trading (more particularly ultimum remedium) there is currently no 
evidence that the enforcement of insider trading laws at Member State level would be 
ineffective, nor can it be expected that the mere introduction of criminal sanctions via 
the EU level would remedy those enforcement problems. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I seek to answer the research questions presented in the introduction of 
this thesis, as well as their implications for scholarly and policy debates and future 
research. 
 
This study’s research questions have been:  
First, is under all circumstances criminal law necessary to enforce insider trading 
laws? Second, even if criminal law is prescribed in certain circumstances, should it be 
introduced at EU level?  
 
In order to answer these research questions, this study addressed distinct sub-
questions: 
First, what is the optimal type, nature and form of sanctions that create an efficient 
insider trading law enforcement policy according to the deterrence theory? 
Next, are the current European public law enforcement strategies regarding insider 
trading prohibition coherent with the theoretical law and economics 
recommendations?  
And finally, should insider trading criminalization be centralized at EU level 
according to the economics of federalism? 
7.1 MAJOR FINDINGS  
Chapter 2 begins with a brief introduction to the underlying legal and economics 
theoretical debate and arguments surrounding insider trading regulation. These 
preliminary considerations enable one to understand the objectives targeted by the 
theoretical corpus, which should be addressed by insider trading laws and 
enforcement.  
 
The controversy concerning insider trading was presented from both legal and 
economic perspectives. The legal theory argues in favor of the insider trading 
regulation because of its immorality823 and its undesirability from a distributional 
justice theory perspective824. In this respect, it is crucial to understand, that the core 
theoretical foundations for regulating insider trading fundamentally lies in the ethics 
and distributional justice considerations. Even in the case where economic arguments 
were considered to some extent ambiguous or unsatisfying, moral theory would above 
all remain an autonomous deontological fundamental reason for regulating insider 
trading. Some legal scholars further argue that, even in the case were insider trading 
would be proven to be economically beneficial state regulation should still intervene 
because the immorality of insider trading makes it undesirable825 per se.  
 
According to economic theory, the goal of regulation is economic efficiency and the 
maximization of welfare. However, schools of thought have diverse strategies to 
                                                           
823 Schotland, R. A., 1967. Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Virginia Law Review 53, 1425-
1478. 
824 See Chapter 2. 
825 Schotland, R. A., 1967. Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Virginia Law Review 53, 1425-
1478. 
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reach maximization of welfare. Considering insider trading, the economic theory 
analysis is difficult to apprehend since economic scholars have different viewpoints 
regarding its effect. In turn, deciding whether insider trading impairs or improves 
overall efficiency is complex. However, the consequences of insider trading should be 
observable through the measure of its impact on indicators of economic preformances 
(such as the informativeness of the prices, the  cost of capital, the concentration of 
shareholding or the stock market liquidity). Most of the arguments are based on 
commensurable measures established through empirical methods. First of all, the 
empirical literature presents insider trading as introducing noise into stock prices, 
which are in turn less efficient in providing information826. According to the 
literature, another detrimental effect created by insider trading is to raise the cost of 
capital827, the cost of trading and the cost of information828. Finally, insider trading 
has also been described as impairing stock market liquidity829 and therefore impacting 
its attractiveness.  
 
All in all, distributional justice theory, the equal access theory, the equality theory, the 
financial public order, the agency theory, the market theory and the property rights 
theory all provide relevant arguments lending support to the insider trading regulatory 
intervention and offer multiple perspectives on how it may result in better outcomes 
for the market. From that perspective, insider trading laws should aim at protecting 
                                                           
826 See Chapter 2 and See Fishman, M., Hagerty, K., 1992. Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock 
Prices, RAND Journal of Economics 23, 106-122. Kraakman, R., 1991. The Legal Theory of Insider 
Trading Regulation in the United States. Georgakopoulos, N. L., 1993. Insider Trading as a 
Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading 
Regulation, Connecticut Law Review 26, 1-51. Hu, J., Noe, T., H., 1997. The Insider Trading Debate, 
Economic Review, 34-45.p.41. 
827 See Manovre, M., 1989. The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 104, 823-845. See DelBrio, E., Miguel, A., Perote, J., 2002. An Investigation of 
Insider Trading Profits in the Spanish Stock Market, Quaterly Review of Economics and Finance 42, 
73-94. Finnerty, J., 1976. Insiders and Market Efficiency, Journal of Finance 31, 1141-1148. Jaffe, J., 
1974. Special Information and Insider Trading, Journal of Business 47, 410-428. Seyhun, N., 1986. 
Insider Profits, Costs of Trading and Market Efficieny, Journal of Financial Economics 16, 189-212. 
Georgakopoulos, N. L., 1993. Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure 
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, Connecticut Law Review 26, 1-51. Frijns, 
B., Gilbert, A., Tourani Rad, A., 2013. Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Insider Trading?, The Financial 
Review 48, 205-232.p.211. See Bainbridge, S. M., 1999. Securities Law: Insider Trading(Foundation 
Press, New York). Bainbridge explicitly describes four significant potential harms done to the 
corporation connected with insider trading among which a reputational injury to the corporation caused 
by insider trading, which is translated into direct financial injury that raises the firm’s cost of capital. 
See Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 
75-108. Enforcement of insider trading laws has a significant negative effect on cost of capital, 
implying that insider trading increases the cost of capital. Frijns, B., Gilbert, A., Tourani Rad, A., 2013. 
Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Insider Trading?, The Financial Review 48, 205-232.p.10. Ang, J. S., 
Cox, D.R., 1997. Controlling the Agency Cost of Insider Trading, Journal of Financial And Strategic 
Decisions 10, 15-26.p.19. 
828 See Haft, R. J., 1982. The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large 
Corporation, Michigan Law Review 80, 1051-1071. Macey, J. R., 1991. Insider Trading: Economics, 
Politics and Policy(AEI Press, Washigton D.C.). Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns 
and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 273-286.p.283. Easterbrook, F. H., 1985. Insider Trading 
as an Agency Problem(Harvard Business Press, Boston). 
829 Beny, L., 1999. A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider 
Trading, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion 
Paper Series Discussion Paper No. 264. Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider 
Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 75-108. Glosten, L. R., 1989. Insider Trading, Liquidity, and the Role 
of the Monopolist Specialist, The Journal of Business 62, 211-235. 
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equality, fairness830, morality831, financial public order832, market interest, 
transparency, informational efficiency833, stock market price accuracy834, market 
liquidity835, and an optimal allocation of property rights in information836. 
 
Based on this, the study examines if the insider trading prohibition should be 
criminally enforced (7.1.1), compares the current practices in Europe (7.1.2) and 
assesses the European Commission proposal for a Directive on criminal sanction for 
Market Abuse (7.1.3). 
7.1.1 Criminalization of insider trading: an economic perspective 
The first part of the thesis analyzes under which circumstances public or private 
enforcement would lead to a more cost effective insider trading laws enforcement 
(7.1.1.1). Then, considering that public enforcement of insider trading laws can be 
necessary, the question is raised of whether optimal sanctions should be monetary or 
non-monetary, or if public enforcement should take the form of administrative or 
criminal law enforcement. Criminalization implies particular criteria (7.1.1.2). The 
next section applies these economic criteria to the case of insider trading (7.1.1.3) and 
argues that there is a specific role to play for criminal law, and that more attention 
should be paid to alternative legal procedures. Both from an economic and a legal 
perspective, criminal law should be considered as a last resort remedy (ultimum 
remedium) (7.1.1.4), respectively based on the fact that the costs of applying the 
criminal law are very high and that criminal law provides the strongest infringements 
to human rights and individual civil liberties. 
7.1.1.1 Public versus private enforcement of insider trading regulation 
Chapter 3 develops the rationale for public enforcement of insider trading law, that is, 
questions why society cannot rely exclusively on private enforcement of law to 
control undesirable insider behavior. It explores the economic theory criteria under 
which the use of public law enforcement should be preferred over private 
enforcement. 
 
Considering the costs of enforcement, private enforcement should be preferred to 
public enforcement from an economic viewpoint, as long as it is less costly and it can 
                                                           
830 Manovre, M., 1989. The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 104, 823-845. 
831 Deffains, B., Stasiak, F., 2002. Les Préjudices Résultants des Infractions Boursières: Approche 
Juridique et Economique(Sorbonne, Paris). Pietrancosta, A., 1999. Le Droit des Sociétés Sous l'Effet 
des Impératifs Financiers et Boursiers(Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris). Strudler, A., Orts, 
E., 1999. Moral Principles in the Law of Insider Trading, Texas Law Review 78, 375-438.  
832 Muller, A.-C., 2007. Droit des Marchés Financiers et Droit des Contrats(Economica, Paris). 
833 Fox, M., Randall, M., Yeung, B., Durnev, A., 2003. Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, Michigan Law Review 102, 331-386. 
834 Kraakman, R., 1991. The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States. 
835 Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading, Journal of Finance 57, 75-
108. 
836 Ang, J. S., Cox, D.R., 1997. Controlling the Agency Cost of Insider Trading, Journal of Financial 
And Strategic Decisions 10, 15-26. 
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provide an equivalent deterrence effect837. Moreover, Becker’s model of optimal 
enforcement establishes that, when the probability of detection is low or when the 
gain or the harm is high, more severe sanctions are needed in order to compensate and 
attain optimal deterrence838. From this perspective, public enforcement has an 
advantage because it provides for the most stringent sanctions. 
  
In the trade-off between private and public enforcement, the most important criterion 
is whether potential victims will have sufficient incentives to file a lawsuit under 
private law. There could be many reasons why victims could suffer substantial 
damage but nevertheless never bring suit, even in insider trading cases. An important 
reason is that their losses are often dispersed. They may therefore suffer from what is 
known in the literature as rational apathy or a rational disinterest problem: since their 
losses appear to be very small, they are rationally disinterested to bring suit.839 
Another reason is that the harm may be public. In that case private parties do not feel 
personnally involved. 
 
The other major problem with private law enforcement is related to the fact that 
access to information can be difficult and consequently the probability of private 
detection can be low due to the mere nature of insider trading. Nevertheless, 41% of 
the sources of SEC investigation cases appears to be the public complaint. Meaning 
that private parties have access to a certain type of information. Regarding the 
detection, private and public enforcement both seem adapted to certain types of illegal 
insider trading, and complement each other.From a deterrence perspective, the 
sanction for deterring a potential insider should be set correspondingly to the 
probability of sanction. However, it was seen in the introduction to Title 1 that the 
probability that a sanction for insider trading would be imposed was low. In that case, 
public enforcement is called for to outweigh the low insider trading detection and 
prosecution rates.840  
 
Hence, private litigation of insider trading may constitute a problem because of 
rational apathy and low probability of detection. However, another possibility to 
remedy the low probability of sanction would be in fact to increase the amount of 
compensation payable by the injurer under tort law. This is precisely the idea behind 
the concept of punitive damages.841 Also, the rational apathy problem created by the 
                                                           
837 Shavell, S., 1984. Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, Journal of Legal Studies 13, 357-
374. Shavell, S., 1993. The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, Journal of Law and Economics 36, 
255-287. Van den Bergh, R., Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.38. 
838 Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. Jackson, H. E., Roe, M. J., 2009. Public and Private Enforcement of Securities 
Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 93, 207-238.  
839 Schäfer, H.-B., 2000. The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class 
Actions and Legal Actions taken by Associations, European Journal of Law and Economics 9, 183-
223. Van den Bergh, R., 2007. Should Consumer Protection Law Be Publicly Enforced? An Economic 
Perspective on EC Regulation 2006/2004 and its Implementation in the Consumer Protection Laws of 
the Member States(Europa Law Publishing, Groningen).p.179-203. 
840 See Skogh, G., 1973. A Note on Gary Becker’s Crime and Punishment: an economic approach, 
Swedish Journal of Economics 75, 305-311. 
and Skogh, G., Steward, C., 1982. An Economic Analysis of Crime Rates, Punishment and the Social 
Consequences of Crime, Public Choice 38, 171-179. 
841 See Cooter, R., 1982. Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, Southern California Law Review 
56, 97-101. Landes, W. M., Posner, R. A., 1981. An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 
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potentially widespread nature of damages could be resolved by allowing collective 
action by victims.842 It is also possible to resolve these problems partially with 
conditional fee arrangement843. Currently, these systems do not exist, or only to a 
limited extent, in most European legal systems. However, it is argued that, before 
using criminal law, the focus should be made first on possibilities to improve the 
functioning of private enforcement of insider trading law for instance844.  
 
From an economic perspective, a first lesson is that public and private enforcement of 
insider trading are complementary. A second lesson is that pubic enforcement 
(including criminal enforcement) is only needed insofar as private enforcement fails. 
At policy level, it may then however be more interesting to look at alternatives to 
improve the functioning of private enforcement, thus reducing the need for 
criminalization. 
 
Summing-up 
 
There is a need for public enforcement of laws in case of: 
 
• Low probability of detection 
• High social harm  
• High gain  
• Low incentive to enforce the law by private parties (No sufficient financial 
gain, personal interests, rational apathy, dispersed ownership, public harm) 
 
7.1.1.2 Administrative versus criminal law and criteria for criminalization 
 
The deterrence theory approach provides an economic analytical framework for the 
analysis of law enforcement: the goal of the law and its enforcement is deterrence and 
should be achieved through the setting of optimal expected sanctions.  
Based on this theoretical framework and according to the law and economics theory 
objectives, the regulator’s numerous options to elaborate optimal policies addressing 
insider trading regulation are introduced and discussed. The central concern of 
Chapter 4 is the sanction, and more precisely its type, nature and form.  
 
Optimal expected sanction 
 
The use of a high sanction with a lower probability of detection may not be optimal 
considering arguments relative to the risks of insolvency, the costs of implementation 
                                                                                                                                                                         
International Review of Law and Economics 1, 127-154. Meurskens, R. C., Nordin, E., 2012. The 
Power of Punitive Damages, Is Europe Missing Out?(Intersentia, Antwerp). 
842 See on those issues Keske, S., Renda, A., Van den Bergh, R., 2010. Financing and Group Litigation  
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham). There is certainly a debate at the European level about the development 
of collective action. See Micklitz, H., Stadler, A., 2006. The Development of Collective Legal Action 
in Europe, especially in Germany, European Business Law Review 17, 1473-1503. Van den Bergh, R., 
Visscher, L., 2008. Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law(Erasmus University Rotterdam, RILE Working 
Paper Series No. 2008/04, Rotterdam).p.32, 44. 
843 Faure, M., Fernhout, F., Philipsen, N., 2010. No Cure, No Pay and Contingency Fees(Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham). 
844 Decriminalization is considered important in the literature, see Van Zyl Smit, D., 2007. Handbook 
of Basic Principles and Promising Practices on Alternatives to Imprisonment(United Nations 
Publication, New York).p.13. Coulon, J.-M., 2008. La Dépénalisation de la Vie des Affaires (Ministère 
de la Justice, France). 
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of a large sanction, the marginal deterrence and the supposed risk aversion towards 
sanctions of the insider traders. Moreover, according to the scholarly literature, risk 
aversion implies that optimal sanctions should not be maximal845.  
 
Monetary and non-monetary sanctions  
 
Regarding the trade-off between monetary and non-monetary sanctions, the major 
conclusions are the following: Society cannot exclusively rely on monetary sanctions 
and furthermore, there are circumstances under which the use of non-monetary 
sanctions is necessary to operate either deterrence or incapacitation.  
 
The personal situation of wealth or occupation of an individual can have an impact on 
the necessity to use non-monetary sanctions for deterrence. The literature raises three 
specific points regarding this issue. First: the deterrence effect of a monetary sanction 
is limited by wealth and thus non-monetary sanctions should be used in complement. 
Second, risk-seeking attitudes increase with wealth; high wealth types of individuals 
should therefore not be imposed with maximum monetary sanctions. Third, 
individuals with high opportunity cost of time should be imposed shorter prison 
terms.  
 
Furthermore, non-monetary sanctions should be used for incapacitation under 
restricted circumstances, calibrated to the social or economic dangerousness of the 
offender. 
 
From an economic perspective, an optimal law enforcement policy should be 
achieved by first using monetary sanctions at the maximum, and furthermore by using 
proportional and wealth-related ones, and then by complementing with non-monetary 
sanctions846, starting with the less costly ones (considering control, infrastructure, 
maintenance, and indirect and consequential costs) and the less restrictive, in order to 
induce a similar deterrent effect. From a theoretical point of view, at equal deterrence 
effect, non-incapacitating non-monetary sanctions should be used first (Naming and 
shaming sanctions should be dealt with carefully because of the irreversible stigma 
they impose, error costs and the potential disproportion847), followed by the 
                                                           
845 See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 2007. Handbook of Law and Economics, 1st edition.(Elsevier, 
Boston).p.415-416. See Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S., 1979. The Optimal Trade-Off Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891.p.884. See Polinsky, A. 
M., Shavell, S., 1991. A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among Individuals, American 
Economic Review 81, 618-621. 
846 Bowles, R., Faure, M., Garoupa, N., 2000. Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains, 
International Review of Law and Economics 20, 537-549. Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217. Shavell, S., 1987b. The 
Optimal Use of Non Monetary Sanction as a Deterrent, American Economic Review 77, 584-592. 
Shavell, S., Polinsky, A. M., 1984. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, Journal of Public 
Economics 24, 89-99. Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The 
Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.p.208. Shavell, S., 1985. Criminal Law and the Optimal Use 
of Non Monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, Columbia Law Review 85, 1232-1262.pp.1236-1237. 
847 Van Erp, J., 2011. Naming Without Shaming: The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial 
Market, Regulation and Governance 5, 287-308. Van Erp holds that naming offenders functions as a 
general deterrent in the market for financial intermediaries, but considerably less so in the capital 
market.p.292: “An undesired, but perhaps more likely potential effect is that the publication of 
sanctions is experienced as stigmatizing. In that case, naming offenders results in defiance, 
disengagement, distrust, and, expectedly, more crime”. See note on X, 2003. Shame, Stigma, and 
Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions and Criminal Law, Harvard Law Review 116, 
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economically incapacitating ones (status ban penalty, withdrawal of licenses, 
disqualification of managers) and, lastly, by the socially incapacitating ones. 
Economic incapacitation should be applied to harm concerning public order matters 
(societal dangerousness), whilst the social incapacitation should be applied to harm 
concerning economic order matters (market domain specific dangerousness). 
Incarceration should always be last resort, meaning that it should be based on the 
experience that other sanctions are insufficient: All the other means have to be 
explored and tried before. 
 
Summing-up  
 
There is a need for non-monetary sanctions to achieve deterrence in case of : 
  
• Limitation of wealth (insolvency) 
 
There is a need for non-monetary sanctions to achieve incapacitation in case of : 
 
• Undeterrable offenders (repeated offences) 
• Dangerousness for the economy: Need for economic incapacitation in 
particular 
• Dangerousness for society (violence): Need for social incapacitation in 
particular 
 
Administrative and criminal sanctions 
 
Finally, in the trade-off between administrative and criminal enforcement, all things 
being equal, the administrative procedure has the advantage of being less costly than 
criminal procedure848. However the use of criminal law seems only justified when 
there is a need for very stringent sanctions and accurate proceedings in order to secure 
the imposition of such stringent sanctions (reduction of error cost849). When 
criminalizing, the principle of legitimate purpose, the ultima ratio principle, the 
principle of guilt and the principle of legality should always be carefully respected. 
 
The use of the most severe sanctions through criminal law is desirable to operate 
deterrence when the gain or the harm is very high (for instance large, diffuse and 
immaterial) and when the probability of detection and apprehension is very low. They 
can also be needed to operate incapacitation in cases of limited wealth or violence850. 
The most severe sanctions should be imposed through criminal proceedings because 
criminal procedure offers the advantage to secure the imposition of such severe 
sanctions through high procedural requirements, which guarantee limited error costs. 
Moreover, the inherent stigma associated with criminal law enables the strengthening 
                                                                                                                                                                         
2186-2207. There is hence a huge danger of overdeterrence and disproportional sanctions when 
stigmatisation is used as the goal of criminal law. As was convincingly shown by Klement, A., Harel, 
A., 2007. The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less 
Stigmatization, Journal of Legal Studies 36, 355-378. 
848 See Faure, M., Ogus, A., Philipsen, N., 2009. Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics 
of Regulatory Enforcement, Law and Policy 31, 161-191.p.173-176. 
849 See Miceli, T., 1990. Optimal Prosecution of Defendents Whose Guilt is Uncertain, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation 6, 189-201. 
850 Becker 1968, 1974; Bowles, Faure, Garoupa 2008; Escresa Guillermo 2012; Shavell 1985, 1987, 
1989; Shavell, Polinsky 1984, 1991, 2004, 2007; Svatikova 2012. 
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of the deterrent effect of any criminal sanction. Nevertheless, it may not always seem 
optimal to systematically have recourse to criminal law when a high sanction is 
required. It may be relevant to keep in mind that, even if criminal law seems to offer 
the most coercive sanctions through social incapacitation and inherent stigma, some 
sanctions, such as economic incapacitating sanctions, naming and shaming sanctions 
or classic fines, can be considered as serious alternatives. Moreover, and as 
extensively described before, criminal law achieves a very specific goal and should be 
reserved for harms fulfilling specific criteria. Consequently, the recourse to such 
enforcement should be thought through very cautiously. Every criminalization should 
be consistent with the principle of a legitimate purpose, the ultima ratio principle, the 
principle of guilt and the principle of legality. 
Finally, regarding the cumulation of administrative and criminal enforcement of laws, 
from an economic perspective it seems desirable to opt for a non-cumulative system of 
prosecutions (over punishment and costs of prosecution)851. 
Summing-up, administrative enforcement of law can suffice when the harm is 
relatively low, when the injurer may have enough assets and stake, when the 
individual does not need to be socially incapacitated but economic incapacitation may 
suffice and when inherent stigma is not necessary to get additional deterrence. 
 
There is a need for the most stringent sanctions through criminal law in case of : 
 
• Very low probability of detection and apprehension  
• Very high and substantial gain  
• Very high social harm: large, immaterial, diffuse 
 
Qualities of criminal law that makes it a unique tool to achieve deterrence and 
incapacitation: 
 
• Exclusive availability of social incapacitation: needed to achieve deterrence 
(limited wealth) or incapacitation (violence or undeterrable offenders) 
• Inherent stigma reinforces the deterrence effect 
• Reduction of error cost: High procedural requirements  
7.1.1.3 Criminalization of insider trading? 
How do the economic criteria for criminalization, discussed here above, apply to the 
case of insider trading?  
 
Firstly, the question of the need for criminal law really comes down to whether there 
is a need to use criminal law in a deterrence perspective. The issue to address is 
therefore to determine whether the potential harm caused by, or the gain obtained via 
insider trading, can be high enough and the probability of apprehension low enough 
for, the optimal administrative sanctions to fail in deterring potential insiders. 
 
If the insider trading effects on economic efficiency is delicate and controversial to 
assess, insider trading should be considered wrong for a matter of fairness and justice.  
                                                           
851 Wils, W., 2003. The Principle of "Ne Bis in Idem" in EC Antitrus Enforcement: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, World Competition 26, 131-148.pp.140-141: “From the perspective of minimizing 
cost, multiple prosecutions would thus always appear undesirable”. 
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Furthermore, the average gain or loss appears to be stable through the decades and 
approximates a median of $ 25,594852.  Also, it obviously means that gains were 
substantially lower in some case and substantially larger in other cases. This means 
that, in many cases, administrative sanctions may suffice to operate deterrence. 
However, a study of Frino et al. established that the mean gain or loss avoided was 
$215,696. This would suggest that a few insiders accomplish astronomical takes. The 
later are the cases that justify the use of criminal law.  
 
Adressing the probability of detection, the literature relevantly underlines several 
challenges in detecting insider trading. Even if the scholars have not yet been able to 
measure the quantity of undetected insider trading, several studies suggest that insider 
trading is a rampant and common practice that remains too rarely detected. According 
to the literature, this low probability of detection of insider trading seems to be mainly 
explained by its immaterial and diffuse nature. Hence, the essence of insider trading is 
based on legitimately acquired but confidential information that one receives from a 
personal position.853 Moreover, financial instruments and trade are considered to be 
international, anonymous, technical and immaterial.854 Insiders may also hide their 
trade, using proxies or intermediaries.855 Finally, regarding the secretive nature of 
insider trading, the scholarly literature questions the limited efficacy of the methods 
of detection used by the public authorities856 and the insufficiency of staff and budget 
resources dedicated to insider trading detection857. They also suggest that a large part 
of insider trading cases remain undetected858. All in all, the literature provides 
elements that support that insider trading is difficult to detect. 
 
Once detected, insider trading has to be prosecuted in order to convict the insider. 
Insider trading involves the trading on the basis of material non-public information. 
The establishment of the material and the non-public qualities of the information on 
which the trade is based are central to successfully prosecute and convict illegal 
insider trading. Under certain circumstances, the intention of the insider also has to be 
proven. This process is difficult, if not “impossible”859. Most of the time, the 
establishment of a certain level of culpability is only required under criminal law . 
The establishment of any level of guilt proves to be extremely difficult in insider 
                                                           
852 Frino, A., Satchell, S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, 
International Review of Finance 13, 241-263. Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of 
Illegal Insider Trading, The journal of Finance 47, 1661-1699. Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider 
Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 273-286.  
853 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286. 
854 Easterbrook, F. H., 1985. Insider Trading as an Agency Problem(Harvard Business Press, Boston), 
Miceli, T., 2004. The Economic Approach to Law(Stanford University Press, Stanford). 
855 Kraakman, R., 1991. The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, Macey, 
J. R., 1991. Insider Trading: Economics, Politics and Policy(AEI Press, Washigton D.C.). 
856 Frino, A., Satchell, S., Wong, B., Zheng, H., 2013. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, 
International Review of Finance 13, 241-263. Harris, L., 2003. Trading and Exchanges(Oxford 
University Press, New York). Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider 
Trading, The journal of Finance 47, 1661-1699.  
857 Beny, L., 2012. Has Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United States? Evidences from 
Takeovers, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, University of Michigan Law School. 
858 Meulbroek, L. K., 1992. An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, The journal of Finance 
47, 1661-1699. 
859 Harris, L., 2003. Trading and Exchanges(Oxford University Press, New York).p.588: Larry Harris 
was former Chief Economist at the SEC from July 2002 to June 2004. 
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trading matters due to their very nature. Finally an ESMA’s report has established that 
the probability of conviction of insider trading is 52,3% for administrative insider 
trading and 37,3% for criminal insider trading860. 
 
It has been established that insider trading can prove to be unfair and, more 
controversialy, potentialy harmful for the economy. Morevover, insider trading 
associated gain of loss avoided can be substantial. Furthermore, the probability of 
sanction (resulting from the combination of the probability of detection and 
conviction) tend to be quite low. Under these circumstances, criminal law would be 
needed for deterrence.  
 
Secondly, the study has further examined the two aspects that make criminal law a 
unique tool (stigma and social incapacitation) and has questionned their efficiency for 
the case of insider trading. 
 
Looking at the effect of stigma on insiders, some literature suggests that first time 
offenders would particularly suffer social and economic consequences from being 
criminally convicted.861 Statistics also indicate that 67.5% of the defendants were only 
charged with insider trading on one occasion.862 This literature and these numbers 
seem to indicate that insiders belong to the category of wrongdoers who are especially 
receptive to stigma. On the one hand, this may be an argument to use criminal law for 
its stigmatizing effect; on the other hand, the potential dangers of criminal law have to 
be seriously taken into account. As a result, it is doubtful that criminalization would 
be warranted merely to impose stigma. This characteristic could nevertheless 
constitute an argument to consider the possibility of criminalization when it is really 
needed.  
 
Empirical papers show that insider traders usually belong to high-wealth category and 
occupy a hierarchically high occupation (mostly composed of corporate officers and 
directors, and business executives such as presidents and vice-presidents) with, on 
average, a high-compensation package863. These characteristics imply that insiders 
have a higher payment capacity than regular wrongdoers. In turn, the need to use non-
                                                           
860 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris). 
861 See Adam, J., Engelen, P.J., Van Essen, M., 2011. Reputational Penalties on Financial Markets to 
Induce Corporate Responsibility(Springer, Heidelberg). Van Erp, J., 2011. Naming Without Shaming: 
The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market, Regulation and Governance 5, 287-308.  
862 Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286.p.277: “Frequency of insider trading refers to the number of times that non-public information 
was exploited. Two-thirds (67.5 percent) of the defendants were charged with illegally trading on only 
one occasion”. 
863 See 4.1.2. Geis, G., 1998. Antitrust and Organizational Deviance(JAI Press, Stamford, CT). 
Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 30, 
273-286.pp.275-276: “Approximately a third of all defendants came from the business sector (31.5 
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officers and directors, because of their position, were more likely to have access to material nonpublic 
information and were far more likely to be charged for trading on such information than their 
employees (84.2 percent of the business defendants were business officers or directors and only 15.8 
percent were lower status employees). Defendants in the securities industry, on the other hand, were 
unlikely to be executives: securities employees such as brokers, dealers, and analysts (77.5 percent) 
were more likely than securities executives such as CEOs, vice presidents, and heads of departments 
(22.5 percent) to be insider trading defendants”. 
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monetary sanctions in case of limited wealth seems less indicated than for the average 
wrongdoer, but however considerable.  
 
Furthermore insider-trading is not a violent crime for which the use of non-monetary 
sanctions to operate incapacitation seems indicated. Indeed statistics show that 
67.5% of the defendants in insider trading cases were only charged on one occasion. 
This means that they are not undeterrable repeat offenders that need to be 
incapacitated.864 From that perspective, the need to use non-monetary sanctions in 
case of undeterrability seems very limited; and in case of violence seems out of 
context. 
Finally, the need to use non-monetary sanctions in case of danger for the economy 
seems indicated because insider trading is characterized as harming the economy865. 
A part of the literature supports that economic incapacitating sanctions are 
“sufficient” according to the law and economics precepts of deterrence866. 
 
In conclusion, the resort to criminal law in order to operate social incapacitation in the 
context of insider trading seems very limited. 
7.1.1.4 Ultimum Remedium 
Following this analysis, it should be reminded that criminal law must be considered in 
all circumstances as an ultimum remedium, a remedy of last resort, not only given its 
high social costs, but also the high thresholds for applying it and the highly negative 
social consequences for the people involved. Criminal law should only be employed 
when other remedies (private law or administrative enforcement) are not capable of 
reaching the same goal. Above all incarceration, the most stringent sanction available 
to criminal law, is itself the last resort tool of the criminal sanctions: Non-monetary 
sanctions alternatives to prison should be favored, starting with the non-incapacitating 
ones, following with the economically incapacitating ones and finishing with the 
socially incapacitating ones.  
 
Also, as far as administrative enforcement is concerned, there are quite a few 
possibilities to make use of it. There is a possibility of using administrative fines for 
cases where there is no insolvency risk due to limitation of wealth for instance (where 
the gain is not too high and the probability of detection not too reduced). There are, 
moreover, administrative sanctions that prove to be particularly efficient in the 
context of insider trading regulation that should be further developed. Hence, the 
sanctions belonging to the category of the economically incapacitating sanctions 
deserve to be more often used. It includes for example the sanction of prohibition to 
be director in a particular corporation during a specified amount of time,or the 
revocation of a license as well as the prohibition to exercise a particular profession. 
                                                           
864 See Szockyj, E., Geis, G., 2002. Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, Journal of Criminal Justice 
30, 273-286.p.277: “Frequency of insider trading refers to the number of times that non-public 
information was exploited. Two-thirds (67.5 percent) of the defendants were charged with illegally 
trading on only one occasion.” 
865 cf. Chapter 2. 
866 Royer, G., 2009. L'Efficience en Droit Pénal Economique - Etude du Droit Positif à la Lumière de 
l'Analyse Economique du Droit(LGDJ, Paris).p.143. 
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7.1.2 Actual practices of sanctions and enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe 
Chapter 5 confronts actual practices of insider trading law enforcement in eight 
Member States and the theoretical recommendations formulated in Chapter 3 and 4. 
Indeed, concerning the elaboration of optimal enforcement of insider trading laws, the 
literature produced relevant observations that should preferably inspire the Member 
States.  
 
Regarding the content of the insider trading laws in the eight chosen Member 
States867, the major observations are the following. First of all, there are divergences 
in levels of sanctions. Minimum and maximum amount of monetary administrative 
and criminal sanctions as well as minimum and maximum length of criminal 
incarceration varies widely. For instance, the maximum amounts for the maximum 
administrative monetary sanctions amounts ranges from !200,000 in Germany to 
!100,000,000 in France; for the criminal maximum monetary sanctions amounts 
ranges from !55,000 in Belgium to !10,800,000 in Germany and the range of the 
maximum length varies from one year in BE to 12 years in IT868. Furthermore The 
sanctions are not set according to the same factors. There are also divergences in 
types of sanction. For instance, some countries did not provide for alternatives to fines 
and incarceration. Another major observation is that some competent authorities 
cannot address criminal sanctions to legal person. Some competent authorities cannot 
publish sanction decisions. In some countries, the cumulation of administrative and 
criminal prosecutions and sanctions is possible and organized, whilst in others 
prosecutions are separated and exclusive. Finally some competent authorities can 
criminally sanction insiders without establishing their intention. 
 
Firstly, theory recommends that Member States should provide for proportional and 
dissuasive maximum monetary sanctions in order to satisfy the deterrence objective. 
In this respect, Member States should take into consideration factors relating to the 
wealth of individuals when determining sanctions to inflict, in order to optimally 
induce deterrence. In practice, the use of alternative administrative sanctions is low 
and the use of alternative criminal sanctions is almost inexistent. Incarceration is 
however used. Member States should therefore develop administrative and criminal 
non-monetary sanctions alternative to incarceration (economically incapacitating 
sanctions and socially incapacitating sanctions alternative to prison) in order to reach 
an optimal enforcement of insider trading laws. It should be reminded that 
incarceration must always be used as an ultimum remedium. Moreover, the scholarly 
literature recommends to only publish the sanction under a criminal procedure in 
order to avoid error costs, which may be high and furthermore unrecoverable. 
Therefore, the publication of sanctions should preferably be made under a criminal 
procedure or perhaps under a reinforced administrative procedure (or anonymity). The 
literature also offers a viewpoint on the question of cumulation of proceedings. To 
obtain an optimal enforcement of insider trading law, it recommends to favor 
cooperation and non-cumulation of prosecutions, instead of enabling the possibility of 
having two cumulative, parallel and independent prosecutions. Cooperation at an 
early stage allows the choice of a relevant competent authority who will prosecute the 
case from the beginning. Finally, from an economic point of view, Member States 
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868 For the countries providing for maximum sanctions. 
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should preferably require a proof of intent to establish guilt of criminal insider trading 
in order to avoid high error costs and secure criminal sanctions.  
 
Secondly, resources and enforcement of insider trading laws also significantly diverge 
in Europe. In the report, the 15 countries for which the data is complete display a total 
of 101 administrative sanctions and a total number of 155 criminal sanctions869. 
Incarceration sanctions occupy a relative importance because they represent 39 
sanctions in total for these Member States. Their terms are relatively short compared 
to the legal provisions limiting the maximum. MS allocate different amounts of staff 
and budget resources to public enforcement of insider trading laws but it was not 
possible to establish a link with the actual enforcement of laws. Finally, legal persons 
are rarely administratively prosecuted nor sanctioned, and even less so criminally 
prosecuted and sanctioned. These observations lead to the conclusion that liability of 
legal persons for insider trading is rarely used in practice.  
 
In the end, there are considerable differences between both the sanctions provided by 
law and sanction decisions amongst the 8 examined Member States. The question 
arises whether that is necessarily a problem. Sanctions differ for many violations 
between Member States because of the different legislative traditions. However, these 
differences do not indicate that the system of enforcement in one Member State is 
necessarily more effective than in another. The sanctions provided for in legislation 
just stipulate the maximum penalties and don’t revealing of what is actually imposed 
by judges. From an economic perspective, this would only be a problem if the 
sanctions provided by the legislation were of such nature that they would make it 
impossible in practice to impose effective sanctions for insider trading. 
7.1.3 Criminalization and harmonization 
According to the European Commission, the divergences of practices amongst the 
Member States justify the need for harmonization of sanctions and enforcement 
powers. On the 20th of October 2011, the Commission issued a proposal for a 
Directive on criminal sanctions, applicable to insider trading and market 
manipulation870, on the basis of the article 83(2) TFEU. Chapter 6 offers a critical 
analysis of this proposal from a perspective of economics of harmonization and of 
fundamental legal principles.  
7.1.3.1 Economics of federalization 
Economics of federalization provide a relevant framework for questioning whether 
harmonization is desirable, depending on the characteristics of a certain domain. The 
assessment is made on the basis of four criteria: inter-jurisdictional externalities, 
jurisdictional competition, transaction costs and benefits of differentiation. 
 
                                                           
869 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
ESMA/2012/270(European Securities and Market Authority, Paris).p.41, 91, 111. Number of monetary 
and non-monetary sanctions imposed on natural and legal persons. 
870 Proposal for Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation 
(COM(2011)654). 
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Transboundary externalities 
 
Internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions 
of regulation and enforcement.871 In order to ensure operational and informational 
efficiency of their market, domestic regulators have to deal with cross-border cases. 
As a direct effect of the globalization, financial and technological innovations, cross-
border activities, cross-asset effects and broader financial and economic policy issues 
are changing.872 However, this does not necessarily imply that Member States should 
be able to externalize harm to other Member States, for example if one Member State 
decided to criminalize insider trading when another would not. 
 
Race-to-the-bottom 
 
The second type of argument related to the former is that there may be a race-to-the-
bottom in the enforcement of insider trading laws. This scenario implies that some 
Member States are not interested in seriously enforcing insider trading law, for 
instance by enforcing it through very weak mechanisms. There is, however, no 
evidence that such a race-for-the-bottom should take place in this geographical zone. 
Indeed, despite the numerous divergences, insider trading is actually criminalized in 
all of the Member States except for Bulgaria. Finally, some, and more particularly 
Roberta Romano, have on the contrary advocated the likelihood of a race-to-the-top 
scenario873. 
 
Transaction costs  
 
Divergences from one country to another regarding sanctions and enforcement of 
insider trading laws may create transaction costs for issuers and financial institutions 
when obtaining information, and when undertaking actions to comply with host 
countries regulation, in addition to complying with home country regulations. The 
                                                           
871 See Choi, S. J., 2001. Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market Globalization, 
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costs associated to the divergence of regimes may reduce the advantages of investing 
internationally and may thereby prevent investors and companies from participating 
in the international securities market. From this point of view, harmonization could be 
beneficial. However, in the particular field of criminal insider trading matters, there is 
so far little empirical evidence supporting that substantial transaction cost savings 
could constitute a strong argument in favor of a harmonization of enforcement 
methods. 
 
Benefits of differentiation 
 
Finally, economic analysis of harmonization and law and economics of federalism 
have often pointed out the substantial benefits of differentiated legal rules. First of all, 
differentiated legal rules allow the satisfaction of heterogeneous preferences. In this 
respect, one advantage of decentralization is to enable Member States to provide for 
rules which best serve the goals preferred by the local population874. As already 
mentioned, this dimension is particularly important in criminal matters. Another 
benefit of differentiated rules is that, through the application of different legal rules, 
substantial learning effects can be obtained.875 A disadvantage of harmonization at 
European level is that these learning effects would disappear.  
7.1.3.2 Qualitative problems of the Directive 
Chapter 6 also questions the consistency of the proposal for a Directive with the 
principles governing the introduction of substantive criminal rules at EU level, 
contained in the Manifesto on European Criminal Policy published in 2009 by the 
European Criminal Policy Initiative: the principle of a legitimate purpose, the ultima 
ratio principle, the principle of guilt, the principle of legality, the principle of 
subsidiarity, and the principle of coherence. 
 
The proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions may be criticized from various 
respects. The most problematic may be the vagueness of certain notions: in some 
cases, the formulation of the standard for insider trading is formulated even more 
broadly than before. As a result, individuals could be exposed to the danger of 
criminal sanctions on the basis of a vague norm. Moreover, the fact that the proposal 
for a Directive was issued at the same time as the proposal for Regulation may also be 
problematic regarding the principle of proportionality and the principle of ultima 
ratio. The principles of subsidiarity and coherence can be raised as general principles. 
The point is not to contest the legitimacy of the EU in criminal matters but to 
enlighten the importance to restrain the content of the Directive to the strict minimum 
in order to facilitate its implementation in a way that respects civil liberties and 
citizen preferences. The Treaty of Lisbon mentions the guarantee of the fundamental 
rights of citizens as a goal. The proposal for a Directive should therefore reflect this 
will and be consistent with such guarantee. 
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Finally, it should be mentioned that Member States are able to oppose the proposal for 
Directive by invoking the emergency clause of article 83(3) TFEU. Indeed, when 
legislating on substantive criminal law or criminal procedure, Member States can 
express their opposition and refer to the European Council876 if they consider that the 
issued directive touches upon fundamental aspects of their national criminal justice 
system, or breaches one of the fundamental principles of criminal law outlined here 
above. 
7.1.4 Symbolic or undesirable legislation? 
The core of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions is that insider dealings 
must be criminalized when committed as an intentional offence. All Member States, 
with the exception of Bulgaria, have criminal sanctions, but with considerable 
differences in the types, forms, and nature of these sanctions.  
It should also be stressed that the current directive will, at least in the first phase, 
imply little change. First, the directive will merely force Member States towards 
criminalization, which, with the exception of Bulgaria, all Member States already 
practice. Regarding the modalities of this criminalization for all other Member States, 
two things may change as far as the sanctions are concerned. First, the Directive 
requires to provide for criminal liability of legal persons (which is not currently the 
case in eight Member States)877. Second, the Directive requires the establishment of 
“intent” to prove guilt of criminal insider trading (which is not the case in 10 Member 
States)878.  
Above all, these changes may be criticized from a qualitative perspective. Indeed, 
these two dispositions may not be consistent with the principles governing the 
introduction of substantive criminal rules at EU level: the ultima ratio principle, the 
principle of guilt, the principle of legality, the principle of subsidiarity, and the 
principle of coherence. 
All the remaining differences will persist, and would in fact only change if the 
European Commission would use its powers, according to article 9, and introduce 
common minimum rules on the types and levels of criminal sanctions.  
7.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Using an economic perspective, this study has asked the question whether there is a 
need for criminalization of insider trading and moreover, whether there is a need to 
impose such a duty at European level. As far as the first question is concerned, it has 
been argued that criminal law has an important role to play but should in all 
circumstances be considered as an ultimum remedium, a remedy of last resort and 
should therefore only be employed when other remedies (private law or 
administrative enforcement) cannot reach the same goal. In other cases, possibilities 
of improving the functioning of private enforcement (e.g. through result-based 
remuneration systems for lawyers, collective enforcement and punitive damages) and 
to looking at possibilities of improving administrative enforcement as well 
                                                           
876 COM(2011) 573 final. 
877 ESMA, 26.04.2012. Report: Actual Use of Sanctioning Powers under MAD, 
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878 Ibid.p.112 “Is proof of intent required in order to have a guilty verdict in a market abuse case? No: 
Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom”. 
223
 219 
(developing economically incapacitating sanctions) should be seriously considered.  
 
Moreover, there are doubts about whether there is a large practical need for imposing 
criminal sanctions at this stage at EU level. At least, the economics of harmonization 
does not provide a strong support in that direction. Furthermore, to reply to the 
Commission’s main argument (‘the sanctions currently in place to fight market abuse 
offences are lacking impact and are insufficiently dissuasive which results in 
ineffective enforcement of the Directive’879), even when criminal enforcement may 
have a role to play in insider trading cases (more particularly where private 
enforcement and administrative law may fail), it is yet unclear whether there actually 
is today a serious enforcement problem in the laws of Member States. All Member 
States except Bulgaria have criminal law to back-up insider trading legislation and 
actually enforce it. Hence, the added value of European legislation in this respect is 
limited. Moreover, the mere imposition of criminal sanctions at EU level and the 
requirement to provide for criminal liability of legal persons and to establish  “intent” 
to prove guilt of criminal insider trading, cannot guarantee to solve the problems 
faced when effectively enforcing insider trading law. Moreover, the Commission 
refers to a current ‘ineffective enforcement’ of insider trading law, but there is not 
much empirical proof provided to back up this observation. If the Commission refers 
to the fact that there are very few trialed cases, then merely forcing criminalization at 
EU level will not solve such a problem. 
 
Moreover, the specific provisions proposed at EU level may be problematic from a 
qualitative point of view. Indeed, the proposal contains a tendency to criminalize 
vague notions, which is at odds with fundamental principles of criminal law, more 
particularly the lex certa principle derived from the legality principle. From a general 
point of view, the proposal may be criticized from the ultima ratio principle, the 
principle of guilt, the principle of subsidiarity, and the principle of coherence 
perspective. 
 
This study therefore holds that, even though there is a specific role to play for 
criminal law in enforcing insider trading law (more particularly utlimum remedium), 
there is currently little evidence that the enforcement of insider trading laws at 
Member State level would be ineffective, nor can it be expected that the mere 
introduction of criminal sanctions at EU level would remedy any current enforcement 
problems. 
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As already mentioned, one of the limitations of this research concerns the availability 
of the data. Constructing a data set comparable across nations was not easy because 
data was difficult to obtain and not always available for every country. Firstly, the 
resource-based measures of public enforcement, including the “Staff per million 
population” and the “Budget per billion US$ of GDP” was only available for the year 
2005 because no more recent databases were available. Secondly, all the data about 
the substantial and the procedural aspects were collected in 2010, and the enforcement 
data concern years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Changes have occurred since then, regarding 
the law, the competent authorities, etc. In the framework of this study, the intention of 
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the index was to provide an overall image of the practices and the context that 
motivated the European Commission to reform the Market Abuse Regulation and to 
issue two proposals in October 2011. Therefore, it was sufficient to have an idea of 
the practices that were taking place during this period in order to relevantly assess the 
proposal for a Directive on criminal sanction in Chapter 6. More problematically, the 
data relative to the enforcement of administrative and criminal sanctions for the 
period 2008, 2009 and 2010 (mainly taken from the ESMA report) entails a 
weakness: regarding criminal enforcement of laws, it provides data for only 17 
countries. Three of the eight countries I chose to study more in detail (BE, ES, IT) are 
amongst the 12 countries for which the ESMA’s report does not provide data. It 
would be valuable to complete the data for these 12 countries. 
Moreover, following this analysis, one major conclusion is that criminal law has to be 
considered as ultimum remedium, not only given its high social costs, but also the 
high thresholds for applying it and the highly negative social consequences for the 
people involved. In that respect, research concerning alternatives to prison should be 
developed, starting with the possibilities of improving the functioning of private 
enforcement (e.g. through result-based remuneration systems for lawyers, collective 
enforcement and punitive damages) and of administrative enforcement (developing 
economically incapacitating sanctions).  
 
Furthermore, I believe the topic of the criminal liability of a legal person deserves to 
be researched.  
Finally, the proposal for a Directive is now passed on to the European Parliament and 
to the Council for negotiation and adoption. Once adopted, Member States will have 
two years to transpose the Directive into national law. Even if insider trading is 
already criminally sanctioned in all the Member States (except for Bulgaria), the 
consequences of this Directive should be taken seriously. In the future, The 
Commission, the ESMA or the CJEU may draw clear lines. Indeed, the proposal for 
Regulation mentions that the ESMA shall submit draft implementing technical 
standards in financial services for matters covered by the Regulation880; the guidance 
of the Regulation may assist the interpretation of the terms of the Directive881. 
Moreover, the proposal for a Directive includes an article requiring the Commission 
to report to the European Parliament and Council within four years of the Directive’s 
entry into force882 on the application of this Directive. It is foreseen that the 
Commission will assess the need to review the Directive, particularly with regards to 
the appropriateness of introducing common minimum rules on types and levels of 
criminal sanctions. If appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by legislative 
proposals883. If this happens, it should be necessary to refine the literature 
recommendations. Law and economics could contribute to this assessment.  
In this respect, a natural experiment would be particularly adapted. For example, 
relations between means and outcomes could be tested by comparing their evolution 
before and after the introduction of new regulatory practices. The means could 
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correspond to various practices (measures, sanctions,…) and the outcome could be the 
bid-ask spread for example. This could be the object of a future work. 
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SUMMARY 
The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to 
counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex 
operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading 
regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation 
battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities 
markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market 
stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged 
traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. In order to ensure operational and 
informational efficiency of their market, domestic regulators have to deal with cross 
border cases. This means that they must be capable of assessing the nature of 
activities within markets and legal regimes that differ from their own environments. 
Regulators have to ensure they have sufficient capacity and a relevant structure to 
adapt their measures to a dynamic environment.  
 
Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study 
follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be 
enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is 
necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be 
introduced at EU level. 
 
This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the 
legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that 
effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the 
economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal 
enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding 
to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. 
This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical 
analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse.  
 
Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the 
challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the 
laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics 
recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.  
 
Firstly, this study holds that criminal law play a specific role and should in all 
circumstances be considered as a remedy of last resort and should therefore only be 
employed when other remedies (private law or administrative enforcement) cannot 
reach the same goal. In that respect the study stresses the possibility of using 
administrative fines for cases where the harm and the gain are not too high and the 
probability of detection not too reduced. Moreover, economic incapacitating 
administrative sanctions (such as the revocation of a licence or a prohibition to 
exercise a particular profession) should be developed. 
 
Secondly, even though there is a specific and last resort role to play for criminal law 
in enforcing insider trading, there is also a doubt whether at this stage there is a large 
practical need of imposing criminal sanctions at the EU level from an economics of 
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federalization point of view. There is currently little evidence that the enforcement of 
insider trading laws at Member State level would be ineffective, nor can it be 
expected that the mere introduction of criminal sanctions via the EU level would 
remedy those enforcement problems. In that respect, the study suggests that the 
Commission should better focus first on possibilities to improve the functioning of 
administrative or private enforcement. Finally, the study stresses that the specific 
provisions proposed at EU level may be problematic from a qualitative point of view. 
Indeed, the proposal contains a tendency to criminalize vague notions, which is at 
odds with fundamental principles of criminal law, more particularly the lex certa 
principle derived from the legality principle.  
 
All in all the analysis contained in this study encourages the construction of a legally 
and economically consistent and responsive apparatus of public enforcement of 
insider trading laws.  
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Samenvatting  
  
  
De  recente  financiële  crisis  heeft  een  groeiende  vraag  naar  financiële  regelgeving  in  
beweging   gezet   om   tegenwicht   te   bieden   aan   de   mogelijke   negatieve   economische  
effecten  van   de   steeds   complexere   processen   en   instrumenten  die  momenteel   op   de  
financiële  markten  beschikbaar  zijn.  Als  gevolg  hiervan  is  regelgeving  ter  bestrijding  
van   handel   met   voorkennis,   als   deel   van   de   relatief   recente,   maar   buitengewoon  
actieve   strijd   van   de   regelgever   zowel   binnen   Europa   als   ook  wereldwijd   tot   stand  
gekomen.  Eisen   voor  meer   transparantie   en   een   rechtvaardige   effectenmarkt   nemen  
toe,   variërend   van   zorgen   over   bescherming   van   beleggers   tot   stabiliteit   van   de  
wereldmarkt.   De   globalisering   van   de   wereldeffectenmarkt   heeft   de   geldende  
opvattingen   over   regelgeving   en   publieke   handhaving   ter   discussie   gesteld.   Om   de  
operationele   en   informatieve   productiviteit   van   hun  market   zeker   te   stellen,  moeten  
binnenlandse  regelgevers  het  hoofd  bieden  aan  grensoverschrijdende  problemen.  Dit  
betekent  dat  ze  in  staat  moeten  zijn  om  de  aard  van  activiteiten  binnen  geografische  
en   tijdelijke   markten   die   verschillen   met   hun   eigen   omgeving   in   te   schatten.  
Regelgevers   moeten   zorgen   dat   ze   voldoende   capaciteit   hebben   en   een   relevante  
structuur  bieden  om  hun  maatregelen  aan  een  dynamische  omgeving  aan  te  passen.  
  
Aangezien  handel  met  voorkennis  overal  in  Europa  is  verboden,  volgt  dit  onderzoek  
een   rechtseconomische   benadering   om   na   te   gaan   hoe   dit   verbod   gehandhaafd   zou  
moeten   worden.   Meer   specifiek,   allereerst   wordt   onderzocht   of   de   toepassing   van  
strafrecht   onder   alle   omstandigheden   noodzakelijk   is   om   het   verbod   op   handel  met  
voorkennis   te  handhaven;;   ten  tweede,  of  dit  op  Europees  niveau  geïntroduceerd  zou  
moeten  worden.  
  
Dit  onderzoek   toont  de   rechtseconomische   theoretische   logica  aan  die   ten  grondslag  
ligt   aan   juridische   instrumenten   voor   sancties   en   handhaving   van   het   verbod   op  
handel   met   voorkennis   door   optimale   vormen,   wijze   en   types   van   sancties   te  
determineren,   die   effectieve   preventie   van   handel   met   voorkennis   zouden   moeten  
bewerkstelligen.  
  
Het   onderzoek   tracht   verder   de   economische   rationaliteit   aan   te   tonen   die   de  
mogelijke  behoefte  aan  harmonisering  van  strafrechtelijke  handhaving  van  het  verbod  
op  handel  met  voorkennis  binnen  Europa  beweegt,  door  een  vergelijkende  analyse  uit  
te  voeren  van  de  huidige  wetgeving  van  acht  lidstaten.  Dit  proefschrift  bespreekt  ook  
het  meest  recente  initiatief  van  de  Europese  Unie  door  een  kritische  analyse  van  het  
voorstel  van  een  Richtlijn  voor  strafrechtelijke  sancties  voor  marktmisbruik.  
  
Gebaseerd   op   de   conclusies   van   deze   diepgaande   analyse,   gaat   dit   onderzoek   de  
uitdaging   aan   om   te   bezien   of   de   huidige   Europese   publieke   handhaving   van   de  
wetgeving   die   handel   met   voorkennis   verbiedt   al   dan   niet   coherent   is   met   de  
theoretische  rechtseconomische  aanbevelingen  en  hoe  de  handhavingspraktijk  zouden  
kunnen  worden  verbeterd.  
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Ten   eerste   claimt   dit   onderzoek   dat   strafrecht   in   alle   omstandigheden   als   laatste  
redmiddel   moet   worden   gezien   en   derhalve   alleen   moet   worden   toegepast   als   met  
andere   maatregelen   (privaatrechtelijke   of   bestuursrechtelijke   handhaving)   niet  
hetzelfde   doel   kan   worden   bereikt.   In   dat   opzicht   benadrukt   dit   onderzoek   de  
mogelijkheid  om  administratieve  boetes  op   te   leggen  voor  zaken  waar  de  schade  en  
het   voordeel   niet   te   hoog   zijn   en   de   pakkans   redelijk   hoog.   Daarbij   zouden  
economische  beperkende  bestuursrechtelijke  maatregelen  (zoals  het  intrekken  van  een  
vergunning  om  een  bepaald  beroep  uit  te  oefenen)  moeten  worden  ontwikkeld.  
  
Ten  tweede,  zelfs  al   is  er  voor  strafrecht   in  enige  vorm  een  rol  als   laatste  redmiddel  
weggelegd  als  middel  om  het  verbod  op  handel  in  voorkennis  te  handhaven,  dan  is  er  
ook   twijfel   of   er   in   dit   stadium   een   grote   behoefte   bestaat   aan   het   opleggen   van  
strafrechtelijke   sancties   op   Europees   niveau   vanuit   het   oogpunt   van   de   optimale  
werkverdeling  tussen  Europa  en  de  lidstaten.  Op  dit  moment  is  er  weinig  bewijs  dat  
de   handhaving   van   het   verbod   op   handel   met   voorkennis   op   het   niveau   van   de  
lidstaten   niet   effectief   zou   zijn,   noch   kan   worden   verwacht   dat   de   introductie   van  
strafrechtelijke  sancties  via  het  Europese  niveau  op  zich  deze  handhavingsproblemen  
zou   oplossen.   In   dat   opzicht   stelt   dit   proefschrift   voor   dat   de   Europese  Commissie  
beter   eerst   zou   kunnen   focussen   op   mogelijkheden   om   het   functioneren   van   de  
privaatrechtelijke   of   bestuursrechtelijke   handhaving   te   verbeteren.   Tenslotte  
benadrukt   dit   onderzoek   dat   de   specifieke   bepalingen   voorgesteld   op   EU   niveau  
wellicht   een   probleem   zouden   kunnen   zijn   vanuit   een   kwalitatieve   invalshoek.  
Inderdaad   heeft   het   voorstel   de   neiging   om   vage   begrippen   te   criminaliseren,   wat  
haaks  staat  op  de  basisprincipes  van  het  strafrecht,  meer  in  het  bijzonder  het  lex  certa  
beginsel  dat  van  het  legaliteitsbeginsel  is  afgeleid.  
    
Alles  bij  elkaar  genomen  bevordert  de  analyse  zoals  uitgevoerd  in  dit  proefschrift  de  
ontwikkeling  van  een  juridisch  en  economisch  consistent  en  responsief  hulpmiddel  in  
de  publieke  handhaving  van  wetgeving  ter  bestrijding  van  de  handel  met  voorkennis.  
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Summary  
  
  
The  recent  financial  crisis  triggered  an  increasing  demand  for  financial  regulation  to  
counteract   the   potential   negative   economic   effects   of   the   evermore   complex  
operations  and  instruments  available  on  financial  markets.  As  a  result,  insider  trading  
regulation   counts   amongst   the   relatively   recent   but   particularly   active   regulation  
battles  in  Europe  and  overseas.  Claims  for  more  transparency  and  equitable  securities  
markets  proliferate,  ranging  from  concerns  about  investor  protection  to  global  market  
??????????? ???? ????????????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ???????????
traditional  notions  of  regulation  and  enforcement.  In  order  to  ensure  operational  and  
informational  efficiency  of  their  market,  domestic  regulators  have  to  deal  with  cross  
border   cases.   This   means   that   they   must   be   capable   of   assessing   the   nature   of  
activities   within   geographic   and   temporal   markets   that   differ   from   their   own  
environments.  Regulators  have  to  ensure  they  have  sufficient  capacity  and  a  relevant  
structure  to  adapt  their  measures  to  a  dynamic  environment.    
  
Considering   that   insider   trading   is   currently   forbidden   all   over   Europe,   this   study  
follows  a  law  and  economics  approach  in  identifying  how  this  prohibition  should  be  
enforced.   More   precisely,   the   study   investigates   first   whether   criminal   law   is  
necessary  under  all   circumstances   to  enforce   insider   trading;;   second,   if   it   should  be  
introduced  at  EU  level.  
  
This  study  provides  evidence  of   law  and  economics   theoretical   logic  underlying   the  
legal  mechanisms  that  guide  sanctioning  and  public  enforcement  of  the  insider  trading  
prohibition   by   identifying   optimal   forms,   natures   and   types   of   sanctions   that  
effectively   induce   insider   trading  deterrence.  The  analysis   further   aims   to   reveal   the  
economic   rationality   that   drives   the   potential   need   for   harmonization   of   criminal  
enforcement  of  insider  trading  laws  within  the  European  environment  by  proceeding  
to  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  current  legislations  of  eight  selected  Member  States.  
This  work  also  assesses  the  Eur??????????????most  recent  initiative  through  a  critical  
analysis  of  the  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  criminal  sanctions  for  Market  Abuse.    
  
Based   on   the   conclusions   drawn   from   its   close   analysis,   the   study   takes   on   the  
challenge  of  analyzing  whether  or  not  the  actual  European  public  enforcement  of  the  
laws   prohibiting   insider   trading   is   coherent  with   the   theoretical   law   and   economics  
recommendations,  and  how  these  enforcement  practices  could  be  improved.    
  
Firstly,  this  study  holds  that  criminal  law  should  in  all  circumstances  be  considered  as  
a  remedy  of  last  resort  and  should  therefore  only  be  employed  when  other  remedies  
(private   law   or   administrative   enforcement)   cannot   reach   the   same   goal.   In   that  
respect  the  study  stresses  the  possibility  of  using  administrative  fines  for  cases  where  
the   harm   and   the   gain   are   not   too   high   and   the   probability   of   detection   not   too  
reduced.   Moreover,   economic   incapacitating   administrative   sanctions   (such   as   the  
revocation  of  a  licence  or  a  prohibition  to  exercise  a  particular  profession)  should  be  
developed.  
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Secondly,   even   though   there   is   some   last   resort   role   to   play   for   criminal   law   in  
enforcing   insider   trading,   there   is   also   a  doubt  whether  at   this   stage   there   is   a   large  
practical  need  of  imposing  criminal  sanctions  at   the  EU  level  from  an  economics  of  
federalization  point  of  view.  There  is  currently  little  evidence  that  the  enforcement  of  
insider   trading   laws   at   Member   State   level   would   be   ineffective,   nor   can   it   be  
expected   that   the   mere   introduction   of   criminal   sanctions   via   the   EU   level   would  
remedy   those   enforcement   problems.   In   that   respect,   the   study   suggests   that   the  
Commission   should   better   focus   first   on   possibilities   to   improve   the   functioning   of  
administrative   or   private   enforcement.   Finally,   the   study   stresses   that   the   specific  
provisions  proposed  at  EU  level  may  be  problematic  from  a  qualitative  point  of  view.  
Indeed,   the   proposal   contains   a   tendency   to   criminalize   vague   notions,   which   is   at  
odds   with   fundamental   principles   of   criminal   law,   more   particularly   the   lex   certa  
principle  derived  from  the  legality  principle.    
  
All  in  all  the  analysis  contained  in  this  study  encourages  the  construction  of  a  legally  
and   economically   consistent   and   responsive   apparatus   of   public   enforcement   of  
insider  trading  laws.    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
